EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Investigation of Intelligence Activities

At

Abu Ghraib

Background

This investigation was ordered initially by LTG Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7). LTG Sanchez appointed MG George R. Fay as investigating officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 381-10, Procedure 15. MG Fay was appointed to investigate allegations that members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (205 MI BDE) were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility. Specifically, MG Fay was to determine whether 205 MI BDE personnel requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited Military Police (MP) personnel to abuse detainees and whether MI personnel comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations.


Without reinvestigating areas reviewed by MG Fay, LTG Jones was specifically directed to focus on whether organizations or personnel higher than the 205th MI BDE chain of command, or events and circumstances outside of the 205th MI Brigade, were involved, directly or indirectly, in the questionable activities regarding alleged detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison.

The investigative teams conducted a comprehensive review of all available background documents and statements pertaining to Abu Ghraib from a wide variety of sources. These sources included the reports written by MG Geoffrey Miller, MG Donald Ryder, MG Antonio Taguba and the Department of Army Inspector General. LTG Jones interviewed LTG Sanchez and MG Barbara Fast, the CJTF-7 Senior Intelligence Staff Officer. MG Fay's team conducted over 170 interviews concerning the interviewees' knowledge of interrogation and detention operations at Abu Ghraib and/or their knowledge of and involvement in detainee abuse. MG Fay's interviews included interviews with MG Fast, MG Walter Wojdakowski, MG Geoffrey Miller, MG Thomas Miller, and BG Janis Karpinski.
Abuse

Clearly abuses occurred at the prison at Abu Ghraib. There is no single, simple explanation for why this abuse at Abu Ghraib happened. The primary causes are misconduct (ranging from inhumane to sadistic) by a small group of morally corrupt soldiers and civilians, a lack of discipline on the part of the leaders and Soldiers of the 205th MI BDE and a failure or lack of leadership by multiple echelons within CJTF-7. Contributing factors can be traced to issues affecting Command and Control, Doctrine, Training, and the experience of the Soldiers we asked to perform this vital mission.
For purposes of this report, abuse is defined as treatment of detainees that violated U.S. criminal law or international law or treatment that was inhumane or coercive without lawful justification. Whether the Soldier or contractor knew, at the time of the acts, that the conduct violated any law or standard, is not an element of the definition.

The abuses at Abu Ghraib primarily fall into two categories: a) intentional violent or sexual abuse and, b) abusive actions taken based on misinterpretations or confusion regarding law or policy.

LTG Jones found that while senior level officers did not commit the abuse at Abu Ghraib they did bear responsibility for lack of oversight of the facility, failing to respond in a timely manner to the reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross and for issuing policy memos that failed to provide clear, consistent guidance for execution at the tactical level.

MG Fay has found that from 25 July 2003 to 6 February 2004, twenty-seven 205 MI BDE Personnel allegedly requested, encouraged, condoned or solicited Military Police (MP) personnel to abuse detainees and/or participated in detainee abuse and/or violated established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations during interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib.

Most, though not all, of the violent or sexual abuses occurred separately from scheduled interrogations and did not focus on persons held for intelligence purposes. No policy, directive or doctrine directly or indirectly caused violent or sexual abuse. In these cases, Soldiers knew they were violating the approved techniques and procedures.
Discipline and Leadership

Military Intelligence and Military Police units had missions throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO), however, 205th MI Brigade and 800th Military Police Brigade leaders at Abu Ghraib failed to execute their assigned responsibilities. The leaders from units located at Abu Ghraib or with supervision over Soldiers and units at Abu Ghraib, failed to supervise subordinates or provide direct oversight of this important mission. These leaders failed to properly discipline their Soldiers. These leaders failed to learn from prior mistakes and failed to provide continued mission-specific training. The 205th MI Brigade Commander did not assign a specific subordinate unit to be responsible for interrogations at Abu Ghraib and did not ensure that a Military Intelligence chain of command at Abu Ghraib was established. The absence of effective leadership was a factor in not sooner discovering and taking actions to prevent both the violent/sexual abuse incidents and the misinterpretation/confusion incidents.

Neither Department of Defense nor Army doctrine caused any abuses. Abuses would not have occurred had doctrine been followed and mission training conducted.
AR 15-6 Investigation of the
Abu Ghraib Detention Facility
and 205th MI Brigade

LTG Anthony R. Jones
1. (U) Executive Summary

a. (U) Appointment, Charter and Investigative Activity

(1) (U) On 24 June 2004, Acting Secretary of the Army R. L. Brownlee notified me that I was selected to serve as the Senior Investigating Officer in the investigation of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. GEN Paul Kern was the appointing authority and in a memorandum, dated 25 June 2004, formally designated me Senior Investigating Officer. MG George Fay, who had been investigating the 205th MI BDE since his appointment by LTG Ricardo Sanchez on 31 March 2004, would continue as an investigating officer. Without reinvestigating areas reviewed by MG Fay, I was specifically directed to focus on whether organizations or personnel higher than the 205th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade chain of command, or events and circumstances outside of the 205th MI Brigade, were involved, directly or indirectly, in the questionable activities regarding alleged detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison.

(2) (U) During the course of my investigation, I interviewed LTG Ricardo Sanchez, the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) during the period under investigation, and the senior intelligence officer on his staff, MG Barbara Fast (the “C2”). In addition, I reviewed witness statements that MG Fay’s investigation team had collected; assessment and investigation reports written by MG Geoffrey Miller, MG Donald Ryder, MG Antonio Taguba and the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG); and other written materials including relevant law, doctrine, organizational documents, policy, directives, and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and CJTF-7 operational orders (OPORDS) and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).
(6) (U) No single or simple theory can explain why some of the abuses at Abu Ghraib occurred. In addition to individual criminal propensities, leadership failures and, multiple policies, many other factors contributed to the abuses occurring at Abu Ghraib, including:

- Safety and security conditions at Abu Ghraib;

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• Multiple agencies/organizations involvement in interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib;

• Failure to effectively screen, certify, and then integrate contractor interrogators/analysts/linguists;

• Lack of a clear understanding of MP and MI roles and responsibilities in interrogation operations.

• Dysfunctional command relationships at brigade and higher echelons, including the tactical control (TACON) relationship between the 800th MP Brigade and CJTF-7.
g. (U) Prior to the beginning of hostilities, planners estimated 30-100 thousand enemy prisoners of war would need to be secured, segregated, detained, and interrogated. The 800th MP Brigade was given the mission to establish as many as twelve detention centers, to be run by subordinate battalion units. As of May 2003, BG Hill reported that only an estimated 600 detainees were being held – a combination of enemy prisoners and criminals. As a result, additional military police units previously identified for deployment were demobilized in CONUS. The original plan also envisioned that only the prisoners remaining from the initial major combat operations would require detention facilities, and they would eventually be released or turned over to the Iraqi authorities once justice departments and criminal detention facilities were re-established.

h. (U) As major counter-insurgency operations began in the July 2003 timeframe, the demands on the CJTF-7 commander and staff, the CPA, the subordinate units, the Iraqi interim
government, and Soldiers at all levels increased dramatically. Decisions were made to keep some units in-country to fight the insurgency. Pressure increased to obtain operational intelligence on the enemy’s identity, support systems, locations, leadership, intelligence sources, weapons and ammunition caches, and centers of gravity. In addition, the location of Saddam Hussein and information on WMD remained intelligence priorities. The complexity of missions being conducted by CJTF-7 and subordinate units increased and placed a high demand on leadership at all levels. Leaders had to adapt to the new environment and prosecute hostilities, while at the same time exercising appropriate compassion for non-combatants and protecting the people who were trying to do what was right for their country. Operations were planned to pursue the various factions of the counter-insurgency based on intelligence developed with the Iraqi people and Coalition Forces. A rapid increase in the number of detainees (due to the apprehension of counter-insurgents who posed a security risk to our Soldiers and to the Iraqi people, members of criminal factions, and personnel of intelligence value) demanded a decision on a detention facility and a need to rapidly expand interrogation operations.

j. (U) Interrogating detainees was a massive undertaking. In accordance with doctrine, unit level personnel would gather initial battlefield intelligence at the point of apprehension. Tactical interrogations would continue at designated collection points (CP) at Brigade and Division levels. Then a more detailed interrogation to get operational and strategic intelligence was to be conducted at a designated central detention facility. The location and facility for this detention and interrogation was Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib was selected by Ambassador Bremer after consultation with his staff and LTG Sanchez. Abu Ghraib was envisioned as a temporary facility to be used for criminal detainees until the new Iraqi government could be established and an Iraqi prison established at another site. Following operations during the summer of 2003, Abu Ghraib also was designated by CJTF-7 as the detention center for security detainees. The population of criminals, security detainees, and detainees with potential intelligence value grew to an estimated 4000-5000 personnel in the fall of 2003.

k. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was designated the responsible unit for the Abu Ghraib detention facility and for securing and safeguarding the detainees. The 205th MI Brigade was given responsibility for screening and interrogating detainees at Abu Ghraib. The 320th MP battalion was the unit specifically charged with operating the Abu Ghraib detainee facility by the 800th MP Brigade. Initially, the 205th MI Brigade commander did not specify an MI unit or organization for interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. Interrogators, analysts, and linguists arrived at Abu Ghraib from multiple units and locations within the 205th MI Brigade.
Contractor personnel were also later used to augment interrogation, analyst, and linguist personnel at Abu Ghraib.
(3) (U) MI & MP Responsibilities at Abu Ghraib

The delineation of responsibilities for interrogations between the military intelligence and military police may not have been understood by some Soldiers and some leaders. The doctrinal implications of this issue are discussed later in this report. At Abu Ghraib, the lack of an MI commander and chain of command precluded the coordination needed for effective operations. At the same time, LTC Jordan failed to execute his responsibilities as Chief, JIDC. Tactical doctrine states that interrogators should specify to the guards what types of behavior on their part will facilitate screening of detainees. Normally, interrogation facilities are collocated with detention facilities, requiring close coordination between the MPs who are responsible for detention operations, and the MI personnel who are responsible for screening and interrogations. Both doctrinal manuals, for military police and military intelligence operations, clearly provide that Soldiers and units must obey rules of land warfare and, specifically, the Geneva Conventions when handling detainees. At Abu Ghraib, the delineation of responsibilities seems to have been blurred when military police Soldiers, untrained in interrogation operations, were used to enable interrogations. Problems arose in the following areas: use of dogs in interrogations, sleep deprivation as an interrogation technique and use of isolation as an interrogation technique.
f. (U) Assessing the materials from MG Fay and from MG Taguba, I agree that leadership failure, at the brigade level and below, clearly was a factor in not sooner discovering and taking actions to prevent both the violent/sexual abuse incidents and the misinterpretation/confusion incidents. At Abu Ghraib, interrogation operations were also plagued by a lack of an organizational chain of command presence and by a lack of proper actions to establish standards and training by the senior leaders present.

(1) (U) The leaders from 205th MI and 800th MP Brigades located at Abu Ghraib or with supervision over Abu Ghraib, failed to supervise subordinates or provide direct oversight of this important mission. The lack of command presence, particularly at night, was clear.

(2) (U) The 205th Brigade Commander did not specifically assign responsibility for interrogation operations to a specific subordinate MI unit at Abu Ghraib and did not ensure that a chain of command for the interrogation operations mission was established at Abu Ghraib. The presence of a clear chain of Military Intelligence command and associated responsibilities would have enhanced effective operations.

(3) (U) The leaders from 205th MI and 800th MP Brigades located at Abu Ghraib or with supervision over Soldiers and units at Abu Ghraib, failed to properly discipline their Soldiers and failed to develop and learn from AARs and lessons learned.

(4) (U) These leaders failed to provide adequate mission-specific training to execute a mission of this magnitude and complexity.

(5) (U) A dysfunctional command relationship existed between the MI Brigade and the MP Brigade, including:

(a) Failure to coordinate and document specific roles and responsibilities;
(b) Confusion at the Soldier level concerning the clarity of the MP role in interrogations.

(6) (U) Despite these leadership deficiencies, the primary cause of the most egregious violent and sexual abuses was the individual criminal propensities of the particular perpetrators. These individuals should not avoid personal responsibility, despite the failings of the chain of command.

g. (U) Other Contributing Factors. No single, or simple, cause explains why some of the Abu Ghraib abuses happened. In addition to the leadership failings discussed above, other contributing factors include:

(1) (U) Safety and security conditions at Abu Ghraib. Resources that might otherwise have been put towards detention operations instead had to be dedicated to force protection. In addition, the difficult circumstances for Soldiers, including a poor quality of life and the constant threat of death or serious injury, contributed to Soldiers’ frustrations and increased their levels of stress. Facilities at Abu Ghraib were poor. Working and living conditions created a poor climate to conduct interrogation and detention operations to standard.

(2) (U) The lack of clear and consistent guidance, promulgated at the CJTF level on interrogation procedures coupled with the availability of information on Counter-Resistance Techniques used in other theaters.

(3) (U) Soldier knowledge of interrogation techniques permitted in GTMO and Afghanistan and failure to distinguish between those environments and Iraq.

(4) (U) Interaction with OGA and other agency interrogators who did not follow the same rules as U.S. Forces. There was at least the perception, and perhaps the reality, that non-DOD agencies had different rules regarding interrogation and detention operations. Such a perception encouraged Soldiers to deviate from prescribed techniques.

(5) (U) Integration of some contractors without training, qualifications, and certification created ineffective interrogation teams and the potential for non-compliance with doctrine and applicable laws.

(6) (U) Under-resourcing of personnel in both the 800th MP BDE (including the inability to replace personnel leaving theater) and in the 205th MI Brigade, specifically in the interrogator, analyst, and linguist fields. (Under-resourcing at the CJTF-7 level also contributed and was previously discussed.)

(7) (U) Lack of a clear understanding of MP and MI roles and responsibilities by some Soldiers and leaders.

(8) (U) Lack of clear roles and responsibilities for tactical, as opposed to, strategic interrogation.
AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE
ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND
205th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (U)

MG GEORGE R. FAY
INVESTIGATING OFFICER
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
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SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

1. (U) Appointing Officials' Instructions and Investigative Methodology
   
   a. (U) Appointing Officials' Instruction.

   (1) (U) On 31 March 2004, LTG Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), appointed MG George R. Fay as an Army Regulation (AR) 381-10 Procedure 15 Investigating Officer. LTG Sanchez determined, based upon MG Antonio Taguba's out brief of the results of an Article 15-6 investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility in Iraq, that another investigation was warranted. MG Fay was to investigate allegations that members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility.

   (a) (U) MG Fay was instructed as follows: Pursuant to AR 381-10, Procedure 15, you are hereby appointed as an investigating officer to conduct an investigation in accordance with (IAW) Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 into all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct on the part of personnel assigned and/or attached to the 205th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade, to include civilian interrogators and/or interpreters, from 15 August 2003 to 1 February 2004 at the Abu Ghraib (AG) Detention Facility.

   (b) (U) Specifically, you will investigate the following areas:

       [1] (U) Whether 205th MI Brigade personnel requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited Military Police (MP) personnel to abuse detainees at AG as preparation for interrogation operations.

       [2] (U) Whether 205th MI Brigade personnel comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations when questioning Iraqi security internees at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center.

   (2) (U) The Commander, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) requested a new appointing authority and investigating officer be assigned to the investigation. On 14 June 2004, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld requested the Acting Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) R.L.Brownlee assign an "officer senior to LTG Sanchez" to assume his duties as appointing authority, and a new or additional investigating officer should one be required. SECDEF provided the following additional guidance to the Acting SECARMY:

       (U) The new appointing authority shall refer recommendations concerning issues at the Department of the Army level to the Department of the Army and recommendations concerning issues at the Department of Defense (DoD) level to the Department of Defense for appropriate action. The appointing authority shall refer the completed report to the Commander,
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SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

United States Central Command for further action as appropriate, including forwarding to the ATSD(IO) [Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight] in accordance with DoD Directive 5240.1-R and CJCS-I 5901.01. Matters concerning accountability, if any, should be referred by the appointing authority, without recommendation, to the appropriate level of the chain of command for disposition.

(3) (U) On 16 June 2004, Acting SECARMY Brownlee designated GEN Paul J. Kern, Commander of the US Army Materiel Command, as the new Procedure 15 appointing authority. Acting SECARMY Brownlee’s instructions included the following:

(a) (U) I am designating you as the appointing authority. Major General Fay remains available to perform duties as the investigating officer. If you determine, however, after reviewing the status of the investigation, that a new or additional investigating officer is necessary, please present that request to me.

(b) (U) Upon receipt of the investigation, you will refer all recommendations concerning issues at the Department of the Army level to me and all recommendations concerning issues at the Department of Defense level to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action. You will refer the completed report to the Commander, United States Central Command, for further action as appropriate, including forwarding to ATSD(IO) IAW DoD Directive 5240.1-R and CJCS-I 5901.01. Finally, you should refer matters concerning accountability, if any, without recommendation, to the appropriate level of the chain of command for disposition. If you determine that you need further legal resources to accomplish this mission, you should contact the Judge Advocate General.

(4) (U) On 25 June 2004, GEN Kern appointed LTG Anthony R. Jones, Deputy Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), as an additional Procedure 15 investigating officer. GEN Kern’s instructions to LTG Jones included the following:

(a) (U) Pursuant to AR 381-10, Procedure 15, and AR 15-6, you are hereby appointed as an investigating officer to conduct an investigation of alleged misconduct involving personnel assigned or attached to the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility. Your appointment is as an additional investigating officer. MG Fay and his investigative team are available to assist you.

(b) (U) Specifically, the purpose of the investigation is to determine the facts and to determine whether the questionable activity at Abu Ghraib is legal and is consistent with applicable policy. In LTG Sanchez’s 31 March 2004 appointment letter to MG Fay, which I have adopted, he specified three areas into which the investigation was to look: whether the 205th
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

Military Intelligence Brigade had been involved in Military Police detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib; whether 205th Military Intelligence Brigade personnel complied with established procedures, regulations, and laws when questioning internees at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center; and the facts behind several identified sworn statements. In addition, your investigation should determine whether organizations or personnel higher in the chain of command of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade were involved directly or indirectly in any questionable activities regarding alleged detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib.

b. (U) Investigative Methodology.

(1) (U) The investigative team conducted a comprehensive and exhaustive review of available background documents and statements pertaining to the operations of the 205th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade (205 MI BDE) at Abu Ghraib from a wide variety of sources, to include all previous investigations. Where possible, coordination was established with other ongoing investigations of the same nature.

(2) (U) Over 170 personnel were interviewed (some multiple times) during the course of the investigation (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1). These interviews included personnel assigned or attached to the 205 MI BDE, the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade (800 MP BDE), CJTF-7, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), 28th Combat Support Hospital (CSH), the United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), the United States Navy, Titan Corporation, CACI International, Inc., and three detainees at Abu Ghraib. Written sworn statements were prepared as a result of these interviews. Several personnel invoked their rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th Amendment of the US Constitution. In these cases and in cases where no sworn statements were collected, Memoranda for Record (MFR) were prepared to describe the nature of and information addressed in the interview.

(3) (U) Over 9,000 documents were collected, catalogued and archived into a database. Advanced analytic tools were used to organize, collate, and analyze this data as well as all collected interview data. Other analytical tools were used to prepare graphic representations of the data.

(4) (U) The investigative team consisted of 26 personnel to include investigators, analysts, subject matter experts and legal advisors.
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

(2) (U) This investigation identified forty-four (44) alleged instances or events of detainee abuse committed by MP and MI Soldiers, as well as civilian contractors. On sixteen (16) of these occasions, abuse by the MP Soldiers was, or was alleged to have been, requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited by MI personnel. The abuse, however, was directed on an individual basis and never officially sanctioned or approved. MI solicitation of MP abuse included the use of isolation with sensory deprivation, removal of clothing and humiliation, the use of dogs as an interrogation tool to induce fear, and physical abuse. In eleven (11) instances, MI personnel were found to be directly involved in the abuse. MI personnel were also found not to have fully comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations. Theater Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policies (ICRP) were found to be poorly defined, and changed several times. As a result, interrogation activities sometimes crossed into abusive activity.

(3) (U) This investigation found that certain individuals committed offenses in violation of international and US law to include the Geneva Conventions and the UCMJ and violated Army Values. Leaders in key positions failed properly to supervise the interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib and failed to understand the dynamics created at Abu Ghraib. Leaders also failed to react appropriately to those instances where detainee abuse was reported, either by other service members, contractors, or by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Fifty-four (54) MI, MP, and Medical Soldiers, and civilian contractors were found to have some degree of
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

responsibility or complicity in the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. Twenty-seven (27) were cited in this report for some degree of culpability and seventeen (17) were cited for misunderstanding of policy, regulation or law. Three (3) MI Soldiers, who had previously received punishment under UCMJ, were recommended for additional investigation. Seven (7) MP Soldier identified in the MG Taguba Report and currently under criminal investigation and/or charges are also central figures in this investigation and are included in the above numbers. One (1) person cited in the MG Taguba Report was exonerated.
c. (U) Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib.

(1) (U) Physical and sexual abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib were by far the most serious. The abuses spanned from direct physical assault, such as delivering head blows rendering detainees unconscious, to sexual posing and forced participation in group masturbation. At the extremes were the death of a detainee in OGA custody, an alleged rape committed by a US translator and observed by a female Soldier, and the alleged sexual assault of a female detainee. These abuses are, without question, criminal. They were perpetrated or witnessed by individuals or small groups. Such abuse can not be directly tied to a systemic US approach to torture or approved treatment of detainees. The MPs being prosecuted claim their actions came at the direction of MI. Although self-serving, these claims do have some basis in fact. The environment created at Abu Ghraib contributed to the occurrence of such abuse and the fact that
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

it remained undiscovered by higher authority for a long period of time. What started as nakedness and humiliation, stress and physical training (exercise), carried over into sexual and physical assaults by a small group of morally corrupt and unsupervised Soldiers and civilians.

(2) (U) Abusing detainees with dogs started almost immediately after the dogs arrived at Abu Ghraib on 20 November 2003. By that date, abuses of detainees was already occurring and the addition of dogs was just one more device. Dog Teams were brought to Abu Ghraib as a result of recommendations from MG G. Miller’s assessment team from GTMO. MG G. Miller recommended dogs as beneficial for detainee custody and control issues. Interrogations at Abu Ghraib, however, were influenced by several documents that spoke of exploiting the Arab fear of dogs. The use of dogs in interrogations to “fear up” detainees was utilized without proper authorization.

(3) (U) The use of nudity as an interrogation technique or incentive to maintain the cooperation of detainees was not a technique developed at Abu Ghraib, but rather a technique which was imported and can be traced through Afghanistan and GTMO. As interrogation operations in Iraq began to take form, it was often the same personnel who had operated and deployed in other theaters and in support of GWOT, who were called upon to establish and conduct interrogation operations in Abu Ghraib. The lines of authority and the prior legal opinions blurred. They simply carried forward the use of nudity into the Iraqi theater of operations. The use of clothing as an incentive (nudity) is significant in that it likely contributed to an escalating “de-humanization” of the detainees and set the stage for additional and more severe abuses to occur.

(4) (U) There was significant confusion by both MI and MPs between the definitions of “isolation” and “segregation.” LTG Sanchez approved the extended use of isolation on several occasions, intending for the detainee to be kept apart, without communication with their fellow detainees. His intent appeared to be the segregation of specific detainees. The technique employed in several instances was not, however, segregation but rather isolation - the complete removal from outside contact other than required care and feeding by MP guards and interrogation by MI. Use of isolation rooms in the Abu Ghraib Hard Site was not closely controlled or monitored. Lacking proper training, clear guidance, or experience in this technique, both MP and MI stretched the bounds into further abuse; sensory deprivation and unsafe or unhealthy living conditions. Detainees were sometimes placed in excessively cold or hot cells with limited or poor ventilation and no light.
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
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SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade


[a] (U) The US Army employs contract linguists/translators and contract interrogators in military operations. Some IET is provided to familiarize military interrogators in the conduct of interrogations using translators. No training is conducted at any level (enlisted, NCO, Warrant Officer, or Officer) on the employment of contract interrogators in military operations. The use of contract interrogators and linguists at Abu Ghraib was problematic (See paragraph 4.g.) from a variety of perspectives. JIDC interrogators, analysts, and leaders were unprepared for the arrival of contract interrogators and had no training to fall back on in the management, control, and discipline of these personnel.

[b] (U) No doctrine exists to guide interrogators and their intelligence leaders (NCO, Warrant Officer, and Officer) in the contract management or command and control of contractors in a wartime environment. These interrogators and leaders faced numerous issues involving contract management: roles and responsibilities of JIDC personnel with respect to contractors; roles, relationships, and responsibilities of contract linguists and contract interrogators with military personnel; and the methods of disciplining contractor personnel. All of these need to be addressed in future interrogation and interrogation management training.
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SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

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SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
(2) (U) Civilian CACI contract interrogators began to arrive in late September 2003. There are a number of shortfalls connected to this issue (See paragraph 4.g., below). It was another complicating factor with respect to command and control. CPT Wood relied on the CACI site manager, CIVILIAN-18, to interview contractors as they arrived and to assign them based on his interviews. She knew little of their individual backgrounds or experience and relied on “higher headquarters” to screen them before arrival. Such screening was not occurring.
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SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
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SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET/NOFORN/X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

(14) (U) As pointed out clearly in the MG Taguba report, MP units and individuals at Abu Ghraib lacked sufficient training on operating a detention/interrogation facility. MI units and individuals also lacked sufficient, appropriate, training to cope with the situation encountered at Abu Ghraib (See Paragraph 3.b.(4)). An insurgency is HUMINT intensive. The majority of that HUMINT comes from interrogations and debriefings. Yet at the JIDC, which was set up to be the focal point for interrogation operations, there was only one officer, CPT Wood, with significant interrogation operations experience. There were four MI Warrant Officers but all were used for staff functions rather than directly supervising and observing interrogations. There was a shortage of trained NCOs at the E-7/E-6 level. Each Section Leader had four or five Tiger Teams, too many to closely observe, critique, counsel, consult, and supervise. One Section Leader was an E-5. Several of the interrogators were civilians and about half of those civilians lacked sufficient background and training. Those civilians were allowed to interrogate because there were no more military assets to fill the slots. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, PAPPAS). Such a mixture together with constant demands for reports and documentation overwhelmed the Section Leaders. The analysts assigned to Tiger Teams were not all trained 96Bs, but were a mixture of all available intelligence Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). Many of those assigned as analysts had never been trained nor had they ever served as analysts.
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

(1) (U) Contracting-related issues contributed to the problems at Abu Ghraib prison. Several of the alleged perpetrators of the abuse of detainees were employees of government.
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

contractors. Two contractual arrangements were involved: one with CACI, for interrogators and several other intelligence-related occupational categories; and one with BTG, for linguists. Since 28 November 2001, BTG has been part of Titan Corporation.

SECRET/NOFORN/X1

48
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

[2] (U) These Delivery Orders were awarded under a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) (NBCHA01-0005) with the National Business Center (NBC), a fee for service activity of the Interior Department. The BPA between CACI and NBC set out the ground rules for ordering from the General Services Administration (GSA) pursuant to GSA Schedule Contract GS-35F-5872H, which is for various Information Technology (IT) Professional Services. Approximately eleven Delivery Orders were related to services in Iraq. While CJTF-7 is the requiring and funding activity for the Delivery Orders in question, it is not clear who, if anyone, in Army contracting or legal channels approved the use of the BPA, or why it was used.

[3] (U) There is another problem with the CACI contract. A CACI employee, Thomas Howard, participated with the COR, LTC Brady, in writing the Statement of Work (SOW) prior to the award of the contract (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, BOLTZ). This situation may violate the provisions of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 9.505-2 (b) (1).

[4] (U) On 13 May 2004, the Deputy General Counsel (Acquisition) of the Army issued an opinion that all Delivery Orders for Interrogator Services should be cancelled immediately as they were beyond the scope of the GSA Schedule contract.

(2) (U) Although intelligence activities and related services, which encompass interrogation services, should be performed by military or government civilian personnel wherever feasible, it is recognized that contracts for such services may be required in urgent or emergency situations. The general policy of not contracting for intelligence functions and services was designed in part to avoid many of the problems that eventually developed at Abu Ghraib, i.e., lack of oversight to insure that intelligence operations continued to fall within the law and the authorized chain of command, as well as the government’s ability to oversee contract operations.

(3) (U) Performing the interrogation function in-house with government employees has several tangible benefits for the Army. It enables the Army more readily to manage the function if all personnel are directly and clearly subject to the chain of command, and other administrative and/or criminal sanctions, and it allows the function to be directly accessible by the commander/ supervisor without going through a Contracting Officer Representative (COR). In addition, performing the function in-house enables Army Commanders to maintain a consistent approach to training (See Paragraph 3.b.(3)) and a reliable measure of the qualifications of the people performing the function.
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

(8) (U) If it is necessary to contract for interrogator services, more specific training requirements and personnel standards must be incorporated into the solicitation/contract to ensure that the contractor hires properly trained and qualified personnel.
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraiub Detention Facility and
205th MI Brigade

While there are specific technical requirements in the linguist contract, the technical
requirements for the interrogator contract were not adequate. It appears that the only mention of
qualifications in the contract stated merely that the contractor employee needs to have met the
requirements of one of two MOS, 97E or 351E, or “equivalent”. Any solicitation/contract for
these services needs to list specific training, if possible, not just point to an MOS.

The necessity for some sort of standard training and/or experience is made evident by the statements of both contractor employees and military personnel. CIVILIAN-21 (CACI) seemingly had little or no interrogator experience prior to coming to Abu Ghraiub (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, CIVILIAN-21, ADAMS), even though he was a Navy Reserve Intelligence Specialist. Likewise, numerous statements indicated that little, if any, training on Geneva Conventions was presented to contractor employees (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-25, CIVILIAN-10, CIVILIAN-21 and CIVILIAN-11). Prior to deployment, all contractor linguists or interrogators should receive training in the Geneva Conventions standards for the treatment of detainees/prisoners. If the solicitation/contract allows “equivalent” training and experience, the Contracting Officer, with the assistance of technical personnel, must evaluate and assess the offerors’/contractor’s proposal/written rationale as to why it believes that the employee has “equivalent” training. It appears that under the CACI contract, no one was monitoring the contractor’s decisions as to what was considered “equivalent.”

(10) (U) In addition, if functions such as these are being contracted, MI personnel need to have at least a basic level of contract training so they can protect the Army’s interests. Another indication of the apparent inadequacy of on-site contract management and lack of contract training is the apparent lack of understanding of the appropriate relationship between contractor personnel, government civilian employees, and military personnel.
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

(13) (U) Proper oversight did not occur at Abu Ghraib due to a lack of training and inadequate contract management and monitoring. Failure to assign an adequate number of CORs to the area of contract performance puts the Army at risk of being unable to control poor performance or become aware of possible misconduct by contractor personnel. This lack of monitoring was a contributing factor to the problems that were experienced with the performance of the contractors at Abu Ghraib.
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

k. (U) International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

(1) (U) The ICRC visits to Abu Ghraib have been the source of great concern since the abuses at Abu Ghraib became public knowledge. The ICRC are independent observers who identified abuses to the leadership of Abu Ghraib as well as to CJTF-7. Their allegations were not believed, nor were they adequately investigated.

(3) (U) The ICRC found a high level of depression, feelings of helplessness, stress, and frustration, especially by those detainees in isolation. Detainees made the following allegations during interviews with the ICRC: threats during interrogation; insults and verbal insults during transfer in Tier 1A; sleep deprivation; walking in the corridors handcuffed and naked, except for female underwear over the head; handcuffing either to the upper bed bars or doors of the cell for
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and
205th MI Brigade

3-4 hours. Some detainees presented physical marks and psychological symptoms which were
compatible with these allegations. Also noted were brutality upon capture, physical or
psychological coercion during interrogation, prolonged isolation, and excessive and
disproportionate use of force. (Reference Annex G, Appendix 1, TAB B)
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

5. Summary of Abuses at Abu Ghraib

   a. (U) Several types of detainee abuse were identified in this investigation: physical and sexual abuse; improper use of military working dogs; humiliating and degrading treatments; and improper use of isolation.

      (1) (U) Physical Abuse. Several Soldiers reported that they witnessed physical abuse of detainees. Some examples include slapping, kicking, twisting the hands of a detainee who was hand-cuffed to cause pain, throwing balls at restrained internees, placing gloved hand over the nose and mouth of an internee to restrict breathing, “poking” at an internee’s injured leg, and forcing an internee to stand while handcuffed in such a way as to dislocate his shoulder. These actions are clearly in violation of applicable laws and regulations.

      (2) (U) Use of Dogs. The use of military working dogs in a confinement facility can be effective and permissible under AR 190-12 as a means of controlling the internee population. When dogs are used to threaten and terrify detainees, there is a clear violation of applicable laws and regulations. One such impermissible practice was an alleged contest between the two Army dog handlers to see who could make the internees urinate or defecate in the presence of the dogs. An incident of clearly abusive use of the dogs occurred when a dog was allowed in the cell of two male juveniles and allowed to go “nuts.” Both juveniles were screaming and crying with the youngest and smallest trying to hide behind the other juvenile. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-17)

      (3) (U) Humiliating and Degrading Treatments. Actions that are intended to degrade or humiliate a detainee are prohibited by GC IV, Army policy and the UCMJ. The following are examples of such behavior that occurred at Abu Ghraib, which violate applicable laws and regulations.

      (4) (U) Nakedness. Numerous statements, as well as the ICRC report, discuss the seemingly common practice of keeping detainees in a state of undress. A number of statements indicate that clothing was taken away as a punishment for either not cooperating with interrogators or with MPs. In addition, male internees were naked in the presence of female Soldiers. Many of the Soldiers who witnessed the nakedness were told that this was an accepted practice. Under the circumstances, however, the nakedness was clearly degrading and humiliating.

      (5) (U) Photographs. A multitude of photographs show detainees in various states of undress, often in degrading positions.
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and
205th MI Brigade

(6) (U) Simulated Sexual Positions. A number of Soldiers describe incidents where
detainees were placed in simulated sexual positions with other internees. Many of these
incidents were also photographed.

(7) (U) Improper Use of Isolation. There are some legitimate purposes for the segregation
(or isolation) of detainees, specifically to prevent them from sharing interrogation tactics with
other detainees or other sensitive information. Article 5 of Geneva Convention IV supports this
position by stating that certain individuals can lose their rights of communication, but only when
absolute military security requires. The use of isolation at Abu Ghraib was often done as
punishment, either for a disciplinary infraction or for failure to cooperate with an interrogation.
These are improper uses of isolation and depending on the circumstances amounted to violation
of applicable laws and regulations. Isolation could properly be a sanction for a disciplinary
infraction if applied through the proper process set out in AR 190-8 and the Geneva
Conventions.

(8) (U) Failure to Safeguard Detainees. The Geneva Conventions and Army Regulations
require that detainees be “protected against all acts of violence and threats thereof and against
insults and public curiosity.” Geneva Convention IV, Article 27 and AR 190-8, paragraph 5-1(a)(2). The duty to protect imposes an obligation on an individual who witnesses an abusive act
to intervene and stop the abuse. Failure to do so may be a violation of applicable laws and
regulations.

(9) (U) Failure to Report Detainee Abuse. The duty to report detainee abuse is closely tied
to the duty to protect. The failure to report an abusive incident could result in additional abuse.
Soldiers who witness these offenses have an obligation to report the violations under the
provision of Article 92, UCMJ. Soldiers who are informed of such abuses also have a duty to
report violations. Depending on their position and their assigned duties, the failure to report
detainee abuse could support a charge of dereliction of duty, a violation of the UCMJ. Civilian
contractors employed as interrogators and translators would also have a duty to report such
offenses as they are also bound by the Geneva Conventions and are charged with protecting the
internees.

(10) (U) Other traditional prison guard issues were far less clear. MPs are responsible for
the clothing of detainees; however, MI interrogators started directing nakedness at Abu Ghraib as
early as 16 September 2003 to humiliate and break down detainees. MPs would also sometimes
discipline detainees by taking away clothing and putting detainees in cells naked. A severe
shortage of clothing during the September, October, November 2003, time frame was frequently
mentioned as the reason why people were naked. Removal of clothing and nakedness were
being used to humiliate detainees at the same time there was a general level of confusion as to
what was allowable in terms of MP disciplinary measures and MI interrogation rules, and what

SECRET//NOFORN//X1

69
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

clothing was available. This contributed to an environment that would appear to condone depravity and degradation rather than the humane treatment of detainees.

b. (U) The original intent by MI leadership (205 MI BDE) was for Tier 1A to be reserved for MI Holds only. In fact, CPT Wood states in an email dated 7 September 2003, during a visit from MG Miller and BG Karpinski, that BG Karpinski confirmed “we (MI) have all the iso (Isolation) cells in the wing we have been working. We only had 10 cells to begin with but that has grown to the entire wing.” LTC Phillabaum also thought that MI had exclusive authority to house MI holds in Tier 1A. The fact is, however, that a number of those cells were often used by the MPs to house disciplinary problems. That fact is supported by the testimony of a large number of people who were there and further supported by the pictures and the detainee records. In fact, 11 of a total of 25 detainees identified by the CID as victims of abuse were not MI holds and were not being interrogated by MI. The MPs put the problem detainees (detainees who required separation from the general population for disciplinary reasons) in Tier 1A because there was no other place available to isolate them. Neither CPT Wood nor MAJ Williams appreciated the mixing because it did not allow for a pure MI environment, but the issue never made its way up to either LTC Phillabaum or to BG Karpinski.
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

e. (U) The physical and sexual abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib are by far the most serious. The abuses spanned from direct physical assault, such as delivering head blows rendering detainees unconscious, to sexual posing and forced participation in group masturbation. At the extremes were the death of a detainee in OGA custody, an alleged rape committed by a US translator and observed by a female Soldier, and the alleged sexual assault of an unknown female. They were perpetrated or witnessed by individuals or small groups. Such abuse can not be directly tied to a systemic US approach to torture or approved treatment of detainees. The MPs being investigated claim their actions came at the direction of MI. Although self-serving, these claims do have some basis in fact. The climate created at Abu Ghraib provided the opportunity for such abuse to occur and to continue undiscovered by higher authority for a long period of time. What started as undressing and humiliation, stress and physical training (PT), carried over into sexual and physical assaults by a small group of morally corrupt and unsupervised Soldiers and civilians. Twenty-four (24) serious incidents of physical and sexual abuse occurred from 20 September through 13 December 2003. The incidents identified in this investigation include some of the same abuses identified in the MG Taguba investigation; however, this investigation adds several previously unreported events. A direct comparison cannot be made of the abuses cited in the MG Taguba report and this one.
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
(5) (U) Incident #5. In October 2003, DETAINEE-07, reported alleged multiple incidents of physical abuse while in Abu Ghraib. DETAINEE-07 was an MI Hold and considered of potentially high value. He was interrogated on 8, 21, and 29 October, 4 and 23 November and 5 December 2003. DETAINEE-07’s claims of physical abuse (hitting) started on his first day of arrival. He was left naked in his cell for extended periods, cuffed in his cell in stressful positions (“High cuffed”), left with a bag over his head for extended periods, and denied bedding or blankets. DETAINEE-07 described being made to “bark like a dog, being forced to crawl on his stomach while MPs spit and urinated on him, and being struck causing unconsciousness.” On another occasion DETAINEE-07 was tied to a window in his cell and forced to wear women’s underwear on his head. On yet another occasion, DETAINEE-07 was forced to lie down while MPs jumped onto his back and legs. He was beaten with a broom and a chemical light was broken and poured over his body. DETAINEE-04 witnessed the abuse with the chem-light. During this abuse a police stick was used to sodomize DETAINEE-07 and two female MPs were hitting him, throwing a ball at his penis, and taking photographs. This investigation surfaced no photographic evidence of the chemical light abuse or sodomy. DETAINEE-07 also alleged that CIVILIAN-17, MP Interpreter, Titan Corp., hit DETAINEE-07 once, cutting his ear to an extent that required stitches. He told SOLDIER-25, analyst, B/321 MI BN, about this hitting incident during an interrogation. SOLDIER-25 asked the MPs what had happened to the detainee’s ear and was told he had fallen in his cell. SOLDIER-25 did not report the detainee’s abuse. SOLDIER-25 claimed the detainee’s allegation was made in the presence of CIVILIAN-21, Analyst/Interrogator, CACI, which CIVILIAN-21 denied hearing this report. Two photos taken at 2200 hours, 1 November 2003 depict a detainee with stitches in his ear; however, we could not confirm the photo was DETAINEE-07. Based on the details provided by the detainee and the
Case 1:08-cv-00827-LMB-JFA   Document 1644-4   Filed 05/16/24   Page 110 of 178 PageID# 45191

SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

close correlation to other known MP abuses, it is highly probable DETAINEE-07’s allegations are true. SOLDIER-25 failed to report the detainee’s allegation of abuse. His statements and available photographs do not point to direct MI involvement. However, MI interest in this detainee, his placement in Tier 1A of the Hard Site, and initiation of the abuse once he arrived there, combine to create a circumstantial connection to MI (knowledge of or implicit tasking of the MPs to “set conditions”) which are difficult to ignore. MI should have been aware of what was being done to this detainee based on the frequency of interrogations and high interest in his intelligence value. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-25, CIVILIAN-21; Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-04, DETAINEE-07; Annex 1, Appendix 1, Photographs M54-55).
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
(9) (U) Incident #9. Three photographs taken on 25 October 2003 depicted PFC England, 372 MP CO, holding a leash which was wrapped around an unidentified detainee’s neck. Present in the photograph is SPC Ambuhl who was standing to the side watching. PFC England claimed in her initial statement to CID that CPL Graner had placed the tie-down strap around the detainee’s neck and then asked her to pose for the photograph. There is no indication of MI involvement or knowledge of this incident (Reference Annex E, CID Report and Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M33-35).

(10) (U) Incident #10. Six Photographs of DETAINEE-15, depict him standing on a box with simulated electrical wires attached to his fingers and a hood over his head. These photographs were taken between 2145 and 2315 on 4 November 2003. DETAINEE-15 described a female making him stand on the box, telling him if he fell off he would be electrocuted, and a “tall black man” as putting the wires on his fingers and penis. From the CID investigation into abuse at Abu Ghraib it was determined SGT J. Davis, SPC Harman, CPL Graner, and SSG Frederick, 372 MP CO, were present during this abuse. DETAINEE-15 was not an MI Hold and it is unlikely MI had knowledge of this abuse (Reference Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-15; Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs C1-2, D19-21, M64).

(11) (U) Incident #11. Twenty-nine photos taken between 2315 and 0024, on 7 and 8 November 2003 depict seven detainees (DETAINEE-17, DETAINEE-16, DETAINEE-24, DETAINEE-23, DETAINEE-26, DETAINEE-01, DETAINEE-18) who were physically abused, placed in a pile and forced to masturbate. Present in some of these photographs are CPL Graner and SPC Harman. The CID investigation into these abuses identified SSG Frederick, CPL Graner, SGT J. Davis, SPC Ambuhl, SPC Harman, SPC Sivits, and PFC England; all MPs, as involved in the abuses which occurred. There is no evidence to support MI personnel involvement in this incident. CID statements from PFC England, SGT J. Davis, SPC Sivits, SPC Wisdom, SPC Harman, DETAINEE-17, DETAINEE-01, and DETAINEE-16 detail that the...
Case 1:08-cv-00827-LMB-JFA   Document 1644-4   Filed 05/16/24   Page 113 of 178 PageID# 45194

SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

detainees were stripped, pushed into a pile, and jumped on by SGT J. Davis, CPL Graner, and SSG Frederick. They were photographed at different times by SPC Harman, SPC Sivits, and SSG Frederick. The detainees were subsequently posed sexually, forced to masturbate, and “ridden like animals.” CPL Graner knocked at least one detainee unconscious and SSG Frederick punched one so hard in the chest that he couldn’t breathe and a medic was summoned. SSG Frederick initiated the masturbation and forced the detainees to hit each other. PFC England stated she observed SSG Frederick strike a detainee in the chest during these abuses. The detainee had difficulty breathing and a medic, SOLDIER-01, was summoned. SOLDIER-01 treated the detainee and while in the Hard Site observed the “human pyramid” of naked detainees with bags over their heads. SOLDIER-01 failed to report this abuse. These detainees were not MI Holds and MI involvement in this abuse has not been alleged nor is it likely. SOLDIER-29 reported seeing a screen saver for a computer in the Hard Site that depicted several naked detainees stacked in a “pyramid.” She also once observed, unrelated to this incident, CPL Graner slap a detainee. She stated that she didn’t report the picture of naked detainees to MI because she did not see it again and also did not report the slap because she didn’t consider it abuse (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-29; Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-01, DETAINEE-17, DETAINEE-16, ENGLAND, DAVIS, HARMAN, SIVITS, WISDOM; Annex B, Appendix 3, TAB A, SOLDIER-01, and Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs C24-42, D22-25, M73-77, M87).
(15) (U) **Incident #15.** On 26 or 27 November 2003, SOLDIER-15, 66 MI GP, observed CIVILIAN-11, a CACI contractor, interrogating an Iraqi policeman. During the interrogation, SSG Frederick, 372 MP CO, alternated between coming into the cell and standing next to the detainee and standing outside the cell. CIVILIAN-11 would ask the policeman a question stating that if he did not answer, he would bring SSG Frederick back into the cell. At one point, SSG Frederick put his hand over the policeman's nose, not allowing him to breathe for a few seconds. At another point SSG Frederick used a collapsible nightstick to push and possibly twist the policeman's arm, causing pain. When SSG Frederick walked out of the cell, he told SOLDIER-15 he knew ways to do this without leaving marks. SOLDIER-15 did not report the incident. The interpreter utilized for this interrogation was CIVILIAN-16. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-15)

(16) (U) **Incident #16.** On an unknown date, SGT Hernandez, an analyst, observed CIVILIAN-05, a CACI contractor, grab a detainee from the back of a High-Mobility, Multipurpose, Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and drop him on the ground. CIVILIAN-05 then dragged the detainee into an interrogation booth. The detainee was handcuffed the entire time. When the detainee tried to get up to his knees, CIVILIAN-05 would force him to fall. SGT Hernandez reported the incident to CID but did not report it in MI channels. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, HERNANDEZ)
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
(24) (U) **Incident #24.** A photograph created circa early December 2003 depicts an unidentified detainee being interrogated by CIVILIAN-11, CACI, Interrogator, and CIVILIAN-16, Titan, linguist. The detainee is squatting on a chair which is an unauthorized stress position. Having the detainee on a chair which is a potentially unsafe situation, and photographing the detainee are violations of the ICRP. (Reference Annex I, Appendix 2, Photograph “Stress Position”).

SECRET//NOFORN//X1

82
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and
205th MI Brigade

(1) (U) Incident #25. The first documented incident of abuse with dogs occurred on 24
November 2003, just four days after the dogs teams arrived. An Iraqi detainee was smuggled a
pistol by an Iraqi Police Guard. While attempting to confiscate the weapon, an MP was shot and
the detainee was subsequently shot and wounded. Following the shooting, LTC Jordan ordered
several interrogators to the Hard Site to screen eleven Iraqi Police who were detained following
the shooting. The situation at the Hard Site was described by many as “chaos,” and no one really
appeared to be in charge. The perception was that LTG Sanchez had removed all restrictions
that night because of the situation; however, that was not true. No one is able to pin down how
that perception was created. A Navy Dog Team entered the Hard Site and was instructed to
search for additional weapons and explosives. The dogs searched the cells, no explosives were
detected and the Navy Dog Team eventually completed their mission and left. Shortly thereafter,
MA1 Kimbro, USN, was recalled when someone “needed” a dog. MA1 Kimbro went to the top
tier of Tier 1B, rather than the MI Hold area of Tier 1A. As he and his dog approached a cell
doors, he heard yelling and screaming and his dog became agitated. Inside the cell were
CIVILIAN-11 (CACI contract interrogator), a second unidentified male in civilian clothes who
appeared to be an interrogator and CIVILIAN-16 (female contract interpreter), all of whom were
yelling at a detainee squatting in the back right corner. MA1 Kimbro’s dog was barking a lot
with all the yelling and commotion. The dog lunged and MA1 Kimbro struggled to regain
control of it. At that point, one of the men said words to the effect “You see that dog there, if
you don’t tell me what I want to know, I’m gonna get that dog on you!” The three began to step
out of the cell leaving the detainee inside and MA1 Kimbro backed-up to allow them to exit, but
there was not much room on the tier. After they exited, the dog lunged and pulled MA1 Kimbro
just inside the cell. He quickly regained control of his dog, and exited the cell. As CIVILIAN-
11, CIVILIAN-16, and the other interrogator re-entered the cell, MA1 Kimbro’s dog grabbed
CIVILIAN-16’s forearm in its mouth. It apparently did not bite through her clothes or skin and
CIVILIAN-16 stated the dog did not bite her. Realizing he had not been called for an explosives
search, MA1 Kimbro departed the area with his dog and as he got to the bottom of the tier stairs,
he heard someone calling for the dog again, but he did not return. No record of this interrogation
exists, as was the case for the interrogations of Iraqi Police in the hours and days following the
shooting incident. The use of dogs in the manner directed by CIVILIAN-11 was clearly abusive
and unauthorized (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-11, KIMBRO, PAPPAS,
CIVILIAN-11; Annex B, Appendix 2, PAPPAS).
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
(4) (U) Incident #28. In an apparent MI directed use of dogs in detainee abuse, circa 18 December 2003, a photograph depicts a Syrian detainee (DETAINEE-14) kneeling on the floor with his hands bound behind his back. DETAINEE-14 was a “high value” detainee who had arrived at Abu Ghraib in December 2003, from a Navy ship. DETAINEE-14 was suspected to be involved with Al-Qaeda. Military Working Dog Handler SOLDIER-27 is standing in front of DETAINEE-14 with his black dog a few feet from DETAINEE-14’s face. The dog is leashed, but not muzzled. SGT Eckroth was DETAINEE-14’s interrogator from 18 to 21 December 2003, and CIVILIAN-21, CACI contract interrogator, assumed the lead after SGT Eckroth departed Abu Ghraib on 22 December 2003. SGT Eckroth identified DETAINEE14 as his detainee when shown a photo of the incident. CIVILIAN-21 claimed to know nothing about this incident; however, in December 2003 he related to SSG Eckroth he was told by MPs that DETAINEE-14’s bedding had been ripped apart by dogs. CIVILIAN-21 was characterized by SOLDIER25 as having a close relationship with the MPs, and she was told by SGT Frederick about dogs being used when CIVILIAN-21 was there. It is highly plausible that CIVILIAN-21 used dogs without authorization and directed the abuse in this incident as well as others related to this detainee (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, ECKROTH, SOLDIER25, CIVILIAN-21; Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs Z1-6).

(6) (U) Incident #30. On another occasion, SOLDIER-26, an MI Soldier assigned to the S2, 320 MP BN, was present during an interrogation of a detainee and was told the detainee was suspected to have Al Qaeda affiliations. Dogs were requested and approved about three days later. SOLDIER-26 didn’t know if the dog had to be muzzled or not, likely telling the dog handler to un-muzzle the dog, in contravention to CJTF-7 policy. The interrogators were CIVILIAN-20, CACI, and CIVILIAN-21 (CACI), SOLDIER-14, Operations Officer, ICE stated that CIVILIAN-21, used a dog during one of his interrogations and this is likely that occasion. According to SOLDIER-14, CIVILIAN-21 had the dog handler maintain control of the dog and
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

did not make any threatening reference to the dog, but apparently “felt just the presence of the dog would be unsettling to the detainee.” SOLDIER-14 did not know who approved the procedure, but was verbally notified by SOLDIER-23, who supposedly received the approval from COL Pappas. CIVILIAN-21 claimed he once requested to use dogs, but it was never approved. Based on the evidence, CIVILIAN-21 was deceitful in his statement (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-14, SOLDIER-26, CIVILIAN-21).

(8) (U) Incident #32. In yet another instance, SOLDIER-25, an interrogator, stated that when she and SOLDIER-15 were interrogating a female detainee in the Hard Site, they heard a dog barking. The female detainee was frightened by dogs, and SOLDIER-25 and SOLDIER-15 returned her to her cell. SOLDIER-25 went to see what was happening with the dog barking and saw a detainee in his underwear on a mattress on the floor of Tier 1A with a dog standing over him. CIVILIAN-21 was upstairs giving directions to SSG Fredrick (372 MP Co), telling him to “take him back home.” SOLDIER-25 opined it was “common knowledge that CIVILIAN-21 used dogs while he was on special projects, working directly for COL Pappas after the capture of Saddam on 13 December 2003.” SOLDIER25 could not identify anyone else specifically who knew of this “common knowledge.” It appeared CIVILIAN-21 was encouraging and even directing the MP abuse with dogs; likely a “softening up” technique for future interrogations. The detainee was one of CIVILIAN-21’s. SOLDIER-25 did not see an interpreter in the area, so it is unlikely that CIVILIAN-21 was actually doing an interrogation.

(9) (U) SOLDIER-25 stated that SSG Frederick would come into her office every other day or so and tell her about dogs being used while CIVILIAN-21 was present. SSG Fredrick and other MPs used to refer to “doggy dance” sessions. SOLDIER-25 did not specify what “doggy dance” was (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-25), but the obvious implication is that it referred to an unauthorized use of dogs to intimidate detainees.
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
(1) (U) **Incident #33.** There is also ample evidence of detainees being forced to wear women’s underwear, sometimes on their heads. These cases appear to be a form of humiliation, either for MP control or MI “ego down.” DETAINEE-07 and DETAINEE-05 both claimed they were stripped of their clothing and forced to wear women’s underwear on their heads. CIVILIAN-15 (CACI) and CIVILIAN-19 (CACI), a CJTF-7 analyst, alleged CIVILIAN-21 bragged and laughed about shaving a detainee and forcing him to wear red women’s underwear. Several photographs include unidentified detainees with underwear on their heads. Such photos show abuse and constitute sexual humiliation of detainees (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-03, SOLDIER-14, JORDAN, REESE, CIVILIAN-21, WOOD; Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-05, CIVILIAN-15, CIVILIAN-19, DETAINEE-07; Annex C; Annex G; Annex I, Appendix 1, photographs D12, D14, M11-16).
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
(7) (U) **Incident #39.** On 16 November 2003, SOLDIER-29 decided to strip a detainee in response to what she believed was uncooperative and physically recalcitrant behavior. She had submitted an Interrogation Plan in which she planned to use the “Pride and Ego Down,” technique but did not specify that she would strip the detainee as part of that approach. SOLDIER-29 felt the detainee was “arrogant,” and when she and her analyst, SOLDIER-10, “placed him against the wall” the detainee pushed SOLDIER-10. SOLDIER-29 warned if he touched SOLDIER-10 again, she would have him remove his shoes. A bizarre tit-for-tat scenario then ensued where SOLDIER-29 would warn the detainee about touching SOLDIER-10, the detainee would “touch” SOLDIER-10, and then had his shirt, blanket, and finally his pants removed. At this point, SOLDIER-29 concluded that the detainee was “completely uncooperative” and terminated the interrogation. While nudity seemed to be acceptable, SOLDIER-29 went further than most when she walked the semi-naked detainee across the camp. SGT Adams, SOLDIER-29’s supervisor, commented that walking a semi-naked detainee across the camp could have caused a riot. CIVILIAN-21, a CACI contract interrogator, witnessed SOLDIER-29 and SOLDIER-10 escorting the scantily clad detainee from the Hard Site back to Camp Vigilant, wearing only his underwear and carrying his blanket. CIVILIAN-21 notified SGT Adams, who was SOLDIER-29’s section chief, who in turn notified CPT Wood, the ICE OIC. SGT Adams immediately called SOLDIER-29 and SOLDIER-10 into her office, counseled them, and removed them from interrogation duties.

(U) The incident was relatively well known among JIDC personnel and appeared in several statements as second hand information when interviewees were asked if they knew of detainee abuse. LTC Jordan temporarily removed SOLDIER-29 and SOLDIER-10 from interrogation duties. COL Pappas left the issue for LTC Jordan to handle. COL Pappas should have taken sterner action such as an Article 15, UCMJ. His failure to do so did not send a strong enough message to the rest of the JIDC that abuse would not be tolerated. CPT Wood had recommended to LTC Jordan that SOLDIER-29 receive an Article 15 and SFC Johnson, the interrogation NCOIC, recommended she be turned over to her parent unit for non-compliance. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, ADAMS, CIVILIAN-04, JORDAN, PAPPAS, SOLDIER-29, CIVILIAN-21, WOOD; Annex B, Appendix 2, JORDAN).
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

(18) (U) Finding: Four (4) contract interrogators allegedly abused detainees at Abu Ghraib.

(U) Explanation: The contracting system failed to ensure that properly trained and vetted linguist and interrogator personnel were hired to support operations at Abu Ghraib.
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET/NOFORN/X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
Case 1:08-cv-00827-LMB-JFA   Document 1644-4   Filed 05/16/24   Page 157 of 178 PageID# 45238

SECRET//NOFORN//X\*1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and
205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

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SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

SECRET//NOFORN//X1

127
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

(23) (U) Finding: CIVILIAN-05, CACI employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN-05 did, or failed to do, the following:
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

- He grabbed a detainee (who was handcuffed) off a vehicle and dropped him to the ground. He then dragged him into an interrogation booth and as the detainee tried to get up, CIVILIAN-05 would yank the detainee very hard and make him fall again.
- Disobeyed General Order Number One; drinking alcohol while at Abu Ghraib.
- Refused to take instructions from a Tiger Team leader and refused to take instructions from military trainers.
  - When confronted by SSG Neal, his Tiger Team leader, about his inadequate interrogation techniques, he replied, “I have been doing this for 20 years and I do not need a 20 year old telling me how to do my job.”
  - When placed in a remedial report writing class because of his poor writing, he did not pay attention to the trainer and sat in the back of the room facing away from the trainer.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-05 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the Contracting Officer (KO) for appropriate contractual action.
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

(25) (U) Finding: CIVILIAN-11, Interrogator, CACI employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN11 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Detainee abuse.
  - He encouraged SSG Frederick to abuse Iraqi Police detained following a shooting incident (IP Roundup). SSG Frederick twisted the handcuffs of a detainee being interrogated; causing pain.
  - He failed to prevent SSG Frederick from covering the detainee’s mouth and nose restricting the detainee from breathing.
- Threatened the Iraqi Police “with SSG Frederick.” He told the Iraqi Police to answer his questions or he would bring SSG Frederick back into the cell.
- Used dogs during the IP Roundup in an unauthorized manner. He told a detainee, “You see that dog there, if you do not tell me what I want to know, I’m going to get that dog on you.”
- Placed a detainee in an unauthorized stress position (Reference Annex I, Appendix 2, Photograph “Stress Positions”). CIVILIAN-11 is photographed facing a detainee who is in a stress position on a chair with his back exposed. The detainee is in a dangerous position where he might fall back and injure himself.
- Failed to prevent a detainee from being photographed.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-11 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the KO for appropriate contractual action.
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

(28) (U) Finding: CIVILIAN-21, Interrogator, CACI employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN-21 did, or failed to do, the following:

• Inappropriate use of dogs. SOLDIER-26 stated that CIVILIAN-21 used a dog during an interrogation and the dog was unmuzzled. SOLDIER-25 stated she once saw CIVILIAN21 standing on the second floor of the Hard Site, looking down to where a dog was being used against a detainee, and yelling to the MPs “Take him home.” The dog had torn the detainee’s mattress. He also used a dog during an interrogation with SSG Aston but stated he never used dogs.

• Detainee abuse. CPT Reese stated he saw “NAME” (his description of “NAME” matched CIVILIAN-21) push (kick) a detainee into a cell with his foot.

• Making false statements. During questioning about the use of dogs in interrogations, CIVILIAN21 stated he never used them.

• Failed to report detainee abuse. During an interrogation, a detainee told SOLDIER-25 and CIVILIAN-21 that CIVILIAN-17, an interpreter, hit him and cut his ear which required stitches. SOLDIER-25 stated she told CIVILIAN-21 to annotate this on the interrogation report. He did not report it to appropriate authorities.

• Detainee Humiliation.
  o CIVILIAN-15 stated he heard CIVILIAN-21 tell several people that he had shaved the hair and beard of a detainee and put him in red women’s underwear. CIVILIAN-21 was allegedly bragging about it.
  o CIVILIAN-19 stated he heard OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE02 laughing about red panties on detainees.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-21 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the KO for appropriate contractual action.
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

SECRET//NOFORN//X1

135
SECRET//NOFORN//X1

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade
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205th MI Brigade
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SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade