



1 No. 189.) Plaintiffs allege that this policy was intended to deter individuals from seeking  
2 asylum in the United States, in violation of constitutional, statutory, and international law.  
3 (*Id.* ¶¶ 3, 5, 72–83.) The Court has certified the class in this underlying dispute. (ECF No.  
4 513.) The parties have also filed and briefed cross motions for summary judgment that  
5 await resolution. (ECF Nos. 535, 563.)

6 During the pendency of this action, Defendants have promulgated new asylum  
7 eligibility regulations—including the Final Transit Rule—that have threatened the  
8 preservation of the underlying class of metered asylum-seekers. This has led to a morass  
9 of litigation ancillary to the primary case regarding the lawfulness of Defendants’ metering  
10 practices. The Court summarizes this byzantine procedural history below.

#### 11 **A. Asylum Ban**

12 On July 16, 2019, Defendants promulgated a regulation entitled “Asylum Eligibility  
13 and Procedural Modifications”—also known as the “Asylum Ban” or the “Interim Final  
14 Rule” (“IFR”).<sup>1</sup> 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829 (July 16, 2019), *codified at* 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(c)(4),  
15 1208.13(c)(4). Among other things, the rule renders asylum seekers who enter, attempt to  
16 enter, or arrive at the United States-Mexico border after July 16, 2019 ineligible for asylum  
17 if they transit through at least one country, other than their country of origin, and fail to  
18 apply for any available humanitarian protection in that country.

19 Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and provisional class certification to  
20 partially enjoin the application of the IFR to asylum-seekers from countries other than  
21 Mexico who were metered before its effective date. (ECF Nos. 293, 294.) They argued  
22 that: (1) the provisional class was prevented from accessing the asylum process before the  
23 effective date of the IFR only because they were subject to Defendants’ unlawful metering  
24 practices; and (2) the IFR, if applied to this class, would preclude these individuals from  
25 obtaining any form of humanitarian protection, since they their 30-day window to apply for  
26 asylum in Mexico—a country through which they transited—had already expired.

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28 <sup>1</sup> Because the Final Transit Rule refers to this initial regulation as the IFR, the Court does the same in this Order for the sake of clarity.

1 On November 19, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motions. (Prelim. Inj., ECF  
2 No. 330.) The Court’s order was partly based on its previous finding that Plaintiffs located  
3 on Mexican soil at the time they were metered were “arriving in” the United States for  
4 purposes of asylum under the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act  
5 (“INA”). (*See id.* at 4–5 (citing *Al Otro Lado v. McAleenan*, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1199–  
6 1201 (S.D. Cal. 2019)).) In its concluding paragraph, the Court issued the following order:

7 The Court provisionally certifies a class consisting of “all non-Mexican  
8 asylum seekers who were unable to make a direct asylum claim at a U.S. POE  
9 before July 16, 2019 because of the U.S. Government’s metering policy, and  
10 who continue to seek access to the U.S. asylum process.”

11 ...

12 Defendants are hereby **ENJOINED** from applying the Asylum Ban to  
13 members of the aforementioned provisionally certified class and **ORDERED**  
14 to return to the pre-Asylum Ban practices for processing the asylum  
15 applications of members of the certified class.

16 (*Id.* at 36.)

17 Defendants appealed the Preliminary Injunction to the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 335.)  
18 After granting an administrative stay on December 20, 2019, the Ninth Circuit denied  
19 Defendants’ motion to stay the Preliminary Injunction on March 5, 2020. (ECF Nos. 369,  
20 418.) The court heard oral argument on July 10, 2020 on the merits of the appeal but issued  
21 an order on December 2, 2020 holding the proceedings in abeyance pending issuance of  
22 the mandates in two related cases. (ECF No. 636.)

### 23 **B. Subsequent Litigation**

24 While this underlying appeal of the Preliminary Injunction has been pending, several  
25 disputes related to the Preliminary Injunction or the provisionally certified class have arisen  
26 between the parties.

27 First, Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order similar to the instant motion  
28 but concerning a different regulation, “Implementing Bilateral and Multilateral Asylum  
Cooperative Agreements Under the Immigration and Nationality Act” (the “ACA Rule”).  
(ECF Nos. 344, 352.) Plaintiffs claimed Defendants intended to impose the ACA Rule on  
members of the provisional class to extinguish their underlying metering claims and bar

1 them from accessing the asylum process. (*Id.*) The Court denied the motion without  
2 prejudice, finding that Plaintiffs had not established a likelihood that Defendants would  
3 apply the new regulation to class members. (ECF No. 382.) The Court also based its  
4 decision on the fact that the terms of the Preliminary Injunction, if affirmed on appeal,  
5 would require Defendants to “return to the pre-Asylum Ban practices” for asylum-seekers  
6 metered before July 16, 2019 and therefore “necessarily prohibit[ed]” the application of the  
7 more recently promulgated ACA Rule. (*Id.* at 5–6.) The Court stated that it assumed  
8 Defendants would act in good faith by “avoid[ing] taking steps that could complicate or  
9 preclude its compliance with a court order.” (*Id.* at 6.)

10 Second, on July 17, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Clarification of the  
11 Preliminary Injunction after the parties failed to resolve disputes about the scope of the  
12 order and Defendants’ attendant obligations. (ECF No. 494.) The Court then issued an  
13 order on October 30, 2020 (the “Clarification Order”) clarifying that the Preliminary  
14 Injunction: (1) applied to individuals denied asylum before the order issued and during the  
15 administrative stay; (2) bound the Executive Office of Immigration Review to the terms of  
16 the order; and (3) required Defendants to take affirmative steps to reopen or reconsider past  
17 asylum denials for class members, make reasonable efforts to identify class members and  
18 inform them of their class membership, and share identifying information with Plaintiffs.  
19 (ECF No. 605.)

20 Defendants appealed the Clarification Order and moved to stay the order in this  
21 Court. (ECF Nos. 636, 637.) The briefing on the motion to stay is ongoing. (ECF No.  
22 641.) On December 18, 2020, the Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part  
23 Defendants’ request for an administrative stay. (ECF No. 652.) The stay applies to the  
24 Clarification Order’s requirement that Defendants take affirmative steps to find and reopen  
25 or reconsider the asylum denials of provisional class members that became final before the  
26 Preliminary Injunction was entered or during the period of the administrative stay, but was  
27 denied in all other respects. (*Id.*)

28

1           Lastly, Plaintiffs have filed another Motion to Enforce the Preliminary Injunction on  
2 December 15, 2020, citing continued conflicts over the implementation measures required  
3 by the Clarification Order. (*See* ECF Nos. 644, 657, 665.)

#### 4           **C.    New Regulation**

5           The regulation that is the subject of the instant Motion, referred to by Defendants as  
6 the “Final Transit Rule,” purports to “respond[] to comments received on the [IFR],”  
7 “make[] minor changes to regulations implemented or affected by the IFR for clarity and  
8 correction of typographical errors,” and “adopt[] ‘as final’ certain of the IFR’s amendments  
9 to the Code of Federal Regulations.” (Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. (“Opp’n”) at 6 (citing  
10 Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modification, 85 Fed. Reg. 82,260, 82,289 (Dec. 17,  
11 2020)).)

12           Relevant here is the Final Transit Rule’s response to a comment that the IFR conflicts  
13 with the language of the INA establishing that “[a]ny alien who . . . arrives in the United  
14 States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . . ) . . . may apply for asylum.” 8  
15 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). In response, the rule clarifies that the IFR

16           applies to all aliens who enter, attempt to enter, or arrive in the United States  
17 across the southern land border on or after July 16, 2019. These three terms .  
18 . . . require physical presence in the United States, and, as a result, any aliens  
19 who did not physically enter the United States before July 16, 2019, are  
20 subject to this rule. ***This includes, for example, aliens who may have***  
21 ***approached the U.S. border but were subject to metering by DHS at a land***  
***border port of entry and did not physically cross the border into the United***  
***States before July 16, 2019.***

22 (85 Fed. Reg. at 82,268 (emphasis added).) In a footnote immediately following this  
23 paragraph, the rule further explains:

24           The Departments note that this result is different from the district court’s  
25 reasoning in granting a preliminary injunction in *Al Otro Lado, Inc. v.*  
26 *McAleenan*, 423 F. Supp. 3d 848, 875–76 (S.D. Cal. 2019), which included  
27 aliens who approached a U.S. port of entry but were not immediately  
28 permitted to cross the border as within the class of aliens who had “attempted  
to enter or arrived in” the United States. *See Al Otro Lado v. McAleenan*, 394  
F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1199–1205 (S.D. Cal. 2019). The district court’s

1 interpretation is contrary to the Departments’ intent, as explained below. The  
 2 Departments also note that, even if aliens subject to metering prior to July 16,  
 3 2019, were exempt from this rule, they would nevertheless become subject to  
 the rule upon any subsequent entry into the United States.

4 (*Id.* n.22.) The Final Transit Rule then explains that agencies intend the terms “entry,”  
 5 “attempted entry,” and “arrival” to require physical presence in the United States, excluding  
 6 asylum-seekers whom CBP “encounter[s] at the physical border line of the United States  
 7 and Mexico, who have not crossed the border line at the time of that encounter[.]” *Id.* at  
 8 82,269. The rule takes effect on January 19, 2021.

## 9 **II. LEGAL STANDARD<sup>2</sup>**

10 The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to “preserv[e] the status quo and  
 11 prevent[] irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.”  
 12 *Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers*, 415 U.S.  
 13 423, 439 (1974) (footnote omitted). If the nonmovant has received notice of a motion for  
 14 a temporary restraining order, the standard for issuing such order is the same as that for  
 15 issuing a preliminary injunction. *See Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Mind’s Eye Interiors, Inc.*,  
 16 236 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (D. Haw. 2002); *Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes*  
 17 *Aircraft Co.*, 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Here, Defendants have received  
 18 notice of the Motion and have had the opportunity to be heard in opposition. Therefore,  
 19 the preliminary injunction standard applies.

20 To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a movant must “meet one of two variants of  
 21 the same standard.” *All for the Wild Rockies v. Pena*, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 22 Under the first standard, the movant must show “that he is likely to succeed on the merits,  
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24 <sup>2</sup> The parties dispute whether this Court must issue another injunction to enjoin the Final Transit Rule or  
 25 whether prohibiting the application of this rule requires only that the Court enforce its initial Preliminary  
 26 Injunction. Defendants claim that the Final Transit Rule is a “new agency action” requiring a new  
 27 injunction. (Opp’n at 12–13.) Plaintiffs argue nothing prevents the Court from modifying or enforcing  
 28 its earlier Preliminary Injunction against the Final Transit Rule. (Mot. at 7–12; Reply at 3.) The parties  
 provide little by way of citation to supporting authorities for their arguments. In any event, solely for  
 purposes of this Order, the Court assumes without deciding that separate injunctive relief is required to  
 provide a remedy in this instance, and therefore applies the preliminary injunction standard to its analysis.

1 that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the  
2 balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” *Id.*  
3 (quoting *Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Under the  
4 second standard, the movant must show “that there are serious questions going to the  
5 merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits,” that the “balance of  
6 hardships tips *sharply* in the Plaintiff’s favor,” and that “the other two *Winter* factors are  
7 satisfied.” *Id.* (quotation omitted). “Serious questions are substantial, difficult and  
8 doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberative  
9 investigation.” *Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos*, 862 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1988)  
10 (quotations and citation omitted). The balance of equities and public interest factors merge  
11 “[w]hen the government is a party.” *Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell*, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092  
12 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).

### 13 **III. ANALYSIS**

14 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that serious questions exist as  
15 to the merits of this challenge, that class members are likely to suffer irreparable harm in  
16 the absence of the requested relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest tip  
17 strongly in their favor.

18 First, Defendants allege that it is lawful under the Executive’s rulemaking authority  
19 to proceed with the issuance of a final rule despite the existence of the Preliminary  
20 Injunction on the same topic. (Opp’n at 11–12.) However, this is an incomplete  
21 characterization of the facts of this case. The Court previously interpreted the asylum  
22 provisions of a statute, the INA, to apply to asylum-seekers metered at ports of entry, thus  
23 concluding that these individuals could have requested asylum but for Defendants’  
24 metering practices. Defendants now claim that their rulemaking authority can be used to  
25 craft definitions in a regulation that run contrary to the Court’s interpretation of the same  
26 language in the enabling statute, all for the explicit purpose of circumventing the Court’s  
27 Preliminary Injunction. It is at least questionable, if not altogether doubtful, that  
28 Defendants can redefine statutory terms in a regulation in direct contradiction to the Court’s

1 plain language interpretation, especially when their intention in doing so is to evade the  
2 import of the Court’s previous rulings.<sup>3</sup> See *California Cosmetology Coal. v. Riley*, 871  
3 F. Supp. 1263, 1270 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (citing *Koshland v. Helvering*, 298 U.S. 441, 447  
4 (1936)) (“A regulation may not serve to amend a statute or to add to the statute something  
5 which is not there.”), *aff’d*, 110 F.3d 1454 (9th Cir. 1997); see also *Brown v. Gardner*, 513  
6 U.S. 115, 122 (1994) (“[T]he fact . . . that [a regulation] flies against the plain language of  
7 the statutory text exempts courts from any obligation to defer to it.”). The Final Transit  
8 Rule’s lengthy interpretive arguments to the contrary cannot preemptively resolve these  
9 serious questions arising from this rather blatant evasive maneuvering around the Court’s  
10 interpretation of the INA.

11 This action is especially legally dubious because the Court’s interpretation has not  
12 been overturned or otherwise invalidated on appeal, which is still pending resolution.  
13 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit expressed in its order denying Defendants’ motion for stay that  
14 this Court’s “linguistic and contextual analysis has considerable force” and affirmed that  
15 pursuant to this statutory interpretation, “a class member’s first arrival triggered a statutory  
16 right to apply for asylum and have that application considered . . . . As the [IFR] was not in  
17 place at the time each class member’s right to apply for asylum attached, it makes sense  
18 that it would not apply.” *Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Wolf*, 952 F.3d 999, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2020).  
19 This Court sees no reason why this rationale would not apply equally to the Final Transit  
20 Rule, which will take effect 18 months after the IFR.

21 The remaining prongs of the preliminary injunctive standard are easily met,  
22 considering the similarities between the Final Transit Rule and the IFR. It is clear that  
23 irreparable injury would occur if this relief were not issued. Defendants are unambiguous,  
24 both in the regulatory language of the Final Transit Rule and in their briefings, that one

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25  
26 <sup>3</sup> Further, as aforementioned, the Court previously denied Plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining  
27 order regarding the ACA Rule on the basis that Defendants would comply in good faith with the  
28 instructions in the Preliminary Injunction, which implicitly barred the ACA Rule’s implementation as to  
the class. It follows that the Final Transit Rule—which simply modifies the previously enjoined IFR—  
would be subject to the same prohibition.



1 purpose of the rule is to ensure that the asylum eligibility limitation applies to the asylum-  
2 seekers metered at the border who form the specific provisional class certified in this case.  
3 It is thus beyond doubt that Defendants seek to enforce the regulation against the class, and  
4 that without injunctive relief, Plaintiffs will be permanently barred from seeking asylum in  
5 the United States and could face physical danger if forced to return to their countries of  
6 origin. Lastly, given that the Final Transit Rule is an extension of the IFR previously  
7 enjoined, the Court finds that the balance of equities and public interest analysis stated in  
8 its Preliminary Injunction applies here with the same force. (*See* Prelim. Inj. at 34–35.)  
9 These factors favor Plaintiffs because Defendants’ metering practices were the root cause  
10 of their inability to access the asylum process prior to the promulgation of the IFR. This  
11 remains true for any regulation that seeks to limit asylum eligibility, including the Final  
12 Transit Rule.

13 Lastly, Defendants raise several challenges to this Court’s jurisdiction to hear this  
14 Motion under various jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the INA and under the All Writs  
15 Act. (*See* Opp’n at 9–11.) It is well-settled that a court may issue the orders necessary to  
16 determine its own jurisdiction. *See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am.*, 330 U.S.  
17 258, 290 (1947) (“[T]he District Court unquestionably had the power to issue a restraining  
18 order for the purpose of preserving existing conditions pending a decision upon its own  
19 jurisdiction.”); *see also Derminer v. Kramer*, 386 F. Supp. 2d 905, 906 (E.D. Mich. 2005)  
20 (“A court always has jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction.”).<sup>4</sup>

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21 <sup>4</sup> The Court also notes that the way in which the Rule was authorized also raises questions as to its validity.  
22 The Rule states:

23 The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Chad F. Wolf, having reviewed and approved  
24 this document, is delegating the authority to electronically sign this document to Chad R.  
25 Mizelle, who is the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the General Counsel for DHS,  
for purposes of publication in the Federal Register.

26 85 Fed. Reg. at 82,289. Recently, the Northern District of California issued a preliminary injunction  
27 regarding other regulations signed in a similar manner, finding that the plaintiffs had shown a likelihood  
28 that DHS lacked authority through Wolf for the proposed rulemaking because he was not nominated by  
the President and confirmed by the Senate. *Pangea Legal Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 20-  
CV-09253-JD, 2021 WL 75756, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2021). Several other courts have also invalidated

1 Because of complex issues raised in this Motion, the Court finds that it is necessary  
2 to enjoin the application of the Final Transit Rule to the provisional class pending the  
3 Court’s determination regarding the merits.

4 **IV. CONCLUSION**

5 Accordingly, the Court **GRANTS** Plaintiffs’ Motion for a TRO (ECF No. 658).  
6 Defendants are **TEMPORARILY ENJOINED** from applying 85 Fed. Reg. 82,260 (Dec.  
7 17, 2020) to all non-Mexican asylum seekers who were unable to make a direct asylum  
8 claim at a U.S. Port of Entry (“POE”) before July 16, 2019 because of the U.S.  
9 government’s metering policy, and who continue to seek access to the U.S. asylum process.  
10 This Order extends to Defendants and any other federal officials and personnel involved in  
11 the asylum and/or removal process.

12 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that a telephonic oral argument on the issues raised  
13 in the Motion is set for **February 3, 2021 at 1:30 p.m.** This temporary restraining order  
14 shall remain in effect until this date.

15 Information for calling into the teleconference is listed below. The parties and the  
16 public may access the hearing by calling the Court’s teleconference number before 1:30  
17 p.m. When prompted, enter the access code followed by the pound sign (#).

18 **Teleconference number:** (888) 557-8511

19 **Access code:** 6968297

20 Any members of the public that join the teleconference must mute their lines after joining.

21 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

22  
23 **DATED: January 18, 2021**

24   
**Hon. Cynthia Bashant**  
**United States District Judge**

25 Wolf’s action on the basis that he was not a duly authorized Acting Secretary. *See Batalla Vidal v. Wolf*,  
26 No. 16-CV-4756 (NGG) (VMS), — F. Supp. 3d —, —, 2020 WL 6695076, at \*9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.  
27 14, 2020); *Nw. Immigrant Rights Project v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs.*, No. CV 19-  
28 3283 (RDM), — F. Supp. 3d —, —, 2020 WL 5995206, at \*24 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2020); *Immigrant*  
*Legal Res. Ctr. v. Wolf*, No. 20-CV-05883-JSW, — F. Supp. 3d —, —, 2020 WL 5798269, at \*7  
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020); *Casa de Maryland, Inc. v. Chad F. Wolf*, Case No. 8:20-cv-02118-PX, —  
F.Supp.3d —, —, 2020 WL 5500165, at \*23 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2020).