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	13	INITED STATE	S DISTRICT	COURT
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	14			
	15	SALEH, an individual; SAMI ABBAS AL	Case No.	04-CV-1143 R (NLS)
	16	RAWI, an individual; MWAFAO SAMI	0450 110.	01 CV-1143 K (NLS)
	10	ABBAS AL RAWI, an individual; AHMED, an individual; ISMAEL, an individual;		
	17	NEISEF, an individual; ESTATE OF		
	18	IBRAHIEM, the heirs and estate of an		
	10	Individual; RASHEED, an individual: JOHN	NOTICE	OF MOTION AND MOTION
	19	DOE NO. 1; JANE DOE NO. 2; A CLASS OF PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED,	OFDEF	ENDANTS CACI
	20	KNOWN HEREINAFTER AS JOHN and	FEDERA	ATIONAL INC, CACI, INC. – AL, AND CACI N.V. TO
		JANE DOES NOS. 3-1050,	TRANSF	ER VENUE
	21	Plaintiffs,	D. mr.	Enny py 7 2005
	22	r ianiums,	DATE: TIME:	FEBRUARY 7, 2005 2:00 p.m.
	Ì	v.	CTRM:	2:00 P.M. 5
	23	TITAN CORDODATION DI		5
	24	TITAN CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; ADEL NAHKLA, a Titan		
		employee located in Abu Ghraib, Iraq: CACI		
	25	INTERNATIONAL INC., a Delaware		
	26	Corporation; CACI INCORPORATED-		
	l	FEDERAL, a Delaware Corporation; CACI N.V., a Netherlands corporation; STEPHEN		
	27	A. STEFANOWICZ; and JOHN B. ISRAEL,		
	28	Defendants.		
	- 1	Detendants.		

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# TO: PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 7, 2005 at 2:00 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Courtroom 5 of the above-entitled Court, located at 940 Front Street, San Diego, California, 92101, Defendants CACI International Inc., CACI, INC. – FEDERAL, And CACI N.V. (collectively, the "CACI Defendants") will and hereby do move this Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1404(a) to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Transfer is appropriate because the relevant private and public interest factors, such as convenience to witnesses, access to sources of proof, and judicial economy, all favor litigation of this action in the Eastern District of Virginia rather than this District, which has no connection to the Plaintiffs and most of the Defendants. In the alternative, the CACI Defendants request transfer of this action to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia if the Court is disinclined to transfer the action to the Eastern District of Virginia.

This Motion is based on the Notice of Motion and Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support thereof, the Declaration of Jeffrey P. Elefante dated November 4, 2004, the pleadings and papers on file herein and any argument or further evidence submitted in support of said Motion

Dated: November 10, 2004

Respectfully submitted,

R.J. Coughlan, Jr. (CA Bar No. 91711) Cathleen G. Fitch (CA Bar No. 95302)

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11		NICEDICE COVER		
12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
13	SALEH, an individual; SAMI ABBAS AL	) Coso No. 04 CV 1142 D (NI C)		
14	RAWI, an individual; MWAFAQ SAMI ABBAS AL RAWI, an individual; AHMED,	) Case No. 04-CV-1143 R (NLS)		
15	an individual; ESTATE OF IBRAHIEM, the heirs and estate of an individual; RASHEED,			
16	an individual; JOHN DO NO. 1; JANE DOE NO. 2; A CLASS OF PERSONS	) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
17	SIMILARLY SITUATED, KNOWN HEREINAFTER AS JOHN and JANE DOES	)		
18	NOS. 3-1050,	)		
19	Plaintiffs,			
20	V.	)		
21	TITAN CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; ADEL NAHKLA, a Titan	) )		
22	employee located in Abu Ghraib, Iraq; CACI INTERNATIONAL INC., a Delaware	) )		
23	Corporation; CACI INCORPORATED- FEDERAL, a Delaware Corporation; CACI	) )		
24	N.V., a Netherlands corporation; STEPHEN A. STEFANOWICZ; and JOHN B. ISRAEL,	) )		
25	Defendants.	) )		
26	///			
27	<i>III</i>			
28	///			
	- 1			
	Certificate of Service, Case N	io. 04-CV-1143 R (NLS)		

1	1, the undersigned, hereby certify:
2	I am employed in the County of San Diego, State of California. I am over the age of 18
3	and not a party to the within action; my business address is 501 West Broadway, Suite 400, San
4	Diego, California.
5	On November 10, 2004, in the manner specified on the mailing list, I served the
6	documents described as:
7 8	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANTS CACI INTERNATIONAL INC., CACI, INC FEDERAL AND CACI N.V. TO TRANSVER VENUE
9	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
10	IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION OF DEFENDANTS CACI INTERNATIONAL INC., CACI, INC FEDERAL AND CACI N.V. TO TRANSVER VENUE
11	DECLARATION OF JEFFREY P. ELEFANTE IN SUPPORT
12 13	OF MOTION BY DEFENDANTS CACI INTERNATIONAL INC., CACI, INC FEDERAL AND CACI N.V. TO TRANSVER VENUE
14	on the interested parties in this action addressed as follows:
15	SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
16	☐ (BY HAND) On November 10, 2004 I delivered such envelope to the party listed
17	above and left the envelope with the party, the receptionist or person in charge thereof between
18	the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
19	<b>BY MAIL</b> ) On November 10, 2004 I placed such envelope for collection, deposit
20	and mailing with the United States Postal Service following ordinary business practices at my
21	place of business. I am readily familiar with the business practice of my place of business for
22	collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service.
23	Correspondence so collected and processed is deposited with the United States Postal Service
24	that same day in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that, on motion of party served,
25	service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day
26	after date of deposit for mailing an affidavit.
27	☐ (BY FACSIMILE) On November 10, 2004, I caused a true copy of the document(s)
28	to be transmitted via facsimile to a facsimile machine maintained by the person on whom the

#### SERVICE LIST

Rawi, et al. v. Titan Corp., et al. Case No. 04-CV-1153 R (NLS)

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COUGHLAN, SEMMER & LIPMAN LLP 1 R.J. COUGHLAN, JR. (CA Bar No. 91711) CATHLEEN G. FITCH (CA Bar No. 95302) 10 Ph 4: 14 2 501 West Broadway, Suite 400 San Diego, CA 92101 4 Telephone: (619) 232-0800 DEPUTY Facsimile: (619) 232-0107 5 STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 6 J. WILLIAM KOEGEL, JR. 7 JOHN F. O'CONNOR 1330 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 8 Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: (202) 429-3000 9 Facsimile: (202) 429-3902 10 Attorneys for Defendants CACI International Inc, 11 CACI INC. - FEDERAL, and CACI N.V. 12 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 14 15 SALEH, an individual; SAMI ABBAS AL Case No. 04-CV-1143 R (NLS) RAWI, an individual; MWAFAQ SAMI 16 ABBAS AL RAWI, an individual; AHMED, an individual; ISMAEL, an individual; 17 NEISEF, an individual; ESTATE OF IBRAHIEM, the heirs and estate of an 18 individual; RASHEED, an individual; JOHN MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND DOE NO. 1; JANE DOE NO. 2; A CLASS AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE 19 OF PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, MOTION OF DEFENDANTS CACI KNOWN HEREINAFTER AS JOHN and INTERNATIONAL INC, CACI, INC. -20 JANE DOES NOS. 3-1050, FEDERAL, AND CACIN.V. TO TRANSFER VENUE 21 Plaintiffs, 22 V. 23 DATE: **FEBRUARY 7, 2005** TITAN CORPORATION, a Delaware TIME: Corporation; ADEL NAHKLA, a Titan 2:00 P.M. 24 employee located in Abu Ghraib, Iraq; CACI CTRM: 5 25 INTERNATIONAL INC., a Delaware Corporation; CACI INCORPORATED-26 FEDERAL, a Delaware Corporation; CACI N.V., a Netherlands corporation; STÉPHEN 27 A. STEFANOWICZ, and JOHN B. ISRAEL,

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Nai-Chao v. Boeing Co., 555 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
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Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 2000)
State Street Capital Corp. v. Dente, 855 F. Supp. 192 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
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# **STATUTES**

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)	20
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CASE NO. 04CV1143 R (NLS)

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint" or "SAC") is clearly barred as a matter of law for the reasons set forth in the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants CACI International Inc, CACI, INC.-FEDERAL, and CACI N.V. (the "CACI Defendants"). As a result, the CACI Defendants believe that Plaintiffs' claims will never proceed beyond the pleading stage. Regardless, however, it is clear that the Plaintiffs should not have brought this action in this district. Therefore, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice, the CACI Defendants move to transfer this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (or, in the alternative, to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia).

The gravamen of this dispute—in which Plaintiffs allege a conspiracy between civilian government contractors and the United States military concerning treatment of detainees in Iraq—is centered at U.S. military installations in Iraq that have no connection to this District. To the extent the dispute has a principal locus within the United States, that locus is in Arlington, Virginia, home of both the Pentagon and three of the four contractor defendants. The bulk of the witnesses and evidence in this case is located either in the environs of the Pentagon, or at U.S. military installations abroad that are much closer to the Eastern District of Virginia (*i.e.*, suburban Washington, D.C.) than to this District. Indeed, it is beyond cavil that the Nation's capitol area is in the center of gravity for this action.

The only connection between this litigation and the Southern District of California is that one Defendant, Titan Corporation, is headquartered here. The Plaintiffs are all Iraqi nationals who live outside the United States and have no connection to this District. Thus, Plaintiffs' choice of forum should be afforded little weight in considering this motion.

Moreover, Plaintiffs will not be inconvenienced by transfer of the action to a location closer to the sources of proof. Plaintiffs have not alleged that any injurious conduct took place in the Southern District of California, nor alleged any facts to suggest that the supposed conspiratorial agreement asserted in the Complaint was negotiated or closed in this District. In short, any incidental connection the litigation may have to this District is far outweighed by the inconvenience both to parties and nonparties of litigating this action nearly 3,000 miles away from the evidence that exists in this country. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has considerable expertise in handling matters involving sensitive national security issues, such as espionage cases, which make that court well-suited for oversight of any discovery issues arising in this case should it proceed beyond the pleading stage.

Accordingly, the Court in its discretion should order the case transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia—the location of the Pentagon, the CACI Defendants, and the government contracts at issue. In the alternative, the Court may transfer venue to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, where a case concerning similar allegations against the same contractor Defendants is pending.

# II. FACTS RELEVANT TO TRANSFER MOTION

In this case, a group of Iraqi nationals who were detained by the U.S. military in Iraq have filed a proposed class action against four civilian government contractors and three individual contract employees, alleging that the Defendants conspired with certain officials of the United States government to engage in illegal treatment of Iraqi detainees, and that Plaintiffs were injured by Defendants' illegal conduct ensuing from that alleged conspiracy. *See* Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") ¶ 1, 36, 74-166.

#### A. PARTIES AND NONPARTY WITNESSES

The named Plaintiffs are all Iraqi nationals, none of whom resides in this District. All but one of the named Plaintiffs reside in Iraq. One named Plaintiff, an expatriate Iraqi, is a Swedish citizen who sometimes resides in Michigan. SAC ¶¶ 2-11. All of the proposed class members are individuals detained in Iraq, none of whom is alleged to have any connection to the United States or this District. SAC ¶¶ 12-14.

The Defendants are civilian government contractors who have performed services for the U.S. military in Iraq. Defendant Titan Corporation is a Delaware corporation headquartered in San Diego, California. SAC ¶15. Defendant CACI International Inc is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Arlington, Virginia. SAC ¶20. Defendants CACI, INC.-FEDERAL (a Delaware corporation) and CACI N.V. (a Netherlands corporation) are whollyowned subsidiaries of CACI International Inc, and share CACI's Arlington, Virginia headquarters. SAC ¶¶21-22.

The three individual Defendants (Adel Nahkla, John B. Israel, and Stephen A Stefanowicz) are individuals alleged to have acted at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq (and, upon Plaintiffs' supposed information and belief, at other unspecified locations) under the employment or direction of Titan and/or the CACI Defendants. SAC ¶ 16-19, 23-24. Their nationality is not alleged in the complaint. Defendant Stefanowicz is a resident of Pennsylvania. SAC ¶ 23. Defendants Nahkla's and Israel's residences are not alleged in the Second Amended Complaint.

Unnamed non-party government officials, who are alleged to have contracted and/or conspired with the Defendants, are principally agents and officers of the United States Department of Defense, which is headquartered at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. See

SAC ¶ 25, 47, 49, 56, 59-65 & Ex. F, 76-89. For venue purposes, the Department of Defense is considered to be located either in the Eastern District of Virginia (where the Pentagon is located) or in Washington, D.C. (the seat of the United States government).

To the extent that the Second Amended Complaint alleges the involvement of nonmilitary U.S. intelligence agencies or officials, see SAC ¶¶ 64, 76-78, 83, 86, 89, such agencies are headquartered near Washington, D.C., including the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley, Virginia (within the Eastern District of Virginia) and the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Maryland (which is within 100 miles of both the Eastern District of Virginia and the District of Columbia). See SAC ¶¶ 48, 64. The complaint further alleges, on information and belief, that Defendants provided interrogation services under blanket-purchase agreements with agencies not related to interrogation services, such as the United States Department of the Interior. SAC ¶ 64. The Interior Department is located in Washington, D.C.

## B. CONDUCT

The conduct and injuries of which Plaintiffs complain are alleged to have taken place primarily at detention facilities in Iraq. SAC ¶¶ 2-14, 36, 87-88, 101-158, esp. ¶ 156. Some additional conduct is alleged to have taken place at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. SAC ¶ 97. To the extent that the complaint alleges wrongful conduct at other U.S. military detention facilities or unknown locations, such facilities or locations are likely located in the Middle Eastern theater.

Plaintiffs allege that this conduct was pursuant to alleged conspiratorial agreements between the Defendant government contractors and U.S. government officials. SAC ¶ 1, 25, 51, 54, 56, 59, 61, 64, 76-95. The principal contract of which the Plaintiffs complain, which provided for civilian interrogation services in Iraq, was negotiated and executed by CACI Premier Technology, Inc. ("CACI PT"). CACI PT, a subsidiary of CACI, INC.-FEDERAL, is

not named as a defendant in this action. CACI PT is headquartered in Arlington, Virginia. *See* SAC ¶¶ 47(d), 64; Declaration of Jeffrey Elefante ¶¶ 5-6 (filed herewith as Exhibit A).

Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts placing the formation of the alleged conspiracy in the Southern District of California. See SAC ¶¶ 25, 74-100. Nor did any of the complained-of injurious conduct, i.e., the alleged mistreatment of detainees, occur here. Id.  $\P$ ¶ 2-14, 101-158.

The only allegations in the complaint that place any conduct at all in California are pleaded on information and belief. Those paragraphs, which speculate that certain relationships were formed, and certain implementing conduct took place, in the United States, allege that the conduct took place in California, Virginia, the District of Columbia, or elsewhere. SAC ¶ 83, 86, 166. None of those allegations is based on Plaintiffs' knowledge, nor do any of them place the complained-of conduct exclusively in California. *See id.* 

An action similar to this one, making similar allegations against Titan and the CACI Defendants, has been filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and is currently pending before Judge James Robertson. *Ibrahim et al. v. Titan Corp. et al.*, No. 04-CV-1248-JR. The *Ibrahim* action is filed by a group of former Iraqi detainees other than the named Plaintiffs here, and is based on the same contract(s) and the same alleged conduct. A copy of the *Ibrahim* complaint is attached to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enjoin Duplicative Action. The *Ibrahim* case is in its infancy: the complaint was filed July 27, 2004; the defendants filed motions to dismiss on October 12, 2004.

## III. ARGUMENT

Other than being the corporate home of one out of seven defendants, this District has no connection to this litigation. This lawsuit, brought by Iraqi nationals who have no connection to the United States, much less California, concerns alleged misconduct in Iraq—halfway

around the world from San Diego, and 3,000 miles closer to Defendants' proposed venue (suburban Washington, D.C.) than to this forum. To the extent the dispute concerns actions taken in the United States, those actions would have occurred in or around Arlington, Virginia, where the CACI personnel who negotiated the government contracts at issue are located, and where the Pentagon, other U.S. intelligence agencies, and three of the four government contractors are located.

Because Plaintiffs have no connection to this District, their choice of forum is entitled to little weight in the Court's analysis. The nonparty witnesses and other sources of proof are overwhelmingly located either in the Middle East, far from this District, or in and around suburban Washington, D.C. Moreover, the Eastern District of Virginia has a demonstrated expertise in dealing with lawsuits that involve classified or otherwise sensitive evidence, such as espionage cases. To ease burdens on parties and nonparties, to ease access to sources of proof, and in the interest of justice, the Court should transfer this suit either to the Eastern District of Virginia, where the Pentagon and the CACI Defendants are located, or to the District for the District of Columbia, where a similar lawsuit is already pending.

# A. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES

This Court has broad discretionary authority to transfer this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). That section provides: "For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Section 1404(a) was enacted as a statutory substitute for motions to dismiss for *forum non conveniens*, when the alternative forum is within the territory of the United States. As under the *forum non conveniens* doctrine, the purpose of a § 1404(a) transfer is to "prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and to protect litigants, witnesses,

and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense." *Van Dusen v. Barrack*, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (quotations and citations omitted).

Accordingly, the type of factors to be considered in a transfer motion are similar to those considered in *forum non conveniens* motions. *Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa*, 211 F.3d 509, 512-13 (9th Cir. 2000); *see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert*, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). Factors that may be appropriate for consideration in deciding a motion to transfer venue include things such as:

(1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff's choice of forum, (4) the respective parties' contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff's cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the cost of litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources of proof.

Jones v. GNC Franchising, 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)); see also Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Court should conduct an "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness," using these "case-specific factors," *Stewart Org.*, 487 U.S. at 29, and should weigh in the balance the public interest, as well as the interests of the private litigants before the Court. *Id.* at 30; *see also Jones*, 211 F.3d at 499 & n.20. The relevant "private interest factors" are those enumerated in *Jones*: they include "ease of access to sources of proof, the availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses, the comparative cost of obtaining willing ones, and 'all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." *Ravelo Monegro*, 211 F.3d at 512 (quoting *Gulf Oil*, 330 U.S. at 508). "Public interest factors" to be considered include court congestion, the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty, the interest in having localized

controversies decided at home, the interest in trying the case in a forum familiar with the applicable law, and the interest in avoiding unnecessary conflicts of laws. *See id.* at 512 (citing *Gulf Oil*, 330 U.S. at 508-09).

Although a § 1404(a) transfer and a *forum non conveniens* motion weigh the same types of factors, the standard for decision differs. A transfer under § 1404(a) is to be "granted upon a lesser showing of inconvenience" than a *forum non conveniens* motion. *Norwood v. Kirkpatrick*, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955); *Piper Aircraft*, 454 U.S. at 265 ("District courts were given more discretion to transfer under § 1404(a) than they had to dismiss on grounds of *forum non conveniens*."); *see also Joe Boxer Corp. v. R. Siskind & Co., Inc.*, 1999 WL 429549, \*7 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 1999) (discretion to transfer is broader than discretion to dismiss). While a dismissal for *forum non conveniens* requires a "clear showing," *Miskow v. Boeing Co.*, 664 F.2d 205, 208 (9th Cir. 1981), a motion for § 1404(a) transfer requires only a showing "that the transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and will promote the interest of justice." *Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.*, 820 F. Supp. 503, 506 (C.D. Cal. 1992).

# B. THE PRIVATE INTERESTS OF THE LITIGANTS WARRANT A TRANSFER OF THIS ACTION

In this case, the interests of the litigants before the Court—the plaintiff's choice of forum, the relative ease of access to sources of proof, including the availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses and the cost of obtaining willing witnesses, and all the practical problems and expenses of trying the case (*Gulf Oil*, 330 U.S. at 508; *Ravelo Monegro*, 211 F.3d at 512)—all tip in favor of transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia or the District of Columbia. There is nothing about this case that makes litigation in the Southern District of California convenient for any of the parties, much less the nonparty witnesses.

# 1. Plaintiffs' Choice of Forum Warrants Only Minimal Consideration

Plaintiffs sued in the Southern District of California, despite having no connection whatsoever to this forum. None of the named Plaintiffs live here. All but one of the named Plaintiffs are Iraqis who reside in Iraq; one named Plaintiff, an expatriate Iraqi, is alleged to be a Swedish citizen who sometimes resides in Michigan. SAC ¶¶ 2-11. Although a plaintiff's choice of forum ordinarily carries substantial (though not dispositive) weight, such deference is based on the presumption that the plaintiff has selected his home forum, which will naturally be most convenient for him. *See Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.*, 330 U.S. 518, 525 (1947). "When the plaintiff is foreign, however," and suing in the U.S., "this assumption is much less reasonable." *Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981). In weighing convenience of the trial location, "a foreign plaintiff's choice deserves less deference." *Id.* 

The deference is lesser still when the plaintiff is an individual attempting to sue on behalf of hundreds or thousands of other potential plaintiffs, each of whom might have different considerations of convenience. *Koster*, 330 U.S. at 524; *Lou*, 834 F.2d at 739. "To entertain such an action places the forum in a position of responsibility toward the whole class which the plaintiff assumes to represent." *Koster*, 330 U.S. at 525. A class action "brings to the court more than an ordinary task of adjudication; it brings a task of administration; and what forum is appropriate for such a task may require consideration of its relation to the whole group of members... whom plaintiff volunteers to represent as well as to the nominal plaintiff himself." *Id.* at 525-26. In such a case, for convenience's sake, the location of the defendants, and the "books, records and witnesses" that may exist at defendants' home offices, are entitled to greater consideration. *See id.* at 526.

"If the operative facts have not occurred within the forum and the forum has no interest

in the parties or subject matter, [the plaintiff]'s choice is entitled to only minimal consideration." Lou, 834 F.2d at 739. Here, the operative facts pled by Plaintiffs have no connection with the Southern District of California. None of the complained-of conduct occurred here. See SAC ¶¶ 101-158. The complaint fails to allege any facts that place the formation of the alleged conspiracy in the Southern District of California. See SAC ¶¶ 74-100.

Plaintiffs' complaint stops short of alleging that the conspiratorial agreement was negotiated or closed in the Southern District of California, or that any individual here negotiated or joined the alleged conspiracy:

Certain government officials and senior management in Defendant Titan and CACI Corporate Defendants had relationships that assisted in the formation and implementation of the Torture Conspiracy. Upon information and belief, these relationships were formed and fostered by meetings, telephonic discussions, in-person discussions, email discussions and other communications that occurred in, among other places, California, Virginia and the District of Columbia.

SAC ¶ 83. At most, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants acted to implement the alleged conspiracy:

[Defendants] took steps in California, Virginia and other locations throughout the United States to screen potential applicants to ascertain whether they would be willing to engage in illegal acts. Certain Team Titan postings sought 'male U.S. citizens' and revealed that applicants 'must undergo a favorable U.S. Army Counterintelligence screening interview.'

SAC ¶ 86. But Plaintiffs' premise (not to mention their unsupported conclusion) is incorrect: the "Team Titan" project referred to in paragraph 86 had nothing to do with the contract that CACI PT has to supply interrogators to the military in Iraq. See Elefante Decl. ¶ 7.

The only other allegation of conduct in California is Plaintiffs' unsupported allegation that Defendants "took steps to obstruct justice in the District of Columbia, Virginia, California, and other states, as well as abroad." SAC ¶ 166. Notably, the only alleged act of obstruction as

to which location is specifically alleged is the alleged falsification of an international death certificate, alleged to have taken place outside the United States. See SAC ¶ 164. The complaint does not allege any specific acts of obstruction to have taken place within this District. See SAC ¶ 159-66.

Significantly, none of the allegations of conduct in California is based on Plaintiffs' knowledge—the allegations are all made on information and belief. See SAC ¶ 83, 86, 166. Moreover, none of those allegations allege any conduct committed specifically in California, much less in this District. Rather, each paragraph alleges that the conduct was committed in California, Virginia, the District of Columbia, or elsewhere. See id. Thus, even these few slim allegations (among the hundreds in the complaint) are speculative as to whether the conduct occurred in this state or elsewhere—particularly in Virginia (the proposed transferee district). When the Court considers the attached Elefante Declaration in addition to the face of the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), it becomes clear that the SAC contains no factually supported allegations that establish any connection between this District and the operative facts giving rise to Plaintiffs' asserted claims.

In sum, none of the Plaintiffs can show the Southern District of California is convenient for them. Even for Plaintiffs, the Eastern District of Virginia is more convenient. Plaintiffs living in Iraq or Sweden, or even part-time in Michigan, are all closer to the East Coast of the United States than to the West Coast. The same is true of any Iraqi residents who theoretically might be part of the class that Plaintiffs may seek to certify, or who were witnesses to the alleged conduct. The Virginia venue is more convenient to Plaintiffs' counsel, as well, with the exception of counsel that is "[s]erving as local counsel only." See SAC at 61. Three of Plaintiffs' six sets of lawyers are located on the East Coast, in New York and Philadelphia. Id.

Additional Plaintiffs' counsel are located in Chicago and Michigan. *Id.* Plaintiffs' local counsel is the only one of their thirteen lawyers who is located in this District (and admitted to the California bar). *Id.* 

The only connection between this litigation and the Southern District of California is that Defendant Titan Corporation has its corporate offices in San Diego. While this bare fact *may* suffice for venue in a technical sense, it does not make this forum a convenient forum for trying the action, when all of the operative facts, most of the parties, and the vast majority of witnesses and documents are located elsewhere. Indeed, it is telling that when Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in San Diego, they held their press conference to announce that fact in Washington, D.C., near the Pentagon and CACI's corporate offices.

## 2. Sources of Proof: Witnesses and Documents

"Perhaps the most important private interest factor is the relative availability of evidence and witnesses." *Nai-Chao v. Boeing Co.*, 555 F. Supp. 9, 17 (N.D. Cal. 1982). Access to the sources of proof, whether testimonial, documentary, or physical, is obviously fundamental to the parties' ability to try the case, and thus to the interests of justice. In this case, the sources of proof, to the extent that they are located in the United States at all, are concentrated within the reach of the subpoena power of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or that for the District of Columbia.

The convenience of non-party witnesses is generally accorded more weight than the convenience of party witnesses. *See, e.g., State Street Capital Corp. v. Dente*, 855 F. Supp. 192, 197 (S.D. Tex. 1994) ("it is the convenience of non-party witnesses rather than that of party witnesses, that is accorded greater weight in a transfer of venue analysis"); *Aquatic Amusement Assocs. v. Walt Disney World Co.*, 734 F. Supp. 54, 57 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) ("While

the convenience of party witnesses is a factor to be considered, the convenience of non-party witnesses is a more important factor.") Further, in weighing the importance of non-party witnesses, courts should look to the nature and quality of the witnesses' testimony with respect to the issues in the case, not just to the number of witnesses. *Id.* 

Non-party witnesses for the military and other government agencies, and officials charged with investigating the incidents at the detention facilities in Iraq, are expected to be critical witnesses in this matter. Such witnesses are overwhelmingly concentrated either in Iraq, at the facilities where the alleged abuse took place, or at the Pentagon and its immediate environs. To the extent that critical non-party witnesses are located elsewhere, *e.g.*, in military installations throughout the United States and in the Middle East and European theaters, the Eastern District of Virginia is still more likely to be convenient to such witnesses than is the Southern District of California.

There is no reason to expect, given the nature of the allegations, that non-party witnesses will be willing to testify absent compulsory process. It is much more likely that many non-party government witnesses will *not* be willing to testify unless subpoenaed. The inability to compel unwilling witnesses is an "important" factor to be considered in a transfer motion. *Gulf Oil*, 330 U.S. at 508; *Jones*, 211 F.3d at 499.

Plaintiffs' choice of forum in the Southern District of California greatly complicates the use of compulsory process for both sides to obtain access to unwilling witnesses. With almost all of the government witnesses in this case subject to compulsory process only from the United States District Courts for the Eastern District of Virginia (which has geographic jurisdiction over the Pentagon, as well as the CIA, and, within 100 miles, the NSA in nearby Maryland) or the District of Columbia (which has geographic jurisdiction over the seat of the federal

government),<sup>1</sup> it is inevitable that those courts will be heavily involved in the issuance of witness and document subpoenas in this case. It would impose unreasonable demands on those courts to initiate untold proceedings on their miscellaneous dockets solely for the purpose of enforcing discovery in a case nearly 3,000 miles away, just as it would impose unreasonable demands on this Court to attempt to control discovery using only the compulsory process of distant courts, with no compulsory powers of its own save over the parties.

Choice of a forum that would hamper Defendants' ability to compel witnesses or documents that may be critical to their defense threatens to gravely undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial process as well as the Defendants' right to present a defense. Plaintiffs' choice of venue, especially in the absence of any compelling reason for the choice of forum in the first instance, should not be permitted to hamstring Defendants' use of compulsory process. See Am. Int'l Underwriters (Philippines), Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming abstention where inability to compel non-party witnesses made a federal forum inconvenient).

Former employees of Premier Technology Group, Inc. ("PTG"), an entity formerly headquartered in northern Virginia, may also be critical non-party witnesses in this litigation. In May 2003 (long after the alleged conspiracy began, according to Plaintiffs, see SAC ¶ 82), CACI, INC.-FEDERAL purchased most of the assets of PTG. Elefante Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. It is CACI PT, not one of the three CACI Corporate Defendants, that obtained the contract for interrogation services in Iraq that is implicated in the complaint. Elefante Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. Former

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> It is anticipated, though not yet confirmed, that military witnesses serving in overseas areas may be subjected to compulsory process through subpoenas directed at the Department of Defense, aided by the military chain of command. In any event, such witnesses are no more subject to this Court's subpoena power than to the subpoena power of the federal courts in Virginia and D.C.

PTG employees who are not now employed by or under the control of one of the CACI Corporate Defendants and who may be key defense witnesses are most likely to be concentrated in the Northern Virginia area, where PTG was headquartered and conducted its business.

In addition to the serious problem of meaningful access to compulsory process, Plaintiffs' selection of venue poses significant costs even for willing witnesses. Party witnesses critical to the defense are also concentrated in the Eastern District of Virginia. The three CACI Corporate Defendants' corporate offices, as well as the corporate offices for CACI PT, are located in northern Virginia. In addition, Titan Corporation's government contracting office for the relevant contract is located in northern Virginia. *See* Titan Corp.'s Opposition to Pl. Mot. to Enjoin Duplicative Action at 7 (filed Oct. 18, 2004). For Iraqi nationals or U.S. citizens still in Iraq who may also be defense witnesses, the East Coast forum is significantly more convenient than the West Coast forum. Obviously, all else being equal, trying this action in the Eastern District of Virginia or in the District of Columbia would involve far less travel expense for the vast majority of potential witnesses than trying it on the West Coast.

In addition to the concentration of critical witnesses in Northern Virginia, documents containing facts critical to the Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' defenses are likely to be concentrated in this same region. Presumably, many key documents will be held by custodians in the Pentagon and offices of other government agencies located within 100 miles of the Alexandria Courthouse in the Eastern District of Virginia. *See Koster*, 330 U.S. at 526. Notably, each of the three nonmilitary government agencies mentioned in the Second Amended Complaint (the CIA, the NSA, and the Department of the Interior) is also located within 100 miles of the Alexandria Courthouse.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The CIA is located in the Eastern District of Virginia; the Department of the Interior in

Access to documentary proof is further complicated by the fact that many, if not most, of the documents relevant to the claims and defenses in this action will be classified. There can be little doubt that any litigation of the merits of this action will entail a significant amount of information protected by the nation's highest secrecy classification, known as "sensitive compartmentized information," or "SCI." SCI is defined as:

classified information concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods or analytical process, which is required to be handled exclusively within formal control systems established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

See Director of Central Intelligence, Directive No. 6/9, Nov. 18, 2002, available online at <a href="http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid6-9.htm">http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid6-9.htm</a>.

SCI materials must be maintained, and can be reviewed, only in a SCI facility (an "SCIF"), or with an express waiver of the published security requirements. *Id.* While it is possible to establish new SCIFs, the required security measures and clearances involve substantial cost and time if they are not already in place. *See id.* The Alexandria Courthouse already has an established SCIF, maintained by and for the United States Department of Justice, and there are several other SCIFs in the general vicinity.

In sum, it is clear that all the private factors weigh in favor of transfer. "[T]he relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; . . . and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive," would be well-served by transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia. *Gulf Oil*, 330 U.S. at 508. Under the circumstances, Plaintiffs' choice of forum is due minimal weight at most. *Lou*, 834 F.2d at 739. In fact, it is

Washington, D.C. The NSA, in Fort Meade, Maryland, is less than 100 miles away.

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obvious that transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia would serve to maximize Plaintiffs' convenience and reduce Plaintiffs' expenses, as well.

# C. THE PUBLIC INTEREST WEIGHS IN FAVOR OF A TRANSFER

The public interest, including things such as court congestion and judicial economy, is also to be weighed in a venue transfer motion. *Stewart Org.*, 487 U.S. at 30; *Jones*, 211 F.3d at 499 & n.21; *see also Gulf Oil*, 330 U.S. 508-09. Here, the balance of the public interest factors favors a transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia.

Through no fault of its own, the Southern District of California has a more congested calendar than the Eastern District of Virginia. Recent appointments to the bench notwithstanding, the Southern District of California cannot reasonably be expected to adjudicate this action with as much deliberate speed as the Eastern District of Virginia, which ranks first in the country in time to disposition for civil cases. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 2003 Fed. Court Management Statistics, 70, available online www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2003.pl. In 2003, the median time from filing to trial for a civil trial in the Eastern District of Virginia was 8 months; it was nearly three times as long in the Southern District of California, 23.5 months. See id. at viii, 70, & 130. Given the nature of the litigation, it is in the public interest, as well as the interests of the litigants, to have a prompt adjudication of Plaintiffs' claims.

Judicial economy will also be served by a transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia because that court is familiar with, and regularly deals with, the atypical issues that are likely to present themselves in this case, such as those related to discovery, inspection, review, use, and testimony related to government classified information and the more closely regulated materials containing SCI. As noted above, the Alexandria Courthouse has an SCI facility that is actively

maintained by the U.S. Department of Justice. That courthouse is accustomed to the logistics attendant to trials involving national security secrets: it is currently conducting the Zacarias Moussaoui trial, and has also been the site of numerous other espionage or national security-related prosecutions, including those of Robert Hanssen, John Walker Lindh, Brian Regan, Mir Amal Kansi, and Aldrich Ames.

# D. VENUE IS PROPER IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

To prevail on a motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a), Movants must establish that the proposed transferee district is one where the action could have been brought. *Goodyear Tire*, 820 F. Supp. at 506. The relevant general venue statute provides as follows:

A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

As explained above, the overwhelming majority of the events and omissions complained of in the Second Amended Complaint occurred overseas, outside any district within the United Stats. If the Second Amended Complaint shows that any "substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim" occurred within the United States at all, such events or omissions occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia, where the government contracts at issue were negotiated and executed among, variously, the Pentagon, other U.S. government agencies, the CACI Defendants, their corporate predecessors, and the government contracts office of Titan. If executing government contracts, by itself, constitutes a "substantial part of the events or omissions" underlying Plaintiffs' complaint, then venue is proper in the Eastern District of

Virginia. If the contracts, by themselves, do not suffice for venue under § 1391(b)(2), then there is no district in which venue is proper under § 1391(b)(2), and consequently venue is proper either in California or Virginia, the respective corporate homes of Titan and the CACI Defendants, under § 1391(b)(3). In that instance, transfer is proper for convenience and in the interest of justice under § 1404(a).

# E. TRANSFER IS ALSO PROPER TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

In the alternative, this Court may also transfer this case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A related case, making similar allegations against the same group of corporate Defendants, is currently pending there before Judge James Robertson. *See Ibrahim et al. v. Titan Corp. et al.*, No. 04-CV-1248-JR.

The private interests involving convenience for the litigants and nonparty witnesses all favor litigation in the District of Columbia as easily (or nearly as easily) as in the Eastern District of Virginia. The federal courthouse in the District of Columbia is less than ten miles from the courthouse in Alexandria. The same geographic considerations apply. Moreover, because it has geographic jurisdiction over the seat of the federal government, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Interior, and the nation's nonmilitary intelligence agencies, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia would have subpoena power over unwilling nonparty witnesses. *See Barfman v. Cheney*, 827 F. Supp. 1,2 (D.D.C. 1993) (venue in D.C. proper over claims against Secretary of Defense); *Mundy v. Weinberger*, 554 F. Supp. 811, 817–18 (D.D.C. 1982) (same).

Considerations of the public interest and judicial economy also favor transfer to the District of Columbia. There is a significant potential for savings through judicial economy,

through possible consolidation with the *Ibrahim* case pending before Judge Robertson.<sup>3</sup> That case has substantial overlap with this one: both cases involve allegations of conspiracy, and detainee mistreatment, arising out of the U.S. military's detention facilities in Iraq. Both cases are against the same group of contractor defendants: Titan Corporation and the three CACI Defendants. Although they involve different detainees, the cases involve the same detention facilities in Iraq, the same government contracts and contractors, and similar claims of harm. Thus, they are likely to involve substantially overlapping, if not completely duplicative, discovery demands. Although it would come at the cost of some speed and some convenience for the CACI Defendants and for non-party officials located at or near the Pentagon, litigation in the District of Columbia would offer the parties, the nonparties, and the courts substantial savings through elimination of duplicative litigation and duplicative discovery.

The only question, for transfer to the District of Columbia under §§ 1404(a) is whether this action could have been brought there in the first place. Venue is proper in the District of Columbia if "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred" there. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Because D.C. is the seat of the federal government, including executive departments such as the Departments of Defense and Interior, it might be possible to conclude that Plaintiffs' allegations concerning Defendants' government contracts are sufficient to sustain venue in the District of Columbia. That presumably is the basis for the *Ibrahim* plaintiffs' having sued in the District of Columbia.

Because the requirements of § 1391(b)(2) are more easily satisfied in the Eastern

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Obviously, consolidation is not to be taken for granted. That would be a question for the D.C. district court in the first instance, under that court's own procedures for handling related cases. Nonetheless, it is significant that this case and the *Ibrahim* case involve the same Defendants, similar Plaintiffs, and similar claims. Moreover, the *Ibrahim* case is at the same procedural stage as this case—it is still in its infancy, with responsive pleadings not yet served and discovery not yet begun in earnest.

District of Virginia (location of the Pentagon, the CACI Defendants, Titan's government contracting office, and the location where a number of the government contracts at issue here were negotiated and executed), and because it is their corporate home, the CACI Defendants principally seek transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division. However, due to the pendency of the *Ibrahim* case, and the ability of the D.C. court to exercise subpoena power over witnesses and entities located in the District of Columbia and northern Virginia, the Movants note that the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia may be a suitable alternative forum for transfer, should the Court decline to transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Eastern District of Virginia is a far more convenient forum than the Southern District of California. Accordingly, this action should be transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia. In the alternative, convenience and judicial economy would also be served by transferring the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, where a related case involving the same allegations and Defendants is already pending.

Dated: November 10, 2004

Respectfully submitted,

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COUGHLAN, SEMMER & LIPMAN LLP R.J. COUGHLAN, JR. (CA Bar No. 91711) CATHLEEN G. FITCH (CA Bar No. 95302) 501 West Broadway, Suite 400 DEPUTY 3 8 Y 1 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 232-0800 Facsimile: (619) 232-0107 5 STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP J. WILLIAM KOEGEL, JR. JOHN F. O'CONNOR 1330 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: (202) 429-3000 Facsimile: (202) 429-3902 10 Attorneys for Defendants CACI International Inc, 11 CACI INC. - FEDERAL, and CACI N.V. 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 13 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 14 15 SALEH et al. Case No.: 04 CV 1143 R (NLS) 16 Plaintiffs, 17 **DECLARATION OF** JEFFREY P. ELEFANTE IN SUPPORT 18 OF MOTION BY DEFENDANTS CACI TITAN CORPORATION et al. INTERNATIONAL INC, CACI, INC. – 19 FEDERAL, AND CACI N.V. TO Defendants. TRANSFER VENUE 20 21 Jeffrey P. Elefante attests as follows: 22 1. My name is Jeffrey P. Elefante. I am over the age of eighteen, of sound mind 23 and body and competent to testify. 24 25 I am Executive Vice-President, General Counsel, Secretary, and Director of 2. 26 Contract and Admin. Services for CACI International Inc. I have been employed by CACI 27 International Inc or one of its subsidiary corporations since 1983 and worked in its legal 28 division continuously since 1987.

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- 3. I have personal knowledge of the facts to which I attest herein. I could testify to such things in a court of law, and would, if called to do so.
- 4. CACI International Inc is the parent corporation of severally wholly owned subsidiaries, including CACI, INC.-FEDERAL and CACI N.V. CACI International Inc and CACI, INC.-FEDERAL are incorporated in Delaware and have their principal place of business in Arlington, Virginia. CACI, INC.-FEDERAL is, in turn, the parent corporation of, CACI Premier Technology, Inc. CACI Premier Technology, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Arlington, Virginia.
- 5. In May 2003, CACI, INC.-FEDERAL acquired most of the assets of the company formerly known as Premier Technology Group, Inc., headquartered in Chantilly, Virginia. These assets became the corpus of CACI Premier Technology, Inc. Among the assets acquired through this purchase was a Blanket Purchase Agreement issued initially by the Department of the Army and subsequently transferred to the Department of Interior. In connection with the purchase of the Premier Technology Group's assets, the Blanket Purchase Agreement was novated to CACI Premier Technology, Inc.
- 6. Beginning in August 2003, the United States Department of the Interior issued a series of delivery orders to CACI Premier Technology, Inc. pursuant to the Blanket Purchase Agreement. Two of those delivery orders called for CACI Premier Technology, Inc. to provide, among other things, interrogators in support of Joint Coalition Task Force–7 in Iraq. CACI International Inc is not a party to that contract. Nor is CACI, INC.-FEDERAL or CACI, N.V. a party to that contract.
- 7. The "Team Titan" project which Plaintiffs allege in their Second Amended Complaint has nothing to do with CACI Premier Technology, Inc.'s contract to supply

interrogators. Indeed, the only involvement any CACI company has had in the provision of interrogation services is the work performed by employees of CACI Premier Technology, Inc. in Iraq, which began with task orders issued by the United States government in August 2003.

8. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 4th day of November, 2004, at Arlington, Virginia.

Jeffrey P. Elefante