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6 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
7 **FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
8

9 SALEH, an individual; SAMI ABBAS AL RAWI,  
an individual; MWAFaq SAMI ABBAS AL  
10 RAWI, an individual; AHMED, an individual;  
ISMAEL, an individual; NEISEF, an individual;  
11 ESTATE OF IBRAHIEM, the heirs and estate of an  
individual; RASHEED, an individual; JOHN DOE  
12 NO. 1; JANE DOE NO. 2; CLASSES OF  
PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, KNOWN  
13 HEREINAFTER AS JOHN and JANE DOES NOS.  
3 – 1050,

14 Plaintiffs,

15 v.

16 TITAN CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation;  
ADEL NAHKLA, a Titan employee located in Abu  
Ghraib, Iraq; CACI INTERNATIONAL INC., a  
17 Delaware Corporation; CACI INCORPORATED –  
FEDERAL, a Delaware Corporation; CACI N.V., a  
18 Netherlands corporation; STEPHEN A.  
STEFANOWICZ, a CACI employee located in Abu  
19 Ghraib, Iraq; and JOHN B. ISRAEL, a Titan  
subcontractor located in Abu Ghraib, Iraq,

20 Defendants.  
21

) Case No. 04 CV 1143 R (NLS)

) **CLASS ACTION**

) **SECOND AMENDED CLASS**  
) **ACTION COMPLAINT**  
) **ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF**  
) **RICO, CONSPIRACY TO**  
) **VIOLATE RICO, VIOLATIONS**  
) **OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS**  
) **ACT, VIOLATIONS OF THE**  
) **GENEVA CONVENTIONS,**  
) **VIOLATIONS OF THE UNITED**  
) **STATES CONSTITUTION,**  
) **VIOLATIONS OF THE**  
) **RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND**  
) **INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS**  
) **ACT, AND COMMON LAW**  
) **TORTS.**

) **[DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL]**

) **FILED BY FACSIMILE**

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**SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT**

1. This class action alleges that Defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, violated United States domestic and international law and intentionally and negligently committed a series of tortious acts against Plaintiffs. Defendants contracted with the United States to provide interrogation and other related intelligence services. Instead of providing such services in a lawful manner, they conspired with each other and with certain United States government officials to direct and conduct a scheme to torture, rape, and, in some instances, summarily execute Plaintiffs. This action seeks a permanent injunction against this illegal conduct, compensatory and punitive damages, treble damages and attorneys fees under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), declaratory relief, and a permanent injunction against any future contracting with the United States.

**PARTIES**

2. Plaintiff Saleh (“Plaintiff Saleh”) is a Swedish citizen residing in both Sweden and Dearborn, Michigan. Plaintiff Saleh opposed Saddam Hussein, who had him imprisoned and tortured in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. After being released from prison, Plaintiff Saleh fled from Iraq to Sweden. After the fall of the Hussein regime, Plaintiff Saleh responded to United States’ plea for expatriates to return and help rebuild Iraq. Plaintiff Saleh returned to Iraq with funds to invest and rebuild the country. Upon his arrival on or about September 25, 2003, he was detained, sent to the same Abu Ghraib prison where he had been tortured by Saddam Hussein, and was tortured, abused, and otherwise mistreated by the Defendants and their Co-Conspirators.

3. Plaintiff Sami Abbas Majdel Al Rawi (“Plaintiff Sami”) is a 56-year old Iraqi citizen, residing at Bhagdad – Amirya – PL636, St 74, House No. 19, Bhagdad, Iraq. He owns and manages a company in Baghdad that had entered into a number of reconstruction contracts with the United States government. On March 1, 2004, Plaintiff Sami was arrested and detained at the Baghdad International Airport Prison, together with his four sons. Plaintiff Sami was tortured, abused, and otherwise mistreated by the Defendants and their co-conspirators. Plaintiff Sami was released without charge on March 6, 2004.

1           4.       Plaintiff Mwafaq Sami Abbas Al Rawi (“Plaintiff Mwafaq”) is the 28-year old son  
2 of Plaintiff Sami. Plaintiff Mwafaq is a lawyer. He was arrested and detained with Plaintiff Sami  
3 and his three brothers on March 1, 2004 at the Baghdad International Airport. Plaintiff Mwafaq  
4 was tortured, abused, and otherwise mistreated by the Defendants and their co-conspirators.  
5 Plaintiff Mwafaq was released without charge on March 6, 2004.

6           5.       Plaintiff Ahmed (“Plaintiff Ahmed”) is an Iraqi released without charge after five  
7 months of detention in Abu Ghraib Prison, Tent No. 7, Camp No. 3. His prison number was No.  
8 154120. Plaintiff Ahmed was tortured, abused, and otherwise mistreated by the Defendants and  
9 their co-conspirators.

10          6.       Plaintiff Ismael (“Plaintiff Ismael”) is an Iraqi released without charge on June 6,  
11 2004, after months of detention in Abu Ghraib Prison in Tent No. 7, Camp No. 3. He also was  
12 detained in the Buka Prison. His prison number was No. 154110. Plaintiff Ismael was tortured,  
13 abused, and otherwise mistreated by the Defendants and their co-conspirators. He is concerned  
14 about his son, Burban, who remains in detention in an unknown location.

15          7.       Plaintiff Neisef (“Plaintiff Neisef”) is an Iraqi who was detained for seven months in  
16 Abu Ghraib Prison, Tent No. 7, Camp No. 3, and for five months in Buka Prison. Plaintiff Neisef  
17 was tortured, abused, and otherwise mistreated by the Defendants and their co-conspirators.

18          8.       Plaintiff Estate of Ibrahiem (“Ibrahiem Estate Plaintiff”) is the heirs and estate of  
19 Ibrahiem, a 63-year old man who died in Abu Ghraib Prison as a result of acts and inactions by  
20 Defendants and their co-conspirators.

21          9.       Plaintiff Rasheed (“Plaintiff Rasheed”) is an Iraqi citizen who was detained and  
22 tortured in Iraq. Upon information and belief, the Defendants participated in torturing, abusing,  
23 and otherwise mistreating Plaintiff Rasheed.

24          10.       Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 is an Iraqi citizen who was recently released without charge  
25 from the Abu Ghraib Prison. Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 was tortured, abused, and otherwise  
26 mistreated by the Defendants and their co-conspirators. The identity of Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 is  
27 known to counsel, but he has asked not to be publicly identified due to concerns about his safety.  
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1           11. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 is an Iraqi citizen who was released without charge on  
2 January 22, 2004. She is a 55-year old English teacher. Her 70-year old husband had been tortured  
3 to death in Abu Ghraib Prison during the Saddam Hussein regime. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 was  
4 tortured, abused, and otherwise mistreated by the Defendants and their co-conspirators. The  
5 identity of Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 is known to counsel, but she has asked not to be publicly  
6 identified due to concerns about her safety.

7           12. Plaintiffs John and Jane Does Nos. 3 - 500 are the Class of persons who (a) have  
8 been forcibly detained in prisons or facilities in or around Iraq subsequent to the fall of the Hussein  
9 regime; (b) have been subjected to conditions and abuses that violate United States domestic law,  
10 international treaties, and norms of customary international humanitarian and human rights law;  
11 and (c) have suffered injuries to their properties and businesses as a result of those conditions and  
12 abuses. (This Class shall hereinafter be known as the “RICO Class.”)

13           13. Plaintiffs John and Jane Does Nos. 500 - 1000 are the Class of persons who (a) have  
14 been forcibly detained in prisons or facilities in or around Iraq subsequent to the fall of the Hussein  
15 regime; (b) have been or will be subjected to conditions and abuses that violate United States  
16 domestic law, international treaties, and norms of customary international humanitarian and human  
17 rights law; and (c) have suffered injuries as a result of the treatment. (This Class shall hereinafter  
18 be known as the “Common Law Class.”)

19           14. Plaintiffs John and Jane Does Nos. 1001-1050 are the Class of the estates and heirs  
20 of persons who (a) were detained in Iraq; (b) were subjected to conditions and abuse that violates  
21 United States domestic law, international treaties, and norms of customary international  
22 humanitarian and human rights law; and (c) wrongfully died as a result of those conditions and  
23 abuses. (This Class shall hereinafter be known as the “Wrongful Death Class.”)

24           15. Defendant Titan Corporation (hereinafter “Defendant Titan”) is a publicly traded  
25 corporation with headquarters located at 3033 Science Park Road, San Diego, California 92121-  
26 1199. Defendant Titan Corporation was formed and incorporated under the laws of Delaware.  
27 Defendant Titan Corporation acted at all times relevant to this action through individual agents and  
28 employees, who are hereinafter subsumed within the term “Defendant Titan.”

1           16. Defendant Titan Corporation employed and directed the action of Defendant Adel  
2 Nahkla, an individual identified by the United States as participating in illegal conduct at the Abu  
3 Ghraib Prison in Iraq.

4           17. Defendant Titan Corporation retained and/or employed Defendant John Israel as an  
5 employee, representative, and/or agent and who was an individual identified by the United States as  
6 participating in illegal conduct at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq.

7           18. As an employee and agent of Defendant Titan, and acting within his scope of  
8 authority, Defendant Nahkla participated directly and indirectly in illegal conduct at the Abu  
9 Ghraib Prison in Iraq and, upon information and belief,<sup>1</sup> other locations.

10          19. As a representative, constructive employee, and/or agent of Defendant Titan,  
11 Defendant Israel directed and participated in illegal conduct at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq and,  
12 upon information and belief, other locations.

13          20. Defendant CACI International Inc. (hereafter “Defendant CACI”) is a publicly  
14 traded corporation with headquarters located at 1100 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.  
15 Defendant CACI was formed in 1962 and incorporated under the laws of Delaware. Defendant  
16 CACI Corporation acted at all times relevant to this action through individual agents and  
17 employees, who are hereinafter subsumed within the term “Defendant CACI” and the term “CACI  
18 Corporate Defendants.” Defendant CACI does business throughout the United States and the rest  
19 of the world.

20          21. Defendant CACI Incorporated – Federal is a subsidiary wholly owned and  
21 controlled by Defendant CACI. Defendant CACI Incorporated – Federal was formed and  
22 incorporated under the laws of Delaware. Defendant CACI Incorporated – Federal acted at all  
23 times relevant to this action through individual agents and employees, who are hereinafter  
24 subsumed within the term “Defendant CACI” and the term “CACI Corporate Defendants.”

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28 <sup>1</sup> The term “information and belief” is used throughout the Second Amended Complaint to  
connote those instances when Plaintiffs believe the allegations are likely to have evidentiary  
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

1           22. Defendant CACI N.V. is a subsidiary wholly owned and controlled by Defendant  
2 CACI. Defendant CACI N.V. is a Netherlands corporation doing business in the United States at  
3 1100 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201. Defendant CACI N.V. acted at all times  
4 relevant to this action through individual agents and employees, who are hereinafter subsumed  
5 within the term “Defendant CACI” and the term “CACI Corporate Defendants.”

6           23. Defendant Stephen A. Stefanowicz, a resident of Pennsylvania, is or was employed  
7 by Defendant CACI, Defendant CACI Incorporated – Federal, and Defendant CACI N.V.  
8 (hereinafter “CACI Corporate Defendants”). As an employee and agent of the CACI Corporate  
9 Defendants, Defendant Stefanowicz directed and participated in illegal conduct at the Abu Ghraib  
10 Prison in Iraq and, upon information and belief, other locations.

11           24. Defendant John B. Israel is or was retained by, constructively employed by, or  
12 contracted with Defendant Titan Corporation as its employee, agent, and/or representative.  
13 Defendant Israel, acting within the scope of his agency and/or authority, engaged and participated  
14 directly and/or indirectly in illegal conduct at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq and, upon information  
15 and belief, other locations.

16           25. Acting together, Defendants Titan, CACI Corporate Defendants, Stefanowicz, Israel,  
17 and Nahkla conspired with certain United States officials (a) to engage in a series of wrongful and  
18 illegal acts, including but not limited to, summary execution, torture or other cruel, inhuman or  
19 degrading treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention, assault and battery, false imprisonment and  
20 intentional interference with religious practices; (b) to inflate artificially by these acts the demand  
21 for interrogation and other related services such as interpretation and translation; and (c) to profit  
22 and gain a competitive advantage from this artificially-inflated demand for such services and from  
23 additional government contracts directed to Defendant Titan and CACI Corporate Defendants.

24           26. Each of the Defendants was the agent, employee and/or joint venturer, or working in  
25 concert with, other Defendants and was acting within the course and scope of such agency,  
26 employment and/or joint venture or concerted activity. To the extent that any particular act was  
27 perpetrated by a certain Defendant or Defendants, the remaining Defendant or Defendants  
28 confirmed and ratified the same.



- 1 (a) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
- 2 (b) there are questions of law common to the class;
- 3 (c) there are questions of fact common to the class;
- 4 (d) the claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class; and
- 5 (e) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
- 6 the class.

7 35. Counsel are experienced in bringing and defending class actions and will adequately  
8 represent the class interests.

9 36. There should be at least three subclasses certified. These subclasses should be  
10 defined as follows:

11 (a) The RICO Class consists of persons who (i) have been forcibly detained in  
12 prisons or detention facilities in or around Iraq subsequent to the fall of the Hussein regime; (ii)  
13 have been subjected to conditions and treatment that violate United States domestic law,  
14 international treaties, and customary international humanitarian and human rights law; and (iii)  
15 have suffered or will suffer injuries to their properties and/or businesses as a result of those  
16 conditions and abuses.

17 (b) The Common Law Class consists of persons who (i) have been forcibly  
18 detained in prisons or detention facilities in or around Iraq subsequent to the fall of the Hussein  
19 regime; (ii) have been subjected to conditions and treatment that violate United States domestic  
20 law, international treaties, and customary international humanitarian and human rights law; and (iii)  
21 have suffered injuries as a result.

22 (c) The Wrongful Death Class consists of persons and other legal entities who  
23 are the estates and heirs of persons who (i) were forcibly detained in prisons or detention facilities  
24 in prisons or detention facilities in or around Iraq subsequent to the fall of the Hussein regime; (ii)  
25 were subjected to conditions and treatment that violate United States domestic law, international  
26 treaties, and customary international humanitarian and human rights law; and (iii) who wrongfully  
27 died as a result of those conditions.

28 (d) There may be additional subclasses suitable for certification.

1  
2 **ALLEGATIONS OF FACT**

3 **DEFENDANTS' FINANCIAL GROWTH DEPENDED ON**  
4 **CREATING AND MAINTAINING A DEMAND**  
5 **FOR INTERROGATION SERVICES**

6 37. Defendant Titan performs the government contracts at issue in this action through a  
7 division previously known as "Titan Systems" and now known as "National Security Solutions."  
8 That division has approximately 1,000 government contracts.

9 38. Defendant Titan invested significantly in building capacity for services such as  
10 interrogation, interpretation, translation, intelligence gathering, and security (hereinafter referred to  
11 as "Interrogation Services").

12 39. As revealed in Defendant Titan's 2003 annual report, "[s]ince January 1, 1998, Titan  
13 has acquired 19 government information technology businesses as part of Titan's strategy of  
14 consolidating government information technology business." Among others, Titan bought  
15 SEMCOR, Pulse Engineering, BTG Inc., Unidyne Corp., VisiCom Services Inc., and Eldyne Inc.

16 40. Defendant Titan became increasingly dependent on federal revenues. Always a high  
17 portion of its overall business, Defendant Titan's federal revenues went from 90% in 2000 to 96%  
18 in 2004. No business other than federal government business mattered significantly to the bottom  
19 line of Defendant Titan.

20 41. Defendant Titan relied almost exclusively on increased demand for the type of  
21 intelligence and interrogation services provided by its National Security Solutions business to  
22 sustain the company and reach its revenue targets. As recently as May 3, 2004, Defendant Titan  
23 attributed a 21 percent increase in revenues – up to \$459 million for the first quarter of 2004 as  
24 compared to \$378 million for the first quarter in 2003 – to revenue growth in the National Security  
25 Solutions business.

26 42. Defendant Titan also relied heavily on relationships with certain government  
27 officials. As the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filings reveal, Defendant Titan  
28 believed the industry experience of its executives was a reason why it obtained new business: "The  
industry experience of Titan Systems executives and general managers has also helped Titan

1 Systems to develop a significant presence with many civilian government agencies, which has  
2 contributed to Titan Systems' success in securing new contracts.”

3 43. CACI Corporate Defendants have been involved in government contracting for  
4 many years. Beginning in 2001, the CACI Corporate Defendants began to grow dramatically – in  
5 terms of both employees (approximately 5,000 employees in 2001 to 6,300 employees in 2003) and  
6 revenue.

7 44. CACI Corporate Defendants hit a new revenue record, reporting revenue of \$263.4  
8 million in the second quarter of FY04. This represents a 29% growth from the prior year's results.

9 45. In 2001, CACI Corporate Defendants received an additional \$108.8 million in  
10 revenue from the Department of Defense (hereinafter “DoD”) over and above what they had  
11 received in 2000. In 2003, DoD revenue grew by another \$102.3 million as compared to 2002.

12 46. As with Defendant Titan, CACI Corporate Defendants' growth resulted from a  
13 deliberate strategy to build capacity and provide increased amounts of Interrogation Services to the  
14 United States. CACI Corporate Defendants' SEC filings reveal “a significant part of the  
15 company's growth over the past two years was primarily due to the expansion of the managed  
16 network services and intelligence community work.”

17 47. To implement the strategy to build Interrogation Services capacity, CACI Corporate  
18 Defendants made the following acquisitions:

19 (a) On February 1, 2000, they acquired all the common stock of a company  
20 known as XEN for \$4.3 million.

21 (b) On October 6, 2000, they acquired the contracts and selected assets of the  
22 Special Projects Business of Radian International, LLC, a subsidiary of URS Corp. for \$1.3 million.

23 (c) On February 28, 2003, they purchased all of the stock of Applied  
24 Technology Solutions of Northern Virginia, Inc. for \$13.1 million.

25 (d) On May 15, 2003, they acquired all of the assets of Premier Technology  
26 Group, Inc. (“PTG”) for \$49 million. The company paid \$45.6 million in cash and paid the balance  
27 of \$3.4 million “in the form of earn-out payments tied to the continuation of existing business.”  
28

1 PTG had been providing professional services to the DoD and United States government  
2 intelligence agencies.

3 (e) On October 16, 2003, they acquired yet another intelligence company, C-  
4 CUBED Corporation. C-CUBED was described in press reports as providing specialized services  
5 in support of C4ISR (command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and  
6 reconnaissance initiatives) to the DoD and the United States intelligence agencies.

7 (f) On October 16, 2003, they acquired all of the outstanding capital stock of  
8 Acton Burnell, Inc., another company providing services to the intelligence agencies.

9 48. CACI Corporate Defendants viewed these acquisitions as a means of increasing their  
10 intelligence services offerings to the DoD and other unidentified intelligence agencies, which likely  
11 include the Central Intelligence Agency (hereinafter “CIA”) and the National Security  
12 Administration (hereinafter “NSA”).

13 49. As reflected in the SEC filings, CACI Corporate Defendants became increasingly  
14 financially dependent on revenues generated from federal intelligence agency contracts and  
15 permitted their other revenue sources (such as commercial, state and local governments) to  
16 dwindle. As stipulated in their SEC filings, “continued and expanded focus on DoD and federal  
17 civilian agency opportunities has resulted in a reduced emphasis on state and local government  
18 business. CACI Corporate Defendants maintained close relationships with certain government  
19 officials. As their SEC filings reveal, “our senior management team is very important to our  
20 business because personal reputations and individual business relationships are a critical element of  
21 obtaining and maintaining client engagements in our industry, *particularly with agencies*  
22 *performing classified operations. The loss of any our senior executives could cause us to lose*  
23 *client relationships or new business opportunities*, which could cause actual results to differ  
24 materially from those anticipated.” (Emphasis added.)

25 51. Defendant Titan and Corporate CACI Defendants contracted with the United States  
26 using two types of government contract (among others): “indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity”  
27 (“ID/IQ”) contracts and blank purchase agreements (BPA). These contract vehicles permitted the  
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1 United States government to award substantial contracts for Interrogation Services to Defendants  
2 without disclosure to the public and to modify the contract terms without any competitive bidding.

3 52. Defendant Titan and CACI Corporate Defendants recruited heavily throughout the  
4 United States to build their capacity to provide Interrogation Services.

5 53. Defendant Titan advertised throughout the United States by posting job positions on  
6 their web sites and in newspapers and other print media to obtain persons with relevant skills.  
7 These advertisements sought, among other persons, persons skilled in interrogation and persons  
8 who had “secret” security clearances.

9 54. CACI Corporate Defendants and Defendant Titan worked together on a contract  
10 relating to intelligence services known as “Assistance and Advisory Services” contract. Recently-  
11 printed excerpts from Defendant Titan’s web site that show Defendant Titan and the CACI  
12 Corporate Defendants working together as “Team Titan” are attached as Exhibit A.<sup>2</sup>

13 55. An employee of Defendant Titan has stated in an email communication that  
14 Defendant Titan intends to use the Assistance and Advisory Services contract to deploy people to  
15 Iraq in the near future. Upon information and belief, Defendant Titan and/or the CACI Corporate  
16 Defendants used and/or continue to use the Assistance and Advisory Services contract as one of the  
17 contract vehicles related to Interrogation Services conducted in Iraq.

18 56. Defendant Titan and the CACI Corporate Defendants offered persons with the  
19 necessary skill sets salaries far in excess of what had been the prevailing market rates for their  
20 services. Defendant Titan and the CACI Corporate Defendants were willing to pay above-market  
21 rates for interrogation services because they had entered into significant numbers of contracts with  
22 various United States agencies, including the United States military, which called for them to  
23 provide Interrogation Services. A selection of relevant printouts from the Defendant Titan web site  
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25 <sup>2</sup> In the initial Complaint, plaintiffs had attached as Exhibit A various relevant text excerpted  
26 from Defendant Titan’s web site. (This information is now located in the printouts attached  
27 separately for clarity as Exhibit A and Exhibit B.) In the prior version of Exhibit A, there was a  
28 reference to a third party included on Defendant Titan’s web site as part of “Team Titan.”  
Defendant Titan had not obtained permission to use the name of this third party on its web site.  
Although this third party was not named or identified in any way in the initial Complaint, the  
plaintiffs want to make crystal clear that they have not and are not making any allegations against  
this third party. To further that goal, the name of the third party has been redacted from the revised  
Exhibit A.

1 is attached as Exhibit B; a selection from CACI Corporate Defendants' web site is attached as  
2 Exhibit C.

3 57. Upon information and belief, neither Defendant Titan nor CACI Corporate  
4 Defendants properly screened persons being hired.

5 58. Upon information and belief, neither Defendant Titan nor CACI Corporate  
6 Defendants nor the Individual Defendants properly trained and supervised persons conducting  
7 Interrogation Services.

8 59. Defendant Titan acknowledged that it was responsible for supervising its employees  
9 located in Iraq. According to a document apparently issued by Defendant Titan, the policy  
10 regarding supervision in Iraq was as follows: "While supporting OEF [Operation Enduring  
11 Freedom], any professional issues that may arise need to be brought to your site manager's  
12 attention. Do not to bring personal or professional issues to the U.S. Government representatives.  
13 We are supporting the U.S. Government, but they do not exercise administrative control over the  
14 group." See Exhibit E.

15 60. Upon information and belief, Defendant Titan failed to properly fulfill its  
16 responsibilities to train and supervise employees. Defendant Titan delegated to a "Human  
17 Resource/Administrative Assistant" the critical task of "[e]nsur[ing] that linguists adhere to OSD  
18 [Office of the Secretary of Defense] regulations and standards of conduct concerning in-theater  
19 operations." See Exhibit B.

20 61. Upon information and belief, CACI Corporate Defendants failed to properly fulfill  
21 their responsibilities to train and supervise employees. The CACI Corporate Defendants admit on  
22 their web site that Interrogators and other employees in Iraq work under "minimal supervision" or  
23 "moderate supervision." For example, one excerpt on the CACI Corporate Defendants' web site  
24 stated:

25 Assists the US Military interrogation support program team leader  
26 (under direction and supervision) to *increase the effectiveness of*  
27 *getting intelligence information from Detainees, Persons of Interest,*  
28 *and Prisoners of War (POWs) that are in the custody of US/Coalition*  
*Forces in the CJTF 7 AOR, in terms of screening, interrogation, and*  
*debriefing of persons of intelligence value. Under minimal CACI*  
*supervision [see Additional Job Information below], will assist the*

1 government team leader in managing a multifaceted interrogation  
2 support cell consisting of database entry/intelligence research clerks,  
3 screeners, tactical/strategic interrogators, and intelligence analysts.

4 (Emphasis added.) See Exhibit C, job description BZSG308.

5 62. Upon information and belief, the document attached as Exhibit D was prepared by a  
6 CACI Corporate Defendant employee. Among other information, the document reveals that CACI  
7 Corporate Defendants permitted, allowed and/or facilitated untrained persons to perform  
8 Interrogation Services.

9 63. Upon information and belief, Defendant Titan and CACI Corporate Defendants  
10 permitted their employees to wear, and their employees did wear, uniforms and other attire that  
11 portrayed them as part of the United States military..

12 64. Some of the contracts between Defendants and the United States government that  
13 may be related to Interrogation Services are identified in Exhibit F. Upon information and belief,  
14 some contracts cannot be identified by review of publicly available records because the United  
15 States and Defendants kept secret certain contracts, such as those with the CIA and NSA. Upon  
16 information and belief, Defendant Titan and the CACI Corporate Defendants provided  
17 Interrogation Services under blanket-purchase agreements with agencies not related to Interrogation  
18 Services, such as the Interior Department.

19 65. Defendant Titan and CACI Corporate Defendants knew that the amount of  
20 Interrogation Services for which the United States contracted was directly related to the United  
21 States government's perception of the amount of information that could be obtained by  
22 interrogating Plaintiffs.

23 **DEFENDANTS KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN**  
24 **THE UNITED STATES INTENDED TO CONDUCT INTERROGATIONS**  
25 **IN ACCORD WITH THE RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS.**

26 66. Defendants knew, or should have known, that the United States intended to conduct  
27 interrogations in accord with the relevant domestic and international laws.

28 67. The laws that prohibit summary execution, torture, or other cruel, inhuman or  
degrading treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention, assault and battery, false imprisonment and  
intentional interference with religious practices include, but are not limited to, the following:

1 (a) The Constitution of the United States, including the Eighth Amendment,  
2 which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment; the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which  
3 prohibit deprivation of life and liberty without due process of law; and the Fourth Amendment,  
4 which prohibits unlawful searches and seizures.

5 (b) Treaties ratified or signed by the United States, including *Articles 55 and 56*  
6 *of Charter of the United Nations*, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, *entered*  
7 *into force* Oct. 24, 1945, which protects human rights and fundamental freedoms and specifically  
8 guarantees the right to be free from torture; the *Third Geneva Convention, Geneva Convention*  
9 *relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, arts. 13, 14, 17, 21, 25, 87, 130,  
10 *entered into force*, Oct. 21, 1950, which prohibits acts of torture and abuse against prisoners of war;  
11 *the Fourth Geneva Convention, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons*  
12 *in Time of War*, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, arts. 5, 27, 31, 32, 33, 27, 41, 42, *entered into force* Oct. 21,  
13 1950, which prohibits acts of torture and abuse against civilians; the *Protocol Additional to the*  
14 *Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International*  
15 *Armed Conflicts*, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, *entered into force* Dec. 7, 1978, which requires the  
16 humane treatment of *any* person who is in the power of a party to an armed conflict, regardless of  
17 status or national origin, and specifically prohibits the use of torture at any time; Article 7 of the  
18 *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR  
19 Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 3, *entered into force* Mar. 23, 1976,  
20 which provides that: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading  
21 treatment or punishment;” Article 4 of ICCPR, which states that Article 7 is non-derogable even in  
22 times of public emergency; Article 1 of the *Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman*  
23 *or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*, G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at  
24 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), *entered into force* June 26, 1987, which prohibits any act: “by  
25 which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for  
26 such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him  
27 for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating  
28 or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such

1 pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a  
2 public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”

3 (c) Customary international law, as reflected in the above treaties and  
4 international instruments and others, including the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, G.A.  
5 res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948) which states “no one shall be subjected to torture or to  
6 cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”; the *United Nations Declaration on the*  
7 *Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture*, General Assembly Resolution 3452, 30  
8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975), which expressly prohibits “any act by  
9 which severe pain and suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the  
10 instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as . . . intimidating him or other  
11 persons”; the *American Convention on Human Rights*, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.  
12 123 entered into force July 18, 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in  
13 the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 art. 5 (1992), which provides, “no  
14 one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment”; the  
15 *European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom*, Nov. 4,  
16 1950, Art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224, which provides “no one shall be subjected to torture or to  
17 inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;” and the *Restatement (Third) of the Foreign*  
18 *Relations Law of the United States*, section 702, which provides: “A state violates international law  
19 if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones . . . (d) torture or other cruel,  
20 inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

21 (d) Statutes and common law of the United States, including but not limited to, United  
22 States Code, Title 18, U.S.C. § 1510 (relating to the obstruction of criminal investigations), § 1951  
23 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), § 1952 (relating to racketeering), §  
24 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire), and  
25 §§ 2315 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property); and Article 23 of the  
26 Transitional Administrative Law;

1 (e) Iraqi laws in force under Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, including  
2 Iraqi Penal Code of 1968 and the Criminal Procedure Code of 1972, which include laws prohibiting  
3 murder, attempted murder, rape, assault and battery, and robbery; and.

4 (e) state law, including but not limited to the common law of the State of California relating  
5 to wrongful death, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent  
6 infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and supervision, and negligence; as well as  
7 California Code Cal. Penal Code §§ 182-85 (conspiracy); 186-186.8; (criminal profiteering);  
8 186.11 (fraud and embezzlement); 187-199 (homicide); 203-206.1 (mayhem); 207-210  
9 (kidnapping); 210.5 (hostages); 211-215 (robbery); 217.1-219.3 (attempts to kill); 220-222  
10 (assaults with intent to commit felony); 236-237 (false imprisonment); 240-248 (assault and  
11 battery); 261-269 (rape, abduction, carnal abuse of children, and seduction); 302-310.5 (crimes  
12 against religion and conscience); 311-312.7 (obscene matter); 313-313.5 (harmful matter); 346-368  
13 (other injuries to persons); 422-422.1 (criminal threats); 484-502.9 (larceny); 503-515  
14 (embezzlement); 518-527 (extortion); 528-539 (false pretenses); 594-625c (malicious mischief).

15 68. The United States government in official pronouncements has repeatedly and  
16 forthrightly denounced the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment at all  
17 times. In its Initial Report to the United Nations Committee Against Torture, the United States  
18 Department of State noted that, “[t]orture is prohibited by law throughout the United States. It is  
19 categorically denounced as a matter of policy and as a tool of state authority . . . . No official of the  
20 government, federal, state or local, civilian or military is authorized to commit or to instruct anyone  
21 else to commit torture. Nor may any official condone or tolerate torture in any form.” *U.S.*  
22 *Department of State: Initial Report of the United States of America to the U.N. Committee Against*  
23 *Torture, Introduction (1999).*

24 69. In the same report, the United States explicitly stated that no exigent circumstances  
25 permit the use of torture: “No exceptional circumstances may be invoked as a justification for  
26 torture. U.S. law contains no provision permitting otherwise prohibited acts of torture or other  
27 cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to be employed on grounds of exigent  
28

1 circumstances (for example, during a “state of public emergency”) or on orders from a superior  
2 officer or public authority.” *Id.*

3 70. More recently, President Bush, in an address on United Nations International Day in  
4 Support of Victims of Torture, reiterated the United States position on the use of torture and other  
5 cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment: “The United States is committed to the worldwide  
6 elimination of torture and we are leading the fight by example. I call on all governments to join  
7 with the United States and the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting, investigating and  
8 prosecuting all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and unusual punishment.”  
9 *President George W. Bush, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture,*  
10 *June 26, 2003.*

11 71. The United States annually publishes a compilation of practices and techniques used  
12 by foreign governments that transgress the laws against torture and other cruel, inhuman or  
13 degrading treatment. This publication, called the U.S. Department of State Select Country Reports  
14 on Human Rights Practices, criticized the following practices and techniques when engaged in by  
15 other countries: repeated slapping, exposure to cold, stripping and blindfolding, food and sleep  
16 deprivation, threats to detainees or family members, dripping water on the head, squeezing of the  
17 testicles, mock executions, and sexual humiliation.

18 72. The United States has adopted regulations to govern the military to ensure its  
19 adherence to the Geneva Conventions and United States laws generally, including a 1995 Central  
20 Command regulation.

21 73. The United States’ Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*,  
22 2004 U.S. Lexis, 4763 (June 29, 2004) that the federal district courts should recognize private  
23 claims under federal common law for violations of international law norms that have definite  
24 content and acceptance among civilized nations, such as the international law against torture.

25 **FORMATION OF A CONSPIRACY**  
26 **TO INCREASE DEMAND FOR INTERROGATION SERVICES**

27 74. Defendants knew or should have known that United States domestic and  
28 international law governing the conduct of interrogations and other methods of obtaining

1 intelligence from detained persons prohibits them from torturing, abusing, or otherwise mistreating  
2 Plaintiffs.

3 75. Defendants knew or should have known that torturing, abusing, or otherwise  
4 mistreating Plaintiffs may result in their divulging information (whether true or untrue) in order to  
5 end their torture or other mistreatment.

6 76. Upon information and belief, Defendants were indifferent as to whether their  
7 Interrogation Services yielded useful or reliable information able to be used by the United States.  
8 Instead, they wanted to ensure that the Interrogation Services created the impression of  
9 effectiveness and met with “quotas” imposed by the United States government for intelligence  
10 gathering.

11 77. Certain government officials who were involved with Defendants’ intelligence  
12 gathering efforts were indifferent to whether Defendants’ Interrogations Services complied with the  
13 relevant laws. Those government officials who were indifferent to the lawfulness of Defendants’  
14 conduct and who were otherwise involved with, directed, supervised or ignored Defendants’  
15 wrongful acts are hereinafter referred to as “conspirators,” or “co-conspirators,” or are subsumed  
16 within the term “Torture Conspirators” defined below.

17 78. Defendants and co-conspiring government officials decided, ratified and/or agreed,  
18 expressly and/or implicitly, that the efforts to acquire information from Plaintiffs should not be  
19 hampered by ensuring that interrogation efforts complied with the mandates of United States  
20 domestic and international law.

21 79. The Torture Conspirators knew, or should have known, that there are many United  
22 States and international laws that strictly circumscribe the manner in which the Plaintiffs could  
23 lawfully be treated.

24 80. Defendants and certain government officials conspired and formed an ongoing  
25 criminal enterprise designed to flout the United States domestic and international laws prohibiting  
26 the torture, abuse, and other mistreatment of the Plaintiffs (hereinafter “Torture Conspiracy”). (The  
27 actors implementing this Torture Conspiracy are hereinafter referred to as “Torture Conspirators,”  
28 which includes the corporate defendants, individual defendants and certain government officials).

1           81.     This criminal enterprise was premised on the fact that Defendants and certain  
2 government officials knew, and intended, that creating an environment and setting conditions in  
3 which persons were being tortured, abused, and otherwise mistreated would result in more persons  
4 “willing” to provide so-called “intelligence” (of whatever value) to their interrogators in order to  
5 end their mistreatment. In turn, an environment in which the United States perceived the  
6 Interrogation Services as being productive and useful would create, maintain, and increase the  
7 United States’ demand for Defendants’ Interrogation Services.

8           82.     The Torture Conspiracy began in or around 2001 and, upon information and belief,  
9 is on going. The Torture Conspiracy exists separate and apart from the ongoing lawful operations  
10 of the corporate Defendants.

11           83.     Certain government officials and senior management in Defendant Titan and CACI  
12 Corporate Defendants had relationships that assisted in the formation and implementation of the  
13 Torture Conspiracy. Upon information and belief, these relationships were formed and fostered by  
14 meetings, telephonic discussions, in-person discussions, email discussions and other  
15 communications that occurred in, among other places, California, Virginia and the District of  
16 Columbia.

17           84.     The corporate Defendants formed and implemented the Torture Conspiracy in order  
18 to make money selling Interrogation Services to the United States and in order to gain a  
19 competitive advantage in the market. The corporate Defendants also formed and implemented the  
20 Torture Conspiracy to ensure that they did not lose money on their past acquisitions of  
21 Interrogation Services capacity.

22           85.     The individual Defendants formed and implemented the Torture Conspiracy in order  
23 to obtain personal financial rewards and/or financial rewards for their employers.

24           86.     The Torture Conspirators actively recruited individuals willing to participate in the  
25 illegal conspiracy. Upon information and belief, the Torture Conspiracy took steps in California,  
26 Virginia and other locations throughout the United States to screen potential applicants to ascertain  
27 whether they would be willing to engage in illegal acts. Certain Team Titan postings sought “male  
28 U.S. citizens” and revealed that applicants “must undergo a favorable U.S. Army

1 Counterintelligence screening interview.” Applicants perceived as potentially willing to participate  
2 in the conspiracy were retained to provide Interrogation Services.

3 87. Upon information and belief, Defendant Titan employees were essential to the  
4 Interrogations conducted in an unlawful manner in Iraq. Defendant Titan supplied employees “to  
5 work 12 hour shifts and in excess of 60-hour weeks in order to provide continuous contract linguist  
6 support that this 24x7 operation requires.” See Exhibit B, job description OAT730. Defendant  
7 Titan employees “work as part of a civil-military team in an unstructured environment; [they] live  
8 and work in a harsh environment.” See Exhibit B, job description TOSG26. They are expected to  
9 “[i]dentify and extract information components meeting military information requirement list  
10 criteria, and to “[p]rovide input to reports” See Exhibit B, job description OAT730.

11 88. Upon information and belief, CACI Corporate Defendants employees were essential  
12 to the Interrogations conducted in an unlawful manner in Iraq. CACI Corporate Defendants  
13 supplied, among other persons, “Interrogators” and “Jr CI Agent[s],” who “[c]onduct[]  
14 interrogations of detainees.” See Exhibit C, job descriptions BZSG224 and BZSG191. CACI  
15 Corporate Defendants also supplied, among other persons, “Intelligence Analysts” who:

16 Provides intelligence analytical support to the interrogation team  
17 during development and execution of the interrogation plan/cycle.  
18 Interfaces with higher, lower and adjacent intelligence organizations  
19 to *fully prepare interrogation team for exploitation of detainees*, as  
20 well as preparing post interrogation analytical products/assessments  
21 that support further targeting efforts, source development and  
22 analysis of the threat.

20 (Emphasis added.) See Exhibit C, job description BZSG192. CACI Intelligence Analysts not only  
21 provided guidance before Interrogations, but also provided feedback afterward about how the next  
22 Interrogation could be more effective.

23 89. Upon information and belief, CACI Corporate Defendants amended the CACI Code  
24 of Ethics and Business Conduct Standards to facilitate the Conspiracy. The 2002 version of the  
25 CACI Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Standards stated that:

26 All employees should be aware that if they are a party to violations  
27 that affect or involve transactions with the U.S. Department of  
28 Defense or other U.S. government agencies, a record of any  
involvement and disciplinary action taken *will* be made available to  
the U.S. government.

1 (Emphasis added.) *See* Exhibit G. This language was changed on some date between 2002 and  
2 2003 to read:

3 All employees should be aware that if they are a party to any  
4 *demonstrably illegal activity*, the Company *in its discretion may*  
5 make a record of any involvement and disciplinary action taken  
available to the appropriate law enforcement officials.

6 (Emphasis added.) *See* Exhibit G.

7 90. The Torture Conspiracy was successful in achieving its unlawful ends. With  
8 assistance from certain conspiring government officials, Defendants were able to reap handsome  
9 monetary rewards in exchange for facilitating setting the conditions and assisting in detaining the  
10 Plaintiffs under unlawful conditions and torturing, abusing, and otherwise mistreating them.

11 91. During the period 2001 to present, upon information and belief, Defendant Titan  
12 earned millions of dollars in revenue from the provision of Interrogation Services. These fruits of  
13 the criminal Torture Conspiracy have been invested in the ongoing operations of Defendant Titan.

14 92. During the period 2001 to present, upon information and belief, CACI Corporate  
15 Defendants earned millions of dollars in revenues from their provision of Interrogation Services.  
16 These fruits of the criminal Torture Conspiracy have been invested in the ongoing operations of  
17 CACI Corporate Defendants.

18 93. Upon information and belief, each individual Defendant, through their participation  
19 in the Torture Conspiracy, earned far more money per hour than they could otherwise have earned,  
20 and had far more demand for their services than would have existed, absent the Torture Conspiracy.

21 94. Upon information and belief, the corporate Defendants also benefited financially by  
22 forming the Torture Conspiracy because their co-conspirators used their influence to ensure that the  
23 corporate Defendants were awarded contracts or modifications of existing contracts on a no-bid  
24 basis. Some of these no-bid contracts are identified in Exhibit F.

25 95. Numerous predicate acts have been committed by the conspirators (and others acting  
26 at their direction) in their implementation of the Torture Conspiracy.

1           96.     The predicate acts include, but are not limited to, kidnapping, murder, assault and  
2 battery, unlawful imprisonment, obstruction of justice, and other acts intended to be humiliating  
3 and mentally devastating to those who practice the faith of Islam.

4           97.     On information and belief, the Torture Conspirators working in Guantánamo  
5 developed an approach to interrogation (“tiger teams”) based on study and review of what practices  
6 would be most humiliating to those who practice the Muslim faith. On information and belief, the  
7 Torture Conspirators conspired to, and adopted this same interrogation method in Iraq.  
8 Specifically, in or around October 2003, five Interrogation Teams (including Torture Conspirators)  
9 who had been conducting interrogations in Guantánamo were sent to Iraq to set up a “Gitmo-style”  
10 prison at Abu Ghraib. (“Gitmo” is the colloquial term used for Guantánamo Bay.)

11           98.     Certain employees of the Defendants have admitted to engaging in these predicate  
12 acts. For example, on or before May 21, 2004, an unknown employee of Defendant Titan working  
13 in Iraq admitted to stripping, handcuffing, and forcibly restraining putative Class Members as they  
14 were placed by the employee and others in sexual positions.

15           99.     Upon information and belief, the United States government has sought and obtained  
16 additional admissions from employees of Defendant Titan and CACI Corporate Defendants during  
17 the course of ongoing investigations into the allegations of the torture, abuse, and other  
18 mistreatment of detainees in Iraq.

19           100.    Upon information and belief, Defendant Titan has admitted that it cannot bill the  
20 United States government for services provided by Defendants Nakla and Israel.

21  
22                                   **SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF WRONGFUL ACTS  
RELATING TO PLAINTIFF SALEH**

23           101.    On or about September 25, 2003, the Torture Conspirators detained Plaintiff Saleh  
24 without any cause. Plaintiff Saleh, an opponent of Saddam Hussein, was returning to Iraq with  
25 certain monies and a vehicle to assist with the rebuilding efforts. The Torture Conspirators tied him  
26 up, placed a hood over his head, and placed him in the trunk of a vehicle. The Torture Conspirators  
27 stole his car and cash he had brought with him to invest in rebuilding Iraq.

1           102.    Thereafter, the Torture Conspirators imprisoned Plaintiff Saleh in El-Najaf for  
2 approximately 8 days for no reason whatsoever. They beat him with a stick so fiercely he lost  
3 consciousness.

4           103.    On or about October 4, 2003, the Torture Conspirators took Plaintiff Saleh to Abu  
5 Ghraib Prison, the same prison where he had been tortured by Saddam Hussein. The Torture  
6 Conspirators thereafter engaged in a series of actions against Plaintiff Saleh, including, but not  
7 limited to, the following:

8                   (a)    Roping Plaintiff Saleh and 12 other naked prisoners together by their genitals  
9 and then pushing one of the male detainees to the ground, causing the others to suffer extreme  
10 physical, mental and emotional distress.

11                   (b)    Stretching Plaintiff Saleh's penis with a rope and beating it with a stick.

12                   (c)    Stripping Plaintiff Saleh naked for extended periods of time (as long as a day  
13 and a half) and leaving him this way with a hood over his head.

14                   (d)    Forcing Plaintiff Saleh to ejaculate in a plastic cup and pouring the semen  
15 over his head and body.

16                   (e)    Forcing Plaintiff Saleh to lay naked over another male with his penis  
17 touching the buttocks of the male, causing both males to cry profusely and ask for forgiveness from  
18 God.

19                   (f)    Pouring cold water over him.

20                   (g)    Repeatedly shocking Plaintiff Saleh with an electric stick and beating him  
21 with a cable.

22                   (h)    Depriving Plaintiff Saleh of sleep by blasting music and pouring cold water  
23 over him every time he attempted to sleep.

24                   (i)    Subjecting him to dehumanizing name-calling using Arabic phrases such as  
25 "minuk" which means "bitch" and "ishtah", meaning worthless scum.

26                   (j)    Tying a belt around his neck and dragging him approximately 70 feet.

27                   (k)    Using a dog to threaten and intimidate him.

28                   (l)    Beating him with a pistol and slamming his head against the wall.

- 1 (m) Pouring chemicals on his body.
- 2 (n) Tying his hands above his head and sodomizing him while slapping his head  
3 back and forth.
- 4 (o) Placing him naked on a table, face down with a hood over his head, and  
5 grabbing his penis and inserting fingers up his anus.
- 6 (p) Urinating on him.
- 7 (q) Shooting him with plastic bullets to his chest as he was trying to call for  
8 prayer.
- 9 (r) Forcing him to carry buckets of feces as the Torture Conspirators bumped the  
10 buckets to have the feces cover Plaintiff Saleh.
- 11 (s) Denying his ability to perform his prayers.

12 104. Plaintiff Saleh also observed the Torture Conspirators summarily execute other  
13 detainees. A Torture Conspirator shot randomly at a crowd of detainees, killing approximately five  
14 prisoners, including an individual by the name of “Saed,” whom Plaintiff Saleh had befriended. Mr.  
15 Saed was shot in the neck and chest and left to bleed on the ground for a couple of hours. Plaintiff  
16 Saleh witnessed two men dying slowly, without being provided medical treatment.

17 105. Plaintiff Saleh also observed the Torture Conspirators strip and rape two young male  
18 detainees. The Torture Conspirators tied their hands, and raped them in front of Mr. Saleh and  
19 other prisoners. The Torture Conspirators then warned Plaintiff Saleh and other plaintiffs that if  
20 they told anyone, they would be next.

21 106. Plaintiff Saleh observed the Torture Conspirators strip naked three plaintiffs and  
22 hang them by their hands from a hook in the ceiling, while a laughing Conspirator beat on their  
23 genitals and sodomized them with a stick in front of other detainees.

24 107. Plaintiff Saleh observed the Torture Conspirators rounding up and imprisoning local  
25 females. For approximately 13 days, Mr. Saleh heard constant screaming and crying at night from  
26 many females. Mr. Saleh heard some females screaming “No! No! Shame on you! This is against  
27 God’s laws.” Although Plaintiff Saleh did not see the acts, he is convinced the Torture  
28 Conspirators were raping these women.

1 108. To date, Mr. Saleh's money and car have not been returned.

2  
3 **SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF WRONGFUL ACTS**  
4 **RELATING TO PLAINTIFF AHMED**

5 109. The Torture Conspirators detained Plaintiff Ahmed and his father Ibrahiem (now  
6 deceased) without cause in the Abu Ghraib Prison.

7 110. The Torture Conspirators tortured, abused, and otherwise mistreated Plaintiff  
8 Ahmed and his father Ibrahiem by committing the following acts, among others:

9 (a) Removing their clothes and spraying them with cold water during the cold  
10 winter;

11 (b) Stripping them of their clothes entirely and then tying their hands and legs  
12 together and allowing fierce and hungry dogs to come two inches away from their faces and bark in  
13 their faces;

14 (c) Kicking them with their heavy military boots on all parts of their bodies  
15 including their heads, backs, private parts, and stomach;

16 (d) Hitting them with guns on their bodies, including their heads, backs,  
17 stomach, and private parts;

18 (e) Removing all their clothes and leaving them outside for days;

19 (f) Depriving them of food and keeping them in the cold for such lengths of time  
20 as to cause fainting;

21 (g) Lifting their hands above their heads and leaving them standing in that  
22 position for days, and beating them whenever they moved or twitched;

23 (h) Leaving them lying on their stomachs naked on the floor with their hands  
24 tied above their heads for long hours.

25 111. Plaintiff Ahmed was forced to observe the Torture Conspirators torturing his father  
26 and putative Class Plaintiffs by physically and verbally assaulting them, humiliating them,  
27 including sexual humiliation.

28 112. Plaintiff Ahmed was forced to observe the Torture Conspirators torturing his father  
to such a degree that he died.

1 113. Plaintiff Ahmed also suffered property losses as a result of actions by the Torture  
2 Conspirators. They destroyed his house, took \$3,200 in cash, \$1,500 worth of gold, jewelry and  
3 other property.

4  
5 **SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF WRONGFUL ACTS**  
6 **RELATING TO PLAINTIFF ISMAEL**

7 114. The Torture Conspirators detained Plaintiff Ismael without cause in the Abu Ghraib  
8 Prison and the Buka Prison.

9 115. Thereafter the Torture Conspirators continued to detain and otherwise mistreat  
10 Plaintiff Ismael and committed the following acts, among others, during his Abu Ghraib Prison  
11 detention:

12 (a) During interrogation, hitting him with electric cables and kicking him with  
13 boots if he did not answer or did not answer in the manner desired by the Torture Conspirators;

14 (b) Tying his hands behind his backs and terrorizing him by shooting electric  
15 guns at him;

16 (c) Stripping him, tying his hands behind his back and releasing dogs to attack  
17 his private parts;

18 (d) Using demeaning and dehumanizing language;

19 (e) Depriving him of sleep by use of loud music or loose dogs roaming around  
20 the tent;

21 (f) Stripping his clothes off and forcing him to stand on one leg for as long as 6  
22 hours, during which they would hit him with a rifle if he showed any sign of fatigue or moved in  
23 any manner;

24 (g) Hitting his private parts repeatedly.

25 116. During a particular interrogation, the Torture Conspirators asked Plaintiff Ismael a  
26 question that he refused to answer. As a result, they stripped off his clothes and covered his face  
27 with a bag. Hours later they removed the bag and showed him two photographs of sexual torture  
28 committed on detainees known to Plaintiff Ismael. The first photograph showed a young boy (age  
12-15) being sexually molested by a person in a United States uniform. The Torture Conspirators

1 told Plaintiff Ismael that he would be treated in the same fashion if he did not answer their question.  
2 The Torture Conspirators then showed him another photograph of a different detainee, also known  
3 to Plaintiff Ismael, who was being forced to perform oral sex on a person in a United States  
4 uniform. The Torture Conspirators again threatened Plaintiff Ismael with similar treatment if he  
5 refused to answer questions.

6 117. The Torture Conspirators also tortured, abused, and otherwise mistreated Plaintiff  
7 Ismael during his detention at the Buka Prison. They committed the following acts, among others:

8 (a) Turning on very loud music whenever he and other detainees tried to pray or  
9 read the Quran and otherwise preventing any type of worship;

10 (b) Placing him standing outside in the burning sun for long hours;

11 (c) Stripping him and tying him together with other detainees and dragging their  
12 naked bodies with a leash across the hot summer sand;

13 (d) Kicking him with their heavy boots on their heads;

14 (e) Tying him to other detainees by their feet and forcing them to sleep on their  
15 stomachs on the hot sand.

16 118. Even after Plaintiff Ismael's release, the Torture Conspirators continue to inflict  
17 harm on him by continuing to detain his 27-year old son, Burban, in an unknown location. Plaintiff  
18 Ismael has not seen his son since they were both detained.

19  
20 **SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF WRONGFUL ACTS  
RELATING TO PLAINTIFF NEISEF**

21 119. The Torture Conspirators detained Plaintiff Neisef without cause in the Abu Ghraib  
22 and Buka Prisons.

23 120. During his detention in the Abu Ghraib Prison, the Torture Conspirators tortured,  
24 abused, and otherwise mistreated Plaintiff Neisef by committing the following acts, among others:

25 (a) Placing brown mesh bags on his head as they questioned him;

26 (b) Hitting him on his face and body with heavy military boots if he did not  
27 provide the desired answers;

28

1 (c) Placing him and other male detainees in a room with a naked female detainee  
2 who had a brown mesh bag on her head and who was screaming;

3 (d) Depriving him of sleep for as much as 48 hours by placing him in a room  
4 with very loud music close to his ears;

5 (e) Spraying cold water on him and placing him outside in the cold for long  
6 periods of time.

7 121. During his detention in the Buka Prison, the Torture Conspirators committed the  
8 following acts, among others:

9 (a) Stripping him, tying his hands and feet together with other detainees, and  
10 placing them on a dog's leash and dragging their naked bodies on the hot summer sand;

11 (b) Hitting him with their heavy boots on his head;

12 (c) Forcing him to stand in the hot summer sun outside with his hands tied  
13 behind his neck for periods between 6 hours to 24 hours without movement, and beating him if he  
14 showed any sign of movement or fatigue.

15 122. The Torture Conspirators raped Plaintiff Neisef. A female conspirator placed a hood  
16 over his head and called in two other conspirators, who held Neisef down while she raped him.  
17 After sexually abusing him for approximately thirty minutes, she left him naked on the floor and  
18 told him "it is our job to take your manhood away from you by the time you leave, you son of a  
19 bitch."

20 123. The Torture Conspirators forced Plaintiff Neisef to touch other detainees' body parts  
21 by threatening him with attack dogs. The Torture Conspirators poured cold water on Plaintiff  
22 Neisef and the other detainees, wrapped electric wire around their penises, and gave them electric  
23 shocks. Plaintiff Neisef started to bleed and suffered a ruptured vein on his penis. The Torture  
24 Conspirators refused to tend his wounds.

25 124. The Torture Conspirators again degraded Plaintiff Neisef sexually by forcing him to  
26 assume a dog position and by threatening to sodomize him with a stick.

27 125. The Torture Conspirators prevented Plaintiff Neisef from praying. Whenever he and  
28 other detainees tried to pray the religious prayer of salah, the Torture Conspirators would place

1 their heavy boots on their heads and prevent them from lifting their heads off the ground. When  
2 asked, “why do you torture us and prevent us from worshipping God?”, the Torture Conspirators  
3 answered “you are under our authority, we can do whatever we want with you.”

4 126. Plaintiff Neisef suffered property losses as a result of actions by the Torture  
5 Conspirators. They damaged his house, took \$6,000 in cash, \$1,000 worth of gold and jewelry.

6  
7 **SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF WRONGFUL ACTS  
RELATING TO PLAINTIFF IBRAHIEM ESTATE**

8 127. The Torture Conspirators detained, tortured, abused, and otherwise mistreated  
9 Ibrahiem as described above in the paragraphs relating to Plaintiff Ahmed.

10 128. The Torture Conspirators wrongfully killed Ibrahiem by torturing him and thereafter  
11 refusing to provide him the needed medical attention to prevent his death.

12  
13 **SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF WRONGFUL ACTS  
RELATING TO PLAINTIFF SAMI**

14 129. The Torture Conspirators subjected Plaintiff Sami to a series of unlawful acts,  
15 including, but not limited to, the following:

16 (a) Hooding him for extended periods of time so that he was completely  
17 disoriented and had difficulty breathing.

18 (b) Handcuffing him with flexi-cuffs around the wrists for extended periods  
19 causing skin lesions.

20 (c) Depriving him of food, water and hygiene facilities.

21 (d) Repeatedly kicking and beating him;

22 (e) Subjecting him to loud rock music;

23 (f) Depriving him of sleep;

24 (g) Making him stand on one leg for a prolonged period and beating him  
25 whenever he fell down;

26 (h) Forcing him to crouch up and down repeatedly until he fell over.



- 1 (d) Pulling out his toe nails; and  
2 (e) Tying his hands, hanging him on the ceiling and beating him severely on all  
3 parts of his body.

4  
5 **SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF WRONGFUL  
ACTS RELATING TO PLAINTIFF JOHN DOE NO. 1**

6 134. On or about August 24, 2003, the Torture Conspirators detained Plaintiff John Doe  
7 No. 1 without cause. Initially detained and interrogated at the United States military prison facility  
8 at the Baghdad International Airport, Iraq, Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 was eventually transferred to  
9 Abu Ghraib Prison. Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 was recently released from detention without charge.

10 135. Throughout his detention and interrogation the Torture Conspirators tortured,  
11 abused, and otherwise mistreated Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 by subjecting him to the following acts,  
12 among others:

- 13 (a) Hooding him for extended periods of time so that he was completely  
14 disorientated and had difficulty breathing;
- 15 (b) Humiliating and degrading him by making him walk “like a dog” on all  
16 fours;
- 17 (c) Restraining him in awkward and painful positions;
- 18 (d) Sexually humiliating him by stripping him naked and parading him in front  
19 of other prisoners and prison guards, including women;
- 20 (e) Subjecting him to extremes of temperature by pouring cold water on him,  
21 causing him to lose consciousness;
- 22 (f) Threatening to kill him as well as his wife;
- 23 (g) Placing electric cables on his body and threatening to use electrical shocks  
24 on him;
- 25 (h) Hanging weights on his neck for extended periods resulting in spinal  
26 damage;
- 27 (i) Continually mocking his Islam faith and interrupting his efforts to pray;
- 28

1 (j) Sexually humiliating and degrading him by stripping him naked and  
2 attempting to make him masturbate in front of women and fondling his penis with a stick so as to  
3 give him an erection;

4 (k) Subjecting him to prolonged interrogation while he was tied tightly by the  
5 hands and hung up;

6 (l) Hanging him by his feet;

7 (m) Beating and kicking him until he fainted;

8 (n) Coercing him to beat other prisoners;

9 (o) Subjecting him to loud music for extended periods; and

10 (p) Applying electric shocks to his body parts.

11 136. Throughout his detention, Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 observed the Torture  
12 Conspirators torturing, abusing, and otherwise mistreating other Plaintiffs in similar fashion. In  
13 particular, Plaintiff John Doe No. 1 learned that the Torture Conspirators tortured to death two  
14 Generals from the Hussein regime who had been detained at the same time.

15  
16 **SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF WRONGFUL ACTS  
RELATING TO PLAINTIFF JANE DOE NO. 2**

17 137. On or about September 24, 2003, the Torture Conspirators detained Plaintiff Doe  
18 No. 2 without cause. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 is a 55-year old English teacher by profession.  
19 Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2's 70-year old husband had been tortured to death in Abu Ghraib Prison  
20 during the Saddam Hussein regime.

21 138. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 was detained and interrogated by the Torture Conspirators  
22 in four of its prison facilities in Iraq – Samarra Airport, Tikrit, Abu Ghraib, and Sahia – before  
23 being released without charge on January 22, 2004.

24 139. During her detention and interrogation, the Torture Conspirators tortured, abused,  
25 and otherwise mistreated Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 by subjecting her to the following acts, among  
26 others:

27 (a) Detaining her incommunicado, in isolation, for prolonged periods in a tiny (3  
28 metres by 2 metres) dark, unhygienic, cold cell;

1 (b) Hooding her for extended periods of time so that she was completely  
2 disorientated and had difficulty breathing;

3 (c) Handcuffing her with flexi-cuffs around the wrists and ankles for extended  
4 periods causing skin lesions;

5 (d) Depriving her of food, water, and hygiene facilities;

6 (e) Threatening and intimidating her with guard dogs;

7 (f) Threatening her and members of her family with death; and

8 (g) Interrogating her for extended periods while she was restrained in awkward  
9 positions.

10  
11 **SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF WRONGFUL ACTS  
RELATING TO PUTATIVE CLASS PLAINTIFFS**

12 140. On or about August 31, 2003 to September 9, 2003, the Torture Conspirators issued,  
13 or caused to be issued, a report that expressly directed other non-conspirators to violate the law and  
14 set the conditions for the continued success of the Torture Conspiracy. The report stated “it is  
15 essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for the successful  
16 exploitation of the internees.” See Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, *U.S. Army Report on Iraqi  
17 Prisoner Abuse* (May 5, 2004) at 8 (attached as Exhibit H).

18 141. On September 13, 2003, the Torture Conspirators located in Basrah, Iraq, arrested  
19 nine putative Class Plaintiffs in a hotel. They forced the nine men to kneel, face and hands against  
20 the ground, as if in a prayer position. They then stamped on the back of the neck of those persons  
21 raising their head. They confiscated their money without issuing a receipt. This torture and theft is  
22 documented by a report prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter  
23 “ICRC) attached as Exhibit I.

24 142. Thereafter, also on September 13, 2003, the Torture Conspirators took the nine  
25 putative Class Plaintiffs to Al-Hakimiya, a former office previously used by the *mukhabarat* in  
26 Basrah, and beat them.

1           143. On or about September 13, 2003, the Torture Conspirators beat one man to death.  
2 He was aged 28, married, and the father of two children. This murder is documented in Exhibit I,  
3 the report prepared by the ICRC.

4           144. On or about September 13, 2003, the Torture Conspirators beat two other putative  
5 Class Plaintiffs so severely that they had to be hospitalized with severe injuries, including, but not  
6 limited to, broken noses, severely broken ribs and skin lesions on the faces. Approximately one  
7 week after the injuries were intentionally inflicted by the conspirators, an International Red Cross  
8 physician examined the victims in the hospital and observed haematomas with dried scabs on the  
9 abdomen, buttocks, sides, thigh, wrists, nose and forehead.

10           145. A few weeks prior to September 22, 2003, the Torture Conspirators located at Camp  
11 Buka, Iraq, kidnapped a 61-year old putative Class Plaintiff, tied him up, placed a hood over his  
12 head, and forced him to sit on the hot surface of a vehicle until he lost consciousness and suffered  
13 severe burns to his buttocks.

14           146. In September or October 2003, the Torture Conspirators located in the so-called  
15 “High Value” section of a prison in Iraq tortured a putative Class Plaintiff. They placed a hood  
16 over his head, handcuffed his hands behind his back, and forced him to lie on a hot surface until he  
17 was severely burned. Conspirators’ assault on this person caused such substantial injuries that he  
18 was hospitalized for three months and forced to undergo several skin grafts, and the amputation of  
19 his right index finger. He suffered the permanent loss of the use of his left fifth finger secondary to  
20 burn-induced skin retraction and extensive burns over the abdomen, anterior aspects of the lower  
21 extremities, the palm of his right hand and the sole of his left foot.

22           147. In or around November 2003, Torture Conspirators located in Ramadi, Iraq, detained  
23 approximately 30 putative Class Plaintiffs in a house. The conspirators released German shepherd  
24 dogs into the house and encouraged the dogs to attack the detainees.

25           148. On or about November 19, 2003, Torture Conspirators located in Iraq managed to  
26 wrest control over the detention conditions in Abu Ghraib prison from those charged with such  
27 control under normal military procedures. The Torture Conspirators’ success in gaining control  
28 over the conditions of detention is reflected in a memorandum signed by General Sanchez, which

1 formally transferred tactical control over the conditions of detention to the 205th Military  
2 Intelligence Brigade.

3 149. On or about December 12, 2003, the Torture Conspirators located in Abu Ghraib,  
4 Iraq, terrorized a putative Class Plaintiff with German shepherds. They stripped this victim and  
5 subsequently permitted the dogs to attack him.

6 150. On or around Ramadan, 2003, the Torture Conspirators located in Abu Ghraib, Iraq  
7 tortured a putative Class Plaintiff by putting sandbags on his head, stripping him naked, forcing him  
8 onto his hands and knees, piling other naked prisoners on top of him, taking pictures from front and  
9 back views of the pile of naked prisoners, forcing him to stroke his penis, pretending to put his  
10 penis in the mouth of a guard while taking pictures, playing with his penis with a pen, writing on  
11 his buttocks, leaving him naked in a cell with no mattress for two days and denying him all food but  
12 bread and water for three days.

13 151. On or around Ramadan, 2003, the Torture Conspirators located in Abu Ghraib, Iraq  
14 tortured a putative Class Plaintiff by stripping him naked, ordering him to stroke his penis in front  
15 of a female guard, placing three other naked prisoners on his back, forcing him onto his stomach  
16 and then placing six other prisoners on top, taking pictures of him in a pile of naked prisoners,  
17 writing on his body, forcing him and others to walk and bark like dogs, beating him on the face and  
18 chest and forcing him to sleep on the floor with bags on his head for ten days.

19 152. The Torture Conspirators located in Abu Ghraib, Iraq tortured a putative Class  
20 Plaintiff by handcuffing him to a cell door for two hours, pouring cold water on him, putting his  
21 head in urine, beating him with a broom, stepping on his head and legs, pressing a broom into his  
22 buttocks, spitting on him and yelling at him over a loudspeaker for three hours.

23 153. On September 10, 2003 the Torture Conspirators in Abu Ghraib, Iraq tortured a  
24 putative Class Plaintiff by placing him in solitary confinement for sixty-seven days, during which  
25 time they further tortured him by hitting him on the chest, cuffing him to a window for five hours,  
26 and depriving him of food for twenty-four hours.

1  
2 **CONTINUING PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF**  
3 **WRONGFUL AND ILLEGAL ACTS**

4 154. Beginning in January 2002 and, upon information and belief, continuing to present,  
5 the Torture Conspirators have engaged in an ongoing pattern and practice of illegal acts designed to  
6 generate alleged “intelligence” from Plaintiffs and putative Class Plaintiffs. Defendants and their  
7 co-conspirators used physical and psychological coercion in a systematic way to extract alleged  
8 “information” or other forms of co-operation from Plaintiffs allegedly deemed to have “intelligence  
9 value.”

10 155. The Torture Conspirators committed a series of acts specifically designed to  
11 mentally devastate Plaintiffs and putative Class Plaintiffs by attacking and ridiculing their religious  
12 faith of Islam.

13 156. The Torture Conspirators conducted this illegal activity in several prisons and  
14 detention centers, including but not limited to, the Umm Qasr camp in Iraq, Camp Buka in Iraq, the  
15 Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Camp Cropper near the Bhagdad Airport in Iraq, the Wood Building in  
16 Iraq, the Steel Building in Iraq, and the Tikrit holding area formerly known as the Saddam Hussein  
17 Islamic School.

18 157. Beginning in January 2002 and, upon information and belief, continuing to present,  
19 the Torture Conspirators, including but not limited to the corporate Defendants and the named  
20 Individual Defendants, continually tortured, abused, and otherwise mistreated Plaintiffs and  
21 putative Class Plaintiffs by repeatedly engaging in the following acts:

22 (a) Hooding, used to prevent Plaintiffs and putative Class Plaintiffs from seeing  
23 and to disorient them, and also to prevent them from breathing freely. The conspirators used one or  
24 sometimes two bags, sometimes with an elastic blindfold over the eyes which, when it slips down,  
25 further impedes proper breathing. The Torture Conspirators use hooding in conjunction with  
26 beatings, thus increasing anxiety as to when blows would come. The practice of hooding also  
27 allows the Torture Conspirators to remain anonymous and act with impunity. At times, Plaintiffs  
28

1 and putative Class Plaintiffs are hooded up to 2 to 4 consecutive days, during which hoods are  
2 lifted only for drinking, eating or going to the toilets;

3 (b) Handcuffing with flexi-cuffs, which are sometimes made so tight and used  
4 for such extended periods that they caused skin lesions and long-term after-effects on the hands  
5 (nerve damage);

6 (c) Beatings with hard objects (including pistols and rifles), slapping, punching,  
7 kicking with knees or feet on various parts of the body (legs, sides, lower back, groin);

8 (d) Pressing the face into the ground with boots;

9 (e) Threatening further ill-treatment, reprisals against family members, and  
10 imminent execution or transfer to Guantánamo;

11 (f) Stripping them naked and holding them naked for several days while held in  
12 solitary confinement in an empty and pitch black cell;

13 (g) Placing them in solitary confinement for extended periods of time;

14 (h) Depriving them of food and water and access to showers and open air;

15 (i) Holding them incommunicado for prolonged periods;

16 (j) Parading them naked outside cells in front of other detainees, and guards,  
17 and sometimes hooded with women's underwear over the head;

18 (k) Humiliating them by making them stand naked against the wall of their cells  
19 with their arms raised or with women's underwear over the head for prolonged periods - while  
20 being laughed at by guards, including female guards;

21 (l) Urinating on them;

22 (m) Force-feeding them foreign objects, such as baseballs;

23 (n) Photographing them in humiliating positions;

24 (o) Raping them;

25 (p) Restraining them while government officials raped them;

26 (q) Forcing them to engage in sex acts;

27

28

1 (r) Repeatedly attacking and beating them over several days, for several hours  
2 each time, as they are handcuffed to the bars of their cell door in humiliating (*i.e.* naked or in  
3 underwear) and/or uncomfortable positions causing physical pain;

4 (s) Exposing them to loud noise or music, prolonged exposure to the sun over  
5 several hours, including during the hottest time of the day when temperatures could reach 122  
6 degrees Fahrenheit or higher;

7 (t) Forcing them to remain for prolonged periods in stressful positions such as  
8 squatting or standing with or without their arms raised;

9 (u) Depriving them of sleep for days or weeks, by various means, including but  
10 not limited to throwing cold water on them and illuminating their cells with powerful arc lighting  
11 for 24-hours per day;

12 (v) Engaging in other acts for the purpose of ridiculing and attacking their  
13 religious faith of Islam.

14 158. In addition to torturing, abusing, and otherwise mistreating Plaintiffs and putative  
15 Class Plaintiffs in order to make them more willing to talk, Torture Conspirators failed to provide  
16 Interrogation Services that complied with the laws governing arrest and detention as well as  
17 interrogation. As observed by the ICRC, for example, the Torture Conspirators failed to inform  
18 detainees of the reasons for their arrest, even when repeatedly asked to do so. The Torture  
19 Conspirators also interrogated Plaintiffs and putative Class Plaintiffs without charging them.

20  
21 **CONTINUING PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF  
ATTEMPTING TO OBSTRUCT JUSTICE**

22 159. The Torture Conspiracy's activities have been observed by, among others, the  
23 ICRC. These observations were verbally shared with the United States on several occasions,  
24 including April 1, 2003. These observations were also shared with the United States in memoranda  
25 dated May 2003, July 2003, and February 2004. Upon information and belief, the ICRC also had  
26 additional communications on dates not known to Plaintiffs.

27 160. ICRC reports as well as reports by other entities, such as Amnesty International and  
28 allied countries, resulted in concerns being raised by some United States government officials about

1 Plaintiffs' treatment. For example, Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote a strongly worded letter  
2 to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on April 14, 2003, urging that the mistreatment of the  
3 detainees cease. Secretary Powell asserted that the mistreatment of the detainees was a threat to  
4 national security.

5 161. Torture Conspirators took steps to obstruct justice and interfere with the steps being  
6 taken by the ICRC and certain United States government officials to investigate allegations of  
7 mistreatment.

8 162. The Torture Conspirators repeatedly acted to obstruct justice by persuading and  
9 attempting to persuade others in positions of authority that the ICRC reports were not credible and  
10 should not be used to guide the United States' actions. However, the conspirators had no  
11 information or evidence upon which to rely to suggest the ICRC reports were not credible. Rather,  
12 the Torture Conspirators intentionally made false statements in order to prevent the certain United  
13 States officials from discovering and ending the Torture Conspiracy.

14 163. Among other steps taken to obstruct justice, the Torture Conspirators attempted to  
15 move Plaintiffs and putative Class Plaintiffs out of the view of the investigators. *See* Exhibit I.

16 164. On and after September 13, 2003, the Torture Conspirators took a series of steps to  
17 obstruct justice in relation to the summary executions. They issued an "International Death  
18 Certificate" for the person they killed that attributed the death directly to "card-respiratory arrest –  
19 asphyxia" and claimed the "cause of the condition" was "unknown." The conspirators made these  
20 false statements on official documents to obstruct the on-going investigations into the murder,  
21 including an investigation conducted by the United States military, which began on or about  
22 October 3, 2003. Upon information and belief, these documents were sent to the United States.

23 165. For example, the Torture Conspirators, beginning in or around October 2003 and  
24 continuing to present, attempted to prevent the commencement of an investigation into the assault  
25 on a putative Class Plaintiff.

26 166. Upon information and belief, the Torture Conspirators took steps to obstruct justice  
27 in the District of Columbia, Virginia, California, and other states, as well as abroad.

28

1  
2 **DAMAGES**

3 167. Upon information and belief, the Torture Conspirators have summarily executed at  
4 least 15 persons.

5 168. Upon information and belief, the Torture Conspirators have caused as many as 50  
6 suicides.

7 169. The Torture Conspirators have caused serious physical injuries, including  
8 irreversible brain damage, broken bones, permanent paralysis, and permanent physical ill health.

9 170. The Torture Conspirators have caused persons to become seriously mentally ill.  
10 Plaintiffs subjected to abuse by the Torture Conspirators have developed, among other conditions,  
11 concentration difficulties, memory problems, verbal expression difficulties, incoherent speech,  
12 acute anxiety reactions, abnormal behavior and suicidal tendencies. For example, the ICRC  
13 observed one person held in isolation to be unresponsive to verbal and painful stimuli. His heart  
14 rate was 120 beats per minute and his respiratory rate 18 per minute. He was diagnosed as  
15 suffering from somatoform (mental) disorder, specifically a conversion disorder.

16 171. The Torture Conspirators have caused extensive damage to certain Plaintiffs'  
17 businesses and properties, including, upon information and belief, putative RICO Class Members'  
18 businesses and properties located in the United States.

19 **COUNT I**  
20 **VIOLATION OF RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND**  
21 **CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT ("RICO")**

22 172. All preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth  
23 herein.

24 173. Defendant Titan and CACI Corporate Defendants, together with the Individual  
25 Defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C.  
26 §§ 1961-1968.

27 174. The corporate Defendants operated and continue to operate ongoing publicly-traded  
28 corporations formed under Delaware law. These corporations, together with the co-conspiring  
government officials and the individual Defendants, have formed an association-in-fact and

1 combined to conduct legitimate business for the United States in California, other states, and  
2 overseas. This association-in-fact conducted both legal and illegal business and constitutes an  
3 ongoing Enterprise as that term is defined by RICO. The Enterprise began in or around January  
4 2002 and continues as an ongoing concern that engages in legitimate activity separate and apart  
5 from the criminal and illegal activity.

6 175. Defendant Titan, CACI Corporate Defendants and the Individual Defendants  
7 together with the co-conspiring government officials worked together on a repeated and continuous  
8 basis to facilitate and engage directly and indirectly in the illegal racketeering activity. The  
9 predicate acts include, but are not limited to, acts and threats of murder, assault and abuse,  
10 kidnapping, and obstruction of justice.

11 176. Defendants were and continue to be associated with and employed by the Enterprise.

12 177. Defendants and employees employed by the Enterprise engaged in a pattern of  
13 racketeering activity as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) and as described above and in  
14 the accompanying exhibits.

15 178. The Defendants and their co-conspirators engaged for several years and are still  
16 engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity (referred to as the “Torture Conspiracy”) that is  
17 separate and apart from the legitimate activity conducted by the Enterprise. The acts of the  
18 Enterprise and the acts of the Torture Conspirators have a major impact on interstate commerce.

19 179. Defendants have earned millions of dollars from the Torture Conspiracy.  
20 Defendants implemented the Torture Conspiracy in order to earn millions of dollars for  
21 Interrogation Services that would not have been earned through the Enterprise’s legitimate conduct  
22 of business.

23 180. Plaintiff Sami, Plaintiff Ahmed, Plaintiff Neisef, and the putative RICO Class  
24 Members have been injured in their business or property, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The  
25 impact caused by Defendants’ pattern and practice of criminal conduct, if not remedied by this  
26 Court, will continue to harm the named Plaintiffs and putative RICO Class Members.

27 181. The Torture Conspiracy's victims include all detainees who have been killed,  
28 tortured, abused, or otherwise mistreated by the Torture Conspirators. The Enterprise’s victims

1 also include United States citizens were harmed by Defendants' illegal conduct, such as former  
2 military police officer Spc. Dean Baker who was injured while posing as an uncooperative prisoner  
3 during a training session.

4 182. As a direct and proximate result of the Torture Conspirators' actions as aforesaid,  
5 Plaintiff Sami, Plaintiff Ahmed, Plaintiff Neisef, and the putative RICO Class have been damaged  
6 in an amount to be determined at trial.

7 **COUNT II**  
8 **CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE**  
9 **RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT ("RICO")**

10 183. All preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth  
11 herein.

12 184. Defendants and their co-conspirators in the government conspired to violate the  
13 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.

14 185. The corporate Defendants operated and continue to operate ongoing publicly-traded  
15 corporations formed under Delaware law. These corporations, together with the co-conspiring  
16 government officials and the individual Defendants, have formed an association-in-fact and  
17 combined to conduct legitimate business for the United States in California, other states, and  
18 overseas. This association-in-fact conducted both legal and illegal business and constitutes an  
19 ongoing Enterprise as that term is defined by RICO. The Enterprise began in or around January  
20 2002 and continues as an ongoing concern that engages in legitimate activity separate and apart  
21 from the criminal and illegal activity.

22 186. Defendants were and continue to be associated with and employed by the Enterprise.

23 187. Defendants facilitated and/or directed, expressly and implicitly, that employees  
24 employed by the Enterprise engage in a pattern of racketeering activity as that term is defined in  
25 U.S.C. § 1961(5) and as described above and in the accompanying exhibits.

26 188. The Torture Conspirators engaged for several years and is still engaging in a pattern  
27 of criminal conduct.

28 189. Defendants and their co-conspirators conspired together to conduct, facilitate and to  
participate directly and indirectly in the conduct of the affairs of the Enterprise through a pattern of

1 racketeering activity as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) and as described above and in  
2 the accompanying exhibits.

3 190. The Enterprise has earned millions of dollars in exchange for participating with co-  
4 conspiring government officials in the racketeering activities described above. The Enterprise and  
5 the co-conspirators designed and implemented the Torture Conspiracy in order to earn millions of  
6 dollars for Interrogation Services that would not have been earned through the Enterprise's  
7 legitimate conduct of business.

8 191. The acts of the Enterprise and the acts of the Torture Conspirators have a major  
9 impact on interstate commerce.

10 192. Plaintiff Sami, Plaintiff Ahmed, Plaintiff Neisef, and the putative RICO Class  
11 Members have been injured in their businesses or properties, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).  
12 The impact caused by Defendants' pattern and practice of criminal conduct, if not remedied by this  
13 Court, will continue to harm the named Plaintiffs and putative RICO Class Members.

14 193. The Enterprise's victims include not only the named Plaintiffs but all detainees who  
15 have been killed, tortured, abused, or otherwise mistreated by the Torture Conspirators. The  
16 Enterprise's victims also include all United States citizens, who are subjected to greater security  
17 risks as a result of Defendants' illegal conduct.

18 194. As a direct and proximate result of the Torture Conspirators' actions as aforesaid,  
19 Plaintiff Sami, Plaintiff Ahmed, Plaintiff Neisef, and the putative RICO Class have been damaged  
20 in an amount to be determined at trial.

21  
22 **COUNT III**  
**CLAIM UNDER THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT –**  
23 **SUMMARY EXECUTION**

24 195. All preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth  
25 herein.

26 196. The deliberate killings, under color of law, of Ibrahiem and putative Wrongful Death  
27 Class Members were not authorized by a lawful judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted  
28

1 court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized  
2 peoples.

3 197. The acts described herein constitute summary execution in violation of the law of  
4 nations under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, in that the acts violated customary  
5 international law prohibiting summary execution as reflected, expressed, and defined in multilateral  
6 treaties and other international instruments, international and domestic judicial decisions, and other  
7 authorities.

8 198. The acts described herein violate the Alien Tort Claims Act, which recognizes as  
9 federal common law those international norms that have definite content and acceptance among  
10 civilized nations. The acts described here are within the body of acts that violate such definite and  
11 accepted international norms and are within the body of acts deemed actionable under the federal  
12 common law by the United States' Supreme Court in *Sosa v. Alvarez Machain*, 2004 U.S. LEXIS  
13 4763 (June 29, 2004).

14 199. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants set the conditions, directly  
15 and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified and/or conspired with certain  
16 government officials to execute summarily Ibrahiem and other members of the putative Wrongful  
17 Death Class.

18 200. Plaintiffs and putative Class Members were forced to suffer severe physical and  
19 psychological abuse and agony.

20 201. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

21 **COUNT IV**  
22 **CLAIM UNDER THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT –**  
23 **TORTURE**

24 202. All preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth  
25 herein.

26 203. Plaintiffs bring this claim on their own behalf and on behalf of the class against all  
27 Defendants.  
28









1 civilized nations. The acts described here are within the body of acts that violate such definite and  
2 accepted international norms and are within the body of acts deemed actionable under the federal  
3 common law by the United States' Supreme Court in *Sosa v. Alvarez Machain*, 2004 U.S. LEXIS  
4 4763 (June 29, 2004).

5 236. Defendants are liable for said conduct directly and also in so far as they set the  
6 conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified and/or  
7 conspired with certain government officials to commit the war crimes against Plaintiffs and  
8 putative Class Members.

9 237. Defendants' acts described above constitute war crimes in violation of the applicable  
10 provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols thereto, and customary  
11 international law.

12 238. Defendants' acts violated, among others, Article III Common to the Geneva  
13 Conventions, the Third Geneva Convention, the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional  
14 Protocol I to the four Geneva Conventions.

15 239. Defendants' acts were deliberate, willful, intentional, wanton, malicious and  
16 oppressive and should be punished by an award of punitive damages to be determined at trial.  
17 Plaintiffs and putative Class Members were forced to suffer severe physical and psychological  
18 abuse and agony.

19 240. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

20 **COUNT IX**  
21 **CLAIM UNDER THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT –**  
22 **CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY**

23 241. All preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth  
24 herein.

25 242. The acts described herein committed against Plaintiffs constitute crimes against  
26 humanity, including willful killing, torture, rape, arbitrary arrest and detention, and other inhumane  
27 acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population or  
28 persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds. Leaders, organizers, instigators and

1 accomplices participating in the formulation of these acts are responsible for all acts performed by  
2 any person in execution of such plan.

3 243. The acts described herein constitute crimes against humanity in violation of the law  
4 of nations under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, in that the acts violated customary  
5 international law prohibiting crimes against humanity as reflected, expressed, and defined in  
6 multilateral treaties and other international instruments, international and domestic judicial  
7 decisions, and other authorities.

8 244. The acts described herein violate the Alien Tort Claims Act, which recognizes as  
9 federal common law those international norms that have definite content and acceptance among  
10 civilized nations. The acts described here are within the body of acts that violate such definite and  
11 accepted international norms and are within the body of acts deemed actionable under the federal  
12 common law by the United States' Supreme Court in *Sosa v. Alvarez Machain*, 2004 U.S. LEXIS  
13 4763 (June 29, 2004).

14 245. Defendants are liable for said conduct directly and also in so far as they set the  
15 conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified and/or  
16 conspired with certain government officials to commit the crimes against humanity against the  
17 Plaintiffs and putative Class Members.

18 246. Plaintiffs and putative Class Members were forced to suffer severe physical and  
19 psychological abuse and agony.

20 247. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and such other relief as to be determined  
21 at trial.

22

23 **COUNT X**  
**VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS**

24 248. All preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth  
25 herein.

26 249. Plaintiffs bring this claim on their own behalf and on behalf of the putative Class  
27 Members against all Defendants.

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**COUNT XXIII  
UNJUST ENRICHMENT**

315. All preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

316. Defendants' were unjustly enriched by their criminal conduct. Defendants should be prevented from benefiting from their illegal and criminal conduct.

317. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order requiring Defendants to disgorge their ill-gotten gains. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order preventing Defendants from continuing to be unjustly enriched by their co-conspiring government officials influencing the award of government contracts.

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**COUNT XXV  
VIOLATION OF LAWS GOVERNING CONTRACTING WITH THE UNITED STATES**

318. All preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

319. Defendants violated the United States Federal Acquisition Regulations, the United States Truth in Negotiations Act, the United States Cost Accounting Standards, and other laws and regulations that govern the placement and implementation of contracts.

320. Defendants should be prevented from benefiting from conduct that violates these laws and regulations.

321. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order requiring Defendants to disgorge their ill-gotten gains. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order preventing Defendants from being awarded any future contracts from the United States.

**COUNT XXVI  
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

322. All preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

323. Plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Defendants from continuing their illegal and inhuman treatment of Plaintiffs.



1 (b) punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish Defendants and to deter  
2 them from engaging in similar misconduct;

3 (c) equitable declaratory and injunctive relief as is permitted by law (including  
4 RICO), including, but not limited to, an injunction against any continued torture and abuse and an  
5 injunction against any future government contract awards;

6 (d) treble damages to the extent permitted by RICO and RULIPA;

7 (e) attorneys' fees and costs, including but not limited to such fees and costs as  
8 may be awarded under RICO and RULIPA.


9 Date: July 30, 2004

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*Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Class Plaintiffs*

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**INDEX OF EXHIBITS**

<b>Exhibit</b>	<b>Title of Document</b>
A	Excerpts from Titan Corporation web site
B	Excerpts from Titan Corporation web site
C	Excerpts from CACI web site
D	Diary of CACI employee
E	Titan Corporation Memorandum re Job Description/Policy
F	Identification of government contracts
G	CACI Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Standards: 2002 and 2003
H	Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade
I	Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation

# **Exhibit A**



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## Working at Titan



### USAFE A&AS Opportunities

The Titan Corporation and its partners CACI and [redacted] collectively known as Team Titan, recently won the re-compete for the Assistance and Advisory Services (A&AS) contract (previously referred to as the USAFE SETA) supporting United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE), European Command (EUCOM), US Army Europe (USAREUR), the Joint Analysis Center (JAC), and the Warrior Preparation Center (WPC). Awarded by the USAFE Contracting command in Ramstein, Germany, the contract calls for Titan to provide A&AS; Engineering and Technical services; Management and Professional Support; and Studies, Analyses and Evaluation services to maintain and enhance government owned computer software and provide intelligence analysis support for USAFE, WPC, EUCOM and USAREUR and intelligence analysis for the JAC programs and support functions.

The Titan Corporation is a leading provider of comprehensive information and communications products, solutions, and services for National Security and the Security of our Homeland. Serving the Department of Defense, intelligence agencies, and other government customers, Titan's business focus includes homeland security, C4ISR, transformational programs and enterprise information technology. Titan holds to the strong ethical values expressed in its operating principles and its business strategy. The company is proud that dedicated and talented employees have chosen to work at Titan and together create value for the corporation's shareholders.

Our vast experience and dynamic workforce creates an environment that encourages our employees to innovate, design and develop solutions for our customers in a collaborative, highly energized environment. We are committed to providing a work environment that is sensitive and responsive to the workforce needs. Titan's philosophy of compensation includes more than just a paycheck. In addition to salaries, our compensation package includes health and welfare benefits, incentive awards, training, professional development and recognition programs.

The Titan Team is looking for qualified individuals to join us in the following positions:

Position	Location
Airborne Surveillance Analyst	Kosovo
All Source Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
All Source Analyst	Various Germany locations
All Source Intelligence Analyst	Kosovo
Analyst	Various Germany locations
Analyst/Force Protection	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Analyst/Force Protection	Stuttgart, Germany
AOC Mobility Integrator	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
AOC Requirements Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Combat Service Support Analyst	Various Germany locations
Communications Engineer	Einsiedlerhof, Germany
Communications Engineer	Various Germany locations
Counter Terrorism Intelligence Analyst I	Molesworth United Kingdom
Counter Terrorism Intelligence Analyst I - CT Watch Analyst	Molesworth United Kingdom
Counter Terrorism Intelligence Analyst II	Molesworth United Kingdom
Counter Terrorism Intelligence Analyst III	Molesworth United Kingdom
Counterintelligence Analyst	Stuttgart, Germany
Counterintelligence Plans and Exercise Officer	Stuttgart, Germany
Database Administrator	Various Germany locations
DGS-4 Systems Manager	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
EAC MASINT Analyst (imagery)	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
EAC MASINT Analyst (imagery)	Stuttgart, Germany

EAC MASINT Analyst EAC MASINT Senior	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Exercise Planning Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Force Protection Counterintelligence Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Force Protection Intelligence Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Force Protection Readiness Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Force Protection Security Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Foreign Disclosure Assistant	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Functional Analyst II – Systems Planner (Intelligence)	Molesworth United Kingdom
Functional Analyst III – Systems Planner (Intelligence)	Molesworth United Kingdom
Geospatial Information and Services (GI&S) Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Imagery Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Imagery Analyst / Exploitation Manager	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Information Operations Analyst	Stuttgart, Germany
Intelligence Analyst - Counter Intelligence/Human Intelligence	Various Germany locations
Intelligence Analyst - Signal	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Intelligence Analyst - Topographic/Terrain	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Intelligence Analyst I	Molesworth United Kingdom
Intelligence Analyst II	Molesworth United Kingdom
Intelligence Analyst II - Intelligence Request for Information Mgr.	Molesworth United Kingdom
Intelligence Analyst III	Molesworth United Kingdom
Intelligence Task Leader	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Interoperability Analyst	Various Germany locations
ISR Collection Manager	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
ISR Communications Systems Engineer	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
ISR Operations Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Joint Staff Planning Support Specialist	Various Germany locations
LAN Specialist	Various Germany locations
Management Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Management Assistant	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
MASINT Functional Analyst	Stuttgart, Germany
MASINT Functional Analyst	Molesworth, UK
Military Intelligence Planner	Various Germany locations
Military Planner	Various Germany Locations
Mission Manager/Imagery - Analyst/Supervisor	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Network/Software Engineer	Various Germany locations
Physical / Personnel Security Specialist	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Political Military Analyst/Facilitator	Various Germany locations
Receptionist	Germany Locations
Senior Analyst	Einsiedlerhof, Germany
Senior Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Senior Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Senior Arms Control Analyst	Various Germany locations
Senior Engineer	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Senior Engineer	Various Germany locations
Senior Engineer (Operational Targeteer)	Various Germany locations
Senior Engineer (Operations Engineer)	Various Germany locations
Senior Engineer (Senior Engineer/Senior System Engineer)	Einsiedlerhof, Germany
Senior Engineer (Senior Intelligence System Analyst)	Stuttgart, Germany
Senior Force Protection Counterintelligence Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Senior Force Protection Intelligence Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany

Senior Force Protection Security Analyst; Task Lead	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Senior Intel Correlation Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Senior Intel Correlation Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Senior Level Study Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Senior Military Analyst	Einsiedlerhof, Germany
Senior Military Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Senior Military Analyst	Stuttgart, Germany
Senior Military Analyst	Varous Germany locations
Senior Principal Analyst	Various Germany locations
Senior System Analyst	Stuttgart, Germany
Senior System Analyst	Various Germany locations
Senior System Analyst	Various Germany locations
Senior TBM Systems Engineer	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Senior/Advance Systems Engineer	Stuttgart, Germany
Senior/Advance Systems Engineer	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
SIGINT Collection Manager	Kosovo
Site Manager	Einsiedlerhof, Germany
Site Manager - Exercise Planning and SETA Support	Einsiedlerhof, Germany
Site Manager - Intelligence Analysis Support	Molesworth United Kingdom
Site Manager - Intelligence Analysis Support	Stuttgart, Germany
Site Manager - Intelligence Analysis Support	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Site Security Accreditation Specialist	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Systems Administrator	Various Germany locations
Systems Engineer	Heidelberg, Germany
Systems Engineer	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Systems Engineer - Advanced	Einsiedlerhof, Germany
Systems Engineer - Advanced	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Systems Engineer - Advanced	Various Germany locations
Systems Engineer/Site Manager	Einsiedlerhof, Germany
Systems Engineer/Site Manager	Various Germany locations
Systems Integration Management (SIM) Functional Analyst	Molesworth, UK
Systems Integration Management (SIM) Imagery Systems Analyst	Stuttgart, Germany
Systems Specialist	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Systems Specialist	Various Germany locations
Systems/Infrastructure Engineer	Einsiedlerhof, Germany
TBM Systems Engineer	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Training Specialist	Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Training Specialist	Various Germany locations
Web Analyst	Ramstein Air Base, Germany

**Click on one or more our USAFE A&AS opportunities to submit your resume. If you have any questions, contact us at [usafe.aas@titan.com](mailto:usafe.aas@titan.com).**

# JOB FAIRS

The Titan Corporation is a leading provider of comprehensive technical assistance services, information and communications products, and solutions for National Security. Serving the Department of Defense, Intelligence agencies, and other government customers, our business focus includes Homeland Security, Transformational Programs, Enterprise Information Technology, and C4ISR. Due to the recent award of the USAFE A&AS contract (formerly USAFE SETA), we are looking for qualified individuals to join us in the following positions:

- **Military Planners**
- **Intelligence Analyst** (all disciplines)
- **System Administrators/Engineers**
- **Training Specialists**
- **Logistics Specialists**

**Titan and our USAFE A&AS teammates, CACI and [Redacted] will be holding JOB FAIRS at the following locations:**

**October 30 - November 1**

Molesworth, UK, Marriott Huntingdon,  
10/30 (1600-2200), 10/31 (1200-2200), 11/1 (0800-1200)

**November 3 - November 4**

Ramstein, GE, Ramstein Officers Club, 1100-1900 daily

**November 5**

Heidelberg, GE, above Food Court at Campbell Barracks ,  
1000-2000

**November 6 - November 8**

Stuttgart, GE, Swabian Special Events Center,  
11/6 (1600-2000), 11/7 (1200-2000), 11/8 (0800-1200)

For more information on these positions, to view additional opportunities at Titan, or to submit your resume online, visit us at

[WWW.TITAN.COM/JOBS](http://WWW.TITAN.COM/JOBS)

then click on the  
USAFE A&AS  
button.

EOE M/F/D/V

If attending a job fair,  
bring a copy of your resume.



# **Exhibit B**





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#### CAT I Arabic Linguist Iraq

Location: **Iraq**

Req. No.: **TOSG26**

Division: **Technical & Operational Support Group**

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Provide operational contract linguist support to reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Provide general linguistic support for military operations and interpret during interviews, meeting, and conferences. Interpret and translate written and spoken communications. Transcribe and analyze verbal communications. Perform document exploitation. Scan, research, and analyze foreign language documents for key information. Translate and gist foreign language documents. Identify and extract information components meeting military information requirement list criteria. Provide input to reports. Linguists are required to work 12-hour shifts and in excess of 60-hour weeks in order to provide continuous contract linguist support that this 24 x 7 operation requires. Linguists must be available for worldwide deployment as the mission dictates. Minimum required: Native proficiency in the Arabic/Iraqi dialect, (Interagency Language Roundtable skill level 4-5). Must be capable of providing idiomatic translations of non-technical material using correct syntax and expression from English to the native language or vice versa; ability to conduct consecutive, accurate translations/interpretation of on going conversations/activities; must be capable of providing cultural social, ethnic context of translations and interpretations, and advise supported organization on the cultural, social and ethnic significance of conversations, situations, documents, etc., in one or more Iraqi cultural traditions and or regions; must be familiar with the local culture, conduct oneself in accordance with local customs, and deal unobtrusively with the populace; must be familiar with and adhere to U.S. Army standards of conduct and the laws of the host nation in performing work assignments; must have good interpersonal skills and ability to work as part of a civil-military team in an unstructured environment; must be willing and capable to live and work in a harsh environment. Desired: University degree from accredited North American or European university.

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#### CAT II Arabic Linguist

Location: **TO BE DETERMINED**

Req. No.: **OAT754**

Division: **Technical & Operational Support Group**

Provide operational contract linguist support to U.S. Army operations in various locations worldwide. Provide general linguistic support for military operations and interpret during interviews, meeting, and conferences. Interpret and translate written and spoken communications. Transcribe and analyze verbal communications. Perform document exploitation. Scan, research, and analyze foreign language documents for key information. Translate and gist foreign language documents. Identify and extract information components meeting military information requirement list criteria. Provide input to reports. Linguists are required to work 12-hour shifts and in excess of 60-hour weeks in order to provide continuous contract linguist support that this 24 x 7 operation requires. Linguists must be available for worldwide deployment as the mission dictates.

Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a) Minimum required:

An excellent command of Arabic, as well as strong verbal and written American English skills (grammar, vocabulary, idioms, spelling) because linguist work products are prepared in English. A 4/4 (i.e., native) or higher Arabic listening/reading comprehension rating according to the ILR scale and as measured by the DLPT or comparable language test vehicle. Must hold a current U.S. passport. Must possess a SECRET security clearance or be clearable to SECRET. Must be willing to travel/work in various locations worldwide. Ability to deal unobtrusively with the local populace. Familiarity with and ability to conduct oneself in accordance with the local culture and customs. Willingness to work shifts and extended hours in support of 24 x 7 Operations. Must be able to live and work in a harsh environment.

(b) Desired:

Skilled in one or more Arabic dialects, especially Arabic Iraqi. Additional proficiency in Kurdish desired. A pre-existing SECRET security clearance. A thorough knowledge of cultural, economic, geopolitical, and military issues of the Mid East and Arab-speaking countries within that region. Previous operational experience as linguist in support of government operations. An ability to operate standard and specialized office automation equipment to process foreign language material.

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#### CAT II Pashto Linguist

Location: **TO BE DETERMINED**

Req. No.: **OAT730**

Division: **Technical & Operational Support Group**

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Provide operational contract linguist support to U.S. Army operations in various locations worldwide. Provide general linguistic support for military operations and interpret during interviews, meeting, and conferences. Interpret and translate written and spoken communications. Transcribe and analyze verbal communications. Perform document exploitation. Scan, research, and analyze foreign language documents for key information. Translate and gist foreign language documents. Identify and extract information components meeting military information requirement list criteria. Provide input to reports. Linguists are required to work 12-hour shifts and in excess of 60-hour weeks in order to provide continuous contract linguist support that this 24 x 7 operation requires. Linguists must be available for worldwide deployment as the mission dictates.

Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a) Minimum required:

An excellent command of Pashto, as well as strong verbal and written American English skills (grammar, vocabulary, idioms, spelling) because linguist work products are prepared in English. A 4/4 (i.e., native) or higher Arabic listening/reading comprehension rating according to the ILR scale and as measured by the DLPT or comparable language test vehicle. Must hold a current U.S. passport. Must possess a SECRET security clearance or be clearable to SECRET. Must be willing to travel/work in various locations worldwide. Ability to deal unobtrusively with the local populace. Familiarity with and ability to conduct oneself in accordance with the local culture and customs. Willingness to work shifts and extended hours in support of 24 x 7 Operations. Must be able to live and work in a harsh environment.

(b) Desired:

Additional proficiency in Persian Dari desired. A pre-existing SECRET security clearance. A thorough knowledge of cultural, economic, geopolitical, and military issues of the Mid East and Arab-speaking countries within that region. Previous operational experience as linguist in support of government operations. An ability to operate standard and specialized office automation equipment to process foreign language material.

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#### CAT III Arabic Linguist

Location: **TO BE DETERMINED**                      Req. No.: **OAT734**

Division: **Technical & Operational Support Group**

Provide operational contract linguist support to U.S. Army operations in various locations worldwide. Provide general linguistic support for military operations and interpret during interviews, meeting, and conferences. Interpret and translate written and spoken communications. Transcribe and analyze verbal communications. Perform document exploitation. Scan, research, and analyze foreign language documents for key information. Translate and gist foreign language documents. Identify and extract information components meeting military information requirement list criteria. Provide input to reports. Linguists are required to work 12-hour shifts and in excess of 60-hour weeks in order to provide continuous contract linguist support that this 24 x 7 operation requires. Linguists must be available for worldwide deployment as the mission dictates.

Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a) Minimum required:

An excellent command of Arabic, as well as strong verbal and written American English skills (grammar, vocabulary, idioms, spelling) because linguist work products are prepared in English. A 4/4 (i.e., native) or higher Arabic listening/reading comprehension rating according to the ILR scale and as measured by the DLPT or comparable language test vehicle. Must hold a current U.S. passport. Must possess a SECRET security clearance or be clearable to TOP SECRET. Must be willing to travel/work in various locations worldwide. Ability to deal unobtrusively with the local populace. Familiarity with and ability to conduct oneself in accordance with the local culture and customs. Willingness to work shifts and extended hours in support of 24 x 7 Operations. Must be able to live and work in a harsh environment.

(b) Desired:

Skilled in one or more Arabic dialects, especially Arabic Iraqi. Additional proficiency in Kurdish desired. A pre-existing TOP SECRET security clearance. A thorough knowledge of cultural, economic, geopolitical, and military issues of the Mid East and Arab-speaking countries within that region. Previous operational experience as linguist in support of government operations. An ability to operate standard and specialized office automation equipment to process foreign language material.

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### CAT III Pashto Linguist

Location: **Guantanamo, Cuba**Req. No.: **OAT451**Division: **Technical & Operational Support Group**[Overview](#)  
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#### Job Description:

Provide operational contract linguist support to U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID) operations in Guantanamo, Cuba. Support CID interrogations and interviews of detainees. Interpret and translate written and spoken communications. Transcribe and analyze verbal communications. Perform document exploitation. Scan, research, and analyze foreign language documents for key information. Translate and gist foreign language documents. Identify and extract information components meeting CID information requirement list criteria. Provide input to reports. Linguists are required to work 12-hour shifts and in excess of 60-hour weeks in order to provide continuous contract linguist support that this 24 x 7 operation requires.

Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a) Minimum required:

An excellent command of Pashto, as well as strong verbal and written American English skills (grammar, vocabulary, idioms, spelling) because linguist work products are prepared in English. A 4/4 (i.e., native) or higher Pashto listening/reading comprehension rating according to the ILR scale and as measured by the DLPT or comparable language test vehicle. Must be a male U.S. citizen who holds a current U.S. passport. Must possess a TOP SECRET security clearance or be clearable to TOP SECRET. Must be willing to travel/work in local to Naval Air Station Guantanamo Bay. Ability to deal unobtrusively with the local populace. Familiarity with and ability to conduct oneself in accordance with the local culture and customs. Willingness to work shifts and extended hours in support of 24 x 7 Operations. Must be able to live and work in a harsh environment.

(b) Desired:

A pre-existing SECRET or TOP SECRET security clearance. A thorough knowledge of cultural, economic, geopolitical, and military issues of the Mid East and Arab-speaking countries within that region. Previous operational experience as linguist in support of government operations. An ability to operate standard and specialized office automation equipment to process foreign language material.

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#### Finance/Administrative Assistant

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Location: **TO BE DETERMINED**

Req. No.: **TOSG22**

Division: **Technical & Operational Support Group**

Provide Administrative/Finance support to Human resources Lead supporting Titan linguist operations in the Gulf Region for the OSD effort. Assist the HR Lead in daily responsibilities, report generation, communication on plans. Provide support to facilitate payroll of linguists. Assist in preparation of weekly, monthly, and yearly statistical reports. Assist with payroll processing, invoices, data entry, assist with language testing. Maintain accounting system software and finance server. Travel in and around the theatre may be required.

Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a) Minimum required:

U.S. Army military experience. Sound administrative background. Must be able to type 40 words per minute. Proficiency in Microsoft, PowerPoint, and Excel required. Excellent communications skills. Strong ability to work as a member of a diverse, dynamic team. Outstanding problems solving skills and sound judgement. Strong interpersonal skills. U.S. citizenship and a SECRET security clearance. Willingness to travel and work in various locations Worldwide. Willingness to work shifts and extended hours in support of 24 x 7 operations. Highly flexible. Good physical condition. Must hold a U.S. passport.

(b) Desired:

A thorough knowledge of cultural, economic, geopolitical, and military issues of the Mid East and Arab-speaking countries within that region. Previous operational experience as linguist in support of Government operations. Previous experience managing linguists during Department of Defense operations. An ability to operate standard and specialized office automation equipment to process foreign language material.

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#### Human Resource/Administrative Assistant

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Location: **TO BE DETERMINED**

Req. No.: **TOSG24**

Division: **Technical & Operational Support Group**

Provide Human Resource/Administrative support for linguist operations in the Gulf Region supporting the OSD. Assist the Project Director in daily responsibilities, report generation, communication on plans. Provide support to ensure that all Titan linguists and support staff personnel are receiving the benefits that they are entitled to. Coordinate for in-country travel of linguist support personnel. Assist in preparation of the work schedule. Ensure that linguists adhere to OSD regulations and standards of conduct concerning in-theater operations. Assist with payroll processing, invoices, data entry, assist with language testing. Travel in and around the theatre may be required.

Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a) Minimum required:

U.S. Army military experience. Sound administrative background. Must be able to type 40 words per minute. Proficiency in Microsoft, PowerPoint, and Excel required. Excellent communications skills. Strong ability to work as a member of a diverse, dynamic team. Outstanding problems solving skills and sound judgement. Strong interpersonal skills. U.S. citizenship and a SECRET security clearance. Willingness to travel and work in various locations Worldwide. Willingness to work shifts and extended hours in support of 24 x 7 operations. Highly flexible. Good physical condition. Must hold a U.S. passport.

(b) Desired:

A thorough knowledge of cultural, economic, geopolitical, and military issues of the Mid East and Arab-speaking countries within that region. Previous operational experience as linguist in support of Government operations. Previous experience managing linguists during Department of Defense operations. An ability to operate standard and specialized office automation equipment to process foreign language material.

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### Jr. Military Deception Planner

Location: **To Be Determined**

Req. No.: **sis1346**

Division: **Systems Integration Sector**

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Titan Corporation's Systems Integration Sector has 4 contingent openings for a Jr. Military Deception Planner.

This position will provide operational planning support to the customer in the area of Military Deception to include:

- Coordinating peacetime MD with applicable Commands and HQ Staffs to prevent conflicts with other activities.
- Develop and maintain capabilities for planning and conducting MD.
- Adapt MD programs to support Major Command missions.
- Conduct MD exercises during peacetime and as required for mission success during periods of crisis and wartime.
- Ensure that planning staff consider MD during all stages of operational and exercise activities.
- Ensure all warfighting headquarters and line units are familiar with the command MD program and objectives, and comply with this instruction.
- Conduct educational and training programs and exercises to develop proficiency in the planning, execution, and use of MD.
- During exercises involving other Major Commands, provide participants the mission and MD objectives prior to execution.
- Complete a MD after-action report for all exercises within established timelines.
- Establish procedures to document lessons learned from unit MD training and MD activity.
- Develop MD tabs to OPLANS and CONPLANS. Review MD tabs prepared by subordinate units to prevent conflicts with other units.

·Document MD funding requirements, including equipment and personnel

·Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a) Minimum required:

Must have current Top Secret Clearance AND must meet the requirements of DCID 6/4.

Education and Experience: Three years Military Deception experience or formal MILDEC training is mandatory; MD experience at Service, Major Command, or operational planning staff level.

Skills: Strong written and verbal communication skills required. Ability to translate concepts into operational plans. Experience navigating SIPRNET and/or JWICS. Experience with Microsoft Windows NT or 2000 (MS Office, VISIO, Project and Internet Explorer)

(b) Desired:

Education and Experience: Baccalaureate Degree in Psychology, Foreign Area studies, Science, or Engineering. Recent HQ Staff or MAJCOM experience working MD requirements. Graduate of a formal DoD MD course. 5 years experience in MD related activities.

Skills: Expert navigating SIPRNET and/or JWICS. Expert with Microsoft Windows NT or 2000 (MS Office, VISIO, Project and Internet Explorer).

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#### Logistician Tech

Location: **TO BE DETERMINED**

Req. No.: **TOSG21**

Division: **Technical & Operational Support Group**

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Provide logistical support to Titan Senior Logistician supporting OSD efforts in the Gulf Region. Maintain continuity and positive control over the weekly supply distribution convoys. Manage equipment issue and vehicle rotations. Coordinate with OSD and Titan Staff for linguist scheduling and travel. Ensure that necessary linguist health, morale, and welfare requirements are met. Coordinate for in-country travel of linguist support personnel. Effectively manage any logistical issues that may arise.

Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a) Minimum required:

U.S. Army military experience. Sound management background. Excellent communications skills. Strong ability to work as a member of a diverse, dynamic team. Outstanding problems solving skills and sound judgement. Strong interpersonal skills. U.S. citizenship and a SECRET security clearance. Willingness to travel and work in various locations Worldwide. Willingness to work shifts and extended hours in support of 24 x 7 operations. Highly flexible. Good physical condition. Must hold a U.S. passport.

(b) Desired:

A thorough knowledge of cultural, economic, geopolitical, and military issues of the Mid East and Arab-speaking countries within that region. Previous operational experience as linguist in support of Government operations. Previous experience managing linguists during Department of Defense operations. An ability to operate standard and specialized office automation equipment to process foreign language material.

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#### Quality Assurance/ESL Instructor

Location: **TO BE DETERMINED**

Req. No.: **TOSG25**

Division: **Technical & Operational Support Group**

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Be able to provide instructional help to evaluate the reading, writing, vocabulary, listening, and conversational skills to the linguists that are providing operational support to the OSD operations in the middle east. Work with Regional and Site Managers to identify linguist shortcomings and develop training aides to train and help linguists become better at performing their duties as a linguist at a higher level. Administer the ESL test to the linguists as required.

Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a) Minimum required:

U.S. Army military experience. Sound management background. Excellent communications skills. Strong ability to work as a member of a diverse, dynamic team. Certificate in TEFL( teaching English as a second language). Willingness to travel and work in various locations Worldwide. Willingness to work shifts and extended hours in support of 24 x 7 operations. Highly flexible. Good physical condition. Must hold a U.S. passport.

(b) Desired:

A thorough knowledge of cultural, economic, geopolitical, and military issues of the Mid East and Arab-speaking countries within that region. Previous operational experience as linguist in support of Government operations. Previous experience managing linguists during Department of Defense operations. An ability to operate standard and specialized office automation equipment to process foreign language material.

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### Senior Aviation Logistics Advisor (SAEG-AP-04-02)

Location: **Saudi Arabia**

Req. No.: **SAEG-AP-04-02**

Division: **Aviation Integration Division**

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Titan Corporation is a leading provider of Information and Communication Solutions for National Security. Titan's Ship and Aviation Engineering Group, Aviation Integration Division located in Huntsville, AL, is seeking a candidate to support the following position: Senior Aviation Logistics Advisor.

The successful candidate will work closely with client personnel in KKMC/Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as a Senior Aviation Logistics Advisor to provide on-site Foreign Military Sales support for fielded aviation systems.

Minimum of 15 years of U.S. Army aviation maintenance/logistics experience required in AH-64, UH-60, and/or OH-58D helicopters.

BS degree in a technical discipline from an accredited college/university required.

Place of work is KKMC/Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The start date is in June 2004

Applicants selected will be subject to a security investigation and must meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information.

Please apply on line to [www.titan.com/careers/SAEG-AP-04-02](http://www.titan.com/careers/SAEG-AP-04-02)

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#### Senior Logistician

Location: **TO BE DETERMINED**                      Req. No.: **TOSG23**

Division: **Technical & Operational Support Group**

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Provide operational and logistical support to Titan linguist operations supporting OSD operations in the Gulf Region. Maintain continuity and positive control over the weekly supply distribution convoys. Manage equipment issue and vehicle rotations. Coordinate with OSD and Titan Staff for linguist scheduling and travel. Ensure that necessary linguist health, morale, and welfare requirements are met. Coordinate for in-country travel of linguist support personnel. Ensure that Logistics technicians conduct logistics operations as defined by the OSD. Effectively manage any logistical issues that may arise.

Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a) Minimum required:

U.S. Army military experience. Sound management background. Excellent communications skills. Strong ability to work as a member of a diverse, dynamic team. Outstanding problems solving skills and sound judgement. Strong interpersonal skills. U.S. citizenship and a SECRET security clearance. Willingness to travel and work in various locations Worldwide. Willingness to work shifts and extended hours in support of 24 x 7 operations. Highly flexible. Good physical condition. Must hold a U.S. passport.

(b) Desired:

A thorough knowledge of cultural, economic, geopolitical, and military issues of the Mid East and Arab-speaking countries within that region. Previous operational experience as Logistician in support of Government operations. Previous experience managing linguists during Department of Defense operations. An ability to operate standard and specialized office automation equipment to process foreign language material.

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#### Site Manager

Location: **Afghanistan**

Req. No.: **TOSG30**

Division: **Technical & Operational Support Group**

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Provide operational site management support to Titan linguist operations supporting efforts in Afghanistan. Ensure that all requirements are met. Conduct daily meetings to ensure that all requirements, as defined in the SOW, are met. Communicate new requirements, concerns, and issues to Titan Headquarters for resolution. Provide input to reports. Provide operational direction to Titan linguists in the Area of Operations. Coordinate appropriate elements for linguist scheduling and travel. Ensure that necessary linguist health, morale, and welfare requirements are met. Coordinate for in-country travel of linguist support personnel. Ensure that linguists adhere to standards of conduct concerning in-theater operations. Ensure that linguists adhere to scheduling requirements. Effectively manage any linguist management issues that may arise. Operate in environment of high mountain terrain with operating elements supporting the U.S. Armed Forces.

Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a) Minimum required:

U.S. military experience. Sound management background. Excellent communications skills. Strong ability to work as a member of a diverse, dynamic team. Outstanding problems solving skills and sound judgement. Strong interpersonal skills. U.S. citizenship and a SECRET security clearance. Willingness to travel and work in various locations Worldwide. Willingness to work shifts and extended hours in support of 24 x 7 operations. Highly flexible. Good physical condition. Must hold a U.S. passport.

(b) Desired:

A thorough knowledge of cultural, economic, geopolitical, and military issues of Afghanistan and neighboring countries. Previous operational experience in joint service operations, special and intelligence operations. Linguist support in Government operations desired. Previous experience managing linguists during Department of Defense operations. An ability to operate standard and specialized office automation equipment to process foreign language material.

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#### Site Manager

Location: **TO BE DETERMINED**

Req. No.: **TOSG20**

Division: **Technical & Operational Support Group**

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Provide operational site management support to Titan linguist operations supporting OSD efforts in the Gulf region. Ensure that all OSD requirements are met. Conduct daily meetings with the OSD to ensure that all requirements, as defined in the SOW, are met. Communicate new requirements, concerns, and issues to Titan Headquarters for resolution. Provide input to reports. Provide operational direction to Titan linguists in the Area of Operations. Coordinate with OSD elements for linguist scheduling and travel. Ensure that necessary linguist health, morale, and welfare requirements are met. Coordinate for in-country travel of linguist support personnel. Assign linguists to OSD teams as required. Ensure that linguists adhere to OSD standards of conduct concerning in-theater operations. Ensure that linguists adhere to scheduling requirements as defined by the OSD. Effectively manage any linguist management issues that may arise.

Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a) Minimum required:

U.S. Army military experience. Sound management background. Excellent communications skills. Strong ability to work as a member of a diverse, dynamic team. Outstanding problems solving skills and sound judgement. Strong interpersonal skills. U.S. citizenship and a SECRET security clearance. Willingness to travel and work in various locations Worldwide. Willingness to work shifts and extended hours in support of 24 x 7 operations. Highly flexible. Good physical condition. Must hold a U.S. passport.

(b) Desired:

A thorough knowledge of cultural, economic, geopolitical, and military issues of the Mid East and Arab-speaking countries within that region. Previous operational experience as linguist in support of Government operations. Previous experience managing linguists during Department of Defense operations. An ability to operate standard and specialized office automation equipment to process foreign language material.

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### Sr. Military Deception Planner

Location: **To Be Determined**

Req. No.: **SIS1347**

Division: **Systems Integration Sector**

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Titan Corporation's Systems Intergration Sector has 2 contingent openings for a Sr. Military Deception Planner.

This position will provide operational planning support to the customer in the area of Military Deception to include:

- Coordinating peacetime MD with applicable Commands and HQ Staffs to prevent conflicts with other activities.
- Develop and maintain capabilities for planning and conducting MD.
- Adapt MD programs to support Major Command missions.
- Conduct MD exercises during peacetime and as required for mission success during periods of crisis and wartime.
- Ensure that planning staff consider MD during all stages of operational and exercise activities.
- Ensure all warfighting headquarters and line units are familiar with the command MD program and objectives, and comply with this instruction.
- Conduct educational and training programs and exercises to develop proficiency in the planning, execution, and use of MD.
- During exercises involving other Major Commands, provide participants the mission and MD objectives prior to execution.
- Complete a MD after-action report for all exercises within established timelines.
- Establish procedures to document lessons learned from unit MD training and MD activity.
- Develop MD tabs to OPLANS and CONPLANS. Review MD tabs prepared by subordinate units to prevent conflicts with other units.

·Document MD funding requirements, including equipment and personnel

·Background and Experience: (including education, skills, work activities)

(a)Minimum required:

Security Clearance: Must have current Top Secret Clearance AND must meet the requirements of DCID 6/4.

Education and Experience: Baccalaureate Degree in Psychology, Foreign Area Studies, Science, or Engineering. 3 years Military Deception experience or formal MILDEC training is mandatory.

Specific experience in lieu of education may be considered if the following requisites are fulfilled; 5 years experience in DoD Military Deception and graduate of a formal DoD MD course; MD experience at Service, Major Command, or operational planning staff level.

Skills: Strong written and verbal communication skills required. Ability to translate concepts into operational plans. Experience navigating SIPRNET and/or JWICS. Experience with Microsoft Windows NT or 2000 (MS Office, VISIO, Project and Internet Explorer)

(b) Desired:

Education and Experience: Masters Degree in Psychology, Foreign Area Studies, Science, or Engineering. Recent HQ Staff or MAJCOM experience working MD requirements. Instructor at formal MD Course. 7 years experience in MD activities to include the development of MD OPLANS and CONPLANS.

Skills: Expert navigating SIPRNET and/or JWICS. Expert with Microsoft Windows NT or 2000 (MS Office, VISIO, Project and Internet Explorer).

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**Security Manager / ASG**  
(Requisition #BZSG412)

**TASK FORCE FALCON, Kosovo**  
Clearance: TS+

#### Description:

As an emerging authority, provides Information Security, and performs security background investigations on individuals requesting a security clearance, including but not limited to investigative reports. Conducts security inspections of unit security programs and facilities and provides Information Security Program. Investigators are fully integrated and independently supporting elements of the United States Army. Provides investigative services and case control management support required to complete Department of Defense (DoD) Personnel Security Investigations (PSI). May assist lower level investigative personnel and review investigative reports produced by analyst staff.

#### Required:

Position requires a Bachelor's degree or equivalent, and seven to nine years of related experience, preferably working in the Intelligence community. Support to include briefings to Senior Officers and NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers); preparation of reports and assessments; compilation of statistics; research and analysis; and publications to be posted on the collateral SIPERNET. Personnel must possess active/current TOP SECRET clearances with access to Special Compartmented Information (SCI). Due to the level of operational visibility and advanced military knowledge required, ideal candidates for this position will be former US military officers or NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers). Personnel must be deployable to contingency areas. Duties require routine use of available intelligence applications and systems, including Intelink, Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), Joint World-wide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) Automated Message Handling System (AHMS)

#### Desired:

#### Additional Job Information:

All CACI employees operate according to the terms of the specific contract under which they work. They are responsible for fulfilling the duties of the specific job and are accountable for complying with the terms and conditions of their employment, the CACI Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Standards, and with applicable federal, state and local laws. We use the terms "under minimal supervision" and "under moderate supervision" in

our job descriptions to communicate that we are looking for a highly responsible individual with a comprehensive understanding of the requirements of the position and the ability to work without continuous and specific instruction in the details of how to perform the job.

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**Personnel Security Specialist**  
(Requisition #BZSG410)

**TASK FORCE FALCON, Kosovo**  
Clearance: TS+

#### Description:

Under moderate supervision, provides intelligence support for contingency operations, battle staff and operational-level planning, joint and multilateral training exercises, and strategic engagement policy throughout the USFK Areas of Operational Responsibility (AOR) and Areas of Interest (AOI). Monitors and analyzes all strategic and operational aspects of political, military, and economic developments for the countries in the AORs and AOIs. Analyst assesses future and on-going political-military developments, military capabilities and doctrine, weapons acquisitions, and employment of military forces within each country. Researches threat assessments to support the Commander and other senior leadership as well.

#### Required:

Position requires a bachelor's degree or equivalent, and two to four years of related experience, preferably working in the Intelligence community, all gained within the last fifteen (15) years. Support to include briefings to Senior Officers and NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers); preparation of reports and assessments; compilation of statistics; research and analysis; and publications to be posted on the collateral SIPERNET. Personnel must possess active/current TOP SECRET clearances with access to Special Compartmented Information (SCI). Due to the level of operational visibility and advanced military knowledge required, ideal candidates for this position will be former US military officers or NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers). Personnel must be deployable to contingency areas.

Duties require routine use of available intelligence applications and systems, including Intelink, Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), Joint World-wide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) Automated Message Handling System (AHMS)

#### Desired:

#### Additional Job Information:

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federal, state and local laws. We use the terms "under minimal supervision" and "under moderate supervision" in our job descriptions to communicate that we are looking for a highly responsible individual with a comprehensive understanding of the requirements of the position and the ability to work without continuous and specific instruction in the details of how to perform the job.

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Collections Manager / IMINT  
(Requisition #BZSG407)

TASK FORCE FALCON, Kosovo  
Clearance: TS+

#### Description:

With a wide range of knowledge, provides intelligence support for contingency operations, battle staff and operational-level planning, joint and multilateral training exercises, and strategic engagement policy throughout the Areas of Operational Responsibility (AOR) and Areas of Interest (AOI). Monitors and analyzes all strategic and operational aspects of political, military, and economic developments for the countries in the AORs and AOIs. Analyst assesses future and on-going political-military developments, military capabilities and doctrine, weapons acquisitions, and employment of military forces within each country. Researches, authors, and coordinates threat assessments to support the Commander and other senior leadership as well.

#### Required:

Position requires a bachelor's degree or equivalent, and five to seven years of related experience, preferably working in the Intelligence community, all gained within the last fifteen (15) years. Support to include briefings to Senior Officers and NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers); preparation of reports and assessments; compilation of statistics; research and analysis; and publications to be posted on the collateral SIPERNET. Personnel must possess active/current TOP SECRET clearances with access to Special Compartmented Information (SCI). Due to the level of operational visibility and advanced military knowledge required, ideal candidates for this position will be former US military officers or NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers). Personnel must be deployable to contingency areas.

Duties require routine use of available intelligence applications and systems, including Intelink, Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), Joint World-wide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) Automated Message Handling System (AHMS)

#### Desired:

#### Additional Job Information:

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federal, state and local laws. We use the terms "under minimal supervision" and "under moderate supervision" in our job descriptions to communicate that we are looking for a highly responsible individual with a comprehensive understanding of the requirements of the position and the ability to work without continuous and specific instruction in the details of how to perform the job.

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**Property Book Specialist/Clerk**      **BAGHDAD, Iraq**  
(Requisition #BZSG279)      Clearance: Secret

#### Description:

Serves as the CJTF-7 personal property specialist and assistant property book officer (PBO). Incumbent is responsible for a wide variety of functions related to broad functional areas such as: property accountability, inventory management, catalog management, equipment management, financial management, disposal management. Assists in managing expendable property (construction material, certain office supplies, fabricated parts, etc.) and non-expendable property (office equipment, tools, machinery, reproduction equipment, etc.). Assists the CJTF-7 District's principal manager for the standard Property Book System (SPBS) or Defense Property Accounting System (DPAS).

#### Required:

Position requires a Bachelor's Degree or equivalent, and 0-2 years of related experience, preferably at least 2 years of Military experience. Must possess a U.S. Secret security clearance, required for access to information, systems, and facilities during the conduct of sensitive operational planning and execution. Proven military leadership skills which document the requisite technical proficiency with W.S. Army property accountability and supply management. Civilian and Military schooling required in property accountability and standard automated system, SPBSR/DPAS. Proficiency in Microsoft Office.

#### Desired:

At least 2 years of Military experience. Must possess a U.S. Secret security Clearance, required for access to information, systems and facilities during the conduct of sensitive operational planning and execution. Bachelor of Science Degree. Proven military leadership skills which document the requisite technical proficiency with U.S.Army SPBSR and DPAS.

#### Additional Job Information:

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Assistant SSO  
(Requisition #BZSG389)

BAGHDAD, Iraq  
Clearance: TS+

#### Description:

Performs multiple security disciplines such as document control, personnel and information security. Implements security policies and procedures for special security areas and temporary special security areas. Provides support to tenant organizations. Maintains control, inventories and accountability of all classified material originated, received, transmitted, stored or destroyed. Receives and transmits material via courier, secure fax, or other approved electronic means or hand carries as required. Assists in security awareness training and provides education briefings for special security representatives, when required. Performs personnel security functions for SCI clearance actions. Contractor may be required to attend meetings and travel for the purposes of coordination and implementation of Government's security objectives.

#### Required:

Successful candidate must have a bachelors degree or equivalent, and two to four years of related experience for the level 2 position. Candidate must have a bachelor's degree or equivalent, and zero to two years of related experience for level 1 position. The contractor must have solid and varied experience in planning/accrediting facilities in accordance with the DCID 1/21 standard. Knowledge of the structure of DoD, and the U.S. Intelligence community and the ability to lead interdisciplinary teams and work independently to address special security issues. Must have a working knowledge of security policies and procedures to include NISPOM, NISPOM Supplement, DCIDs, and DIA M-1 Manual  
Duties require routine use of available intelligence applications and systems, including Intelink, Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), Joint World-Wide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), JPAS

#### Desired:

The contractor should have strong communications, briefing, writing and organizational skills and be able to communicate effectively with peers and senior military officials. Strong interpersonal skills are desired. The contractor should be thoroughly familiar with all security clearance processes.

#### Additional Job Information:

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Database Analyst  
(Requisition #BZSG226)

BAGHDAD, Iraq  
Clearance: Secret

#### Description:

Under moderate supervision, provide intelligence support for interviewing local nationals and determining suitability of local nationals to support US operations. Must be able to work with interpreters to gather intelligence information from multiple sources. Must be able to effectively interview Local Nationals and complete the interview reports on the findings of the interview. Must be able to complete mission in a field environment. Under moderate supervision provides Information Security, and performs security background investigations on individuals requesting a security clearance. Provides support of contractor background investigative services. Provides investigative services and case control management support. Maintains all locally Employed Persons (LEP) Screening Cell SOP's and prepares the Host Country National (HCN) Computer Security Access Program (approved at DoD level) and the Senior Political Program.

#### Required:

Requires a Secret Clearance (S) that is current. Must have at least two years experience as a military policeman or similar type of law enforcement agency whereby the individual utilized interviewing techniques. Position level 1 requires a Bachelor's degree or equivalent, and zero to two years of related experience. Level 2 requires a bachelor's degree or equivalent and two to four years of related experience. Must be able to work and live in a hostile field environment with minimum medical facilities. Must possess excellent communications skills and the ability to work in extreme environments for extended periods of time. Must be able to use a computer and efficient with Microsoft Word and Excel. Will be required to travel for training updates and other mission requirements. Develop and present reports and briefings to the Military Chain of Command. . Graduate certificate from training institution indicating they have passed the required training courses.

#### Desired:

Willing to travel and must possess the ability to be an effective communicator. Experience with online search techniques using the internet. Must have completed the requisite training courses needed to give the individual the basic requirements to perform the screening mission and have the required two to four years related experience. Graduate certificate from training institution indicating they have passed the required training courses.

#### Additional Job Information:

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**Interrogator/Intel Analyst Team**      BAGHDAD, Iraq  
**Lead Asst.**  
(Requisition #BZSG308)      Clearance: TS

#### Description:

Assists the US Military interrogation support program team leader (under direction and supervision) to increase the effectiveness of getting intelligence information from Detainees, Persons of Interest, and Prisoners of War (POWs) that are in the custody of US/Coalition Forces in the CJTF 7 AOR, in terms of screening, interrogation, and debriefing of persons of intelligence value. Under minimal CACI supervision [see Additional Job Information below], will assist the government team leader in managing a multifaceted interrogation support cell consisting of database entry/intelligence research clerks, screeners, tactical/strategic interrogators, and intelligence analysts.

#### Required:

Position requires a bachelor's degree or equivalent and five to seven years of related experience, preferably in intelligence field. Requires a Top Secret Clearance. Strong writing and briefing skills, with competency in automation, research and basic software applications. Familiar with intelligence collection capabilities/planning, as well as analytical procedures.

#### Desired:

Minimum of 5 years in intelligence field. Requires a Bachelor's degree or equivalent. Requires a Top Secret Clearance. Strong writing and briefing skills, with competency in automation, research and basic software applications. Familiar with intelligence collection capabilities/planning, as well as analytical procedures.

#### Additional Job Information:

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OSINT Analyst  
(Requisition #BZSG343)

BAGHDAD, Iraq  
Clearance: TS

#### Description:

Analyze, review, and advise theater and national operations and contingency plans. Individual will serve as an intelligence analyst dealing with all source intelligence but specifically open source intelligence. Analyze all-source, multidisciplined information using intelligence applications and methodology to prepare reports and assessments of extremist terrorism trends in Middle East, developing threat assessments of installations and to support executive travel. Consult with national and theater and component alert center watches and production centers, recommending topics for analysis and further development, and ensuring a coordinated threat picture. Provide support to address current Middle East contingency operations and potential, related follow-on operations.

#### Required:

Position requires a bachelor's degree or equivalent, and zero to two years of related experience for level 1; a bachelor's degree or equivalent and two to four years of related experience for level 2. It is preferred that candidate would have a minimum of four (4) years of experience working in the Intelligence community, all gained within the last fifteen (15) years. Support to include briefings to Senior Officers and NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers); preparation of reports and assessments; compilation of statistics; research and analysis; and publications to be posted on the collateral SIPERNET. Personnel must possess active/current SECRET clearances. Due to the level of operational visibility and advanced military knowledge required, ideal candidates for this position will be former US military officers or NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers). Personnel must be deployable to contingency areas and have no medical condition which would preclude him from operating in a hostile environment for up to one year. Duties require routine use of available intelligence applications and systems, including Intelink, Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), Joint World-wide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) Automated Message Handling System (AHMS)

#### Desired:

All source, multidisciplined. Provide counterterrorism analysis to both overt and covert collection.. Capable of providing the full range of CI/HUMINT expertise including collection management, analysis and tasking.. Focused on support to contingency operations and the force protection aspects of those operations. Provide Force Protection analysis to include analysis of personnel security, physical infrastructure, vetting of foreign nationals,

Open Source Intelligence, and provide recommendations for corrective measures. Experienced with counterterrorism, subversion, sabotage, and espionage threats posed by various entities within the area of operations.

**Additional Job Information:**

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**Logistic Automation Specialist**      **BAGHDAD, Iraq**  
(Requisition #BZSG292)      Clearance: Secret

#### Description:

Provide STAMIS support to COSCOM/CJTF-7 units in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom throughout the Theatre. This STAMIS support includes the fielding systems, installing software and hardware, training, and follow-on user support for STAMIS systems.

#### Required:

Position requires a bachelor's degree or equivalent, and five to seven years of related experience. Detail knowledge of Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS), Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS), or Standard Army Supply System (SARSS). Be able to install and trouble shoot computer equipment in support of these systems. Be able to train personnel on the use of these systems and how they are integrated in the total Army logistics architecture. Must be able to obtain a Secret Clearance. Proficiency in Microsoft Office programs. Proficiency in either ULLS, SAMS, or SARSS.

#### Desired:

Should have experience working in a military environment, preferably Army. Retired 920B Warrant Officer or 92A SSG or higher. Work experience in a Combat Service Support Automation Management Office (CSSAMO).

#### Additional Job Information:

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Team Lead, Logistic Automation Specialist  
(Requisition #BZSG274) BAGHDAD, Iraq  
Clearance: Secret

#### Description:

Team Lead for the team providing STAMIS support to 3D COSCOM/CJTF-7 units in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom throughout the Theatre. This STAMIS support includes the fielding systems, installing software and hardware, training, and follow-on user support for STAMIS systems.

#### Required:

Detail knowledge of Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS), Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS), or Standard Army Supply System (SARSS). Be able to install and trouble shoot computer equipment in support of these systems. Be able to train personnel on the use of these systems and how they are integrated in the total Army logistics architecture. Must be able to obtain a Secret Clearance. Be able to brief senior Government personnel. Be able to effectively manage personnel in a hostile environment. Position requires a Bachelor's degree or equivalent, and ten to twelve years of related experience. Proficiency in Microsoft Office programs. Proficiency in either ULLS, SAMS, or SARSS.

#### Desired:

Should have experience working in a military environment, preferably Army. Retired 920B Warrant Officer or 92A SSG or higher. Work experience in a Combat Service Support Automation Management Office (CSSAMO).

#### Additional Job Information:

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**Intelligence Analyst**  
(Requisition #BZSG192)

BAGHDAD, Iraq  
Clearance: TS+

#### Description:

Provides intelligence analytical support to the interrogation team during development and execution of the interrogation plan/cycle. Interfaces with higher, lower and adjacent intelligence organizations to fully prepare interrogation team for exploitation of detainees, as well as preparing post interrogation analytical products/assessments that support further targeting efforts, source development and analysis of the threat.

#### Required:

Top Secret/SCI clearances required. Individuals must be trained Intelligence Analyst with at least 5 years of experience in intelligence. Minimum of three years analytical experience within DoD or equivalent government agencies, either all source or HUMINT. Middle East Theater and CT experience desired. Position requires a Bachelor's degree or equivalent, and five to seven years of related experience. Proficiency in Microsoft Office programs.

#### Desired:

Middle East Theater and CT experience desired. Strong automation skills needed, including intelligence analytical applications. Position requires former MOS 96 /97B, 350/351B or civilian/joint service equivalents.

#### Additional Job Information:

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Jr CI Agent

(Requisition #BZSG190)

BAGHDAD, Iraq

Clearance: Secret

#### Description:

Conduct screenings on various individuals with access to the brigade AO or who are hired into a position that allows them knowledge of brigade operations. Individuals will also interview walk-in sources, conduct liaison, support security/OPSEC/force protection programs and produce written reports and assessments. All actions will be managed by the Senior CI Agent.

#### Required:

Individual must be a trained counterintelligence agent with at least 5 years of experience. Individuals must have a wide range of Intelligence knowledge and be knowledgeable of Army/Joint interrogation procedures, data processing systems such as CHIMs and SIPRNET search engines. Is fully versed in organic asset tasking and the staffing of assets to meet Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). Must have a current Secret Clearance. Position requires former MOS 97B, 351B or civilian/joint service equivalents. Position requires a Bachelor's degree or equivalent, and five to seven years of related experience. Proficiency in Microsoft Office programs.

#### Desired:

Individual must be a trained counterintelligence agent or interrogator with 7 years of experience. Individuals should be knowledgeable of Army/Joint interrogation procedures, data processing systems such as CHIMs and SIPRNET search engines. Knowledge of the Arabic language and culture a plus.  
CHIMs, SIPRNET

#### Additional Job Information:

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Sr CI Agent  
(Requisition #BZSG189)

BAGHDAD, Iraq  
Clearance: Secret

#### Description:

Provides team leadership to the HUNINT Support Team (HST) and HST operations, within the SOW. Facilitates the scheduling and assignment of HST tasks, ICW the MI commander and supported command. Must be familiar with OPSEC, SAEDA, interrogation and LEP screening operations/programs. Supports the production of reports and conducts QC of completed reports/products produced by the HST and Brigade DS THT. Ensures the two way flow of information between BDE and DIV is moving efficiently and effectively. Develops recording mechanism for TTP and lessons learned in the conduct of operations.

#### Required:

Individual must be a trained counterintelligence agent or interrogator with seven years of experience. Must have a current Secret Clearance with TS preferred. Position requires former MOS 97B/E, 351B/E, 35E or civilian/joint service equivalents. Position requires a Bachelor's degree or equivalent, and seven to nine years of related experience.

Proficiency in Microsoft Office programs.

#### Desired:

Individual must be a trained counterintelligence agent or interrogator with 10 years of experience. Individuals should be knowledgeable of Army/Joint interrogation procedures, data processing systems such as CHIMs and SIPRNET search engines. Knowledge of the Arabic language and culture a plus.

CHIMs, SIPRNET

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Jr CI Agent

(Requisition #BZSG191)

BAGHDAD, Iraq

Clearance: Secret

#### Description:

Conducts interrogations of detainees. When not employed as interrogators and producing reports, individuals will assist in the HUMINT reporting system maintenance to include Brigade Black/White/Gray list, support screening operations and conducts analysis or liaison to support interrogation operations. All actions will be managed by the Senior CI Agent.

#### Required:

Individuals must be trained interrogators with at least 5 years of experience in interrogation. Individuals must have a wide range of Intelligence knowledge and be knowledgeable of Army/Joint interrogation procedures, data processing systems such as CHIMs and SIPRNET search engines. Must have a current Secret Clearance. Position requires former MOS 97B, 351B or civilian/joint service equivalents. Position requires a Bachelor's degree or equivalent, and five to seven years of related experience. Proficiency in Microsoft Office programs.

#### Desired:

Individual must be a trained counterintelligence agent or interrogator with 7 years of experience. Individuals should be knowledgeable of Army/Joint interrogation procedures, data processing systems such as CHIMs and SIPRNET search engines. Knowledge of the Arabic language and culture a plus. ASI 9N and N7 desired. CHIMs, SIPRNET

#### Additional Job Information:

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Sr Intel Analyst  
(Requisition #BZSG197)

BAGHDAD, Iraq  
Clearance: TS+

#### Description:

As a member of an intelligence analytical team of military and / or civilian analysts, under the direction of the C2 analytical staff supervisor. This position provides senior level stability and analytical continuity in a critical mission related function that experiences high military turnover. Responsible for researching, developing and presenting intelligence products at the operational level for senior leaders, to include counter-terrorism, middle east regional issues, HUMINT and political/military analysis.

#### Required:

Minimum of ten years analytical experience within DoD or equivalent government agencies required, with five at the operational level. Foreign Area Officer background qualifies for the Middle East regional specialist position. Position requires a Bachelor's degree or equivalent, and seven to nine years of related experience. Top Secret/SCI clearance required.

Must be proficient in utilizing basic computer applications and intelligence related automation to support analytical efforts and product development.

#### Desired:

Strong background is required in the following analytical areas: 1x Middle East regional analysis; 1x Geo-Political analysis; 2x HUMINT analysis. Must possess strong briefing skills and be capable of effectively directing subordinate analysts in the accomplishment of intelligence products and assessments.

CHIMs, SIPRNET

#### Additional Job Information:

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All Source Analyst  
(Requisition #BZSG196)

BAGHDAD, Iraq  
Clearance: TS+

#### Description:

Serves as a member of an intelligence analytical team of military and / or civilian analysts, under the direction of the C2 analytical staff supervisor. This position provides mid level stability and analytical continuity in a critical mission related function that experiences high military turnover. Analyst responsible for researching, developing and presenting all source intelligence products at the operational level as part of an overall analytical team. Responsible for intelligence analysis related to counter-terrorism, Middle East regional issues, political/military analysis and support to targeting.

#### Required:

Minimum of five years analytical experience within DoD or equivalent government agencies required, with operational level experience preferred. Position requires a Bachelor's degree or equivalent, and five to seven years of related experience. Top Secret/SCI clearance required. Must possess strong research and writing skills and be capable of effectively operating as a member of an analytical team in the accomplishment of intelligence products and assessments.

Must be proficient in utilizing basic computer applications and intelligence related automation to support analytical efforts and product development.

#### Desired:

Experience in either CT, Middle East regional issues and HUMINT or pol/military analysis desired. Prior service in the one of the following MOS's- 35series/ 96B/ 350B/ 18series equivalents.

CHIMs, SIPRNET

#### Additional Job Information:

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**IMINT Mission Manager**  
(Requisition #BZSG314)

**TASK FORCE FALCON, Kosovo**  
Clearance: TS+

#### Description:

Individual assigns intelligence requirements to the available collection units or agencies best able to provide a timely answer; ensuring intelligence is collected to answer commander's priority intelligence requirements. Develops standard operating procedures (SOPs) by performing the following duties. Individual defines how to employ collection resources to satisfy requirements; Evaluates the suitability of systems, units, and agencies based upon capability and availability; In conjunction with the collection manager, maps out the collection strategy, synchronizing collection schedules to PIR and deriving specific orders and requests (SOR's) from the SIR's; Generates the actual collection task and requests and continually monitors resource readiness and performance; Assists collection manager and requirements manager in their assigned duties as required.

#### Required:

With wide range of knowledge, Imagery Analyst provides topographic/terrain analysis, geospatial analysis, imagery ground station analysis to operators, requirements managers, and mission manager. Analyst is proficient in the use of the multi-spectral imagery production (MSIP) system; is familiar with the multiple imagery sources, commercial, theater and NTM and proficient in the area of imagery research; as well as proficient with related topographic data forms. Must be familiar with Imagery Intelligence MAAS System and the proper requirements scheduled for finalization, processed and analyzed all source data from airborne, ground based and national collectors, as well as mapping on the GALE system. Position requires Bachelor's degree or equivalent, and five to seven years of related experience. Individual must possess a current TS/SCI clearance and be deployable. Must be able to use basic Microsoft Office applications to include Word, PowerPoint, and Excel.

#### Desired:

Individual must possess a current TS/SCI clearance and be deployable.

#### Additional Job Information:

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**Interrogator**  
(Requisition #BZSG224)

BAGHDAD, Iraq  
Clearance: TS+

#### Description:

Under the direction and supervision of the US Military, provide intelligence support for interviewing local nationals and determining their threat to coalition forces. Must be able to work with interpreters to gather intelligence information from multiple sources. Must be able to effectively interview Local Nationals and complete the interview reports on the findings of the interview. Must be able complete mission in a field environment. Under moderate CACI supervision [see Additional Job Information below], provides Information Security, and performs security background investigations on individuals requesting a security clearance. Provides support of contractor background investigative services. Provides investigative services and case control management support.

#### Required:

Requires a Top Secret Clearance (TS) that is current and US citizenship. Must have at least two years experience as a military policeman or similar type of law enforcement/intelligence agency whereby the individual utilized interviewing techniques. At a minimum must have a Bachelor's degree or equivalent, and zero to two years of related experience for level one position. Level 2 position requires a bachelor's degree or equivalent, and two to four years of related experience. Must be able to work and live in a hostile field environment with minimum medical facilities. Must possess excellent communications skills and the ability to work in extreme environments for extended periods of time. Must be able to use a computer and efficient with Microsoft Word and Excel Will be required to travel for training updates and other mission requirements. Develop and present reports and briefings to the Military Chain of Command.

Graduate certificate from training institution indicating they have passed the required training courses.

#### Desired:

Willing to travel and must possess the ability to be an effective communicator. Experience with online search techniques using the internet Must have completed the requisite training courses needed to give the individual the basic Experience in conducting tactical and strategic interrogations in accordance with local standard operating procedures (SOP) and DOD regulation. Knowledge of Military police operations and Force Protection procedures. Experience conducting interrogations and interview using linguist and local interrupters. Knowledge of the reporting tools used in tactical interrogation operations.

Graduate certificate from training institution indicating they have passed the required training courses.

**Additional Job Information:**

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Property Book Officer  
(Requisition #BZSG278)

BAGHDAD, Iraq  
Clearance: Secret

#### Description:

Provides management, customers, and sub-contractors with logistics technology and information that ensures effective and economical support for products, service, equipment and systems. Analyzes contractual commitments, customer specifications, and related information to identify and document maintenance and support requirements. Reviews engineering designs and analyzes equipment characteristics. Develops and prepares manuals, bulletins, and information systems to provide logistics support. Proven military leadership skills which document the requisite technical proficiency with W.S. Army property accountability and supply management. Civilian and Military schooling required in property accountability and standard automated system, SPBSR/DPAS.

#### Required:

Position requires a Bachelor's Degree or equivalent and two to four years of related experience, preferably at least 10 years of Military experience. Must possess a U.S. Secret security clearance, required for access to information, systems, and facilities during the conduct of sensitive operational planning and execution. Proven military leadership skills which document the requisite technical proficiency with U.S. Army deployment planning and project management. Civilian and Military schooling [may include, but is not exclusive to: the Army War College, Battle Staff or their equivalent] to demonstrate proficiency in required academic and analytical skills. Proficiency in Microsoft Office.

#### Desired:

Broad knowledge of higher echelon logistics, i.e. V Corps or above. At least 10 years of Military experience. Must possess a U.S. Secret security clearance, required for access to information, systems, and facilities during the conduct of sensitive operational planning and execution. Bachelor of Science Degree. Proven military leadership skills which document the requisite technical proficiency with U.S. Army deployment planning and project management. Familiarization with SPBS-R, SAMS, ULLS-A, ULLS-S4, ULLS-A, and SARSS is desired.

#### Additional Job Information:

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conditions of their employment, the CACI Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Standards, and with applicable federal, state and local laws. We use the terms "under minimal supervision" and "under moderate supervision" in our job descriptions to communicate that we are looking for a highly responsible individual with a comprehensive understanding of the requirements of the position and the ability to work without continuous and specific instruction in the details of how to perform the job.

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### CACI's Job Database

Intelligence Architecture and Communications Officer  
(Requisition #BZSG328) BAGHDAD, Iraq  
Clearance: TS+

#### Description:

Analyzes complex local and wide area network systems, including planning, designing, evaluating, selecting, operating systems, and protocol suites and configuring communication media with concentrators, bridges, and other devices. Resolves difficult inter-operability problems to obtain operation across all platforms, including e-mail, files transfer, multimedia, teleconferencing and the like. Configures systems and user environments. Supports acquisition of hardware and software as well as subcontractor services. Requires Bachelor's degree (in Computer Science or related field) or equivalent, and ten to twelve years of related (progressively responsible network systems engineering) experience. Master's degree in Computer Science preferred. Supervisory/Management experience.

#### Required:

Position requires Bachelor's degree (in Computer Science or related field) or equivalent, and ten to twelve years of related (progressively responsible network systems engineering) experience. Master's degree in Computer Science preferred. Supervisory/Management experience. Experience managing and overseeing multiple high level, complex automated information systems, projects and activities to include IT infrastructure, information and knowledge management, systems management, applications development and communications. Expert knowledge of communications networks, capabilities and operations. Experience understanding and handling of COMSEC equipment and implementation requirements a must.

#### Desired:

Requires Bachelor's degree (in Computer Science or related field) or equivalent, and ten to twelve years of related (progressively responsible network systems engineering) experience. Master's degree in Computer Science preferred. Supervisory/Management experience. Experience managing and overseeing multiple high level, complex automated information systems, projects and activities to include IT infrastructure, information and knowledge management, systems management, applications development and communications. Expert knowledge of communications networks, capabilities and operations.

**Additional Job Information:**

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**Information Management Officer**      BAGHDAD, Iraq  
(Requisition #BZSG327)                      Clearance: TS+

#### Description:

Serves as company expert in establishing complex operational databases, software configuration control and system interfaces for computer system(s) assigned. Develops procedures to maintain file servers, network access, document, analyze, and troubleshoot system anomalies to ensure optimum equipment performance. May supervise less experienced systems personnel. Prepare system for operational use and oversee operational tests. Bachelor degree in computer science, management information systems, or related field, or equivalent experience, and ten years minimum of related experience is required. Manages database development and maintenance for CJTF intel analytical efforts, systems and intelligence productions. Specialist provides oversight to information management procedures to improve intelligence flow, sharing and usability.

#### Required:

Position requires a bachelor degree in computer science, management information systems, or related field, or equivalent experience, and ten to twelve years minimum of related experience, with an excellent understanding of enterprise database structure and design, capabilities and limitations, and replication/information sharing when working in a complex operational environment. Must have experience in and ability to architect in detail large network information flow structure on a heterogeneous network utilizing multiple enterprise databases. Excellent written and verbal communications skills. Excellent understanding of intelligence information flow, collection, tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination. Working experience with Military Intelligence equipment and architecture.

Microsoft SQL, Oracle, Sybase databases.

#### Desired:

Bachelor degree in computer science, management information systems, or related field, or equivalent experience, and ten to twelve years minimum of related experience is required. Experience in and excellent understanding of enterprise database structure and design, capabilities and limitations, and replication/information sharing when working in a complex operational environment. Experience in and ability to architect in detail large network information flow structure on a heterogeneous network utilizing multiple enterprise databases. Excellent written and verbal communications skills.

**Additional Job Information:**

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# **Exhibit D**

Sources:

<http://nyc.indymedia.org/newswire/display/95152/index.php>

<http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2004/06/292976.html>

[http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Joe\\_Ryan\\_Abu\\_Ghraib\\_diary\\_April\\_2004](http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Joe_Ryan_Abu_Ghraib_diary_April_2004)

## **07 March 2004**

It is terrible when the people working above you have no concept on laws or regulations.

In reviewing our manning document with LTC Faust this evening, I noticed that we have three people doing interrogations that are not school trained or certified. This is a rather large problem. LTC Faust stated that Tom Howard, one of our CACI higher ups working at the C2, told him that we could use analysts that showed promise and turn them into junior interrogators. After recovering from my convulsions, I explained that I would like my next stop to be home, not Ft. Leavenworth. We brought in CW4 Olson and he concurred with my assessment. Now that is has been brought to the attention of the command, it will be there call to deal with it, but I know it will be dealt with swiftly. The guerilla movement over here is basically broken down into two groups remaining. The remnants of the Baathist government and the foreign jihadists who came in from other countries to fight the United States. The Baathist loyalists are secular and are the ones trying to engage the American forces in traditional guerilla fashion. The foreign jihadists are religious zealots are the ones engaging softer targets, in particular suicide bombers. The foreign jihadists could have been much more successful if they would have had a better coordinated effort with the former Baathists. The other shortcoming was that the Sunni Muslims are helping some, but the Shiites are not helping in mass and since the Shiites make up majority of the population, they hampered the resources available. I am sure not complaining that things are going pretty well over here. Here is sit in the middle of the Sunni triangle and we are not even getting hit very hard. We have not had a mortar attack since the Bradley Fighting Vehicles tore up the last attackers (literally) and we had small arms fire on our towers for the first time since then tonight. That fire tends to stop quickly when the Mark 19 automatic grenade launchers start firing and the 50 caliber machine guns let loose. The bombing tonight in Baghdad is a prime example of the total limit of operations that can be conducted. These bombings are conducted in areas that the military is not fortified and showing a strong presence. I saw that on the news they were reporting that the rockets attacks were around the corps headquarters.

This is not exactly true. The Al Rasheed hotel is the one five star type hotel in Iraq and is where some of the theater generals stay, but there is no way for someone to get close enough to do serious damage. this would explain only one injured. We finished getting our internet hooked up here in our living area and it is great. Now I can stay right here in the area and work on the computer. I also do not have to worry about time limits.

## **08 March 2004**

I enjoyed reading letters from a class of third graders today. I took them into work and passed them around for everyone to enjoy. It is a great reminder of why we are here. We had a mouse decide to take up residence in our room yesterday. Fortunately, he did not get into any of our food stuff before I set a trap for him with success. I found that mice in Iraq love EZ Cheese. Hopefully this will not be an ongoing problem, but since we live in prison cells in one of the most notorious prisons in history, I will leave the traps set from now on. We have a couple of guys from other government agencies staying here for a while. They were put up by the army, but went straight to the Colonel complaining that they have to be on cots while we have our nice area down

here. I was called in and then proceeded to show them pictures that some of the guys took of this area before we moved in. After seeing how much clean-up we had to do and me telling them that we earned this area, they backed off the Colonel. I had a short temper when dealing with this particular agency due to dealings with these clowns in the past. They are arrogant and usually ignorant as well so none of us are in a hurry to do them any favors. They have already burned bridges here by coming in and removing a couple detainees without authorization.

The result is that their agency had to send a couple guys to stay here or they could not come in and talk to any detainees. They also will have someone watching through the glass to ensure they adhere to our policies. Some are asking about where I am located versus the news. The 'green zone' is the area from central Baghdad to the southwest suburbs that is under relatively stable control by American forces. I am not in the 'green zone.' Abu Ghurayb Prison is northwest of Baghdad right in the middle of the 'Sunni Triangle.' The Sunni Triangle extends from Baghdad to Fallujah and is the area that is considered the 'red zone.' The Sunni Triangle is the last area of any type of organized Baathist resistance. The last couple of days have been house cleaning as far as interrogations. I am letting my others stew for a couple of days as I have a couple of days of three-a-day interrogations coming up. Those will be some long days, but I have to admit it is an awesome feeling gleaned from the intelligence to bring down these groups.

## **09 March 2004**

The weather is holding quite nice. I know it is too much to hope avoiding the blistering summer heat, but we sure are not complaining about the nice temperatures now. I was asked what the booth was. We have two steel Connex containers (like a semi trailer) with doors cut into the sides. The containers are partitioned into three sections that are about 10 feet by 10 feet. In each booth, there is an air conditioner/heater, table and a few chairs. There is also a one way window for observations and, since the investigation last fall, there are also video cameras in each booth. With every interrogation, I have just the interpreter in with me, but sometimes I will have a junior interrogator in with me to get them trained up. We also will periodically have someone else in the booth from another government entity if the detainee is of high value or specific intelligence value. I am still running the three ring circus since there is no word from Dan or our folks at Camp Victory. It actually has been going very smoothly the last few days now that we have most of the issues ironed out. The guys have been great in pitching in and helping whenever needed. It is frustrating trying to get through all of the detainees that we have here. The normal flow is when a unit detains someone, they go to a Division level cage (detention facility). They usually spend a week or so there and are assessed by field interrogators at that point. Once initial interrogations are performed, the detainee is supposed to be assessed. If they potentially have further intelligence value or there is strong evidence linking them to illegal activities, they come here. If they were the case of wrong place at the wrong time, they are supposed to be released. The problem we are encountering is that no one at the Division level is willing to release a detainee and so they send everyone here. Since we are a Joint Interrogation Facility, we have the responsibility to talk to everyone and have to send each file to the Detainee Assessment Board to be reviewed before someone can be released. Since we are limited on linguists, this is an arduous process.

## **10 March 2004**

Today was my day off, so I was busier than usual. We had to take Michele, one of the CACI personnel that came over here the same time I did, to the airport. She will be spending the next week in Kuwait getting her foot surgically repaired. The medics thought it was a planter wart, but

when they could not get it to heal up with treatment and it became worse, they decided to send her to Kuwait to get it looked at and fixed. She has been a real trooper. She has been battling with this since we got here and she has not missed a day of work. This includes the mile walk to and from work each day. This is the mentality and heart of the people working over here. While down at Camp Victory, I learned that they received a few mortars the other night and one of them hit the AAFES warehouse. It sure made for slim pickings at the post exchange store. I dropped off the timecards for our guys at CACI headquarters while down there and found out that Dan has not checked in with them for more than 48 hours. He was supposed to be on a plane from Ramstein Air Force Base two days ago. There is a little concern from us that he has decided to not return. Hopefully this is not the case. He is a good manager and good man. Above all, we hope he is doing ok. We had an incident with one of the interpreters this afternoon. He is actually not an active interpreter. He was fired back in December, but since Titan does not have a place for him, he is still here. He decided that he could help himself to our resources and just came sauntering in and hooked up to our internet connection. He was asked politely to leave by one of our guys and after he answered in a very rude manner, they came down and got me. After he told me to exercise a few expletives, I proceeded to go get CW# Dave Cope who is in charge of the interpreters before I throttled this punk. Come to find out, this interpreter has picked fights before and is why he was fired. He was told his bags better be packed and ready to go tomorrow when the Titan country manager gets here. The issue with Titan is that CACI spent \$21,000 renovating the area where the interpreters reside under a verbal agreement that they would reimburse and also pay for half of the kitchen, tv room, and computer set up. When the bill came, Titan said they were no longer interested. I guess they want to keep in normal modus operandi with their current SEC fraud, waste, and abuse investigation. It is pathetic the way they treat their employees. To date, they have yet to provide a single thing to their folks up here. We received the four persons responsible for the Karbala bombing tonight. I have already been informed that I will have the pleasure of dealing with them tomorrow. They found the remains of the Marine Lieutenant Colonel and the Coalition Provisional Authority representative in the trunk of the car that the four detainees were caught in. Rest assured, these four will be turned over to the new Iraqi government when the time is right and dealt with more harshly than we ever would be allowed.

## **14 March 2004**

One of the guys who came over here with me, Jose Almanzar, headed out to work with one of the roving HUMINT Support Teams that support the individual Division assets. He will be missed. He is a good friend and kind of a celebrity in the intelligence world. While he was still in the army (he recently got out), he was with the first wave of military interrogators to go to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba when it was set up to take Al Quada detainees. He is also the one who identified and initially interrogated the person who is truly identified as the 20th high-jacker from the September 11th attacks. The story can be found in one of the January issues of Newsweek. The beautiful irony is that Jose is from New York City, so it could not be a better scenario for who got to look the terrorist in the eye. I had a very long day and did not make it back to my prison cell (I love saying that) until 4:30am. I did not anticipate this. I had a detainee tonight that we knew was somewhat involved with activities, but about an hour into the interrogation, he just started spilling his guts. Report writing became a large project tonight. We continue to enjoy nice weather and actually, the walk back to the living area was pretty cold tonight...a frigid 60 degrees or so. The mosquitoes over here are really coming out. They are not too numerous, but I think they have Kevlar exoskeletons because they just don't seem to die when you hit them. The prospect that I

may be taking over the site lead position when Dan leaves is looking more like a reality. I found out today that James Mayo, a man that could run this entire war operation single handedly, gave Dan his recommendation for me to take the manager position. This is humbling considering that James is a 30+ year law enforcement veteran that has done some incredible things in his life. If I can be half as successful at life as he has been, I will consider myself very fortunate.

## **15 March 2004**

The Ides of March. The downfall of Caesar and the success of American interrogators. I have been working a shift from noon to midnight. We usually run over when we get a decent amount of reportable information. As interrogators, we always are in competition to see who gets the best information from their interrogation. The other extreme is who had the person who should not have been detained. (Nobody even accused us of being sound of mind). Tonight I was sure I had the winning interrogation for information gathered. I came out with information to write three different reports. It paled in comparison to what two other people got tonight. I guess tonight was the night the detainees decided to all give up. The other end of the spectrum is the 4th Infantry Division. We have a little skit we act out for their Division Commander. We pour a cup of coffee, puff out our chest, and survey the room. Then you say in a thunderous voice, "Boys, today I want 150 Iraqis captured." Although this is our skit, it is all too true. The 4th Infantry Division thinks that there is a prize if they leave the country with holding the record for the most Iraqi prisoners sent to Abu Ghurayb. The facts are this; when they hit a targeted house, they arrest every male over the age of 16 within a mile of the house just in case. This is why nobody has EVER accused the infantry of being intelligent. We received three new people today. We also have six people that are heading out to Division areas in the next week. The three new people are pretty good and one is an interrogator. Thank goodness because we are starting to run thin on interrogators in theatre. We increased the number of translators here by seven in the last week, which lets us do our job better, but a few interrogators have been sent to Divisions so we have to make up for that. Manpower will be a constant issue over here. The simple fact is that there are not enough army personnel to accomplish the mission. I, to the surprise of many who know me, will admit that this has nothing to do with politics. The simple fact is that the intelligence community has made signals intelligence the "sexy" aspect of intelligence and has ignored the human intelligence (HUMINT) aspect as a result. Well, last time I checked, most people around here do not use satellite phones, cell phones, or even regular telephones. They do not hook up very well in caves and sand dunes. The only way to obtain intelligence information around here is to have personnel on the ground. I would say only one if fifty of the detainees that I talk to have phones.

## **16 March 2004**

There is a Marine Division replacing the 82nd Airborne Division out in Fallujah over the next couple of weeks. For bearings, we are half way between Fallujah and the Baghdad International Airport. The airport is on the western side of Baghdad. Since shortly after we had the ambush on our reaction force, we have had beefed up security. I told you about the Bradleys that were here and tore up the mortar teams. We also have regular patrols of Apache gunships along the highway all the way from the airport to Fallujah. Since we are next to the highway, we get free patrols all day. To give you an idea of how powerful they are, I have a video from one of the gunships that has been passed around. From three miles out, the gunship auto-locked and took out three individuals in a field...at night!! Since we are the only permanent theatre detainee facility, there have been efforts to boost our security. As the two companies of 82nd Airborne guys have

moved out as of yesterday, an entire battalion of Marines has moved in to replace them. The 870th MP company that lives down by us leaves next Sunday and their replacements are the Long Range Surveillance unit from Michigan that numbers 150 men. It is nice living in hard sites and seeing the firepower improve. We are now integrating a new computer system for our intelligence database. Although it is said that it has a lot more capabilities than the current system we are using, it is much less user friendly and has a lot of bugs in it. They have been trying to bring this system on-line for the last three years and it keeps getting kicked back due to failures. The technicians that are here to teach people how to use it are very thin skinned about pointing out deficiencies. The funny part is that the system will be replaced within a year anyway. That is the typical progression. We were out on the deck right after getting back tonight and heard a loud whooshing sound like a bottle rocket on steroids. There was no boom at the end of it. I went down and told the MPs and they rolled out a team and found an unexploded RPG round. It was sure a nice piece of dumb luck that we were standing out there to hear it so the unexploded round could be disposed of.

## **17 March 2004**

Happy St Patrick's Day. My sister sent a great big leprechaun hat and I had fun wearing it all day. It was quite the site in the chow hall as everyone thought it was great. Since it was my day off today, I went into the chow hall early with the food coloring that also was sent by Diane and colored all of the water bottles on the tables. It sure is fun to make people laugh and smile in a place like this. Earlier in the day, Scott, one of the CACI guys that I have become good friends with, and I went down to where the military folks live and showed them how to build bunks like we have. It is much better than the cots they are currently using. Their Sergeant Major was against the idea until he came down the other night and took a look at our and realized that the soldiers could store their footlockers underneath and make everything look 'dress right dress.' This is the same sergeant major who's self admitted number one priority is soldiers wearing their uniforms in strict accordance with regulations. So much for common sense in a combat zone. Scott and I built two for them with them watching each step and then turned them loose. I bought a circular saw when ours gave up the ghost, so they are having fun actually using power tools. I took my clothes to the little dry cleaner shop we have on post. It is run by a local Iraqi family and they are a fun group of people. It sure is nice to have clean clothes. The Iraqis at the cleaners do not understand St Patrick's Day, but they sure thought the big hat was funny! The free Brown and Root service is not making many friends as they have been losing clothes and staining others. The problem is that they take them to another military installation for cleaning and do not have a whole lot of control over the service there. We are planning on having a game night with cards and some movies tonight. A little green beer and the night would be complete!!

## **18 March 2004**

Last night was a shocking night. The hotel that was hit is right on the other side of the river from where the coalition forces patrol. That side of town is not secured. When the bomb went off, US forces sent teams over there to try and help, to include medical personnel. They were blocked off and turned back by Iraqis in the area. That was unexpected and sad because the engineer crews and medics sure could have helped. Today was even busier. Basra, in southern Iraq, had a hotel bombed. Fallujah received rockets into town that struck buildings and started fires. The "green zone" in Baghdad was hit again as well. It is weird seeing that Basra and Baghdad are getting hit so hard because those areas have been some of the more stable areas since we got here. Fallujah has not. I hope that this gets a little more under control in the near future, but I know that the attacks of

soft targets will continue at least until the transitional government takes power at the end of June. Things have been pretty quiet here (knock on wood) and we have really beefed up our force here. Hopefully we will continue to keep our strong presence here and sufficiently deter attacks since it appears that they are only hitting areas that are easy targets. The International Red Cross arrived here today. They caused quite a stir when they started handing out these magazine type booklets to the detainees. In the booklet, it was all in Arabic and when one of the linguists started translating it, we found that it was anti-American propaganda. There was even a picture of a plane dropping a bomb on a child flying a kite. Needless to say, once this was discovered, the Colonel had the entire crew sent out of the front gate. They were supposed to be here a week, but he told them that until they account for their actions with Paul Bremer, they are not setting foot back inside our walls.

## **21 March 2004**

I should specify the difference in some of the groups here. The Mujadin are holy fighters and martyrs, they are usually religious zealots that are foreign fighters and will use homicide bombing as a tactic. The Fedayeen fight in the name of religion, but are not willing to be martyrs. The Saddam Fedayeen are a non-religious group loyal to Saddam Hussein and his family. Most of the prominent figures within Iraq are supporting this group and are the ones paying the farmers to shoot at the coalition forces. Some of the Saddam Fedayeen attend mosque, but mainly because they know we do not raid mosques and they use them as a meeting place. The Saddam Fedayeen are not looked highly upon by the other elements because they drink, smoke, and tend to be womanizers. Three no-nos in the Muslim religion. The International Red Cross seems to like them well enough though. Please note the difference between the American Red Cross, a great organization, and the International Red Cross, the anti-American fascist organization.

We still have no showers, but they are working on it today and we are optimistic that by the end of the day tomorrow we will be able to use water again. Baby wipes are fine for now and we are all just happy this did not happen in July when the weather is really hot. We were pushing the 90s today by noon. The heat is moving in.

I have been given a new assignment at work. I am to finish off my current caseload and then I will be going through all the files assigned to our team and reviewing for whether or not the people have potential further intelligence value, or if they need to be released, or just reassigned to the common criminal element here. Hopefully I will not ruffle too many feathers among the interrogators on our team because I will actually be critiquing their work if I see something they missed. Fortunately, we have a great team and since I have more real-world experience than anyone else on our team, I get turned to when someone has questions.

Jim Matheson, a former counter-intelligence guy who came over here with me is on my team. He has never done interrogations before, but is a very experienced agent and has conducted a lot of investigations. He has done a great job as an interrogator here, but, by his own admission, cannot run a good fear-up harsh approach. He asked me to help out in the booth tonight with a good fear-up harsh. I was like a peacock strutting around when we were done because I scared the guy so much he wet himself. That will get talked about for weeks I'm sure!! The best part, when I walked out of the booth, Jim told the guy that either he can talk to Jim, or deal with me tomorrow. The guy broke and started talking to Jim.

## **22-23 March 2004**

I have to combine yesterday and today since I am not even sure when which started and tonight is not even over. I had to take a break so walked back to type this.

Last night's interrogation was amazing. I have never felt so unprepared or caught so off guard in my life. I get the guy in the booth and he says, in English, "sir, before you say anything, my full name is blah blah blah and I take full responsibility for the missile being fired at the American aircraft." Now, they teach you at the interrogation school to be able to think fast on your feet, and I pride myself in my ability to do so, but this was too much. I sat there for at least a full minute while I let this sink in.

I followed up with the above interrogation today. I will be spending a lot of quality time with this gentleman. He is being very open and giving me information that I could have only dreamed of collecting. Other interrogators have had this opportunity, but working on the Force Protection team, we generally do not get the high profile types. The Sheik is a special project that does not really count. I have written eight reports already based on this guy and I was told that at least one so far will probably end up in a White House daily briefing. The kicker is that I have only scratched the surface with this guy.

We received a couple of mortars today, but fortunately they landed in the middle of the field. As customary, they mortared us right after we received two new CACI personnel, so we blamed them for bringing the mortars.

It is official, Dan left today and I will be moving into his room tomorrow so will have my own cell. It was cool living with Marty Meadows and Don Simpson, but Don snores like a freight train and the peace and quiet of my own snoring will be a welcome change.

Scott Norman and I have been networking with the Marines that arrived a couple of weeks ago. They are a great group of guys and have been crapped on by the army since they got here and they are very eager to establish good relations with people here. Scott and I have been very successful in making contacts and using the barter system over here to get what we need. It is a relief to see that 200+ years of the military and the underground network is still running strong. It saves trees with the lack of paperwork.

They released 200 detainees today. It was an absolute media circus, but I was happy to see us get this release program started. There have been people sitting here for months that should have been sent home. The army has arranged for a local bus company to transport the released persons to their home towns.

Time to go write more reports, have a good night.

## **24 - 25 March 2004**

These days are getting rough. Three hours of sleep is a little harder on me than it used to be. Getting a source that is giving you tons of information is a blessing and a curse. It is great to know I am doing what I came here to do, but the report writing and follow-up is very time consuming. Specialist Shareese Clarke is my analyst. She has been doing a great job taking my notes and reports and doing follow-up research to try and keep a step ahead as we go. She is not overly experienced, but what she lacks in experience, she makes up for in diligence and perseverance.

The 24th was my day off. I ended up working part of the day and then worked on building a new bunk for my new room. Since Dan has officially gone to take the Special Advisor to the C2 position, I moved into his old room. It is nice having my own room and it happens to be the biggest room in our area, so I proceeded to build a nice big bunk and some shelving units. My parents would never believe this, but I actually am keeping my room organized and neat!! Steve and I had a nice long and very frank talk. I have noticed he has changed for the better since returning from R&R and think he just needed to get away for a bit and unwind.

I have to say, the chow hall food has improved since receiving the Sweet Baby Ray's BBQ sauce in a care package from my fantastic in-laws. I have shared with a couple of the guys and it is funny because we are putting it on literally everything, except the ice cream we were treated to the other night. They also served iced tea for the first time since I have been here. I can't believe it took this long since it is Brits that run the place, I figured iced tea would be a given. It is the small things in life that are so precious over here.

Tonight's interrogations were cancelled. We had a mortar hit in one of the prison compounds. It killed two detainees and injured eleven others. The detainees are in tents where as we are in hardened buildings. I was at work when it happened and it was the compound near our worksite. The mortar was fired from a passing truck that was fired on and hit by the towers. Once the all clear was given, we went out to tend to the facility. Since I am "unarmed," I did litter-carry duty and helped along with our other CACI guys in moving the injured detainees to the medic station. It was a somber evening, but sad to say, I am relieved that no Americans were injured except the MP who cut himself on the concertina wire.

## **26 March 2004**

Today went great at work. I am continuing to talk to the same source I have been for the last few days and he just continues to be a wealth of knowledge. All of the CACI interrogators have a little competition as to who gets the most high value evaluations back on reports and this source may put me in the lead after this week. Bill Armstrong, a retired army interrogator who left his instructor position at the intelligence school at Fort Huachuca, AZ get the prize of the day though. He is a very passionate man who loves doing this work and always goes the extra mile. He did some linking from one of his sources and found that we have a high value target here that is registered under an assumed name. This guy has not been talked to because he did not seem to be a priority, but I am sure he will be on Bill's schedule tomorrow!

The marines in Fallujah are having a heck of a time. They showed up out there to replace the 82nd Airborne and are running out of all supplies. They did not plan their logistics well and when our team that works with them stopped by here yesterday, they loaded up on cases of water because there is none out there. On top of that, you may recall reading in the newspaper how the marine division out there was going to try the "mingle with the natives" approach and try to win the hearts and minds through kindness. The Fallujah and Ar Ramadi area, which is only about 15 miles west of us, is a major conduit for foreign fighters coming in from Syria and other countries. They have been getting hit hard and have suffered a few casualties daily as a result. Plain and simple, kindness works while talking to someone over here, but it is also a sign of weakness. I hope that the commander out there adjusts his strategy soon.

We just had the Brigade staff people move into our building the other day. First, they commandeered one of the LRS unit's living areas right after the LRS guys had finished building bunks and making it home. They were told they would just have to pack tighter in the space that remained designated for them. The LRS guys then ripped apart all their work and left a big pile of broken-up lumber in the middle of the bay rather than let these staff weenies get it. They continued to make enemies when I walked by our supply room today and saw a sign posted on it that read, "this room needs to be vacated by 28 March or the lock will be cut and the contents will become property of HHC 202nd." I went ballistic and there is a captain who is getting dressed down by Colonel Payne as a result. The Brigade Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Edwards, is in charge of force protection of the facility. He has decided that the LRS unit can no longer go outside the walls of the compound because it is not a safe environment. Of course not, it is a combat zone! The LRS

teams are furious because now they cannot do their job. None of the rest of us are happy because the attacks on this facility had decreased while they were out there.

## **27 March 2004**

Are we winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people? Not really. Many mosques are preaching that we are an invading force and we must be repelled.

First, you have the Shiites; a sect that has been oppressed by Saddam and the Sunnis for 30 years. They are adamant that they are put in power since they make up 60% of the population. The problem is that Iran has the fundamentalist extremist Shiites and are trying to influence the transition of power over here. The Shiite people are happy that we are here as a whole, but are constantly receiving the propaganda from their mosques to fight us.

The Sunni Muslims are aware that simple numbers show they will be out of power since they are a minority. As such, anything they can do to delay or prevent a free election is in their favor. This is the group that spent 30 years helping Saddam suppress the rest of the population so fear retribution.

The Kurds up north just want their own state. They are the most friendly toward the coalition forces and are trying hard to establish their own region, even if it is a subpart of Iraq.

The Christians are a small minority and, as they did under Saddam, have kept quiet to ride out the latest storm here.

This is a war torn country. The people are weary of that, but not so much so that they are ready to work together. It is even obvious in our camps here. We have one compound with 25 detainees in it. They cannot agree on anything. This works to our advantage because they cannot even agree to work against the Americans. They have had major war for the last 25 years and most do not believe that the Americans will stay to see a real peace through. That is a major part of their skepticism. They remember 1991 when we came in and liberated Kuwait and stayed to help protect and stabilize that country. They also remember that we turned our backs on the masses in Iraq and did not help when they were asking for it. Most Iraqis are certain we are going to turn over the government to the wrong person and then just leave and it will be just as bad as it was when Saddam was in power.

The mortar attack the other night that killed a detainee and injured 11 others has really opened the eyes of some detainees. Our interrogators are getting more information than ever before. The detainees are mad that Iraqis would fire on them and are much more willing to make it stop by giving us any information they have that might help stop the mortars. We received 11 more this morning though. No injuries thank God.

## **28 March 2004**

Ken Cochran, our country manager who looks and sounds exactly like Jeff Foxworthy, was driving to Camp Anaconda yesterday and was shot at by a US Soldier. He and a Sergeant Major had been following behind a convoy for about 30 miles. As the convoy pulled in to Camp Anaconda, the Army E-4 manning the turret gun in the trail vehicle fired off a burst of rounds from the machine gun. Fortunately, he did not hit anyone in the vehicle nor did he hit any of the constant stream of civilians walking on the side of the road. The Sergeant Major got out of the vehicle, in uniform, and apparently did a very good impersonation of the Sam Elliot role in *We Were Soldiers*. The worst part is the convoy commander was a Lieutenant Colonel and told the Sergeant Major, "My soldiers are prepared to fight so he did nothing wrong." So apparently firing on US citizens is ok for this new unit.

This is prevalent with these new units coming in. They have been watching the news back home and seeing only the shooting and bombings before coming over here. As a result, they are very high strung and do not realize that the environment over here is not nearly as bad as the news is portraying. The fact is, the media is being very irresponsible. We have been watching the news via AFN and it is amazing how the only things they are choosing to report are the bad things. We are in a major rotation of units throughout Iraq. The logistics of moving the amount of troops and equipment in and out of Iraq is nothing short of a modern marvel. There are roughly 130,000 troops over here. With US civilian contractors, the number is over 200,000. The foreign troops push the number even higher.

This is a war, yet we have been losing an average of just over one soldier a day. There were weeks during Vietnam where the losses numbered in the thousands. Not quite a valid comparison. We have taken a country that had no water, electric, sewer or school infrastructure and have been creating all of them. Seeing the children walk to school every day, boys and girls, is a sight that shows daily success. Have you seen this on the news? I think not.

Tonight was another late one with a new source. He has been waiting for two weeks to talk to someone and was very detailed about diming out a bomb maker who set up and detonated a bomb outside one of the American bases in January. I thought it was ironic when we were going over the description of the guy and my detainee says, "He only has one hand. He was playing with a bomb one time and lit it with his cigarette, pulled it back to throw and BOOM." The hand gestures as he was describing it were great as he pulled his hand into his sleeve when he said boom.

## **29 March 2004**

The following is a letter/speech that was forwarded to me. This is to the Marines 15 miles to the west of us in Fallujah:

"Letter to all hands; We are going back in to the brawl.. We will be relieving the magnificent soldiers fighting under the 82nd airborne Division, whose hard won successes in the Sunni Triangle have opened opportunities for us to exploit, For the last year, the 82nd airborne has been operating against the heart of the enemy's resistance. It's appropriate that we relieve them: When it's time to move a piano, Marines don't pick up the piano bench - we move the piano. So this is the right place for Marines in this fight. Where we can carry on the legacy of Chesty Puller in the Banana Wars in the same sort of complex environment that he knew in his early years. Shoulder to shoulder with our comrades in the Army. Coalition forces and maturing Iraqi Security forces, we are going to destroy the enemy with precise firepower while diminishing the conditions that create diversarial relationships between us and the Iraqi people. This is going to be hard, dangerous work. It is going to require patient, persistent presence. Using our individual initiative, courage, moral judgment and battle skills, we will build upon the 82nd airborne's victories. Our country is counting on us even as our enemies watch and calculate, hoping that America does not have warriors strong enough to withstand discomfort and danger. You, my fine young men, are going to prove the enemy wrong - dead wrong. You will demonstrate the same uncompromising spirit that has always caused the enemy to fear America's Marines.

The enemy will try to manipulate you into hating all Iraqis. Do not allow the enemy that victory. With strong discipline, solid faith, unwavering alertness, and undiminished chivalry to the innocent, we will carry out this mission. Remember, I have added, "first, do no harm" to our passwords of "No better Friend, No worse Enemy." Keep your honor clean as we gain information about the enemy from the Iraqi people, Then, armed with that information and working in conjunction with fledgling Iraqi Security Forces, we well move precisely against the enemy

elements and crush them without harming the innocent. This is our test--our Guadalcanal, our Chosin reservoir, our Hue city. Fight with a happy heart and keep faith in your comrades and your unit. We must be under no illusions about the nature of the enemy and the dangers that lie ahead. Stay alert, take it all in stride, remain sturdy, and share your courage with each other and the world. You are going to write history, my fine young sailors and Marines, so write it well.

Semper Fidelis,  
J. N. Mattis  
Major General, US Marines

This is what we believe over here, where we are living it. The media can say whatever they want, this is the truth. This is all I am sending today because I cannot top this fine Marine's words except to say, Amen.

### **30 March 2004**

Dinner has been great the past couple of days. No thanks to the cooks. My cousin Lucas sent some Habanero hot sauce and we have all been using it liberally. It is a tremendous improvement!!

The first CACI person to set foot on Abu Ghurayb Prison is leaving our location to go support the division cage for 1st Cavalry Division at Camp Victory. He will be missed. The man that half the detainees call "grandpa sheriff" is always good for a laugh and has brought a great sense, although redneck and warped, of humor to this place. His 12 year old joke of "pull my finger" is legend in that detainee camps as well as with the military when he made a detainee pull his finger in front of a whole camp. For weeks, the detainees would yell across the wire at him and laugh while pulling their fingers. He calls me "Cocomo Joe" in his never quiet voice when he sees me and I will miss the constant smiles he brings with him. This 55 year old big-eared redneck from Alabama has done amazing things here. I went to Colonel Payne this evening and discussed the possibility of James getting a unit coin. That was a done deal in 30 seconds so he will receive that before he goes. Along with James, Kenny Powell, the man we affectionately refer to as Mrs. Mayo, will head down there with James as son as Kenny gets back from R&R. They have been good friends for over thirty years and are trouble in the making when they are together. I hope the 1st Cav is half as entertained as us and it will bring up morale down there without a doubt.

Clowns International, the CIA, has proven once again that they are incompetent boobs. I cannot go into detail regarding their latest SNAFU, but they not have Lieutenant General Fast's ire. If you think a woman scorned is bad, cross a woman with three stars on her shoulder!! They cannot set foot on Abu Ghurayb without her expressed permission (which will not happen anytime soon) after their latest stunt.

Today was an admin day for me. I went through my current caseload and widdled out the files of guys that need to be released and drew up plans on the others with my analyst. It was nice to play a little catch up. The other big news at work was a message sent to us from Ms. Rice, the National Security Advisor, thanking us for the intelligence that has come out of our shop and noting that our work is being briefed to President Bush on a regular basis. Now if we could declassify some of it in order to shut up these people who say we have no business over here, that would be the best day!

Scott Norman, my best friend over here woke me up yesterday morning like a little kid.

"Joe, if I got a car, could I keep it?" Like a little boy who found a puppy. He has procured us a BMW series 7. We spent a while getting it hotwired because it did not have any keys with it,

but it runs great and now we have another vehicle for commuting to and from work. This will be great in the summer when that mile walk in 130+ degree weather would be unbearable. And no, neither of us have hotwired a vehicle before...that we would admit to.

## **31 March 2004**

Today was my day off so did laundry and general cleaning. The dust here is so bad that it settles on the places you just dusted as fast as you dust. A couple guys and I went on the roof this morning and I was 3 for 5 hitting golf balls over the outer wall. It is about a 120 yard shot over the wall and the highway is pushing 200 yards. One of my shots made it to the highway. It was really cool. We then got together with some of the LRS guys and played volleyball. Then the news came.

Four of our CACI people stationed out in Fellujah came over to pick up some cases of water we acquired for them. Not soon after they left to make the 13 mile trek to their base, we got the word on what happened earlier today in Fellujah. I went into work so I could read about it. The mood was somber, yet steeled. "Shit and damn" were the common words uttered as we read the messages and saw the images on the television.

This reminds a lot of us of the images from Somalia. Fellujah has long been the hotbed of insurgency since the coalition troops came into Iraq. The summary of our sentiment was when Todd Preston turned away from the television with his face showing determined anger and said, "Unleash the dogs of war." There was a lot of nodding in agreement throughout the room. These people are cheering and celebrating the death of Americans in the backyard of a fresh Marine division. Should the devil-dogs be unleashed, there will be hell to pay.

It is time to send politicians home and let the military do what they do best. It is time to fight this war like it should be fought. Show our military might. Reveal our viciousness, just once, and it will quell these types of attacks.

It does not seem right to write anything else and it is time to go back to work tonight to provide whatever we can to support them out there.

Here is a little part II for 31 March 2004.

Al Jazeera News was on location when these two attacks occurred. Also, there were many computer generated signs being held up by the crowds. This was a planned attack and Al Jazeera was there to cover it. It is notable that we have been surfing all of the middle east news stations and not one of them are playing the footage or even talking about the tragedy.

The shock value at home must be tremendous. The anger and want for retribution among soldiers and marines is even greater. All I ask of people back home is to trust in the abilities of our military and pray that they are allowed to do their jobs and come home safe.

## **01 April 2004**

This e-mail will be sent early since I was up most of the night and am going back to work after a couple hours of sleep. You cannot pry people out of our shop right now and so Chief Cope and Chief Adkins are kicking people out for a little sleep as necessary.

With regard to yesterday, this is something we knew the terrorists were trying to do for the last month. Our intelligence had come across some folks that admitted to knowledge of some of the insurgents wanting to try the "Somalia Scenario" because America pulled out of Somalia right after it was done there in 1993, so they figured maybe it would work here.

Giving coverage to this at home should consist of the fact that nine people were killed. Yes, horrifically. No pictures should be shown of the desecrated bodies; that is disrespectful to their family and their memory. I have little faith that the news media will be showing pictures of them in

an honorable memorial way. I sure hope they prove me wrong. Furthermore, anyone who repeatedly views this tragedy is playing right into the hands of the terrorists that did this. The more attention this gets, the more it will encourage the terrorists to try it again. Instead, show resolve. Pay respect to the families affected by the tragedy. Every American over here volunteered to serve. Whether you agree or disagree with what is going on, they volunteered with pure heart and courage. That deserves the upmost dignity and respect to them and their families.

“We are a country that has suffered great tragedies and known great victories. Through each, we have grown and never wavered from our founding principles. America does not start fights, we finish them. Throughout history, others have given America a bloody nose. They drew first blood, but were never standing when the final bell rang. Our men and women serving this country will not allow anything less than success; this is why we are the United States of America.”

## **02 April 2004**

The Rules of Engagement have changed over here. If someone throws a rock at a soldier, they are now considered a combatant. We are changing to a zero tolerance policy so incidents like two days ago do not happen again. For four thousand years, he who has the biggest stick is in charge and respected. That is the way of life over here. The Marines have unleashed the big stick and will be very aggressive in Fallujah now!

The MPs were told to talk about what happened in Fallujah inside the camps, knowing that the detainees would over hear. It worked well. They know we are outraged and ready for revenge. Virtually everyone came out of the booth last night with reportable information. I knew I would because the guy I was scheduled to talk to has been giving me good information. The scary part is what he gave me. The first thing he said when he came into the booth (he speaks English well), “Mr. Joe, I am sorry to hear what happened in Fallujah, let’s talk about what I can do to help.” He proceeded to tell me about information he had seen and heard in the mosque by his home.

After the interrogation, Hussein, one of our interpreters from the Sudan and a man I am proud to call a friend, asked me, “How can you control your anger in the booth.” The information we got from my detainee made my blood boil, but composure is paramount since I need the information. I ended up writing three reports yesterday and if people were able to read one of them, there would be public outcry for a nuclear attack to solve the issue over here...I had to calmly sit there as he told me of filmed footage of the murder of Americans with all of the details; time, place, method, and who.

Someone asked me about why we do not just shut down the Sunni triangle and also shut down the borders of Iraq. To put it simply, shutting down the borders of Iraq, where you can cross anywhere in the desert, would be like trying to stop anyone from crossing the border from Mexico; just not possible. As far as the Sunni triangle, it encompasses major metro areas as well as desert area and cannot be easily controlled. The other aspect of that is not all of the people there are bad, it is just where the bad people hide. We have a lot of firepower in the area, so will deal with it in accordance with our overdue new Rules of Engagement.

I want to publicly thank WickedJester.com. I wrote them to ask if they would make up a t-shirt for us over here that we have been joking about. Not only have they agreed, they are sending them over here for a huge discount in support of us. Several of us have enjoyed their t-shirts in the past and will definitely continue to be patrons for their support of us over here. The shirts are black with white lettering and say:

I spent a year in an Iraqi prison

...don't piss me off

## **11 April 2004**

The hostage situation was one that we have been receiving reports on for the last month or so as one of their tactics. Fortunately, they have not been repeating the Somalia Scenario with the hostages. It is difficult to see contractors taken hostage, especially since there are in the neighborhood of 50,000 contractors over here supporting the cause. Tom Hamill, the KBR driver that was taken was en-route to our location with a fuel supply. I never saw him, but some of our guys recognized him from prior trips with other supplies. We pray for his safety and hope that the Special Forces elements working our area find him and bring him home.

Our LRS guys went on a road clearing mission again today. More than 8,000 rounds of ammunition were expended on their little excursion and the only casualty for the LRS was one of their guys received a grazing on his arm from a bullet that only required a band-aid. He did not even realize that he was hurt until they got back. Things outside are pretty hot in this area especially since the cease fire in Fallujah. Since we are only 12 miles away, they are hitting this area since the main supply route passes right in front of our compound. We are still enjoying not being attacked directly, but it is all around our facility.

Today a battalion commander was wounded on a convoy right outside our walls and the Apache gunship that crashed was only a few hundred meters from our wall. It is somewhat surreal to see the fighting all around and we feel like we are on an island within it all. Every convoy that is coming in and out of here is receiving resistance. The convoy returning from Camp Victory today was hit. The vehicle that was hit carried the mail for our compound and apparently some of it was damaged; worse, one of the Marines pulling security for the convoy was seriously wounded.

These pockets of fighting are fairly intense, but are being dealt with. I am optimistic that this will not last more than another week or two. I know that one of the things that is being reported back home is how taxing this mission has been on the military; active duty, reserves, and guard. It is important to remember that 10 years ago we had a lot more active duty forces, but a prior administration made downsizing the military a priority. As such, we pay the price now. Yes, this is taxing, but the vast majority of the forces over here are supportive of why we are here and know we are doing the right thing.

## **12 April 2004**

I want to start telling you about the people I live with, so each day, I will talk about one person in addition to the daily happenings.

Todd Preston is a retired Navy diver who spent the majority of his career in the Marine Corps. He is here as an analyst and sends me daily clips about Special Forces activities via secure e-mail. We call him Hugh Heffner because out of the 1900 or so men here, he is the only one with a bathrobe. It is also a white terry cloth that really should have a little longer hem line. Todd still runs every day to the behest of the military because he does it without his body armor on. Personally, he reminds me of Gunny Highway (Clint Eastwood's character) from the movie Heartbreak Ridge.

There continues to be fighting around us. I heard from Brent Jones last night. He is the division cage team lead for CACI down at BIAP with the 1st Cavalry Division. They were in the chow hall down there and received incoming small arms fire in the area. Everyone was hunkered down in the chow hall while the insurgents from the Mahdi Army (Al Sadr's group) were dealt with. They apparently tried to infiltrate Camp Victory and BIAP in several places yesterday. Fortunately, most places they tried to infiltrate, they were caught as they were entering. A few

others got in, but did not make it too far. Word of advise, do not try and break in to a place where there are US soldiers all carrying weapons and ammunition, it can be bad for your health.

The Mahdi Army is the militant wing of the Shiites in the south. Many of their fighters are either Iranian or Iraqis who have been living in Iran for the last several years, hiding from Saddam. Al Sadr, the guy who just made our most wanted list over here, is their leader. He is a bad egg. He lived in Iran for about eight years to avoid Saddam and also build up an insurgent force. He is a radical who had his father and brother killed so he could ascend to power faster. Al Sadr is only about 26 years old. He does not represent the Shiite population in Iraq and Sistani, the unofficial Shiite leader, does not get along with Al Sadr. Of course, the reason Sistani has so much power within the Shiite community is that he kissed up to Saddam so that he could keep the power down south. Neither man is worthy to be considered to lead Iraq, however, Sistani is the one who really wants it. That would be a big mistake.

We received some incoming weapons fire tonight, but since these people shooting at us are not very good at math, they could not figure out that if you shoot up to clear an 18 foot wall, the bullets will not fall inside the compound. The towers fired back and it was all over in about a minute. It was kind of cool to see the red tracers about 100 feet in the air. I guess it was an early 4th of July.

Work has gone really well the last two weeks. Tonight was the first night that I did not actually get reportable information from a source. The nice thing is that means an early night.

## **13 April 2004**

The June 30th transition of power to the Iraqi people is a convoluted topic. On June 30th, the provisional Iraqi government will take control of Iraq from a governing standpoint. The coalition forces will continue to be responsible for security and maintaining peace. The government will be responsible for their infrastructure, economics, government, legal system, etc., with our assistance as needed. We of course will assist in making a free election possible, but it will be up to the provisional government to decide exactly how they will want to proceed. Part of these standards are written within the constitution that was passed several weeks ago.

Now here is the blunt version; with a government in place, Iraq qualifies to appeal to the world bank for financial aid and other world relief organizations for grants, loans, etc. this will lighten the financial burden for the coalition forces, namely the United States. Besides this, nothing will change over here from the perspective of the soldier.

Yesterday when the LRS guys went out, LTC Edwards insisted on going on their patrol. He is the MI Battalion Commander and not well liked or respected by anyone on this post. The LTC and his driver did not see fit to actually go to the mission briefs prior to rolling out. A blocking position was set up on one of the overpasses and when a vehicle approached, the LTC's driver opened fire without provocation. As such, the LRS guys, upon hearing fire, traversed and opened fire as well. The Rules of Engagement are that no warning shots are fired. You either fire at a known threat, or do not fire at all. This is established so your fellow soldiers can immediately lay down suppressive fire upon hearing shots fired. Fortunately, they did not kill the driver of the vehicle, only wounded him. His truck is completely useless though. The poor Iraqi was treated by our medical staff and then LTC Edwards made the LRS take the guy back to his home with one of the vehicles from on our compound, plus \$500. Now LTC Edwards is downgraded to despised and a joke.

“Wild” Bill Armstrong is one of our interrogators. He and I are both in the Force Protection section. Bill is married with five kids and a devout Christian, father, and husband. He arrived here

two weeks before I did. Bill knows interrogation and reporting doctrine better than anyone here. Of course it was his career in the army and now he teaches at the school house in Arizona when he is not over here playing in the sand. I see Bill and know there are some incredible people in America. Here is a man who has already served in the military for 22 years, has a bunch of children, good job, and decides that he is needed over here so heads over to contribute. Politically, Bill makes Rush Limbaugh look like a flaming liberal by comparison. He is also leaving here after his R&R and will become the division cage site lead out in Fallujah.

## **15 April 2004**

What a long day today was. I did not make the mile trek back to my prison cell in the dark until 4:30 this morning. I was tasked with a new detainee that we just received from Ar Ramadi, which is a sister city just west of Al Fallujah. This guy is my age and has a background in smuggling stuff into Iraq from Syria. It actually did not take long to get him talking, the problem was how much information he had. I would give anything to make the information I received last night public. The support for what we are doing would be unbelievable. Sometimes it is frustrating knowing the truth, but not being able to freely share it. There is good reason for classifying material, but at the same time, it would be nice to rub a few faces in some of this information. We are starting to get some of the people detained by the Marines. Not all of them are from Iraq either. We should really start getting some interesting intelligence now.

Some of the foreign nationals have returned to post to resume their jobs, but not all yet. I am hoping the guys that own the little dry cleaner come back soon. It is nice being able to get laundry done same day and not have to do it on my little bit of down time.

Berryl Jackson is one of the three females we have here. She is a retired Chief Warrant Officer 3. To show you what a small world it is, she was my interrogation instructor when I went through the school 13 years ago. BJ is from Costa Rica originally and is a real character. She sometimes forgets that she is no longer in the military and is not in charge of the soldiers that she works with, but she is a wealth of knowledge and one heck of an interrogator. She is going to be heading to the 1st Cavalry Division cage at Camp Victory in another week or so to work there.

It has been announced that several units that are over here are staying longer than their original year. We already had the MI people extended here, but now they are extending other active duty units such as the 1st Armored Division for at least three months. It is difficult on the families, but the troops as a whole know that they are needed and have a job to do. Most soldiers that are on active duty recognize that this is what the military is all about and being deployed means doing your job. It is also the price we pay for downsizing the military and then truly needing it.

The weather here has been weird. It was in the mid 90s today, but there was a breeze and it was overcast. I learned that the overcast look was indeed not clouds, rather dust in the air and one of the interpreters was telling me to wait until it rains a little because then little droplets of mud come down. Hopefully the wind will carry this stuff east and dump it on Iran, not us.

## **16 April 2004**

Today it rained mud. Can this place be any more undesirable? For those of you that have been seeing the pictures circulating the internet of the camel spiders, yes, we have had a couple here and they are the ugliest things I have ever seen. Fortunately we have not had any near our living area.

Don Simpson, one of my roommates when I first got here, is deathly afraid of camel spiders. He hates bugs in general so it is hilarious because we keep telling him one of these things

is going to crawl into bed with him one night. He is one of the three members of the “lollipop guild” due to his lack of height. Don is retired from the Air Force and is a great guy who will do anything to help. The LRS guys took care of getting him to BIAP so he could fly out on R&R a week ago. They received small arms fire all the way down and were shooting back the whole way. Don was sitting in the middle of the HUMMER loading M-16 magazines faster than the LRS guys could shoot the rounds. Don is an analyst here and a darn good one. He just transferred to work with the British guys we have here and is doing the analytical work for three of them.

I worked the guy from the Ar Ramadi area again tonight. I got home about 3:00am after writing reports and putting together the associations with the others in his group. It was great because my guy knows where the forged citizenship papers are made and by who and the real names and origins of the other detainees captured with him. It is hard for the other guys to lie when I already know all about their backgrounds, but they sure are trying.

We watched the Al Jazeera footage of the two American soldiers that are being held hostage. CW3 Dan Adkins said to the television, “kill 1,000 for every hostage killed. No need to discriminate either.” We know they were captured right down the road from our location. We also know they are still in the general area. The first thing that needs to happen is to stake every Al Jazeera reporter in the middle of the desert and let the buzzards have them. This probably would not work since the buzzards would not touch them due to professional courtesy. Al Jazeera is known to work with and pay international terrorist groups for the “privilege” of filming their activities. It is also the largest Arab media source in the world. SFC Paul Edwards put some perspective on it when he said, “I would rather see them as hostages, than what we saw in Al Fallujah a few weeks ago.” I concur.

The fact is we are not seeing resistance from Sunni Iraqis in our area. It is foreign elements coming in for a big push to try and get us to turn tail and run like we did in Somalia. In fact, they cannot figure out why we have done so yet. Down south, it is similar, but there are Iraqis involved as well. These are the Shiite Iraqis that are more loyal to Iran than they are to Iraq. It is important to remember that the Middle East is similar to Africa in that geopolitical boundaries mean nothing. Tribal and religious sect structure and power are much more important. Also, some of the rivalries among the tribes and/or religious sects date back hundreds if not thousands of years.

## **17 April 2004**

I wanted to kill Scott Norman and Meyer Gilbert this morning. We have been getting up every morning to go work-out. Usually, I am waking Scott up. This morning, after the two long nights I have had in a row, I decided to skip this morning. They would have none of that and pounded on my door until I got up. When I opened the door, there they were, Meyer standing there with his usual friendly smile, and Scott with his smirk of vengeance. I ended up getting up and working out, but am paying the price for not getting enough sleep. At least tonight should be a decent night for sleep.

My smuggler friend just keeps on talking. I have nick-named him Han Solo since he is a smuggler extraordinaire. I have received information regarding the entire network from start to finish on how foreign fighters are coming into Iraq; who is paying for it; how they communicate; how they get their weapons once here; and how they move to their target locations. This will never make the papers, but it sure is exciting to know the information.

The air and weather was nice today. That little bit of rain that took the dirt out of the air really made it nice to breath again. Although the temps are starting to rise, the breeze is making it quite nice. We have all of our Iraqi national workers back here except for the dry cleaners. They

apparently tried to return a couple of days ago, but their car got shot up in Baghdad so they do not have any means of transportation right now.

Meyer Gilbert is an analyst here. He spent several years as a police investigator and just got done serving a year in Kosovo working for the UN. He is definitely from the south with his accent and is a regular at Rico's Tanning Salon on the roof. Meyer brings some great insight to the analysis of information from a criminal investigation standpoint which is so unlike the military analysts.

Time to enjoy some sleep.

## **18 April 2004**

Today has been a tough day of fighting in a few places here. Down south, Sadr's followers have launched an offensive that is being repelled. Over on the Syrian border, the Marines got hit by foreign fighters in Husaybah. Yes, I know these are headlines. The fact is that these are two locations in a country the size of California and population of 25 million. Remember that when you hear the news. How many people protest in America each day? How many shootings occur each day in America? Sadr has been living and getting supplied by Iran for the last eight years. His financial support is estimated to be in the millions of US dollars. I will bet a paycheck with anyone that the 150 fighters that set up the ambush along the Syrian border were Syrian Mujahideen fighters.

Here is a little background on each and their psychological mindset of tactics:

Al Sadr's people are Shiites that are aligned with the Iranian Shiite extremist movement. They do not represent the majority of the Shiites. The Syrian Mujahideen fighters are jihadists, plain and simple. These are people that are recruited specifically to kill us infidels in the name of their Allah. Not the same Allah most Islamic people pray to. The strategy of these people is to try and cause an uprising among the people in Iraq. They do not have the numbers to mount a serious or sustained resistance, but are hopeful that they can gain support from the populous. Considering Al Sadr's militia attacked at the same time as the Syrian fighters attacked on the other border, I cannot believe that the Iranian network and Syrian network did not coordinate it. I am proud of the Marines that fought out west today. They were ambushed by a sizable force and 14 hours of fighting later, crushed the ambush and suffered minimal losses. I do not mean to minimize the loss of five Americans, but considering they rolled into an ambush, we were fortunate. The tactic of an ambush is designed for a small force to be able to engage and incapacitate a larger force. Those Marines were outnumbered and prevailed in a serious statistical advantage.

Many Iraqis would just like to see stability. They have been involved in three major conflicts in the last 13 years and would like to live their lives without war. As such, the intelligence network that started with no sources in Iraq, grows daily from Iraqis supporting what the coalition forces are doing. This does not get reported because it might suggest that we are making progress and does not have shock value for sound bites.

Pay attention over the next few days. There will be some changes over here and we may be showing our "big stick."

## **19 April 2004**

Today we had to make a run to BIAP/Camp Victory. Since we have gotten in good with the LRS guys, they loaned us an up-armored Hummer to make the run. The Marines who serve and the convoy escorts/big guns, were teasing us because Scott and I have been very resourceful in our networking and are better armed than the average traveling vehicle. The trip down and back was

thankfully uneventful. Of course, the two Hueys and the Cobra gun ship that were flying up and down the highway helped as did the Bradley fighting vehicles staged every quarter mile. It was probably the safest trip we have made with the firepower on the road. It is too bad that the army was not proactive and set up the extensive security before the attacks over the last couple of weeks. The road looked like a scene from a Mad Max movie. There were six fuel tanker trucks along the road that were burned out hulls. One of them was actually still burning this morning. Since they were filled with JP-8, the military version of diesel, they only burned and did not explode. On the return trip, the highway had a crater in it that eliminated the road from the right shoulder, through two lanes and was 30 yards long and two feet deep.

While down at BIAP, we stocked up on supplies for everyone here since we are not planning on making another trip down there for at least a month. To look after the guys here, I decided to buy Whoppers at the Burger King for everyone. I came back with 40 Whoppers with cheese. No CACI people ate at the chow hall tonight. It felt good to do that for the guys and it was well received, at least I think it was, the burgers only lasted about 15 minutes.

I learned two things at work tonight. Pigeons only mate for about five seconds and interesting insight about Al Fallujah. Ok, I better explain this. Christine, Dion and I were sitting outside in the break area at work and two pigeons landed on the MP guard tower directly in front of us. This went Nature Channel gone awry, but funny to see in the middle of a combat zone. It also gave us something to joke about the rest of the night. On the more serious subject, I spoke at length with one of my detainees about Al Fallujah. He explained that the people of Al Fallujah were not favored during Saddam's regime. Saddam kept the area under control by brute force and paying off the tribal leaders. Since the fall of the regime, Al Fallujah has been a hotbed for foreign elements funneling into Iraq to cause trouble. I asked him how many foreign fighters he thought there were in Al Fallujah and his answer was simple, "too many." He expounded by saying, "many of the people in Al Fallujah just want to try and make a life for themselves and their families, but these foreign fighters are ruining it for them."

On the trek back through the mud from work tonight (it rained just enough to make the dust into molasses), we watched eight 5-ton trucks roll in with detainees loaded in them. By the look of the vehicles, I think they were from the Marines in Al Fallujah. This will mean that we will probably be pulling long shifts for a while now.

## **20 April 2004**

Nine mortars today...while I was in the shower. Not exactly the favorite place to be. I finished showering, cleaned up and came strolling out. The mortars were over by that time and the army folks that I work with were at their main bay doing accountability. They all started laughing because they were all in their gear and I came out in flip flops and shorts. Then we got the news. Five of the mortars landed in Ganci, one of the two detainee camps. Initial reports were 21 dead, 31 critically injured and another 60 plus injured. No Americans were injured or killed. All casualties were detainees. It is disturbing that Al Jazeera had the article typed and on their web site less than thirty minutes after the attack. I am tired of a "news" service being on location every time Americans are attacked. Nobody can tell me that Al Jazeera is not intertwined with these insurgent groups. The insurgents are trying to accomplish two things with these attacks; first, to draw attention to our facility and be able to say that we cannot protect the detainees and secondly to try and incite the detainees to try and riot and overrun the prison.

I ask that everyone say a prayer or two over the next 48 hours for PFC Keith Maupin, KBR employee Thomas Hamill, and for the Marines in our area. God willing, all three will make the media and give a good story to report for a change. Enough said about that.

Work is fast and furious, but we are more productive right now than we have been since I have been here. Some intelligence things are really coming together and could shift a few things to our advantage, at least west and north of Baghdad. The Al Fallujah situation is being guided by results from the intelligence gleaned from here as well as at their division cage. We are making progress on rooting out foreign fighters as well as those individuals that are helping/hiding them.

Christine Chaney is another of our three CACI females here. She left the army last fall and was actually in the 202nd MI BN that we are working with here. Christine is tall like my sister-in-law, so my posture always improves like when I am around my sister-in-law. She also was in Afghanistan last year with the 202nd and is a fluent Farsi and Pashto linguist in addition to being an experienced interrogator. It is impressive because the three women we have here are all former army and hard chargers. They are more professional and tougher than most of the female soldiers here.

## **21 April 2004**

We have been working hard on an intelligence project for the Al Fallujah area. We would probably be a lot further along if there was some support from Captain Todl. He is the Marine captain out there that wants all of our information post haste, but will not release any information they are getting so we can put the whole picture together. The Marines here are a fantastic bunch of guys and I am sure the average Marine in 1st Marine Division in Al Fallujah is great. I am just singling out one of the intelligence guys because he is our point of contact and an inept one at that. Scott and I put together an analyst package consisting of detailed association matrixes and interrogation highlights to put these guys all together. The command was thrilled and once again the CACI folks have set a high standard for the young soldiers to follow. Specialist Spencer overheard me saying one of the names. About ten minutes later, she came over with some information from one of her interrogations a week ago and we found a link. It is fun to see the excitement in the room when stuff like this happens. It is like putting together a jigsaw puzzle without the picture, so when you get pieces to fit, it is great.

It is getting hot over here, at least for my Minnesota blood. The heat is not too bad when there is a breeze, but when there is no wind like today, the sun beats pretty hard. The rain from the other day briefly kept the dust down, but it blows around even without the slightest breeze.

The tenuous peace agreement in Al Fallujah will not last. The Mujahideen foreign fighters will not allow that. Although there are not many of them compared to the population of the area, they are well armed and dedicated to keeping Iraq unstable. Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iran, all border countries, do not want to see a stable Iraq; especially one that is on good terms with the United States. Just as South Korea is known as the fulcrum of the east, Iraq is the fulcrum here. If we have good relations with Iraq, the countries that surround it will have to behave because the world's only superpower, us, will be here.

## **22 April 2004**

I sure miss normal food. I look forward to going home and cooking whatever I feel like and hitting the grocery store and seeing the stocked shelves and wonderful fresh steaks! When I go home in May for 10 days, I will probably not sleep between spending time with family, eating,

showering in a real shower, and using a toilet that actually flushes and does not have flies everywhere.

The mosquitoes are not bad here by Minnesota standards. Although they are heartier, they are not nearly as numerous. The flies on the other hand, are more populous here than people in China. The heat has really brought out the flies. It was windy today, enough to pick up small rocks and we had to wear our goggles whenever we went outside. You learn quickly why the Arabs wear Shamack wraps around their faces and heads.

Well, the terrorist are doing a good job of showing that they have no regard for life and are just as happy to kill innocent civilians and children as soldiers. The Basra attacks have marginally worked to our favor. It was a blatant attack against the civilian populous without regard as to who the victims were. I say this is only marginally to our favor because we are being blamed for not protecting the people of Iraq properly. My source told me that before we came here, the borders were controlled and there were never any bombing attacks like this in Iraq until the Americans arrived here. Another point is that we can call our being here anything we want, but "liberating force" is only a political name. We are an "occupying force" in the eyes of the Iraqi people and you cannot tell them otherwise because they are not conditioned to play to political spin like Americans are. There is nothing wrong with being an occupying force; that is what we were in Germany and Japan. As long as we can continue to make progress in rebuilding the infrastructure such as the power plants, we will prevail. I know that sounds like a weird objective, but envision your life without electricity or flushing toilets. Basic things we take for granted, but are essential to our standard of living. We have the ability to bring the people normalcy, it will just take time. We take steps each day, just sometimes we have to take one backwards due to the foreign fighters and insurgents.

It has been a long week at work and I will be taking tomorrow off. Scott Norman and I have been putting together the results of the interrogations from our recent guests. Scott has been putting together great association matrixes and I put together a smart book outlining all the intelligence gathered on this particular group to date. The Marines loved it and our stuff was 90% of their presentation to their Commanding General yesterday. It is a wonderful feeling to be able to put together stuff that helps the troops on the ground.

## **23-24 April 2004**

The LRS guys have started Friday Night Fights over here. A lot of the soldiers and Marines are getting into it. They have the padded sparring equipment and have had a blast setting up bouts and have even begun a ranking chart. The LRS guys do some warm up training out on our volleyball court, so we enjoy watching these young guys goof around while we relax on the porch.

Work is continuing to be brutally time consuming. I got home at 6:00am in the morning on the 24th and went right back to work at 1:00pm. I made it home tonight at a nice early 1:00am and have an entire 12 hours off. We have the Iraqi Governing Council showing up here tomorrow because someone told them that we have Syrian detainees here that were caught in Iraq. They are coming up here with news cameras and stuff, but they will not get a chance to talk to them because we will be interrogating them while they are here. We are pushing hard to get everything we can out of these guys because the situation in Al Fallujah is going to boil over shortly and we know it is due to the foreign fighters that have moved into the city.

It is becoming more obvious to the troops here as well as the Iraqi people that a lot of the problems here are directly caused by foreigners. This is not deterring the Coalition Forces and is

slowly turning the populous against these foreign fighters. Iraqi Police are even starting to take action.

Time for sleep before another long day. I will be taking the rest of the day off after our Syrian interviews.

## **25 April 2004**

One thing I forgot to mention about yesterday; it got dark earlier than normal. This was due to a sandstorm that blocked out the sun. It was quite amazing that a wind storm filled with dirt can make it dark as night. It also makes it difficult to breath, even through masks.

The best thing today was that our Iraqi cleaners reopened. Finally, my clothes will be clean and not stained like what we get from the Brown and Root service.

Today was a short day. There were six of us that had to come in early and conduct long interrogations to ensure that certain detainees were only able to be seen, but not talked to. The Iraqi Governing Council came and looked through our mirrors into the booths to see some of the foreign fighters we have detained. They wanted to talk to them and film to show the international media, but we refused, due to not being able to interrupt interrogations. They were much more patient than we thought they would be so they tried to wait us out. Five and a half hours in the booth was a long time, but we finally outlasted them. The IGC left with only the satisfaction that we have foreign fighters from Morocco, Syria, Jordan, and other countries detained here. To be clear, they are not sponsored by their respective countries to come here, but it is due to their individual choices, be it religious or stupidity.

I got to take the rest of the day off after our long booth time. This gave us a nice evening after dinner to head to the roof and play a round of golf. Scott Norman, Jeff Mouton, Steve Hattabaugh, Steve Stefanowicz, and I all took turns trying to hit balls over the back wall and onto the highway. Since the club is a left handed 3 iron, I had an unfair advantage and missed a dump truck by only about ten feet. Not bad since the highway is about 220 yards. We do what we can to make it fun here.

## **26 April 2004**

It was hot today! We flirted with triple digit heat for the first time this year and without a breeze, you can sure feel it! Things are also heating up in Al Fallujah. We are right on the flight path for the air support to the 1st Marines out there so we get to see all the different sleighs delivering packages to the bad boys. There were some intense firefights in Al Fallujah today and it will only get more intense. The fighters and Imams of mosques have now realized that if you shoot from a mosque, we flatten it. We have been leaving mosques alone and still do, but the rule is that if gunfire comes from a mosque or fighters retreat into a mosque, it is no longer a place of worship and is a combat zone. We just eliminated a huge group of safe houses for these fighters.

I was at work until 3:30 in the morning because we got a hold of some intelligence to directly support the Marines out in Al Fallujah. This is the stuff I have been spearheading with three other tiger teams working on it with me. (A tiger team consists of an interrogator and an intelligence analyst.) The Marines wanted to hit one of the houses I had reported on, but wanted more information. I went back in on the guy who gave me the initial information and he pinpointed the spot for me on a map. I am hoping to go into work and find out that they caught the target. Results like that make us feel great here because we are directly supporting the live mission on the ground.

Here in Iraq, one or two of the television stations are running again. The newspapers are in full swing again as well, but mainly only in the Baghdad area. This limits the messages that we can get out to the people since it is only for a small portion of the country. Information distribution in a country like this is tough. There are many places that do not have radios or televisions so it makes it tough to get the truth out.

I am sure looking forward to my first R&R. I will be leaving out of the prison on 10 May in order to catch my flight in Kuwait on the 14th of May. I will get to enjoy 12 days at home and see my son, my wonderful wife, and my newborn son. I probably will not sleep much so I can maximize my time at home.

# **Exhibit E**



Technical and Operational Support Services Division

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS & TRAINING GROUP

MEMORANDUM FOR Titan Corporation OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM Linguist Staff  
SUBJECT: Job Description/Policy Memorandum

1. The following job descriptions pertain to all Titan staff linguists supporting OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF).

Provide operational contract linguist support to joint military operations. Linguists are under the operational control of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). Support Prisoner of War (POW) interrogations, war crimes interviews, CI/HUMINT team operations, etc. Interpret and translate written and spoken communications. Transcribe and analyze verbal communications. Perform document exploitation. Scan, research, and analyze foreign language documents for key information. Translate and gist foreign language documents. Identify and extract information components that meet the criteria contained in intelligence and information requirements lists.

2. While supporting Titan OEF operations, your first line supervisor and site manager is responsible for the following items:

- Professional tasking and overall linguist operations
- Direct interaction/planning with the U.S. Government staff
- Overall direction and conduct of the linguist staff (e.g., accountability, schedules, dress)
- Handling personnel issues (e.g., medical and professional issues and corrective actions)

3. While supporting OEF, any professional issues that may arise need to be brought to your site manager's attention. Do not bring any personal or professional issues to U.S. Government representatives. We are supporting the U.S. Government, but they do not exercise administrative control over the group.

4. If any linguist has professional or personal issues that need to be discussed at a higher level, I will discuss them and any potential remedies to issues that may arise during our mission.

5. As we all discussed during your time in Fairfax, we work as a team. It is my belief that our overall success will be the result of a team effort. Breakdowns, however, can be caused by individual actions. It is a great honor for Titan to support the U.S. Government's operations. Our success will be built on teamwork and individual talents within our team.

6. I extend the greatest professional gratitude to all of you for representing our organization with the utmost professionalism. If you have any questions, concerns, or issues regarding this memorandum, please contact me as soon as possible. I can be reached at (703) 383-8151 or [marc.peltier@titan.com](mailto:marc.peltier@titan.com).

Marc D. Peltier  
Department Director  
Titan Corporation

# **Exhibit F**

## Government Contracts

### TITAN CORPORATION

**Date Announced:** 3/22/04  
**Contract Number:** Not Reported  
**Company:** Titan Corporation  
**Type:** ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Not Reported  
**Contracting Activity:**  
Defense Contract Command  
Washington

This contract is a “Joint Analytical Support contract having a potential ceiling value of up to \$172 million over five years (one base year and four option years). Under this multiple-awarded, task-based contract, Titan will compete against one other company to provide analytical support services to the Joint Staff Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Office (J8) and U.S. Combatant Commands.” Tasks include “analysis support for military operations and campaigns; information technology support; knowledge engineering; support to policy, planning, and process improvement; requirements analysis support; and military exercises, simulation and experimentation.” [Information obtained from press release.]

**Date Announced:** 3/16/04  
**Contract Number:** Not Reported  
**Company:** Titan Corporation  
**Type:** BPA  
**Branch:** Not Reported  
**Contracting Activity:**  
Department of Homeland Security  
(DHS)

The DHS awarded Titan with two BPAs. “The first is a single award BPA for Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) support to the DHS CFO’s Resource Management Transformation Office, and the second is a multiple award BPA to provide Project Management Support Services (PMSS) throughout the DHS. Titan expects to receive orders on these BPAs in excess of \$10 million during the contract period of five years if all options are exercised.” The purpose of the first BPA is to “provide planning, technical analysis, consulting, architecture assurance, and testing support.” The second BPA “will afford solutions to DHS in the areas of establishing and operating a project management function, providing oversight of the implementation of various programs and projects, and establishing processes and procedures for effectively planning, initiating and managing major initiatives at DHS. Titan will compete for individual task orders under this award.” [Information from press release.]

**Date Announced:** 2/6/04  
**Contract Number:** Not Reported  
**Company:** Titan Corporation  
**Type:** BPA  
**Branch:** Not Reported  
**Contracting Activity:**  
Department of Defense Intelligence  
Information System  
and Intelligence Community

Titan received “a Defense Intelligence Agency Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) for the Defense Intelligence Information Systems Integration and Engineering Support Services Contract 3 (DIESCON 3) to provide the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System and Intelligence Community a wide range of information technology support. Titan anticipates that this multiple-award, multiyear BPA will have a potential value to Titan of \$50 million over the next five years. The total potential value of the DIESCON 3 blanket purchase agreement for all seven awardees is \$300 million, with Titan having to compete for future task orders with the six other pre-qualified contractor teams.” [Information obtained from press release.]

**Date Announced:** 9/27/03  
**Contract Number:** F41621-03-D-6300  
**Company:** Titan Corporation  
**Type:** ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Air Force  
**Contracting Activity:**  
Air Force Information Warfare Center  
Lackland Air Force Base, Texas

Titan was awarded this contract along with five other contractors. This contract is to “provide professional and engineering services, and other services in the information warfare arena to include offensive and defensive warfare capabilities in support of the operations, acquisition and testing activities of the Air Force Information Warfare Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. This effort will include systems planning, feasibility studies, system engineering, analysis, prototyping, software development, verification, validation, documentation, software maintenance, systems integration, and systems testing.” The total value of the six contracts is up to \$252,000,000 and will be completed by August 2009.

**Date Announced:** 7/22/03  
**Contract Number:** N66001-03-D-0008  
**Company:** Titan Corporation,  
Integrated Services Division  
**Type:** ID/IQ, cost-plus-fixed-fee  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Space and  
Naval Warfare Systems Center  
San Diego, California

This contract provides “for engineering and related technical, logistical and direct fleet-support services in support of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Activity Pacific.” The value of this contract is \$7,916,326 with a potential value of \$40,927,801. “Work will be performed in Hawaii (75%); Japan (10%); and at sites located in Guam, the continental U.S. or foreign countries (15%), and is expected to be completed July, 2004.”

**Date Announced:** 10/28/02  
**Contract Number:** Not Reported  
**Company:** Titan Corporation  
**Type:** Not Reported  
**Branch:** Not Reported  
**Contracting Activity:** Not Reported

Titan “has been selected by an undisclosed government customer as prime contractor for a program having a potential value of \$533 million over a two year base period and five option years.” [Information obtained from press release.]

**Date Announced:** 10/15/01  
**Contract Number:** F08635-02-A-0013  
**Company:** Titan Systems Corp.  
**Type:** BPA  
**Branch:** Air Force  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Air Armament Center  
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

The Airforce awarded Titan this contract along with three other contractors. The purpose of this contract is “to provide advisory and assistance service in support of Department of Defense Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E) programs. These services will include data collection and analysis, task management, engineering analysis, financial management and administrative and presentation support.” The maximum value for these four contracts is \$400,000,000 and work should be completed by October 2007.

**Date Announced:** 6/27/01  
**Contract Number:** N66001-01-D-0028  
**Company:** Titan Systems Corp.,  
Eldyne, Inc. Division  
**Type:** ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Space and  
Naval Warfare Systems Center  
San Diego, California

This contract is for “engineering, development, production and related technical support services for Antenna Titling Group Systems and related equipment.” The value of this contract is \$11,666,476 with a possible future value of up to \$60,724,714. Ten percent of work will be performed “onboard U.S. Navy vessels and shore activities worldwide.” Completion is expected by June 2002.

**Date Announced:** 4/30/02  
**Contract Number:**  
DAAB07-02-D-M012  
**Company:** Datron World  
Communications Inc.  
**Type:** ID/IQ, firm-fixed-price  
**Branch:** Army  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The U.S. Army Communications  
Electronics Command  
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey

The contract is for “various communications, spare part packages, training, engineering services and other services. Work will be performed in Vista, and is to be completed by April 29, 2007.” The value of this contract is \$100,000,000.

**Date Announced:** 3/13/02  
**Contract Number:**  
USZA22-02-D-0017  
**Company:** BTG, Inc.  
**Type:** ID/IQ  
**Branch:** United States Special  
Operations Command  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The United States  
Special Operations Command  
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

This contract is for “enterprise information technology in support of special operations forces world-wide. The maximum dollar value of this contract is \$189,405,469. Work will primarily be performed within the continental U.S. and managed out of Tampa, Fla.” There is no completion date reported for this contract.

**Date Announced:** 4/8/99  
**Contract Number:**  
MDA908-99-A-2022  
**Company:** BTG, Inc.  
**Type:** BPA  
**Branch:** Army  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Virginia Contracting Activity  
Washington, D.C.

BTG was one of six contractors awarded this BPA against a General Services Administration contract. The estimated total value of these six contracts is \$200,000,000. The contract is for “Defense Intelligence Agency Information Technology Commodities and Information Technologies Commodities.” The expected completion date is April 2001.

**Date Announced:** 7/2/96  
**Contract Number:** N00189-96-D-0101  
**Company:** SEMCOR, Inc.  
**Type:** ID/IQ, time and material  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Fleet and Industrial Supply Center  
Norfolk Acquisition Group  
Hampton Roads Detachment  
Norfolk, Virginia

This contract is “for engineering and technical services as required by the Naval Command and Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, ISE (IN Service Engineering) East Coast Detachment Norfolk, Virginia.” The work will occur at various locations in the U.S. as well as “stateside and worldwide areas as required by individual delivery orders supporting U.S. or foreign governments at shore and shipboard based facilities.” The value of this contract is \$10,106,054 with a possible total value of \$50,655,270. Completion is expected by July 2001.

## CACI International, Inc.

**Date Announced:** 4/5/04  
**Contract Number:** N/A  
(N00178-04-D-4001 through N00178-04-D4014 and N00178-04-D-4014, N00178-04-D-4016 through N00178-04-D-4152)  
**Company:** CACI, Inc.  
**Type:**  
Indefinite Demand, Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ)  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Surface Warfare Center  
Dahlgren Division  
Dahlgren, Virginia

CACI was one of 151 contractors awarded this contract. This contract is for “support services for all phases of naval ship and shipboard weapon systems acquisition and life-cycle support including research & development support, prototyping, acquisition logistics, modeling, test & evaluation trials, and engineering support for Naval Sea Systems Command Headquarters, field activities, and affiliated program executive offices.” The maximum combined value of this contract is \$1,300,000,000 per year.

**Date Awarded:** 2/26/04  
**Contract Number:** W91QV1-04-F-0077  
**Company:** CACI, Inc.  
**Type:** firm-fixed-price  
**Branch:** Army  
**Contracting Activity:**  
U.S. Army Contracting Agency  
Fort Belvoir, Virginia

This contract is “for 24 contract specialists to work in Iraq. Work will be performed in Baghdad, Iraq.” The contract is worth \$10,118,040. Completion is expected by February 28, 2005.

**Date Announced:** 2/11/04  
**Contract Number:** Not Reported  
**Company:** CACI International, Inc.  
**Type:** Not Reported  
**Branch:** Not Reported  
**Contracting Activity:** Not Reported

CACI received “approximately \$60 million in new contracts with national security clients within the federal government. The awards call for CACI to provide technical support in the areas of systems integration, information assurance, and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).” These contracts were “previously unannounced.”  
[Information obtained from press release.]

**Date Announced:** 10/14/03  
**Contract Number:** Not Reported  
**Company:** CACI International, Inc.  
**Type:** Not Reported  
**Branch:** Not Reported  
**Contracting Activity:** Not Reported

CACI received “approximately \$128 million in new contracts with national security clients in the federal government.” These contracts were “previously unannounced.” The contracts require “CACI to provide managed network services, information assurance, systems engineering, and financial management support, among other solutions.” [Information obtained from press release.]

**Date Announced:** 9/16/03  
**Contract Number:** Not Reported  
**Company:** CACI International, Inc.  
**Type:** Not Reported  
**Branch:** Army  
**Contracting Activity:** Not Reported

The contract was awarded by the “Headquarters, United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) to provide mission support services at INSCOM sites, other national intelligence agency sites, and for other army tactical units worldwide. This contract, known as GENESIS II, is awarded for one base year and four option years. CACI’s role is to provide information technology solutions to help combat commanders collect intelligence and deploy countermeasures against enemy communications and intelligence systems.” The value of this contract is \$154.7 million. [Information obtained from press release.]

**Date Awarded:** 8/29/03  
**Contract Number:**  
DASC01-03-C-0003  
**Company:** CACI, Inc.  
**Type:** cost-plus-award-fee  
**Branch:** Army  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The U.S. Army Intelligence  
and Security Command  
Fort Belvoir, Virginia

This contract is “for maintenance, engineering and facility support services.” Services will be conducted “worldwide.” Completion is expected by September 20, 2008.

**Date Announced:** 2/26/03  
**Contract Number:** Not Reported  
**Company:** CACI International, Inc.  
**Type:** BPA  
**Branch:** Not Reported  
**Contracting Activity:** Not Reported

This contract is a “five-year blanket purchase agreement to provide information technology (IT) support for Department of Defense (DoD) national security network and computer infrastructures. The multiple award contract, which CACI won through its General Service Administration Federal Supply Service schedule, is valued at \$450 million. Under the terms of the agreement, CACI will compete with three other companies for tasks in a wide range of life-cycle IT services. The contract positions CACI to continue expanding its support for DoD security and intelligence capabilities with solutions for communications, systems engineering, and technical and program management services.” [Information obtained from press release.]

**Date Awarded:** 9/11/01  
**Contract Number:** N00600-01-D-7113  
**Company:** CACI Field Services, Inc.  
**Type:** ID/IQ, cost-plus-fixed-fee  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Fleet and Industrial  
Supply Center Norfolk  
Detachment Washington  
Washington, D.C.

CACI received this contract along with two other contractors. The purpose of this contract is to “provide technical support services for the Naval Supply Systems Command (NACSUP), Mechanicsburg, Pa., and its associated field activities. Services include independent analysis and technical studies as well as project management and trouble shooting in response to tasks involving the development and initiatives assigned to NACSUP.” The contract has options, which could bring the total value to \$53,000,000.

**Date Announced:** 3/16/01  
**Contract Number:** F33615-01-D-1833  
**Company:** CACI Technologies, Inc.  
**Type:** ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Air Force  
**Contracting Activity:**  
Air Force Research Laboratory  
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

The Air Force awarded this contract to CACI and another contractor. The purpose of this contract is “to participate in the Integrated Electronic Warfare Systems Effectiveness Evaluation (IEWSEE) program.” The total value of this contract is \$18,500,000.

**Date Announced:** 11/30/00  
**Contract Number:**  
DAAB07-01-D-G002  
**Company:** CACI Technologies, Inc.  
**Type:** time and materials, ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Army  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The U.S. Army Communications-  
Electronics Command  
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey

CACI and one other contractor received this contract. The purpose of this contract is to “provide support services to the U.S. Army Communications Electronics Command, Research, Development and Engineering Center, Intelligence and Information Warfare Directorate (I2WD), and includes operational, program management, technical, engineering, integration, prototype development, and fabrication support services and products necessary for I2WD to meet its mission and customer needs. This may encompass all elements of the acquisition cycle, subsequent support of systems in the field, and quick reaction requirements.” The two contracts are valued at \$100,000,000 with a potential worth of \$500,000,000.

**Date Announced:** 10/26/00  
**Contract Number:**  
N00140-01-C-E403  
**Company:** CACI Field Services, Inc.  
**Type:** cost-plus-fixed-fee  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Fleet and Industrial  
Supply Center Norfolk  
Detachment Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

This contract is for “logistics and training support in automated supply management to Navy and Marine Corps activities . . . . Services also will be provided to Navy and Marine Corps units worldwide, both deployed and non deployed.” The potential value of the contract is \$34,421,693. Completion is expected by November 2001.

**Date Awarded:** 9/18/98  
**Contract Number:** Not Reported  
CACI Contracts under  
GSA Schedule Group 70:  
GS-35F-5872H, GS-35F-0342N,  
GS-35F-0362K, GS-35F-4476G,  
GS-35F-4483G, GS-35F-5403H,  
GS-35F-5163H, GS-35F-5454H,  
GS-35F-5922H  
**Company:** Premier Technology Group  
**Type:** BPA  
**Branch:** Not Reported  
**Contracting Activity:** Not Reported

The “Directorate of Contracting, Fort Hauchuca, Arizona, awarded a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) to Premier Technology Group against the GSA Schedule Group 70 (Information Technology) in September, 1998. The BPA was transferred to the National Business Center (NBC), Department of Interior on January 14, 2001 and was extended for an additional five years by the NBC. The BPA was modified on July 31, 2003 to reflect the acquisition by CACI.” CACI notes that “GSA defines the Information Technology Services available under this schedule very broadly.” In addition, “[a]ll federal agencies, other specified activities and agencies are eligible buyers under this contract.” [Information obtained from press release and company website.]

## NO BID CONTRACTS

**Date Reported:** 12/18/03  
**Contract Number:** N00421-04-D-0008  
**Company:** CACI AB, Inc.  
**Type:** ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Air Systems Command  
Aircraft Division  
Patuxent River, Maryland

The purpose of this contract is “to provide technical support services to the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Aviation Training Program. The procured services include technical support for the review, analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluation of process, policy and structure improvement initiatives for aviation training pipeline management.” The estimated worth of the contract is \$15,077,923. “This contract was not competitively procured.”

**Date Announced:** 5/25/00  
**Contract Number:** N66001-00-D-5014  
**Company:** CACI Technologies, Inc.  
**Type:** ID/IQ, cost-plus-fixed-fee  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Space and  
Naval Warfare Systems Center  
San Diego, California

The purpose of this contract is “for engineering support services for the Command and Control Processor (C2p)/Common Data Link Management System (CDLMS) and Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V).” The contract is valued at \$8,082,323. “This contract was not competitively procured.”

**Date Announced:** 3/28/03  
**Contract Number:** N00421-01-D-0065  
**Company:** Acton Burnell, Inc.  
**Type:** modification to ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Air Systems Command  
Patuxent River, Maryland

The modification is to “provide technical support services to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Naval Air Systems Command Aviation Training Systems Program Office.” This modification increases the value of the contract by \$9,900,000.

**Date Announced:** 11/26/01  
**Contract Number:** N00421-01-D-0065  
**Company:** Acton Burnell, Inc.  
**Type:** modification to ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Air Systems Command,  
Naval Air Warfare Center  
Aircraft Division  
Patuxent River, Maryland

The purpose of the modification is “to exercise an option to provide technical support services to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations and the Naval Air Systems Command Aviation Training Systems Program Office.” The modification increases the value of the contract by \$9,005,545.

**Date Announced:** 11/21/00  
**Contract Number:** N00421-01-D-0065  
**Company:** Acton Burnell, Inc.  
**Type:** ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Air Systems Command,  
Naval Air Warfare Center  
Aircraft Division  
Patuxent River, Maryland

The purpose of this contract is to “provide technical support services to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Naval Air Systems Command Aviation Training Systems Program Office.” The value of this contract is \$7,482,474. “This contract was not competitively procured.”

**Date Announced:** 8/29/2003  
**Contract Number:** N00421-01-D-0147  
**Company:** Titan Systems Corp.,  
SEMCOR Aviation Engineering Group  
**Type:** modification to ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Air Systems Command,  
Naval Air Warfare Center  
Aircraft Division  
Patuxent River, Maryland

The purpose of this modification is to “exercise an option for engineering and technical services in support of the VH Executive Helicopter Transport Program and the Satellite Navigation Program.” Work should be completed by August 2004. This modification increases the value of the contract by \$7,872,376.

**Date Awarded:** 10/3/02  
**Date Announced:** 2/27/03  
**Contract Number:** N00014-03-C-0150  
**Company:** Titan Corporation  
**Type:** modification  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Office of Naval Research  
Washington, D.C.

This modification is “for the construction, integration and certification and delivery of the X-Craft and data. This effort will involve the planning, shipyard selection, detail design, construction, certification and delivery of an approximately 1000 ton high-speed aluminum catamaran, meeting the requirements of the X-Craft performance specification.” The value of this modification is \$32,638,715. The contract should be completed by October 2004.

**Date Announced:** 8/29/02  
**Contract Number:**  
N00421-01-D-0147  
**Company:** Titan Systems Corp.  
**Type:** modification to ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Air Systems Command,  
Naval Air Warfare Center  
Aircraft Division,  
Patuxent River, Maryland

The purpose of the modification is “to exercise an option for engineering and technical services in support of the VH Executive Helicopter Transport Program and the Satellite Navigation Program. Work will be performed in Patuxent River, Md., and is expected to be completed by 2003.” The modification increased the value of the contract by \$7,621,653.

**Date Announced:** 8/12/02  
**Contract Number:** N00383-99-G-023G  
**Company:** Titan Linkabit Wireless  
**Type:** ceiling-price-order under a basic ordering agreement  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Inventory Control Point  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

This contract is for the “purchase of 19 An/USC-42A(v)3 Mini-DAMA (Demand Assigned Multiple Access) Systems used on P-3 and E2C aircraft. These items are communications related. Work will be performed in San Diego and is to be completed by October 2003.” The value of this contract is \$5,250,916. “This contract was not competitively procured.”

**Date Announced:** 2/14/02  
**Contract Number:**  
DTRA01-02-D-0005  
**Company:**  
Titan Pulse Sciences Division  
**Type:** cost-plus-award-fee  
**Branch:** Army  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency  
Alexandria, Virginia

The purpose of this contract is “for maintenance of laboratory radiation simulator development testbeds.” The contract is valued at \$2,157,660 and should be completed by December 31, 2006. “One bid was solicited on Sep. 4, 2001, and one bid received.”

**Date Announced:** 2/26/01  
**Contract Number:** N00383-99-G-023G  
**Company:** Titan Linkabit Wireless  
**Type:** ceiling-price-order under a basic ordering agreement  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Inventory Control Point  
Philadelphia, PA

This contract is for the “purchase of 15 AN/USC-42A(v)2 Dual Channel Mini-DAMA (demand assigned multiple access) Communication Sets used on various aircraft and shipboard platforms. This contract is for the Government of the Republic of Korea (100%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program.” The value of this contract is \$5,159,430 and completion is expected by January 2002. “This contract was not competitively procured.”

**Date Announced:** 8/8/00  
**Contract Number:** N00039-00-C-3204  
**Company:** Titan Systems Corp.,  
Linkabit Division  
**Type:** firm-fixed-price  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Space and  
Naval Warfare System Command  
San Diego, California

Titan was awarded this contract to “develop, produce and test Miniaturized Demand Assigned Multiple Access (Mini-DAMA) Advanced Digital Waveform (ADW) upgrade circuit cards.” This contract is valued at \$6,685,548 with a possible maximum value of \$10,000,000. “This contract was not competitively procured.”

**Date Announced:** 4/26/00  
**Contract Number:** N00383-99-G-023G  
**Company:** Titan Linkabit Wireless  
**Type:** ceiling-price-order under a basic ordering agreement  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Inventory Control Point  
Philadelphia, PA

Titan was awarded this contract to “purchase 35 (V)3 modems, 29 (V)3 power amps and 10 display entry panels used on various aircraft.” The value of this contract is \$8,189,646 and completion is expected by April 2001. “This contract was not competitively procured.”

**Date Announced:** 2/9/00  
**Contract Number:**  
N00383-99-G-023G  
**Company:** Titan Linkabit Wireless  
**Type:** firm-fixed-price order  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Inventory Control Point  
Philadelphia, PA

This contract is “for the purchase of 16 single-channel communications sets and seven dual-channel communications sets used on various aircraft for the country of Germany (100%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program.” The value of this contract is \$5,970,608 and completion is expected by February 2001. “This contract was not competitively procured.”

**Date Announced:** 8/29/03  
**Contract Number:** N00421-01-D-0147  
**Company:** Titan Systems Corp.,  
SEMCOR Aviation Engineering Group  
**Type:** modification to ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Air Systems Command,  
Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft  
Division  
Patuxent River, Maryland

This modification is “to exercise an option for engineering and technical services in support of the VH Executive helicopter Transport Program and the Satellite Navigation Program.” This modification increases the value of the original contract by \$7,872,376. Completion is set at August 2004.

**Date Announced:** 6/16/03  
**Contract Number:**  
19628-01-C-0033, P00022  
**Company:** BTG, Inc.  
**Type:** modification  
**Branch:** Air Force  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Electronic Systems Center  
Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts

The purpose of this modification is “to provide for integrated broadcast service (IBS).” This modification increases the value of the original contract by \$32,890,308. The date of completion is June 2009.

**Date Announced:** 9/24/03  
**Contract Number:** N00421-99-D-1698  
**Company:** AverStar, Inc.  
**Type:** not-to-exceed modification to an  
existing ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Air Systems Command  
Aircraft Division  
Patuxent River, Maryland

The modification was awarded “to exercise an option for engineering services for acoustic and non-acoustic sensor system research and development, test and evaluation to support both fleet aircraft and special projects. Work will be performed in Lexington Park, Md., and is expected to be completed in September 2004.” This modification increases the value of the original contract by \$13,632,247.

**Date Announced:** 9/25/02  
**Contract Number:** N00421-99-D-1698  
**Company:** AverStar, Inc.  
**Type:** not-to-exceed modification to ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Air Systems Command  
Naval Air Warfare Center  
Aircraft Division  
Patuxent River, Maryland

The Navy awarded AverStar this modification to “exercise an option for engineering services for acoustic and non-acoustic sensor system research, development, test and evaluation to support both fleet aircraft and special projects. Work will be performed in Lexington Park, Md., and is to be completed by September 2003.” This modification increases the value of the original contract by \$28,826,413.

**Date Announced:** 9/27/01  
**Contract Number:** N00421-99-D-1698  
**Company:** AverStar, Inc.  
**Type:** modification to ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Air Systems Command  
Naval Air Warfare Center  
Aircraft Division  
Patuxent River, Maryland

The Navy awarded AverStar this modification to “exercise an option for engineering services for acoustic and non-acoustic sensor system research, development, test and evaluation to support both fleet issue aircraft and special projects. The estimated level of effort for this option is 158,669 man-hours. Work will be performed in Lexington Park, Md., and is expected to be completed in September 2002.” This modification increases the value of the original contract by \$16,797,090.

**Date Announced:** 12/20/00  
**Contract Number:**  
N00421-99-D-1698  
**Company:** AverStar, Inc.  
**Type:** time and materials task order to fixed-rate time and material ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Naval Air Systems Command  
Naval Air Warfare Center  
Aircraft Division  
Patuxent River, Maryland

This materials task order is “for engineering and technical support services to support the development of the advanced sensor capabilities for special purpose and fleet-issued aircraft, and land and sea-based sensor applications. Work will be performed in Lexington Park, Md., and is expected to be completed by December 2001.” This task order increases the value of the original contract by \$10,169,410.

**Date Announced:** 12/10/97

**Contract Number:**

N00019-95-C-5013

**Company:** SEMCOR, Inc.

**Type:** modification

**Branch:** Navy

**Contracting Activity:**

The Naval Air Systems Command

Naval Air Warfare Center

Aircraft Division

Patuxent River, Maryland

The modification is “for systems engineering, integration, and design analysis for the f-14B upgrade, the EA-6B and the V-22 programs in support of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Md. Work will be performed in Lexington Park, Md. (85%), and Patuxent River, Md. (15%), and is expected to be completed in June 1998. This modification increases the value of the original contract by \$7,667,777.

**Date Announced:** 9/26/96

**Contract Number:** N66001-96-D-5077

**Company:** SEMCOR, Inc.

**Type:** cost-plus-fixed-fee, ID/IQ,  
sole source

**Branch:** Navy

**Contracting Activity:**

The Naval Command

Control and Ocean Surveillance Center

RDT&E Division

San Diego, California

This contract is “for program/project technical system support, configuration system support and systems engineering support services for transitioning the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command from Arlington, Virginia, to San Diego, California.” The 9/26/96 announcement originally reported that the “contract was competitively procured with 26 proposals solicited and one offer received.” However, this statement was corrected on 10/4/96. This contract “was not competitively procured.”

**Date Announced:** 9/15/03

**Contract Number:** N65236-99-D-3812

**Company:** Unidyne Corp.

**Type:** modification to ID/IQ

**Branch:** Navy

**Contracting Activity:**

The Space and Naval Warfare

Systems Center

Charleston, South Carolina

This modification is “for an increase in the number of man-hours in the level of effort for engineering, technical, and logistics services for the installation, removal, and testing of navigation and other systems in ships and shore facilities supporting Naval Sea Systems Command.” The value of this modification is \$8,415,530 bringing the “cumulative value of the contract to \$52,301,688.”

**Date Announced:** 8/16/01  
**Contract Number:** N65236-99-D-3812  
**Company:** Unidyne Corp.  
**Type:** modification to ID/IQ  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Space and Naval Warfare  
Systems Center  
Charleston, South Carolina

This modification is “for engineering, technical, installation, manufacturing and logistics of navigation systems and equipment for all Navy ships.” The value of this modification is \$9,982,110 with “options, which if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to \$43,279,298.” Completion is expected by December 2003.

**Date Announced:** 3/28/01  
**Contract Number:**  
F19628-99-F-8059-P00028  
**Company:** SenCom Corp.  
**Type:** modification  
**Branch:** Air Force  
**Contracting Activity:**  
Electronic Systems Center  
Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts

This modification is “to provide for information technology support from April 2001 through March 2002 for system acquisition and development planning in support of the Strategic and Nuclear Defense Directorate, headquarters, Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.” This modification increases the value of the original contract by \$17,051,810.

**Date Announced:** 4/17/03  
**Contract Number:** N66001-00-D-5045  
**Company:**  
Advanced Communication Systems  
(ACS)  
**Type:** modification to ID/IQ, cost-plus-fixed-fee multiple-award  
**Branch:** Navy  
**Contracting Activity:**  
The Space and Naval Warfare  
Systems Center

This modification awards \$16,000,000 to ACS and four other contractors. The purpose of the modification is to “exercise options to increase the estimated level of effort of each existing contract by an overall total of 215,520 man-hours for support of the mission-critical Tactical Data Information Exchange System B broadcast family of systems.” Tasks will “be performed at the contractor facilities in San Diego, Calif., at various other sites, and military facilities worldwide as specified in task orders.” Completion is expected by February 2005.

**Date Announced:** 6/02/95  
**Contract Number:**  
F04735-95/C-0036  
**Company:** JAYCOR  
**Type:** cost-plus-award-fee  
**Branch:** Air Force  
**Contracting Activity:**  
Sacramento Air Logistics Center  
McClellan Air Force Base, California

The contract is “for operation and maintenance of the logistics support facility for the Commander-in-Chief Mobile Alternate Headquarters Program. The work will be performed at JACOR’s facility in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Contract is expected to be completed September 1998.” The value of this contract is \$23,596,928. “One firm was solicited and 1 firms submitted a proposal.”

# **Exhibit G**



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**Year 2002 Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Standards**

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**CACI Operational Philosophy**

**1. Our Clients... Number One**

At CACI the client is... Number One! We are a client-service-oriented company. We are in business to provide quality services and products to our clients. Their needs are our opportunities. Our goal is complete client satisfaction. Once we have a client, our goal is to keep that client forever. Our Ten Commandments of Consulting are our continuing road map for service.

**2. Our Quality... Top-Notch**

At CACI our motto is "Quality Client Service and Best Value" (QCS/BV). Our "good name," our reputation, is paramount. We strive always to be "top-notch"... quality is everything. We are the "best value" company. We perform valuable project services and provide quality products. In everything we do our goal is quality, distinction, and excellence.

**3. Our People... The Best**

At CACI people are the most important asset. Our people bring distinction to all we do; they are the best. Our people are "team players." They are flexible and can adapt quickly as business conditions and technology changes occur. At CACI we offer virtually unlimited equal opportunity for growth, recognition, and reward for all capable people. Our people are fiercely proud of their legacy of the "CACI entrepreneurial spirit," they are determined to succeed and refuse to fail.

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At CACI we insist on taking full responsibility for ourselves as individuals. We are fully accountable for what we do. Our published Code of Ethics delineates our uncompromising policies on compliance with the laws and regulations of the jurisdictions where we conduct business. We reward legitimate success and forgive understandable failure (no one is perfect!), but we always learn from our mistakes.

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Our business purpose is to increase the net worth of our stockholders. On behalf of our stock-holders, we constantly seek opportunities to develop our lines of business and sustain high value for our stockholders and our people. We continue to focus on enhancing the value of CACI in everything we do.

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- **Distinction** and the **competitive edge** in our markets.

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10. Maintaining a high-quality reputation for CACI and its people.

U.S. government regulations place an emphasis on a contractor's demonstration of a satisfactory record of business ethics, integrity and self-governance. At CACI this is nothing new. Our long-standing philosophy has been, and always will be, to sustain the highest possible business ethics in the pursuit and performance of public, private and government contracts.

Fundamental to CACI's commitment to high ethical standards is a corporate policy statement, issued and administered at the executive level, clearly delineating the company's philosophy, responsibilities and authorities for assuring compliance with the policy. Our goal and policy remains one of high ethics, top-notch work, responsiveness to clients and "QCS, BV"... quality client service, best value.

This document contains CACI's **Business Standards** and the basis of our business ethics for all of our business - government and commercial. It follows all we have said and done in the past in terms of high standards, and it applies to every CACI employee and consultant.

Division Managers are accountable and responsible for ensuring

- that each current employee (full-time and part-time) and consultant in their organization receives a copy of this policy;
- that employees and consultants read and understand our Code of Ethics;
- that each employee and consultant completes the certification attached to the last page
- that signed certificates are promptly sent to CACI's Corporate Human Resource Office; and
- that all new employees and consultants are informed they are required to read and certify their understanding of the Code upon their execution of CACI's offer letter (or Consulting Agreement).

As part of the new-hire package, Hiring Managers are responsible for ensuring that the Code of Ethics certification is provided to the Human Resource Office with the employee's offer letter, resume, Application Form, Employment Agreement and other new-hire documents.

New employees will be entered into the payroll system only when all hiring documents are provided.

CACI is a quality-oriented company, with high standards and a Code of Ethics we can all be proud of. Let's keep it this way through continued vigilance and pride in our reputation.

J. P. London

Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer

December 7, 2001

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- **Scope**

This Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Standards (the "Code") applies to North American subsidiaries of CACI International Inc. It applies equally to direct contracts with the U.S. government, state or local government agencies, foreign governments, to sub-contracts in which our products and services are being directly or indirectly procured by others and to our commercial business dealings. **It applies to all employees and consultants.**

- **Compliance/Penalties**

CACI people are fiercely proud of their work and reputation. As such, we are all responsible for upholding our own reputation and that of CACI. CACI people are responsible for ensuring that their own conduct, as well as the conduct of those who report to them, fully complies with our policies and this Code. Because our reputation for high ethical standards and quality work is so important, violations of policy or the Code will be the basis for disciplinary action, including reprimand, loss of compensation or promotional opportunities, demotions or discharge with cause.

It is the personal responsibility of each employee and consultant to read and understand the Code and to diligently comply with our policies and procedures. If you have any questions regarding specific policies discuss them promptly with your immediate manager or higher level manager. You will be required to certify to your understanding of this Code on an annual basis.

All employees should be aware that if they are a party to violations that affect or involve transactions with the U.S. Department of Defense or other U.S. government agencies, a record of any involvement and disciplinary action taken will be made available to the U.S. government. This could lead to individual criminal prosecution.

- **CACI General Policy Statement**

Our policy is to deliver quality products and services to all our clients, government and commercial, at fair and reasonable prices. This philosophy is embodied in "*Quality Customer Service, Best Value*" or "*QCS, BV.*" This has always been, and will continue to be, the hallmark of our Company.

CACI is also committed to identifying the most capable people we can find and providing them with virtually unlimited opportunities to prosper without regard to their race, color, religion, gender, age, national origin, citizenship status, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, marital or veteran status or any other protected status.

Our policy is to provide a work environment free from all forms of discrimination and harassment, including sexual harassment. It is illegal and against CACI policy for any employee or consultant, male or female, to sexually harass another employee by

- a. making unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature a condition of employment, or
- b. making submission to or rejection of such conduct the basis for employment decisions, or
- c. creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment by such conduct.

While a number of jurisdictions where CACI conducts business have passed legislation to allow individuals to bear arms or to carry concealed weapons, CACI's policy is that weapons are not allowed in our workplace. Thus, employees, consultants and visitors are forbidden from bringing a weapon, concealed or otherwise, to the CACI workplace. Workplace includes a CACI office, client office or site or any other office or site where CACI employees and/or consultants are assigned to work.

- **Management Rights Policy**

CACI management retains all rights to operate the business according to its judgment, including but not limited to the right to

- determine the size and nature of the work force
- determine qualifications and classifications of employees
- be the sole judge of the competency and performance of employees
- determine the means and manner in which the business is to be conducted, including assignment of employees, location of facilities, equipment to be used, products to be produced and services to be provided
- set, interpret and from time to time change employment policies, including wages and salaries paid, benefits provided and holidays recognized
- establish, interpret and from time to time change policies and procedures for the company, its business and employees and to direct, supervise, control and, when it deems appropriate, discipline the work force.

This statement is intended to reserve to company management generally the right to run the business in management's discretion, not to convey to any manager or officer authority that is not otherwise specifically conveyed to such manager or officer.

- **Timekeeping Policy**

High ethical standards are demanded of every employee to ensure that CACI's timekeeping procedures are followed to the letter. Each employee has responsibility to accurately record his or her time on a daily basis, within the policy guidelines. Upon being hired employees are provided with a copy of the procedures. Revisions and updates are provided when determined necessary. Employees must retain a copy of the procedures at their workstation or place of employment. Each employee is expected to read, fully understand and precisely follow the procedures. Any question or doubt should be discussed with your supervisor or manager, Internal Audit staff or

Corporate Human Resources Office.

- **Electronic Communications Policy**

Electronic communications, including electronic mail, Lotus Notes and electronic commerce, are an integral component of our work place. Each employee must realize that electronic communications may be saved, redistributed or reviewed by others, both inside and outside CACI. As a result, you should not have any expectation of privacy for the data, emails and other material stored in your company computer system. The hardware and software on which our company electronic communications take place are assets of the company provided for business use only. Accordingly, CACI reserves the right to access, review, delete, disclose or use employee's electronic communications for any business purpose. Upon being hired employees are provided with a copy of the CACI Employee Handbook which includes the Electronic Communications Policy. Each employee is expected to read, fully understand and precisely follow the Policy, including the rules on content, distribution, receipt and retention of electronic communications. Any question or doubt should be discussed with your supervisor or manager.

- **Trade Secrets, Confidential Information**

It is essential for all employees and consultants to safe-guard the Company's trade secrets and confidential information and to refuse any improper access to trade secrets and confidential information of any other company, including our competitors. Our basic guidelines are

- Company proprietary information must not be discussed with others within CACI, except on a strict need-to-know basis
- if we wish to disclose CACI trade secrets or confidential information to any people outside CACI, it must be done only in conjunction with disclosure agreements provided by the Legal Division
- always be alert to avoid inadvertent disclosures which may arise in social conversations or in normal business relations
- and do not receive any such information from other companies or people except pursuant to written confidentiality agreements.

- **Insider Trading**

As employees of a publicly held company we must be vigilant in safeguarding material, non-public Company information from disclosure both inside and outside the Company. It is a violation of Federal law for anyone with knowledge of such information to make trades in CACI stock. Our policy is that CACI employees with knowledge of material information about the company which has not been disclosed to the general public refrain from engaging in any transaction in CACI stock until the third business day following public disclosure of such information. Always contact the Office of the Corporate General Counsel when in doubt before conducting a transaction in CACI stock.

- **Policy Statement on U.S. Government Contracting**

1. As a government contractor we have a special obligation to the U.S. government, and to the public at large, to ensure that we administer our contracts and deliver our products and services in a manner that fully satisfies both our legal obligations and our own high standards of integrity and quality.

2. We are committed to compliance with the letter and spirit of the laws and regulations governing contracting with the U.S. government. These impose requirements not traditionally associated with purely commercial business transactions.

a. For example, it is a felony to knowingly make a false claim or false statement to the government. Violations of these and other statutes can subject us to damaging publicity, expensive and time-consuming investigations and litigation, reduction of negotiated contract rates and the revocation of contracts. Both CACI and individual employees may also be subject to civil and criminal sanctions including fines, debarment or suspension and prison sentences.

3. Although it is not possible to specify here all contract-related dealings with the government that present the risk of false statements, false claims or other violations, particular attention is called to the following

a. CACI is frequently required to submit accounting and other records to the government as a basis for payment on existing contracts and estimates on future contracts. It is our policy to charge all labor and material cost accurately, to the appropriate account, regardless of the status of the budget for that account. Improprieties, such as charging labor or material costs improperly or to the wrong account, charging direct contract effort to an overhead or indirect account, and falsification of time cards or other records will not be tolerated.

b. CACI is frequently required to submit cost or pricing data to the government, and to certify that it is current, accurate, and complete. The definition of data that must be disclosed is very broad and includes facts as well as management decisions, estimates (based on verifiable data) and other information which a reasonable person would expect to affect the negotiations. Our policy is full disclosure of complete and accurate cost and pricing data that is current up to the date of agreement on price.

c. CACI submits proposals for reimbursement of indirect costs to the government. A company official may be required to certify his belief that the proposal does not contain expressly unallowable costs such as for advertising, donations, entertainment, fines and penalties, lobbying, defense of fraud proceedings and

goodwill. It is our policy to request reimbursement only for those indirect costs that are reasonable in amount and clearly allowable or to which we have a good faith belief that the costs are allowable.

d. We are often required to certify compliance with quality control specifications and testing requirements for our products. Our policy is to deliver goods that meet all contract requirements and give the customer the highest degree of confidence in our products. Improprieties, such as the failure to conduct required testing or manipulation of test procedures or data, will not be tolerated.

4. CACI observes the following special standards of conduct in contracting, directly or indirectly, with the government

a. CACI will not offer, give or promise to offer or give any money, gratuity or other thing of value to any government official or employee that such official or employee is prohibited from receiving by applicable law, including transportation, meals at business meetings, tickets to sporting or other events or the like.

b. Even if applicable government regulations permit their acceptance, CACI will not offer or give or reimburse expenses for any entertainment or offer any gratuity to any government official or employee who is personally and substantially involved in a procurement or administrative function relating to any contract for the direct or indirect purchase of products or services from the Corporation.

c. CACI is prohibited from using federal funds to pay persons such as lobbyists or consultants to influence or to attempt to influence executive or legislative decision-making in connection with the award of any contract. We are also required to furnish a certification that no federal funds have been paid or will be paid in violation of this prohibition. In addition, CACI is required to report to the government any payments to any lobbyist or consultant paid with non-federal funds for such purposes. CACI Policy and Guidelines, Chapter 6, sets forth the Company's policies and procedures on the use of outside professional consultants.

d. Government information that is national security classified, procurement sensitive or proprietary, shall not be solicited or accepted from (or provided to) any source either directly or indirectly, in circumstances where there is reason to believe that the release is not authorized. Nor shall CACI proprietary or "private data" be provided to anyone outside CACI, unless the release of such data has been specifically authorized.

e. CACI must be particularly concerned with obtaining sensitive procurement information from federal agencies.

During the conduct of any procurement action, CACI will not solicit nor obtain from any officer or employee of the agency or any other source, any proprietary or source selection information regarding that procurement. This prohibition begins with the development, preparation and issuance of a solicitation and concludes with award of a contract, a contract modification or extension. The restriction on proprietary data includes information contained in a bid or proposal, cost or pricing data and any information submitted to the government by a contractor and properly designated as proprietary. Source selection information includes such information as listings of offerors and prices, listings of bidders prior to bid opening, source selection plans, technical evaluations of competing proposals, competitive range determinations, rankings (except for sealed bidding), source selection board reports and evaluations, source selection advisory board recommendations and other information determined by the head of the agency or contracting officer to be information which would jeopardize the integrity or successful completion of the procurement if disclosed.

f. Special restrictions apply to hiring or retaining as an employee or consultant of CACI, any government employee. In addition, there are special constraints regarding any communication concerning possible employment during the conduct of any procurement action and otherwise. CACI will not conduct any discussions regarding, or make any offer or promise of future employment or business opportunity to any procurement official during the conduct of any procurement. CACI's specific hiring policy affecting clients and government employees is contained in the CACI Policy and Guidelines, Chapter 3. There are no exceptions to this policy. Clearance must be obtained before even mentioning proposed employment to current government employees, and then only after they have publicly announced that they are leaving government service. In addition, any plans to employ retired military officers of general or flag rank, or civilian officials having the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary or above, must be approved by the Chairman of the Board and CEO of CACI International Inc in writing, prior to an offer of CACI employment.

g. CACI shall not knowingly employ an individual nor contract with a company, by any means, if the individual or company is listed on the General Services Administration's (GSA) Consolidated List of Debarred, Suspended and Ineligible Contractors, nor knowingly employ an individual who has been convicted of an offense related to government contracting.

h. CACI employees will immediately sever all connection with any former employee or consultant of CACI whose

conduct violates applicable laws, regulations or basic tenets of business integrity and honesty and such other individuals which are specifically identified by the Company.

(1) Appropriate notices specifically naming such individuals will be provided to employees or posted on Company bulletin boards.

i. CACI will not enter into a subcontract or teaming agreement that unreasonably restricts sales by the other company directly to the U.S. government of items made or supplied by the other company and will not otherwise act to restrict unreasonably the ability of any other company to sell directly to the U.S. government. Conversely, CACI will not enter into agreements where as a subcontractor or teaming partner, we are subject to any unreasonable restriction to sell our products or services directly to the U.S. government.

j. Consultants shall be required by contract to comply with the laws and regulations relating to government contracting and the government contracting standards of conduct applicable to employees of the corporation. This Policy Statement shall be incorporated in the Policy and Guidelines and the Terms and Conditions for all consultant contracts, and each such contract shall expressly provide for termination in the event the consultant violates either the laws or regulations relating to government contracting or the standards and policies set forth in this Code of Ethics.

- **Implementation**

CACI organizations involved directly or indirectly with contracting with the U.S. government are required to implement procedures and policies to ensure compliance with this Code and with the laws and regulations governing contracting with the government. Such procedures and policies should expressly designate the activities, group or individual responsible for implementing each element of the detailed procedures.

- **Obligation of Employees to Report Violations and Assist in Investigations**

1. It is the responsibility of an employee or consultant having knowledge of any activity that is or may be in violation of the Code or Affirmative Action Policy to promptly disclose such activity.

a. For this purpose CACI has established Bill Clancy, Executive Vice President, as the Company Ombudsman. Bill is the Director of Business Operations and can be reached at (703) 841-7811 or by email at [wclancy@caci.com](mailto:wclancy@caci.com). Employees and consultants may report directly to him in confidence any impropriety of

which they have knowledge whether committed by an employee of CACI, the government or a CACI client.

b. CACI also has available a "hotline" at (800) 928-3505, or email [gmadison@caci.com](mailto:gmadison@caci.com), where reports of potentially illegal, unauthorized or inappropriate conduct can be made confidentially at any time.

c. CACI's Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Jeff Elefante, is available for consultation on any question employees may have concerning their responsibilities within the Code. Jeff may be reached through (703) 841-7800.

d. Any supervisor or manager receiving a report of any impropriety will promptly report the matter to higher management, the Ombudsman, General Counsel or Corporate Internal Audit.

e. Every employee and consultant is expected to cooperate fully with any investigation of any alleged violation of this Code of Ethics.

2. It is the responsibility of an employee or consultant to have a reasonable basis on which to conclude that inappropriate activity may be occurring. This requires that a disclosing employee or consultant have some evidence that has led to a good-faith conclusion that conduct may be inappropriate. If, after investigation, it appears that an employee or consultant made a frivolous or bad faith allegation of improper conduct, such employee or consultant may be subject to discipline up to and including termination of employment.

- **Employee Dispute Resolution**

The enactment of employment laws in increasing numbers and complexity has increased the occurrence of workplace disputes between employers and employees involving a wide range of legal matters. Our policy is to resolve all employment-related disputes in accordance with a private, two-step dispute resolution process designed to be less costly and more efficient than litigation. All employees are required to submit their employment-related disputes first to the Company Ombudsman, and then, if still not satisfied, to arbitration in accordance with the Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The arbitrator's decision will be final and binding upon both the employee and CACI. Employees may obtain a copy of the AAA's rules from the Company Ombudsman or the Director of Human Resources.

- **Administration and Interpretation**

1. The Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Standards will be administered by CACI's Director of Administrative Services.

2. Given the complexities of government contracting laws and

regulations, and the determination of CACI's Executive Officers and Board of Directors to comply with both the letter and spirit of all such laws and regulations, it is recognized that questions of interpretation will arise.

a. All questions relating the charging of material and labor and to the allowability and reasonableness of overhead expenses are to be directed to the CACI Chief Financial Officer, (703) 841-7800, for overall policy guidance.

b. All other questions relating to CACI's policies are to be directed to Bill Clancy, (703) 841-7811, for overall policy guidance.

c. CACI reserves the right to use any lawful method of investigation which it deems necessary to determine whether any person has engaged in conduct which in its view interferes with or adversely affects its business.

3. The Internal Audit department will include in its audit schedule appropriate testing for compliance with CACI's policies on the charging of costs and labor, on the allowability of overhead expenses, on the reimbursement of expenses for entertainment and gratuities and on such other areas as may from time to time be recommended by CACI's line and staff managers.

4. Internal audit staff may request Legal Division investigative assistance concerning suspected or alleged violations of these policies and may periodically review the practices of the operating units for compliance with the defective pricing laws and regulations and the standards of conduct to be followed by CACI when contracting with the U.S. government.

5. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

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## CACI's Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Standards

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- that each current employee (full-time and part-time) and consultant in their organization receives a copy of this policy;
- that employees and consultants read, understand, and comply with our Code of Ethics;
- that each employee and consultant completes the certification attached to the last page; and
- that signed certificates are promptly sent to CACI's Corporate Human Resource Office.
- that all new employees and consultants are informed they are required to read, certify their understanding of and agree to comply with the Code upon their execution of CACI's offer letter (or Consulting Agreement).

As part of the new-hire package, Hiring Managers are responsible for ensuring that the Code of Ethics certification is provided to the Human Resource Office with the employee's offer letter, resume, Application Form, Employment Agreement, and other new-hire documents.

New employees will be entered into the payroll system only when all hiring documents are provided.

CACI is a quality-oriented company, with high standards and a Code of Ethics we can all be proud of. Let's keep it this way through continued vigilance and pride in our reputation.

J. P. London  
Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer

February 15, 2003

This Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Standards (the "Code") applies to all officers and employees world wide. It applies equally to direct contracts with the U.S. Government, state or local government agencies, foreign governments, to sub-contracts in which our products and services are being directly or indirectly procured by others, and to our commercial business dealings. **It thus applies to all officers, employees and consultants.**

Responsibility/Accountability

CACI people are fiercely proud of their work and reputation. As

such, we are all responsible for upholding our own reputation and that of CACI. CACI people are responsible for ensuring that their own conduct, as well as the conduct of those who report to them, is honest and ethical under all circumstances and fully complies with our policies and this Code. Because our reputation for high ethical standards and quality work is so important, violations of policy or the Code will be the basis for disciplinary action, including reprimand, loss of compensation or promotional opportunities, demotions or discharge with cause.

It is the personal responsibility of each employee and consultant to read, understand and comply with the Code, and to diligently comply with our other policies and procedures. If you have any questions regarding specific policies, discuss them promptly with your immediate manager or higher-level manager. You will be required to certify to your understanding of this Code on an annual basis.

All employees should be aware that if they are a party to any demonstrably illegal activity, the Company in its discretion may make a record of any involvement and disciplinary action taken available to the appropriate law enforcement officials. This could lead to individual criminal prosecution.

## CACI Workplace Environment

Our policy is to deliver quality products and services to all our clients, government and commercial, at fair and reasonable prices. This philosophy is embodied in "*Quality Customer Service, Best Value*" or "*QCS, BV.*"

This has always been, and will continue to be, the hallmark of our Company.

CACI is also committed to identifying the most capable people we can find and providing them with virtually

unlimited opportunities to prosper without regard to their race, color, religion, gender, age, national origin, citizenship status, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, marital, or veteran status, or any other protected status.

Our policy is to provide a work environment free from all forms of discrimination and harassment, including sexual harassment. It is against CACI policy for any employee or consultant, male or female, to sexually harass another employee by (a) making unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature a condition of employment, or (b) making submission to or rejection of such conduct the basis for employment decisions, or (c) creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment by such conduct. It is also against CACI policy to engage in behavior that constitutes harassment of any kind, whether such activity would be considered to be sexual harassment or otherwise.

While a number of jurisdictions where CACI conducts business have passed legislation to allow individuals to bear arms or to carry

concealed weapons, CACI's policy is that weapons are not allowed in our workplace. Thus, employees, consultants, and visitors are forbidden from bringing a weapon, concealed or otherwise, to the CACI workplace. Workplace includes a CACI office, client office or site, or any other office or site where CACI employees and/or consultants are assigned to work.

## Management Rights Policy

CACI management retains all rights to operate the business according to its judgment, including but not limited to the right to determine the size and nature of the work force; to determine qualifications and classifications of employees; to be the sole judge of the competency and performance of employees; to determine the means and manner in which the business is to be conducted, including assignment of employees, location of facilities, equipment to be used, products to be produced and services to be provided; to set, interpret and from time to time change employment policies, including wages and salaries paid, benefits provided, and Holidays recognized; to establish, interpret and from time to time change policies and procedures for the company, its business and employees and to direct, supervise, control, and when it deems appropriate, discipline the work force. This statement is intended to reserve to company management generally the right to run the business in management's discretion, not to convey to any manager or officer authority that is not otherwise specifically conveyed to such manager or officer.

## Timekeeping Policy

High ethical standards are demanded of every employee to ensure that CACI's timekeeping procedures are followed to the letter. Each employee has responsibility to accurately record his or her time on a daily basis, within the policy guidelines. Upon being hired, employees are provided with a copy of the procedures. Revisions and updates are provided when determined necessary. Employees must retain a copy of the procedures at their workstation or place of employment. Each employee is expected to read, fully understand, and precisely follow the procedures. Any question or doubt should be discussed with your supervisor or manager, or CACI's Government Compliance Group [(703) 841-7985]. A knowing failure to comply with CACI's Timekeeping Policy will be the basis for disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment.

## Electronic Communications Policy

Electronic communications, including electronic mail, Lotus Notes, and electronic commerce are an integral component of our workplace. Each employee must realize that electronic communications may be saved, redistributed, or reviewed by others, both inside and outside CACI. As a result, you should not have any expectation of privacy for the data, emails, and other material stored in your company computer system. The hardware and software on which our company electronic communications take place are assets of the company provided for business use only. Accordingly, CACI

reserves the right to access, review, delete, disclose or use employee's electronic communications for any business purpose. Upon being hired, employees are provided with a copy of the Electronic Communications Policy. Each employee is expected to read, fully understand, and precisely follow the Policy, including the rules on content, distribution, receipt and retention of electronic communications. Any question or doubt should be discussed with your supervisor or manager.

### Interference with an Audit

CACI's officers and employees, and persons acting under their supervision, must refrain from taking any action that misleads, impedes or otherwise disrupts the work of either the Company's Internal Audit Department or its independent outside auditors, **Ernst & Young Global Limited**, including any action to fraudulently induce, coerce, manipulate or mislead any auditor in any respect.

### Use and Protection of Company Assets

All officers, employees and consultants are responsible for the protection and appropriate, efficient use of CACI assets. All company property is to be used for legitimate business purposes only. Theft, careless or negligent use, or loss of company property may subject the offending person to disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment and, where appropriate, referral to law enforcement authorities.

### Trade Secrets, Confidential Information

It is essential for all employees and consultants to safeguard the Company's trade secrets and confidential information and to refuse any improper access to trade secrets and confidential information of any other company, including our competitors. Our basic guidelines are: Company proprietary information must not be discussed with others within CACI, except on a strict need-to-know basis; if we wish to disclose CACI trade secrets or confidential information to any people outside CACI, it must be done only in conjunction with disclosure agreements provided by the Legal Division or your contracts manager; always be alert to avoid inadvertent disclosures which may arise in social conversations or in normal business relations; and do not receive any such information from other companies or people except pursuant to written confidentiality agreements.

### Insider Trading/Tipping

As employees of a publicly held company, we must be vigilant in safeguarding material, non-public Company information from disclosure both inside and outside the Company. It is a violation of Federal law for anyone with knowledge of such information to make trades in CACI stock or to make any unauthorized disclosure of such information (known as "tipping"). Our policy is that CACI employees with knowledge of material information about the company that has not been disclosed to the general public **refrain**

from disclosing such information to anyone else and from engaging in any transaction in CACI stock until the third business day following public disclosure of such information. Always contact the Office of the Corporate General Counsel when in doubt before conducting a transaction in CACI stock.

Those insiders considered as "reporting persons" under the securities laws of the U.S. are also required to comply with the CACI policy regarding notice and reporting of all transactions in CACI stock. It is vitally important that such persons get notice of any such trade to the Company's SEC Reporting Committee in time to allow timely filing of the required reports to the SEC.

## Conflicts of Interest

A "conflict of interest" occurs when a person's private interest (financial gain, career development, reputation advantage, etc.) interferes in any way – or even appears to interfere – with the legitimate business interests of CACI. A conflict can arise when an officer or employee takes actions or has interests that make it difficult to perform his or her company work objectively and effectively. Conflicts can also arise when an officer or employee, or a member of his or her immediate family, receives personal benefits as a result of his or her position in the Company.

In order to avoid potential conflicts of interest, officers and employees should avoid any activity outside their Company work that is reasonably likely to put them in a conflict situation. For example, it is important to avoid engaging in a personal business in which you provide products or services that may be competitive with the products or services provided by CACI. Similarly, it is important to obtain advance approval from the Chief Executive Officer of CACI International Inc to serve on the board of directors or any advisory board of any commercial business, or of any federal, state or local government agency. Requests for such approval should be submitted to the Corporate General Counsel, or his designee.

CACI cautions employees that acceptance of gifts and gratuities can result in possible conflicts between the employee's duty of loyalty to the Company and the personal interests of the employee. In order to ensure that such situations are considered thoughtfully, any employee who is offered a gift or gratuity with a value exceeding \$100 must report such offer through his/her up-line chain of command to the Corporate General Counsel, or his designee, and transmit a copy of such report to each of the Operations Executive Officer, the President of U.S. Operations, and the Chief Executive Officer of CACI International Inc.

## False Information and Employment

If, following employment, CACI learns that an employee intentionally provided false or misleading information, or intentionally omitted pertinent information regarding essential background, employment history, credentials or qualifications for employment, regardless of the time elapsed before discovery – CACI may discipline the employee, change the employment status, reassign the employee,

or terminate the employee.

## Policy Statement on U.S. Government Contracting

1. As a government contractor, we have a special obligation to the U. S. Government, and to the public at large, to ensure that we administer our contracts and deliver our products and services in a manner that fully satisfies both our legal obligations and our own high standards of integrity and quality.

2. We are committed to compliance with the letter and spirit of the laws and regulations governing contracting with the U.S. Government. These impose requirements not traditionally associated with purely commercial business transactions.

a. For example, it is a felony to knowingly make a false claim or false statement to the government. Violations of these and other statutes can subject us to damaging publicity, expensive and time-consuming investigations and litigation, reduction of negotiated contract rates, and the revocation of contracts. Both CACI and individual employees may also be subject to civil and criminal sanctions including fines, debarment or suspension, and prison sentences.

3. Although it is not possible to specify here all contract-related dealings with the Government that present the risk of false statements, false claims, or other violations, particular attention is called to the following:

a. CACI is frequently required to submit accounting and other records to the government as a basis for payment on existing contracts and estimates on future contracts. It is our policy to charge all labor and material cost accurately, to the appropriate account, regardless of the status of the budget for that account. Improprieties, such as charging labor or material costs improperly or to the wrong account, charging direct contract effort to an overhead or indirect account, and falsification of time cards or other records will not be tolerated.

b. CACI is frequently required to submit cost or pricing data to the Government, and to certify that it is current, accurate, and complete. The definition of data that must be disclosed is very broad and includes facts as well as management decisions, estimates (based on verifiable data), and other information that a reasonable person would expect to affect the negotiations. Our policy is full disclosure of complete and accurate cost and pricing data that is current up to the date of agreement on price.

c. CACI submits proposals for reimbursement of indirect costs to the Government. A company official may be required to certify his belief that the proposal does not contain expressly unallowable costs such as for advertising, donations, entertainment, fines and

penalties, lobbying, defense of fraud proceedings, and goodwill. It is our policy to request reimbursement only for those indirect costs that are reasonable in amount and clearly allowable, or to which we have a good faith belief that the costs are allowable.

d. We are often required to certify compliance with quality control specifications and testing requirements for our products. Our policy is to deliver goods that meet all contract requirements and give the customer the highest degree of confidence in our products. Improprieties, such as the failure to conduct required testing, or manipulation of test procedures or data, will not be tolerated.

4. CACI observes the following special standards of conduct in contracting, directly or indirectly, with the government:

a. CACI will not offer, give, or promise to offer or give any money, gratuity or other thing of value to any government official or employee that such official or employee is prohibited from receiving by applicable law, including transportation, meals at business meetings, tickets to sporting or other events, or the like.

b. Even if applicable government regulations permit their acceptance, CACI will not offer or give or reimburse expenses for any entertainment or offer any gratuity to any government official or employee who is personally and substantially involved in a procurement or administrative function relating to any contract for the direct or indirect purchase of products or services from the Corporation.

c. CACI is prohibited from using federal funds to pay persons such as lobbyists or consultants to influence or to attempt to influence executive or legislative decision-making in connection with the award of any contract. We are also required to furnish a certification that no federal funds have been paid or will be paid in violation of this prohibition. In addition, CACI is required to report to the government any payments to any lobbyist or consultant paid with non-federal funds for such purposes. CACI Policy and Guidelines, Chapter 6, sets forth our policies and procedures on the use of outside professional consultants.

d. Government information that is national security classified, procurement sensitive, or proprietary, shall not be solicited or accepted from (or pro-vided to) any source either directly or indirectly, in circumstances where there is reason to believe that the release is not authorized. Nor shall CACI proprietary or "private data" be provided to anyone outside CACI, unless the release of such data has been specifically authorized.

e. CACI must be particularly concerned with obtaining

sensitive procurement information from federal agencies. During the conduct of any procurement action, CACI will not solicit nor obtain from any officer or employee of the agency, or any other source, any proprietary or source selection information regarding that procurement. This prohibition begins with the development, preparation and issuance of a solicitation and concludes with award of a contract, a contract modification or extension. The restriction on proprietary data includes information contained in a bid or proposal, cost or pricing data, and any information submitted to the Government by a contractor and properly designated as proprietary. Source selection information includes such information as listings of offerors and prices, listings of bidders prior to bid opening, source selection plans, technical evaluations of competing proposals, competitive range determinations, rankings (except for sealed bidding), source selection board reports and evaluations, source selection advisory board recommendations and **other information determined by the head of the agency or contracting officer to be information which would jeopardize the integrity or successful completion of the procurement if disclosed.**

f. Special restrictions apply to hiring or retaining a government employee as an employee or consultant of CACI. In addition, there are special constraints regarding any communication concerning possible employment during the conduct of any procurement action and otherwise. **CACI will not conduct any discussions regarding, or make any offer or promise of future employment or business opportunity to any procurement official during the conduct of any procurement.** CACI's specific hiring policy affecting clients and government employees is contained in the CACI Policy and Guidelines, Chapter 3. **There are no exceptions to this policy.** Clearance must be obtained before even mentioning proposed employment to current government employees, and then only after they have publicly announced that they are leaving government service. In addition, any plans to employ retired military officers of general or flag rank, or civilian officials having the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary or above, must be approved by the Chairman of the Board and CEO of CACI International Inc, prior to an offer of CACI employment.

g. CACI shall not **knowingly** employ an individual nor contract with a company, by any means, if the individual or company is on the General Services Administration's (GSA) Consolidated List of Debarred, Suspended, and Ineligible Contractors, nor knowingly employ an individual who has been convicted of an offense related to government contracting.

h. CACI employees will immediately sever all connection

with any former employee or consultant of CACI whose conduct violates applicable laws, regulations, or basic tenets of business integrity and honesty, and such other individuals specifically identified by the Company.

(1) Appropriate notices specifically naming such individuals will be provided to employees or posted on Company bulletin boards.

i. CACI will not enter into a subcontract or teaming agreement that unreasonably restricts sales by the other company directly to the U.S. Government of items made or supplied by the other company and will not otherwise act to restrict unreasonably the ability of any other company to sell directly to the U.S. Government. Conversely, CACI will not enter into agreements where as a sub-contractor or teaming partner, we are subject to any unreasonable restriction to sell our products or services directly to the U.S. Government.

j. Consultants shall be required by contract to comply with the laws and regulations relating to government contracting and the government contracting standards of conduct applicable to employees of the corporation. This Policy Statement shall be incorporated in the Policy and Guidelines and the Terms and Conditions for all consultant contracts, and each such contract shall expressly provide for termination in the event the consultant violates either the laws or regulations relating to government contracting or the standards and policies set forth in this Code of Ethics.

## Reporting Material Developments, Complying with Controls

As a publicly owned company, CACI is subject to the securities laws and regulations of the U.S. Government and the states of the U.S., including the statutory and regulatory requirements of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Pursuant to such requirements, it is the duty of every employee to fully, fairly, accurately, timely and understandably report financial and non-financial developments that could possibly have a material affect on the operations or financial condition of CACI up-line through his/her chain of command and to the Company’s Chief Financial Officer, the Corporate Controller, or the General Counsel (or other member of the Legal Division) as soon as it is discovered. In addition, it is every employee’s obligation to comply with our internal control policies and procedures and our disclosure controls and procedures. Employees are expected to report any observations of failure to comply with such controls and procedures to one of the individuals named above, the Company Ombudsman (**see below**), or report the incident to the CACI Hotline at (800) 928-3505.

Those employees engaged in preparation and filing of documents with the Securities and Exchange Commission and/or with public

news releases or other public communications made by CACI are expected to fully, fairly, accurately, timely and understandably disclose all information that is required in connection with such communications.

## Implementation

CACI organizations involved directly or indirectly with contracting with the United States Government are required to implement procedures and policies to ensure compliance with this Code and with the laws and regulations governing contracting with the government. Such procedures and policies should expressly designate the activities, group, or individual responsible for implementing each element of the detailed procedures.

## Obligation of Employees to Report Violations and Assist in Investigations

1. It is the responsibility of an employee or consultant having knowledge of any activity that is or may be in violation of this Code, any law, rule or regulation applicable to CACI's work, or any Affirmative Action Policy to promptly disclose such activity.

a. For this purpose, CACI has established **Bill Clancy, Executive Vice President, as the Company Ombudsman**. Bill is the Director of Business Operations, and can be reached at (703) 841-7811 or by email at [wclancy@caci.com](mailto:wclancy@caci.com). Employees and consultants may report directly to him **in confidence** any impropriety of which they have knowledge whether committed by an employee of CACI, the Government, or a CACI client.

b. CACI also has available a "hotline," at (800) 928-3505, or email [gmadison@caci.com](mailto:gmadison@caci.com), where reports of potentially illegal, unauthorized or inappropriate conduct can be made confidentially at any time.

c. CACI's **Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Jeff Elefante**, is available for consultation on any question employees may have concerning their responsibilities within the Code. Jeff may be reached through (703) 841-7800.

d. Any supervisor or manager receiving a report of any impropriety will promptly report the matter to higher management, the Ombudsman, General Counsel, or Corporate Internal Audit.

e. Every employee and consultant is expected to cooperate fully with any investigation of any alleged violation of this Code of Ethics.

2. It is CACI's policy that there will be no retaliation against any person who reports what they believe in good faith to be a violation

of this Code or any law, rule or regulation applicable to CACI's business.

3. It is the responsibility of an employee or consultant to have a reasonable basis on which to conclude that inappropriate activity may be occurring. This requires that a disclosing employee or consultant have some evidence that has led to a good-faith conclusion that conduct may be inappropriate. If, after investigation, it appears that an employee or consultant made a frivolous or bad faith allegation of improper conduct, such employee or consultant may be subject to discipline up to and including termination of employment.

## Employee Dispute Resolution

The enactment of employment laws in increasing numbers and complexity has increased the occurrence of workplace disputes between employers and employees involving a wide range of legal matters. Our policy is to resolve all employment-related disputes in accordance with a private, two-step dispute resolution process designed to be less costly and more efficient than litigation. All employees are required to submit their employment-related disputes first to the Company Ombudsman, and then, if still not satisfied, to arbitration in accordance with the **National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes** of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). The arbitrator's decision will be final and binding upon both the employee and CACI. Employees may obtain a copy of the AAA's rules from the Director of Employee Services.

## Duty of Loyalty

As a growing company, CACI's greatest assets are the knowledge, ingenuity and productivity of its employees. The Company benefits most from such assets when employees perform their work with the highest degree of loyalty. In recognition of this fact, the law places upon each employee certain fiduciary responsibilities to the Company, including, for example, the duty to place the interest of the Company and its shareholders above the employee's personal interest in any business situation where they might conflict.

In light of the special trust and confidence that CACI places in its employees, the Code requires that employees act with undivided loyalty to the Company and fairness in dealings with the Company, its suppliers, its business partners, and its existing and potential clients. The restrictions placed upon employees by this portion of the Code are not intended to prevent employees from competing lawfully and fairly with the Company following termination of employment, or from engaging in subsequent employment in any field of their choice. Instead, they are solely intended to proscribe certain acts (including those listed below by way of example) that would be inconsistent with employees' legal obligations arising out of their employment relationship with the Company, such as:

1. Permitting the use of their names or resumes by another entity in any bid, any response to a request for

proposal, or any other similar application for a contract or task order that competes against the Company for new work; or is intended to replace, succeed, supersede, reduce or diminish CACI's work under a contract or task order;

2. Taking kickbacks in exchange for entering into contracts;

3. Planning to begin a new, non-CACI enterprise while an enterprise while still an employee of the Company and carrying out preparations for such a new enterprise on Company time; and

4. Working on behalf of another entity while an employee and using trade secrets or confidential or proprietary information in an unauthorized manner, or soliciting the Company's customers or employees for another entity.

5. Taking for themselves personally opportunities that are discovered through the use of corporate property, information or position or using corporate property, information or position for personal gain.

Each employee is expected to fulfill his/her fiduciary responsibilities to the Company as required by law. Any failure to comply with the law or these policies constitutes grounds for discipline up to and including termination of employment for cause.

### Administration and Interpretation

1. The Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Standards will be administered by CACI's Director Business Operations.

2. Given the complexities of government contracting laws and regulations, and the determination of CACI's Executive Officers and Board of Directors to comply with both the letter and spirit of all such laws and regulations, it is recognized that questions of interpretation will arise.

a. All questions relating the charging of material and labor and to the allowability and reasonable-ness of overhead expenses are to be directed to the CACI **Chief Financial Officer** (703) 841-7800, for overall policy guidance.

b. All other questions relating to CACI's policies are to be directed to **Bill Clancy** (703) 841-7811, for overall policy guidance.

c. CACI reserves the right to use any lawful method of investigation which it deems necessary to determine whether any person has engaged in conduct which in its view interferes with or adversely affects its business.

3. The Internal Audit department will include in its audit schedule

appropriate testing for compliance with CACI's policies on the charging of costs and labor, on the allowability of overhead expenses, on the reimbursement of expenses for entertainment and gratuities and on such other areas as may from time to time be recommended by CACI's line and staff managers.

4. Internal audit staff may request Legal Division investigative assistance concerning suspected or alleged violations of these policies, and may periodically review the practices of the operating units for compliance with the defective pricing laws and regulations and the standards of conduct to be followed by CACI when contracting with the U.S. Government.

5. Although questions of interpretation of this Code may arise, the Company does not contemplate that it will grant any waiver of any of the terms of this Code. Should extraordinary circumstances arise in which a waiver may be appropriate, however, such waiver may only be granted by the Board of Directors or the Audit Committee of the Board. Upon granting any such waiver, the waiver shall be promptly disclosed by filing a current report on Form 8K with the Securities and Exchange Commission and by publication on the Company's website for a period of not less than one year.

6. Any change to this Code that affects the actions and/or responsibilities of the Company's Executive Officers (the Chief Executive Officer, President of U.S. Operations, Managing Director of CACI Limited, Chief Financial Officer, General Counsel, or Director of Business Operations) shall be promptly disclosed by filing a current report on Form 8K with the Securities and Exchange Commission and by publication on the Company's website for a period of not less than one year.

7. This Code shall be governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

# **Exhibit H**

ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION  
OF THE  
800th MILITARY POLICE  
BRIGADE

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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## ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

### BACKGROUND

1. (U) On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) requested that the Commander, US Central Command, appoint an Investigating Officer (IO) in the grade of Major General (MG) or above to investigate the conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade. LTG Sanchez requested an investigation of detention and internment operations by the Brigade from 1 November 2003 to present. LTG Sanchez cited recent reports of detainee abuse, escapes from confinement facilities, and accountability lapses, which indicated systemic problems within the brigade and suggested a lack of clear standards, proficiency, and leadership. LTG Sanchez requested a comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry to make findings and recommendations concerning the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 2)
2. (U) On 24 January 2003, the Chief of Staff of US Central Command (CENTCOM), MG R. Steven Whitcomb, on behalf of the CENTCOM Commander, directed that the Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), LTG David D. McKiernan, conduct an investigation into the 800th MP Brigade's detention and internment operations from 1 November 2003 to present. CENTCOM directed that the investigation should inquire into all facts and circumstances surrounding recent reports of suspected detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed that the investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain a more comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry into the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 3)
3. (U) On 31 January 2004, the Commander, CFLCC, appointed MG Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding General Support, CFLCC, to conduct this investigation. MG Taguba was directed to conduct an informal investigation under AR 15-6 into the 800th MP Brigade's detention and internment operations. Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:
  - a. (U) Inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF));
  - b. (U) Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison;

- c. (U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate;
  - d. (U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of the investigation, and make any recommendations for corrective action, as appropriate. (ANNEX 4)
4. (U) LTG Sanchez's request to investigate the 800th MP Brigade followed the initiation of a criminal investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of detainee abuse committed by members of the 372nd MP Company, 320th MP Battalion in Iraq. These units are part of the 800th MP Brigade. The Brigade is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC at the time this investigation was initiated. In addition, CJTF-7 had several reports of detainee escapes from US/Coalition Confinement Facilities in Iraq over the past several months. These include Camp Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex/Camp Cropper. The 800th MP Brigade operated these facilities. In addition, four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had been formally charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with detainee abuse in May 2003 at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca, Iraq. (ANNEXES 5-18, 34 and 35)
  5. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior to the actual appointment by the CFLCC Commander. I assembled subject matter experts from the CFLCC Provost Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). I selected COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal to be my Deputy for this investigation. I also contacted the Provost Marshal General of the Army, MG Donald J. Ryder, to enlist the support of MP subject matter experts in the areas of detention and internment operations. (ANNEXES 4 and 19)
  6. (U) The Investigating Team also reviewed the Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq conducted by MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Miller led a team of personnel experienced in strategic interrogation to HQ, CJTF-7 and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to review current Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence. MG Miller's team focused on three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations; and detention operations. MG Miller's team used JTF-GTMO procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)
  7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiry with an in-depth analysis of the Report on Detention and Corrections in Iraq, dated 5 November 2003, conducted by MG Ryder and a team of military police, legal, medical, and automation experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had previously requested a team of subject matter experts to assess, and make specific recommendations concerning detention and corrections operations. From 13 October to 6 November 2003, MG Ryder personally led this assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX 19)

## ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT)

1. (S/NF) The principal focus of MG Miller's team was on the strategic interrogation of detainees/internees in Iraq. Among its conclusions in its Executive Summary were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq. The Executive Summary also stated that detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation. (ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation, MG Miller's Team recommended that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that "sets the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees." Regarding Detention Operations, MG Miller's team stated that the function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe, secure, and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence. However, it also stated "it is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees." (ANNEX 20)
3. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also concluded that Joint Strategic Interrogation Operations (within CJTF-7) are hampered by lack of active control of the internees within the detention environment. The Miller Team also stated that establishment of the Theater Joint Interrogation and Detention Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) will consolidate both detention and strategic interrogation operations and result in synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized, and focused strategic interrogation effort. (ANNEX 20)
4. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also observed that the application of emerging strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new approaches and operational art. The Miller Team also concluded that a legal review and recommendations on internee interrogation operations by a dedicated Command Judge Advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness. (ANNEX 20)

### IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT

1. (S/NF) MG Miller's team recognized that they were using JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines for its observations and recommendations. There is a strong argument that the intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo (GTMO) is different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and other detention facilities in Iraq. Currently, there are a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These are not believed to be international terrorists or members of Al Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other international terrorist organizations. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) The recommendations of MG Miller's team that the "guard force" be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations of MG Ryder's Team and AR 190-8 that military police "do not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation sessions." The Ryder Report concluded that the OEF template whereby military police actively set the favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 20)

## REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS IN IRAQ (MG RYDER'S REPORT)

1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a comprehensive review of the entire detainee and corrections system in Iraq and provided recommendations addressing each of the following areas as requested by the Commander CJTF-7:
  - a. (U) Detainee and corrections system management
  - b. (U) Detainee management, including detainee movement, segregation, and accountability
  - c. (U) Means of command and control of the detention and corrections system
  - d. (U) Integration of military detention and corrections with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-run corrections system
  - e. (U) Detainee medical care and health management
  - f. (U) Detention facilities that meet required health, hygiene, and sanitation standards
  - g. (U) Court integration and docket management for criminal detainees
  - h. (U) Detainee legal processing
  - i. (U) Detainee databases and records, including integration with law enforcement and court databases (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations of MG Ryder's team are beyond the scope of this investigation. However, several important findings are clearly relevant to this inquiry and are summarized below (emphasis is added in certain areas):

### A. (U) Detainee Management (including movement, segregation, and accountability)

1. (U) There is a wide variance in standards and approaches at the various detention facilities. Several Division/Brigade collection points and US monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently detailed use of force and other standing operating procedures or policies (e.g. weapons in the facility, improper restraint techniques, detainee management, etc.) Though, there were no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi facilities, Iraqi criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi crimes) are detained with security internees (generally Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in the same facilities, though segregated in different cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The management of multiple disparate groups of detained people in a single location by members of the same unit invites confusion about handling, processing, and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer of information between different categories of detainees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections specific training during their mobilization period. Corrections training is only on the METL of two MP (I/R) Confinement Battalions throughout the Army, one currently serving in Afghanistan, and elements of the other are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units supporting JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in detention facility operations, to include two days of unarmed self-defense, training in interpersonal communication skills, forced cell moves, and correctional officer safety. (ANNEX 19)

B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention and Corrections System

1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was originally task organized with eight MP(I/R) Battalions consisting of both MP Guard and Combat Support companies. Due to force rotation plans, the 800th redeployed two Battalion HHCs in December 2003, the 115th MP Battalion and the 324th MP Battalion. In December 2003, the 400th MP Battalion was relieved of its mission and redeployed in January 2004. The 724th MP Battalion redeployed on 11 February 2004 and the remainder is scheduled to redeploy in March and April 2004. They are the 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion. The units that remain are generally understrength, as Reserve Component units do not have an individual personnel replacement system to mitigate medical losses or the departure of individual Soldiers that have reached 24 months of Federal active duty in a five-year period. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) The 800th MP Brigade (I/R) is currently a CFLCC asset, TACON to CJTF-7 to conduct Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq. All detention operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO; Camps Ganci, Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a separate High Value Detention (HVD) site. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade has experienced challenges adapting its task organizational structure, training, and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct standard EPW operations in the COMMZ (Kuwait). Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee population ratio and facility layout templates are predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW population, and not criminals or high-risk security internees. (ANNEX 19)

4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the full protections of the Geneva Conventions, unless the denial of these protections is due to specifically articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to preclude the direction of insurgency operations). (ANNEXES 19 and 24)
5. (U) AR 190-8, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and other Detainees*, FM 3-19.40, *Military Police Internment and Resettlement Operations*, and FM 34-52, *Intelligence Interrogations*, require military police to provide an area for intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, do not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby military police actively set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state. The 800th MP Brigade has not been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and 21-23)
6. MG Ryder's Report also made the following, inter alia, near-term and mid-term recommendations regarding the command and control of detainees:
  - a. (U) Align the release process for security internees with DoD Policy. The process of screening security internees should include intelligence findings, interrogation results, and current threat assessment.
  - b. (U) Determine the scope of intelligence collection that will occur at Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the Northeast Compound to separate the screening operation from the Iraqi run Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Establish procedures that define the role of military police Soldiers securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.
  - c. (U) Consolidate all Security Internee Operations, except the MEK security mission, under a single Military Police Brigade Headquarters for OIF 2.
  - d. (U) Insist that all units identified to rotate into the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) to conduct internment and confinement operations in support of OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)

## IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER'S REPORT

1. (U) The objective of MG Ryder's Team was to observe detention and prison operations, identify potential systemic and human rights issues, and provide near-term, mid-term, and long-term recommendations to improve CJTF-7 operations and transition of the Iraqi prison system from US military control/oversight to the Coalition Provisional Authority and eventually to the Iraqi Government. The Findings and Recommendations of MG Ryder's Team are thorough and precise and should be implemented immediately. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during MG Ryder's Team's assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this investigation. In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment. As will be pointed out in detail in subsequent portions of this report, I disagree with the conclusion of MG Ryder's Team in one critical aspect, that being its conclusion that the 800th MP Brigade had not been asked to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interviews. While clearly the 800th MP Brigade and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions for detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects and witnesses that this was done at lower levels. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder's conclusion regarding the effect of AR 190-8. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, should not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military Police should not be involved with setting "favorable conditions" for subsequent interviews. These actions, as will be outlined in this investigation, clearly run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 19)

## PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS

1. (U) Following our review of MG Ryder's Report and MG Miller's Report, my investigation team immediately began an in-depth review of all available documents regarding the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in detail the voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged detainee abuses at detention facilities in Iraq, particularly the Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility. We analyzed approximately fifty witness statements from military police and military intelligence personnel, potential suspects, and detainees. We reviewed numerous photos and videos of actual detainee abuse taken by detention facility personnel, which are now in the custody and control of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command and the CJTF-7 prosecution team. The photos and videos are not contained in this investigation. We obtained copies of the 800th MP Brigade roster, rating chain, and assorted internal

investigations and disciplinary actions involving that command for the past several months. (All ANNEXES Reviewed by Investigation Team)

2. (U) In addition to military police and legal officers from the CFLCC PMO and SJA Offices we also obtained the services of two individuals who are experts in military police detention practices and training. These were LTC Timothy Weathersbee, Commander, 705th MP Battalion, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, and SFC Edward Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also requested and received the services of Col (Dr) Henry Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist assigned to assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4)
3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder's and MG Miller's Reports, the team reviewed numerous reference materials including the 12 October 2003 CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6 Investigation on Riot and Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November 2003, the 205th MI Brigade's Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), facility staff logs/journals and numerous records of AR 15-6 investigations and Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) on detainee escapes/shootings and disciplinary matters from the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEXES 5-20, 37, 93, and 94)
4. (U) On 2 February 2004, I took my team to Baghdad for a one-day inspection of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF) and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex in order to become familiar with those facilities. We also met with COL Jerry Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP Criminal Investigation Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock, Commander, 16th MP Brigade, COL Dave Phillips, Commander, 89th MP Brigade, and COL Ed Sannwaldt, CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7 February 2004, the team visited the Camp Bucca Detention Facility to familiarize itself with the facility and operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February 2004, at Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive training sessions on approved detention practices. We continued our preparation by reviewing the ongoing CID investigation and were briefed by the Special Agent in Charge, CW2 Paul Arthur. We refreshed ourselves on the applicable reference materials within each team member's area of expertise, and practiced investigative techniques. I met with the team on numerous occasions to finalize appropriate witness lists, review existing witness statements, arrange logistics, and collect potential evidence. We also coordinated with CJTF-7 to arrange witness attendance, force protection measures, and general logistics for the team's move to Baghdad on 8 February 2004. (ANNEXES 4 and 25)
5. (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of Authority on 1 February 2004 between III Corps and V Corps, and the upcoming demobilization of the 800th MP Brigade Command, I directed that several critical witnesses who were preparing to leave the theater remain at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait until they could be interviewed (ANNEX 29). My team deployed to Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and conducted a series of interviews with a variety of witnesses (ANNEX 30). We returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 13 February 2004. On 14 and 15 February we interviewed a number of witnesses from the 800th MP Brigade. On 17 February we returned to Camp Bucca,

Iraq to complete interviews of witnesses at that location. From 18 February thru 28 February we collected documents, compiled references, did follow-up interviews, and completed a detailed analysis of the volumes of materials accumulated throughout our investigation. On 29 February we finalized our executive summary and out-briefing slides. On 9 March we submitted the AR 15-6 written report with findings and recommendations to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark Johnson, for a legal sufficiency review. The out-brief to the appointing authority, LTG McKiernan, took place on 3 March 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### (PART ONE)

(U) The investigation should inquire into all of the facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).

1. (U) The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), led by COL Jerry Mocello, and a team of highly trained professional agents have done a superb job of investigating several complex and extremely disturbing incidents of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison. They conducted over 50 interviews of witnesses, potential criminal suspects, and detainees. They also uncovered numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail detainee abuse by Military Police personnel on numerous occasions from October to December 2003. Several potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions regarding their personal involvement and the involvement of fellow Soldiers in this abuse. Several potential suspects invoked their rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 25)
2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive review of all of these statements and documentary evidence, we also interviewed numerous officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade, as well as members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade working at the prison. We did not believe it was necessary to re-interview all the numerous witnesses who had previously provided comprehensive statements to CID, and I have adopted those statements for the purposes of this investigation. (ANNEXES 26, 34, 35, and 45-91)

#### REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. (U) That Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF) provides security of both criminal and security detainees at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, facilitates the conducting of interrogations for CJTF-7, supports other CPA operations at the prison, and enhances the force protection/quality of life of Soldiers assigned in order to ensure the success of ongoing operations to secure a free Iraq. (ANNEX 31)
2. (U) That the Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, was designated by CJTF-7 as the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) effective 19 November 2003. That the 205th MI Brigade conducts operational and strategic interrogations for CJTF-7. That from 19 November 2003 until Transfer of Authority (TOA) on 6

February 2004, COL Thomas M. Pappas was the Commander of the 205th MI Brigade and the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). (ANNEX 31)

3. (U) That the 320th Military Police Battalion of the 800th MP Brigade is responsible for the Guard Force at Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant, & Cellblock 1 of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). That from February 2003 to until he was suspended from his duties on 17 January 2004, LTC Jerry Phillabaum served as the Battalion Commander of the 320th MP Battalion. That from December 2002 until he was suspended from his duties, on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald Reese served as the Company Commander of the 372nd MP Company, which was in charge of guarding detainees at FOB Abu Ghraib. I further find that both the 320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company were located within the confines of FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEXES 32 and 45)
4. (U) That from July of 2003 to the present, BG Janis L. Karpinski was the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 45)
5. (S) That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force (372nd Military Police Company, 320th Military Police Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX 26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these photographs and videos, the ongoing CID investigation, and the potential for the criminal prosecution of several suspects, the photographic evidence is not included in the body of my investigation. The pictures and videos are available from the Criminal Investigative Command and the CTJF-7 prosecution team. In addition to the aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). Specifically, on 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana Spencer, 205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having him strip and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and 53)
6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel included the following acts:
  - a. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet;
  - b. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;
  - c. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for photographing;
  - d. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several days at a time;
  - e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's underwear;
  - f. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed and videotaped;

- g. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;
  - h. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;
  - i. (S) Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;
  - j. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee's neck and having a female Soldier pose for a picture;
  - k. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;
  - l. (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;
  - m. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.
- (ANNEXES 25 and 26)
7. (U) These findings are amply supported by written confessions provided by several of the suspects, written statements provided by detainees, and witness statements. In reaching my findings, I have carefully considered the pre-existing statements of the following witnesses and suspects (ANNEX 26):
- a. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
  - b. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company – Suspect
  - c. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
  - c. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
  - d. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp., Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade- Suspect
  - e. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company
  - f. (U) SGT Neil A. Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical Battalion
  - g. (U) SGT Samuel Jefferson Provance, 302nd MI Battalion
  - h. (U) Torin S. Nelson, Contractor, Titan Corp., Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade
  - j. (U) CPL Matthew Scott Bolanger, 372nd MP Company
  - k. (U) SPC Mathew C. Wisdom, 372nd MP Company
  - l. (U) SSG Reuben R. Layton, Medic, 109th Medical Detachment
  - m. (U) SPC John V. Polak, 229th MP Company
8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the following acts of abuse, which under the circumstances, I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses (ANNEX 26):
- a. (U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees;
  - b. (U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;
  - c. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;
  - d. (U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;
  - e. (U) Threatening male detainees with rape;
  - f. (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell;
  - g. (U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick.

- h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.
9. (U) I have carefully considered the statements provided by the following detainees, which under the circumstances I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses:
  - a. (U) Amjed Isail Waleed, Detainee # 151365
  - b. (U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee # 13077
  - c. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayyadi, Detainee # 19446
  - d. (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee # 151108
  - e. (U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307
  - f. (U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee # 150542
  - g. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, # 150422
  - h. (U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee # 150425
  - i. (U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee # 152529
  - j. (U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee # 7787
  - k. (U) Thaar Salman Dawod, Detainee # 150427
  - l. (U) Ameen Sa'eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee # 151362
  - m. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee # 18470 (ANNEX 26)
10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the findings found in MG Ryder's Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US Government Agency's (OGA) interrogators actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder's Report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to "set the conditions" for MI interrogations. I find no direct evidence that MP personnel actually participated in those MI interrogations. (ANNEXES 19, 21, 25, and 26).
11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual proven abuse that I find was inflicted on detainees and by the following witness statements. (ANNEXES 25 and 26):
  - a. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in her sworn statement regarding the incident where a detainee was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, "that her job was to keep detainees awake." She stated that MI was talking to CPL Grainer. She stated: "MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Grainer and Frederick's job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk."
  - b. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in his sworn statement as follows: "I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section, wing 1A being made to do various things that I would question morally. In Wing 1A we were told that they had different rules and different SOP for treatment. I never saw a set of rules or SOP for that section just word of mouth. The Soldier in charge of 1A was Corporal Granier. He stated that the Agents and MI Soldiers would ask

him to do things, but nothing was ever in writing he would complain (sic).” When asked why the rules in 1A/1B were different than the rest of the wings, SGT Davis stated: “The rest of the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are Military Intelligence (MI) holds.” When asked why he did not inform his chain of command about this abuse, SGT Davis stated: “ Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the wing belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse.” SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what MI said he stated: “Loosen this guy up for us.” Make sure he has a bad night.” “Make sure he gets the treatment.” He claimed these comments were made to CPL Granier and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis stated that (sic): “the MI staffs to my understanding have been giving Granier compliments on the way he has been handling the MI holds. Example being statements like, “Good job, they’re breaking down real fast. They answer every question. They’re giving out good information, Finally, and Keep up the good work . Stuff like that.”

- c. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd MP Company, was asked if he were present when any detainees were abused. He stated: “I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes.” He could not recall who in MI had instructed him to do this, but commented that, “if they wanted me to do that they needed to give me paperwork.” He was later informed that “we could not do anything to embarrass the prisoners.”
  - d. (U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla, a US civilian contract translator was questioned about several detainees accused of rape. He observed (sic): “They (detainees) were all naked, a bunch of people from MI, the MP were there that night and the inmates were ordered by SGT Granier and SGT Frederick ordered the guys while questioning them to admit what they did. They made them do strange exercises by sliding on their stomach, jump up and down, throw water on them and made them some wet, called them all kinds of names such as “gays” do they like to make love to guys, then they handcuffed their hands together and their legs with shackles and started to stack them on top of each other by insuring that the bottom guys penis will touch the guy on tops butt.”
  - e. (U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical Battalion, a medic testified that: “Cell 1A was used to house high priority detainees and cell 1B was used to house the high risk or trouble making detainees. During my tour at the prison I observed that when the male detainees were first brought to the facility, some of them were made to wear female underwear, which I think was to somehow break them down.”
12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had received no training in detention/internee operations. I also find that very little instruction or training was provided to MP personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva Convention Relative

to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever made available to MP personnel or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-24, 33, and multiple witness statements)

13. (U) Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership not communicating with its Soldiers or ensuring their tactical proficiency concerns the incident of detainee abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca, Iraq, on May 12, 2003. Soldiers from the 223rd MP Company reported to the 800th MP Brigade Command at Camp Bucca, that four Military Police Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had abused a number of detainees during inprocessing at Camp Bucca. An extensive CID investigation determined that four soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had kicked and beaten these detainees following a transport mission from Talil Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)
14. (U) Formal charges under the UCMJ were preferred against these Soldiers and an Article-32 Investigation conducted by LTC Gentry. He recommended a general court martial for the four accused, which BG Karpinski supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no evidence that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind 800th MP Soldiers of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions regarding detainee treatment or took any steps to ensure that such abuse was not repeated. Nor is there any evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum, the commander of the Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident, took any initiative to ensure his Soldiers were properly trained regarding detainee treatment. (ANNEXES 35 and 62)

#### RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated multi-discipline Mobile Training Team (MTT) comprised of subject matter experts in internment/resettlement operations, international and operational law, information technology, facility management, interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques, chaplains, Arab cultural awareness, and medical practices as it pertains to I/R activities. This team needs to oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects of detainee and confinement operations.
2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence personnel involved in any aspect of detainee operations or interrogation operations in CJTF-7, and subordinate units, be immediately provided with training by an international/operational law attorney on the specific provisions of The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10, specifically the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, and AR 190-8.

3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be responsible for overall detainee operations throughout the Iraq Theater of Operations. I also recommend that the Provost Marshal General of the Army assign a minimum of two (2) subject matter experts, one officer and one NCO, to assist CJTF-7 in coordinating detainee operations.
4. (U) That detention facility commanders and interrogation facility commanders ensure that appropriate copies of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and notice of protections be made available in both English and the detainees' language and be prominently displayed in all detention facilities. Detainees with questions regarding their treatment should be given the full opportunity to read the Convention.
5. (U) That each detention facility commander and interrogation facility commander publish a complete and comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) regarding treatment of detainees, and that all personnel be required to read the SOPs and sign a document indicating that they have read and understand the SOPs.
6. (U) That in accordance with the recommendations of MG Ryder's Assessment Report, and my findings and recommendations in this investigation, all units in the Iraq Theater of Operations conducting internment/confinement/detainment operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for all purposes, to include action under the UCMJ, to CJTF-7.
7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF as the staff proponent for detainee operations in the Iraq Joint Operations Area (JOA). (MG Tom Miller, C3, CJTF-7, has been appointed by COMCJTF-7).
8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be conducted to determine the extent of culpability of Military Intelligence personnel, assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for detainee operations is assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate, with specialized training and knowledge of international and operational law, to assist and advise on matters of detainee operations.

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### (PART TWO)

(U) The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison:

REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION,  
I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. The 800th MP Brigade was responsible for theater-wide Internment and Resettlement (I/R) operations. (ANNEXES 45 and 95)
2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex during the time period covered in this investigation. (ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)
3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Operations at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility until TOA on 26 February 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 52)
4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the HVD Detention Facility until TOA on 4 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 55)
5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the MEK holding facility until TOA on 15 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 97)
6. (U) Detainee operations include accountability, care, and well being of Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Person, Civilian Detainees, and Other Detainees, as well as Iraqi criminal prisoners. (ANNEX 22)
7. (U) The accountability for detainees is doctrinally an MP task IAW FM 3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)
8. (U) There is a general lack of knowledge, implementation, and emphasis of basic legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP Brigade and its subordinate units. (Multiple witness statements in ANNEXES 45-91).

9. (U) The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after in-processing was inconsistent from detention facility to detention facility, compound to compound, encampment to encampment, and even shift to shift throughout the 800th MP Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)
10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP Battalion, had a “Criminal Detainee In-Processing SOP” and a “Training Outline” for transferring and releasing detainees, which appears to have been followed. (ANNEXES 38 and 52)
11. (U) Incoming and outgoing detainees are being documented in the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) as required by regulation at all detention facilities. However, it is underutilized and often does not give a “real time” accurate picture of the detainee population due to untimely updating. (ANNEX 56)
12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the accountability of detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. The 320th MP Battalion used a self-created “change sheet” to document the transfer of a detainee from one location to another. For proper accountability, it is imperative that these change sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be updated within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process would often take as long as 4 days to complete. This lag-time resulted in inaccurate detainee Internment Serial Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the detainee manifest and the actual occupants of an individual compound, and significant confusion of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP Battalion S-1, CPT Theresa Delbalso, and the S-3, MAJ David DiNenna, explained that this breakdown was due to the lack of manpower to process change sheets in a timely manner. (ANNEXES 39 and 98)
13. (U) The 320th Battalion TACSOP requires detainee accountability at least 4 times daily at Abu Ghraib. However, a detailed review of their operational journals revealed that these accounts were often not done or not documented by the unit. Additionally, there is no indication that accounting errors or the loss of a detainee in the accounting process triggered any immediate corrective action by the Battalion TOC. (ANNEX 44)
14. (U) There is a lack of standardization in the way the 320th MP Battalion conducted physical counts of their detainees. Each compound within a given encampment did their headcounts differently. Some compounds had detainees line up in lines of 10, some had them sit in rows, and some moved all the detainees to one end of the compound and counted them as they passed to the other end of the compound. (ANNEX 98)
15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls (100% ISN band checks) per day. The 320th MP Battalion did this check only 2 times per week. Due to the lack of real-time updates to the system, these checks were regularly inaccurate. (ANNEXES 22 and 98)

16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade and subordinate units adopted non-doctrinal terms such as “band checks,” “roll-ups,” and “call-ups,” which contributed to the lapses in accountability and confusion at the soldier level. (ANNEXES 63, 88, and 98)
17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds and the 320th Battalion TOC contained numerous unprofessional entries and flippant comments, which highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit. There was no indication that the journals were ever reviewed by anyone in their chain of command. (ANNEX 37)
18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fully developed and standing TACSOPs were widely ignored. Any SOPs that did exist were not trained on, and were never distributed to the lowest level. Most procedures were shelved at the unit TOC, rather than at the subordinate units and guards mount sites. (ANNEXES 44, 67, 71, and 85)
19. (U) Accountability and facility operations SOPs lacked specificity, implementation measures, and a system of checks and balances to ensure compliance. (ANNEXES 76 and 82)
20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced or utilized to develop the accountability practices throughout the 800th MP Brigade’s subordinate units. Daily processing, accountability, and detainee care appears to have been made up as the operations developed with reliance on, and guidance from, junior members of the unit who had civilian corrections experience. (ANNEX 21)
21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to conduct I/R operations prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)
22. (U) The documentation provided to this investigation identified 27 escapes or attempted escapes from the detention facilities throughout the 800th MP Brigade’s AOR. Based on my assessment and detailed analysis of the substandard accountability process maintained by the 800th MP Brigade, it is highly likely that there were several more unreported cases of escape that were probably “written off” as administrative errors or otherwise undocumented. 1LT Lewis Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, reported knowing about at least two additional escapes (one from a work detail and one from a window) from Abu Ghraib (BCCF) that were not documented. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion, detailed the escape of one detainee at the High Value Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and then outran the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade, stated that there were more than 32 escapes from her holding facilities, which does not match the number derived from the investigation materials. (ANNEXES 5-10, 45, 55, and 71)

23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities are significantly over their intended maximum capacity while the guard force is undermanned and under resourced. This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses at the various facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities also limits the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the detainee population who may be organizing escapes and riots within the facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)
24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of detainees who should not be in custody takes too long and contributes to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention facilities. There are currently three separate release mechanisms in the theater-wide internment operations. First, the apprehending unit can release a detainee if there is a determination that their continued detention is not warranted. Secondly, a criminal detainee can be released after it has been determined that the detainee has no intelligence value, and that their release would not be detrimental to society. BG Karpinski had signature authority to release detainees in this second category. Lastly, detainees accused of committing “Crimes Against the Coalition,” who are held throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7 AOR, can be released upon a determination that they are of no intelligence value and no longer pose a significant threat to Coalition Forces. The release process for this category of detainee is a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate Cell and a review by a Detainee Release Board consisting of BG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren, SJA, CJTF-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the “Detainee Release Authority” for detainees being held for committing crimes against the coalition. According to BG Karpinski, this category of detainee makes up more than 60% of the total detainee population, and is the fastest growing category. However, MG Fast, according to BG Karpinski, routinely denied the board’s recommendations to release detainees in this category who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly met the requirements for release. According to BG Karpinski, the extremely slow and ineffective release process has significantly contributed to the overcrowding of the facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45, and 46)
25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely being conducted after an escape or other serious incident. No lessons learned seem to have been disseminated to subordinate units to enable corrective action at the lowest level. The Investigation Team requested copies of AARs, and none were provided. (Multiple Witness Statements)
26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations from various 15-6 Investigations concerning escapes and accountability lapses) were rubber stamped as approved and ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is no evidence that the majority of her orders directing the implementation of substantive changes were ever acted upon. Additionally, there was no follow-up by the command to verify the corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and recommendations contained within their own investigations been analyzed and actually implemented by BG

Karpinski, many of the subsequent escapes, accountability lapses, and cases of abuse may have been prevented. (ANNEXES 5-10)

27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghraib and the detention facility at Camp Bucca is inadequate and needs to be improved to illuminate dark areas that have routinely become avenues of escape. (ANNEX 6)
28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are posted in English or in the language of the detainees at any of the detention facilities in the 800th MP Brigade's AOR, even after several investigations had annotated the lack of this critical requirement. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib BCCF) demonstrate questionable work ethics and loyalties, and are a potentially dangerous contingent within the Hard-Site. These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal inmates with contraband, weapons, and information. Additionally, they have facilitated the escape of at least one detainee. (ANNEX 8 and 26-SPC Polak's Statement)
30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan Corporation, CACI, etc...), third country nationals, and local contractors do not appear to be properly supervised within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During our on-site inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised free access in the detainee area. Having civilians in various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about the detainee area causes confusion and may have contributed to the difficulties in the accountability process and with detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, contended that the Detainee Rules of Engagement (DROE) and the general principles of the Geneva Convention were briefed at every guard mount and shift change on Abu Ghraib. However, none of our witnesses, nor our personal observations, support his contention. I find that SGM Emerson was not a credible witness. (ANNEXES 45, 80, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI Soldiers at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) received regular training on the basics of detainee operations; however, they have been unable to produce any verifying documentation, sign-in rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content of this training. (ANNEXES 59, 80, and the Absence of any Training Records)
33. (S/NF) The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees "ghost detainees." On at least one occasion, the 320th MP

Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of “ghost detainees” (6-8) for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law. (ANNEX 53)

34. (U) The following riots, escapes, and shootings have been documented and reported to this Investigation Team. Although there is no data from other missions of similar size and duration to compare the number of escapes with, the most significant factors derived from these reports are twofold. First, investigations and SIRs lacked critical data needed to evaluate the details of each incident. Second, each investigation seems to have pointed to the same types of deficiencies; however, little to nothing was done to correct the problems and to implement the recommendations as was ordered by BG Karpinski, nor was there any command emphasis to ensure these deficiencies were corrected:
- a. (U) 4 June 03- This escape was mentioned in the 15-6 Investigation covering the 13 June 03 escape, recapture, and shootings of detainees at Camp Vigilant (320th MP Battalion). However, no investigation or additional information was provided as requested by this investigation team. (ANNEX 7)
  - b. (U) 9 June 03- Riot and shootings of five detainees at Camp Cropper. (115th MP Battalion) Several detainees allegedly rioted after a detainee was subdued by MPs of the 115th MP Battalion after striking a guard in compound B of Camp Cropper. A 15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan (115th MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee had acted up and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs took off his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the detainees, which further escalated the riot. The MPs were overwhelmed and the guards fired lethal rounds to protect the life of the compound MPs, whereby 5 detainees were wounded. Contributing factors were poor communications, no clear chain of command, facility-obstructed views of posted guards, the QRF did not have non-lethal equipment, and the SOP was inadequate and outdated. (ANNEX 5)
  - c. (U) 12 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee #8399, escape and shooting of detainee # 7166, and attempted escape of an unidentified detainee from Camp Cropper Holding Area (115th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly made their escape in the nighttime hours prior to 0300. A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wendlandt (115th MP Battalion, S-2) concluded that the detainees allegedly escaped by crawling under the wire at a location with inadequate lighting. One detainee was stopped prior to escape. An MP of the 115th MP Battalion search team recaptured detainee # 8399, and detainee # 7166 was shot and killed by a Soldier during the recapture process. Contributing factors were overcrowding, poor lighting, and the nature of the hardened criminal detainees at that location. It is of particular note that the command was informed at least 24 hours in advance of the

upcoming escape attempt and started doing amplified announcements in Arabic stating the camp rules. The investigation pointed out that rules and guidelines were not posted in the camps in the detainees' native languages. (ANNEX 6)

- d. (U) 13 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee # 8968 and the shooting of eight detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly attempted to escape at about 1400 hours from the Camp Vigilant Compound, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wyks (400th MP Battalion, S-1) concluded that the detainee allegedly escaped by sliding under the wire while the tower guard was turned in the other direction. This detainee was subsequently apprehended by the QRF. At about 1600 the same day, 30-40 detainees rioted and pelted three interior MP guards with rocks. One guard was injured and the tower guards fired lethal rounds at the rioters injuring 7 and killing 1 detainee. (ANNEX 7)
- e. (U) 05 November 03- Escape of detainees # 9877 and # 10739 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 0345 from the Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SPC Warner (320th MP Battalion, S-3 RTO). The SIR indicated that 2 criminal prisoners escaped through their cell window in tier 3A of the Hard-Site. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 11)
- f. (U) 07 November 03- Escape of detainee # 14239 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1330 from Compound 2 of the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicated that a detainee escaped from the North end of the compound and was discovered missing during distribution of the noon meal, but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 12)
- g. (U) 08 November 03- Escape of detainees # 115089, # 151623, # 151624, # 116734, # 116735, and # 116738 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 2022 from Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by MAJ DiNenna (320th MP Battalion, S-3). The SIR indicated that 5-6 prisoners escaped from the North end of the compound, but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 13)
- h. (U) 24 November 03- Riot and shooting of 12 detainees # 150216, #150894, #153096, 153165, #153169, #116361, #153399, #20257, #150348, #152616, #116146, and #152156 at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly began to riot at about 1300 in all of the compounds at the

Ganci encampment. This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3 detainees, 9 wounded detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th MP Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that the detainees rioted in protest of their living conditions, that the riot turned violent, the use of non-lethal force was ineffective, and, after the 320th MP Battalion CDR executed "Golden Spike," the emergency containment plan, the use of deadly force was authorized. Contributing factors were lack of comprehensive training of guards, poor or non-existent SOPs, no formal guard-mount conducted prior to shift, no rehearsals or ongoing training, the mix of less than lethal rounds with lethal rounds in weapons, no AARs being conducted after incidents, ROE not posted and not understood, overcrowding, uniforms not standardized, and poor communication between the command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)

- i. (U) 24 November 03- Shooting of detainee at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly had a pistol in his cell and around 1830 an extraction team shot him with less than lethal and lethal rounds in the process of recovering the weapon. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220<sup>th</sup> Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that one of the detainees in tier 1A of the Hard Site had gotten a pistol and a couple of knives from an Iraqi Guard working in the encampment. Immediately upon receipt of this information, an ad-hoc extraction team consisting of MP and MI personnel conducted what they called a routine cell search, which resulted in the shooting of an MP and the detainee. Contributing factors were a corrupt Iraqi Guard, inadequate SOPs, the Detention ROE in place at the time was ineffective due to the numerous levels of authorization needed for use of lethal force, poorly trained MPs, unclear lanes of responsibility, and ambiguous relationship between the MI and MP assets. (ANNEX 8)
- j. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1030 in Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-dispersing round to break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 14)
- k. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1120 in Compound 2 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used two non-lethal shots to disperse the crowd,

which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 15)

- l. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Approximately 30-40 detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1642 in Compound 3 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicates that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-dispersing round to break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 16)
- m. (U) 17 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means of detainee from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly assaulted an MP at 1459 inside the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP BRIGADE, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that three detainees assaulted an MP, which resulted in the use of a non-lethal shot that calmed the situation. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 17)
- n. (U) 07 January 04- Escape of detainee #115032 from Camp Bucca (310<sup>th</sup> MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped between the hours of 0445 and 0640 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) and CPT Holsombeck (724<sup>th</sup> MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainee escaped through an undetected weakness in the wire. Contributing factors were inexperienced guards, lapses in accountability, complacency, lack of leadership presence, poor visibility, and lack of clear and concise communication between the guards and the leadership. (ANNEX 9)
- o. (U) 12 January 04- Escape of Detainees #115314 and #109950 as well as the escape and recapture of 5 unknown detainees at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility (310th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped around 0300 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. An AR 15-6 Investigation by LTC Leigh Coulter (800th MP Brigade, OIC Camp Arifjan Detachment) concluded that three of the detainees escaped through the front holding cell during conditions of limited visibility due to fog. One of the detainees was noticed, shot with a non-lethal round, and returned to his holding compound. That same night, 4 detainees exited through the wire on the South side of the camp and were seen and apprehended by the QRF. Contributing factors were the lack of a coordinated effort for emplacement of MPs during implementation of the fog plan, overcrowding, and poor communications. (ANNEX 10)

- p. (U) 14 January 04- Escape of detainee #12436 and missing Iraqi guard from Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1335 from the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicates that an Iraqi guard assisted a detainee to escape by signing him out on a work detail and disappearing with him. At the time of the second SIR, neither missing person had been located. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 99)
  
  - q. (U) 26 January 04- Escape of detainees #s 115236, 116272, and 151933 from Camp Bucca (310<sup>th</sup> MP Battalion). Several Detainees allegedly escaped between the hours of 0440 and 0700 during a period of intense fog. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainees crawled under a fence when visibility was only 10-15 meters due to fog. Contributing factors were the limited visibility (darkness under foggy conditions), lack of proper accountability reporting, inadequate number of guards, commencement of detainee feeding during low visibility operations, and poorly rested MPs. (ANNEX 18)
36. (U) As I have previously indicated, this investigation determined that there was virtually a complete lack of detailed SOPs at any of the detention facilities. Moreover, despite the fact that there were numerous reported escapes at detention facilities throughout Iraq (in excess of 35), AR 15-6 Investigations following these escapes were simply forgotten or ignored by the Brigade Commander with no dissemination to other facilities. After-Action Reports and Lessons Learned, if done at all, remained at individual facilities and were not shared among other commanders or soldiers throughout the Brigade. The Command never issued standard TTPs for handling escape incidents. (ANNEXES 5-10, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

#### RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) ANNEX 100 of this investigation contains a detailed and referenced series of recommendations for improving the detainee accountability practices throughout the OIF area of operations.
  
2. (U) Accountability practices throughout any particular detention facility must be standardized and in accordance with applicable regulations and international law.
  
3. (U) The NDRS and BATS accounting systems must be expanded and used to their fullest extent to facilitate real time updating when detainees are moved and or transferred from one location to another.

4. (U) "Change sheets," or their doctrinal equivalent must be immediately processed and updated into the system to ensure accurate accountability. The detainee roll call or ISN counts must match the manifest provided to the compound guards to ensure proper accountability of detainees.
5. (U) Develop, staff, and implement comprehensive and detailed SOPs utilizing the lessons learned from this investigation as well as any previous findings, recommendations, and reports.
6. (U) SOPs must be written, disseminated, trained on, and understood at the lowest level.
7. (U) Iraqi criminal prisoners must be held in separate facilities from any other category of detainee.
8. (U) All of the compounds should be wired into the master manifest whereby MP Soldiers can account for their detainees in real time and without waiting for their change sheets to be processed. This would also have the change sheet serve as a way to check up on the accuracy of the manifest as updated by each compound. The BATS and NDRS system can be utilized for this function.
9. (U) Accountability lapses, escapes, and disturbances within the detainment facilities must be immediately reported through both the operational and administrative Chain of Command via a Serious Incident Report (SIR). The SIRs must then be tracked and followed by daily SITREPs until the situation is resolved.
10. (U) Detention Rules of Engagement (DROE), Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), and the principles of the Geneva Conventions need to be briefed at every shift change and guard mount.
11. (U) AARs must be conducted after serious incidents at any given facility. The observations and corrective actions that develop from the AARs must be analyzed by the respective MP Battalion S-3 section, developed into a plan of action, shared with the other facilities, and implemented as a matter of policy.
12. (U) There must be significant structural improvements at each of the detention facilities. The needed changes include significant enhancement of perimeter lighting, additional chain link fencing, staking down of all concertina wire, hard site development, and expansion of Abu Ghraib (BCCF) .
13. (U) The Geneva Conventions and the facility rules must be prominently displayed in English and the language of the detainees at each compound and encampment at every detention facility IAW AR 190-8.

14. (U) Further restrict US civilians and other contractors' access throughout the facility. Contractors and civilians must be in an authorized and easily identifiable uniform to be more easily distinguished from the masses of detainees in civilian clothes.
15. (U) Facilities must have a stop movement/transfer period of at least 1 hour prior to every 100% detainee roll call and ISN counts to ensure accurate accountability.
16. (U) The method for doing head counts of detainees within a given compound must be standardized.
17. (U) Those military units conducting I/R operations must know of, train on, and constantly reference the applicable Army Doctrine and CJTF command policies. The references provided in this report cover nearly every deficiency I have enumerated. Although they do not, and cannot, make up for leadership shortfalls, all soldiers, at all levels, can use them to maintain standardized operating procedures and efficient accountability practices.

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (PART THREE)

(U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate:

Pursuant to Part Three of the Investigation, select members of the Investigation team (Primarily COL La Fate and I) personally interviewed the following witnesses:

1. (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade
2. (U) COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade
3. (U) COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA Ministry of Justice (Interviewed by COL Richard Gordon, CFLCC SJA)
4. (U) LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer, 800th MP Brigade
5. (U) LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade
6. (U) LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation)
7. (U) LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion
8. (U) LTC Vincent Montera, Commander, 310th MP Battalion
9. (U) LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade
10. (U) LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander, 724th MP Battalion and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade
11. (U) LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion
12. (U) MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade
13. (U) MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP Brigade
14. (U) MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade
15. (U) MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

16. (U) MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion
17. (U) MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade
18. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company
19. (U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company
20. (U) CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Battalion
21. (U) CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion
22. (U) CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade
23. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company
24. (U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company
25. (U) CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company
26. (U) CPT Michael Anthony Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP Company
27. (U) CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade
28. (U) 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company
29. (U) 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-camp to Brigade Commander, 800th MP Brigade
30. (U) 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP Battalion
31. (U) 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP Company
32. (U) CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade
33. (U) CSM Joseph P. Arrington, Command Sergeant Major, 320th MP Battalion
34. (U) SGM Pascual Cartagena, Acting Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP  
Brigade
35. (U) CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310th MP Battalion
36. (U) 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP Company
37. (U) SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion
38. (U) MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company

39. (U) MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th MP Battalion
40. (U) SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company
41. (U) SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company
42. (U) SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company
43. (U) SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company
44. (U) SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler, 42nd MP Detachment, 16th MP Brigade
45. (U) SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler, 523rd MP Detachment, 937th Engineer Group
46. (U) MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler, NAS Signal and Canine Unit
47. (U) Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian Contract Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade
48. (U) Mr. John Israel, US civilian Contract Interpreter, Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade  
(ANNEXES 45-91)

REGARDING PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE  
FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. (U) I find that BG Janis Karpinski took command of the 800th MP Brigade on 30 June 2003 from BG Paul Hill. BG Karpinski has remained in command since that date. The 800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight MP battalions in the Iraqi TOR: 115th MP Battalion, 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 324th MP Battalion, 400th MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, 724th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion.  
(ANNEXES 41 and 45)
2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members of the 800th MP Brigade believed they would be allowed to go home when all the detainees were released from the Camp Bucca Theater Internment Facility following the cessation of major ground combat on 1 May 2003. At one point, approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees were held at Camp Bucca. Through Article-5 Tribunals and a screening process, several thousand detainees were released. Many in the command believed they would go home when the detainees were released. In late May-early June 2003 the 800th MP Brigade was given a new mission to manage the Iraqi penal system and several detention centers. This new mission meant Soldiers would not redeploy to CONUS

when anticipated. Morale suffered, and over the next few months there did not appear to have been any attempt by the Command to mitigate this morale problem. (ANNEXES 45 and 96)

3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements of numerous witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade were not proficient in their basic MOS skills, particularly regarding internment/resettlement operations. Moreover, there is no evidence that the command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted to correct them in any systemic manner other than ad hoc training by individuals with civilian corrections experience. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
4. (U) I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately trained for a mission that included operating a prison or penal institution at Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. As the Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units of the 800th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific training during their mobilization period. MP units did not receive pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization and during the post mobilization training, and thus could not train for specific missions. The training that was accomplished at the mobilization sites were developed and implemented at the company level with little or no direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade levels, and consisted primarily of common tasks and law enforcement training. However, I found no evidence that the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever requested specific corrections training from the Commandant of the Military Police School, the US Army Confinement Facility at Mannheim, Germany, the Provost Marshal General of the Army, or the US Army Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and 76)
5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a civilian internee detention mission, Brigade personnel relied heavily on individuals within the Brigade who had civilian corrections experience, including many who worked as prison guards or corrections officials in their civilian jobs. Almost every witness we interviewed had no familiarity with the provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40. It does not appear that a Mission Essential Task List (METL) based on in-theater missions was ever developed nor was a training plan implemented throughout the Brigade. (ANNEXES 21, 22, 67, and 81)
6. (U) I also find, as did MG Ryder's Team, that the 800th MP Brigade as a whole, was understrength for the mission for which it was tasked. Army Doctrine dictates that an I/R Brigade can be organized with between 7 and 21 battalions, and that the average battalion size element should be able to handle approximately 4000 detainees at a time. This investigation indicates that BG Karpinski and her staff did a poor job allocating resources throughout the Iraq JOA. Abu Ghraib (BCCF) normally housed between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was operated by only one battalion. In contrast, the HVD Facility maintains only about 100 detainees, and is also run by an entire battalion. (ANNEXES 19, 22, and 96)

7. (U) Reserve Component units do not have an individual replacement system to mitigate medical or other losses. Over time, the 800th MP Brigade clearly suffered from personnel shortages through release from active duty (REFRAD) actions, medical evacuation, and demobilization. In addition to being severely undermanned, the quality of life for Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was extremely poor. There was no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or MWR facilities. There were numerous mortar attacks, random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious threat to Soldiers and detainees in the facility. The prison complex was also severely overcrowded and the Brigade lacked adequate resources and personnel to resolve serious logistical problems. Finally, because of past associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the Brigade, it appears that friendship often took precedence over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships. (ANNEX 101, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
8. (U) With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), I find that there was clear friction and lack of effective communication between the Commander, 205th MI Brigade, who controlled FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) after 19 November 2003, and the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, who controlled detainee operations inside the FOB. There was no clear delineation of responsibility between commands, little coordination at the command level, and no integration of the two functions. Coordination occurred at the lowest possible levels with little oversight by commanders. (ANNEXES 31, 45, and 46)
9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command relationship was exacerbated by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108 issued on 19 November 2003. Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment of 205th MI Brigade Commander's Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, states as follows:

3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.

3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER 205 MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR "SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION."

Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made all of the MP units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander, 205th MI Brigade. This effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agendas assigned to each of these respective specialties. (ANNEX 31)

- 10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001 defines Tactical Control (TACON) as the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. (ANNEX 42)

“TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant commander.”

11. (U) Based on all the facts and circumstances in this investigation, I find that there was little, if any, recognition of this TACON Order by the 800th MP Brigade or the 205th MI Brigade. Further, there was no evidence if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade clearly informed the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and specifically the Commander, 320th MP Battalion assigned at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), on the specific requirements of this TACON relationship. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)
12. (U) It is clear from a comprehensive review of witness statements and personal interviews that the 320th MP Battalion and 800th MP Brigade continued to function as if they were responsible for the security, health and welfare, and overall security of detainees within Abu Ghraib (BCCF) prison. Both BG Karpinski and COL Pappas clearly behaved as if this were still the case. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)
13. (U) With respect to the 320th MP Battalion, I find that the Battalion Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, was an extremely ineffective commander and leader. Numerous witnesses confirm that the Battalion S-3, MAJ David W. DiNenna, basically ran the battalion on a day-to-day basis. At one point, BG Karpinski sent LTC (P) Phillabaum to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait for approximately two weeks, apparently to give him some relief from the pressure he was experiencing as the 320th Battalion Commander. This movement to Camp Arifjan immediately followed a briefing provided by LTC (P) Phillabaum to the CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, near the end of October 2003. BG Karpinski placed LTC Ronald Chew, Commander of the 115th MP Battalion, in charge of the 320th MP Battalion for a period of approximately two weeks. LTC Chew was also in command of the 115th MP Battalion assigned to Camp Cropper, BIAP, Iraq. I could find no orders, either suspending or relieving LTC (P) Phillabaum from command, nor any orders placing LTC Chew in command of the 320th. In addition, there was no indication this removal and search for a replacement was communicated to the Commander CJTF-7, the Commander 377th TSC, or to Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion. Temporarily removing one commander and replacing him with another serving Battalion Commander without an order and without notifying superior or subordinate commands is without precedent in my military career. LTC (P) Phillabaum was also reprimanded for lapses in accountability that resulted in several escapes. The 320th MP Battalion was stigmatized as a unit due to previous detainee abuse which

occurred in May 2003 at the Bucca Theater Internment Facility (TIF), while under the command of LTC (P) Phillabaum. Despite his proven deficiencies as both a commander and leader, BG Karpinski allowed LTC (P) Phillabaum to remain in command of her most troubled battalion guarding, by far, the largest number of detainees in the 800th MP Brigade. LTC (P) Phillabaum was suspended from his duties by LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander on 17 January 2004. (ANNEXES 43, 45, and 61)

14. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during much of her testimony. What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers. (ANNEX 45 and the Personal Observations of the Interview Team)
15. (U) BG Karpinski alleged that she received no help from the Civil Affairs Command, specifically, no assistance from either BG John Kern or COL Tim Regan. She blames much of the abuse that occurred in Abu Ghraib (BCCF) on MI personnel and stated that MI personnel had given the MPs “ideas” that led to detainee abuse. In addition, she blamed the 372nd Company Platoon Sergeant, SFC Snider, the Company Commander, CPT Reese, and the First Sergeant, MSG Lipinski, for the abuse. She argued that problems in Abu Ghraib were the fault of COL Pappas and LTC Jordan because COL Pappas was in charge of FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEX 45)
16. (U) BG Karpinski also implied during her testimony that the criminal abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) might have been caused by the ultimate disposition of the detainee abuse cases that originally occurred at Camp Bucca in May 2003. She stated that “about the same time those incidents were taking place out of Baghdad Central, the decisions were made to give the guilty people at Bucca plea bargains. So, the system communicated to the soldiers, the worst that’s gonna happen is, you’re gonna go home.” I think it important to point out that almost every witness testified that the serious criminal abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) occurred in late October and early November 2003. The photographs and statements clearly support that the abuses occurred during this time period. The Bucca cases were set for trial in January 2004 and were not finally disposed of until 29 December 2003. There is entirely no evidence that the decision of numerous MP personnel to intentionally abuse detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was influenced in any respect by the Camp Bucca cases. (ANNEXES 25, 26, and 45)
17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP Brigade S-1, MAJ Hinzman and S-4, MAJ Green, were essentially dysfunctional, but that despite numerous complaints, these officers were not replaced. This had a detrimental effect on the Brigade Staff’s effectiveness and morale. Moreover, the Brigade Command Judge Advocate, LTC James O’Hare, appears to lack initiative and was unwilling to accept responsibility

for any of his actions. LTC Gary Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly supervise the Brigade staff by failing to lay out staff priorities, take overt corrective action when needed, and supervise their daily functions. (ANNEXES 45, 47, 48, 62, and 67)

18. (U) In addition to poor morale and staff inefficiencies, I find that the 800th MP Brigade did not articulate or enforce clear and basic Soldier and Army standards. I specifically found these examples of unenforced standards:
- a. There was no clear uniform standard for any MP Soldiers assigned detention duties. Despite the fact that hundreds of former Iraqi soldiers and officers were detainees, MP personnel were allowed to wear civilian clothes in the FOB after duty hours while carrying weapons. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)
  - b. Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on their helmets and soft caps. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)
  - c. In addition, numerous officers and senior NCOs have been reprimanded/disciplined for misconduct during this period. Those disciplined include; (ANNEXES 43 and 102)
    - 1). (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade
      - Memorandum of Admonishment by LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7, on 17 January 2004.
    - 2). (U) LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
      - GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade, on 10 November 2003, for lack of leadership and for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally
      - Suspended by BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, 17 January 2004; Pending Relief for Cause, for dereliction of duty
    - 3). (U) LTC Dale Burtyk, Commander, 400th MP Battalion
      - GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003, for failure to properly train his Soldiers. (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.
    - 4). (U) MAJ David DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
      - GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he personally observed; returned to soldier unfiled.

- GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally.
- 5). (U) MAJ Stacy Garrity, Finance Officer, 800th MP Brigade
  - GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming alcohol with an NCO; filed locally.
- 6). (U) CPT Leo Merck, Commander, 870th MP Company
  - Court-Martial Charges Preferred, for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Unauthorized Use of Government Computer in that he was alleged to have taken nude pictures of his female Soldiers without their knowledge; Trial date to be announced.
- 7). (U) CPT Damaris Morales, Commander, 770th MP Company
  - GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.
- 8). (U) CSM Roy Clement, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP Brigade
  - GOMOR and Relief for Cause from BG Janis Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, for fraternization and dereliction of duty for fraternizing with junior enlisted soldiers within his unit; GOMOR officially filed and he was removed from the CSM list.
- 9). (U) CSM Edward Stotts, Command Sergeant Major, 400th MP Battalion
  - GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally
- 10). (U) 1SG Carlos Villanueva, First Sergeant, 770th MP Company
  - GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.
- 11). (U) MSG David Maffett, NBC NCO, 800th MP Brigade,
  - GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming alcohol; filed locally.

- 12) (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion,
- Two GO Letters of Concern and a verbal reprimand from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, for failing to adhere to the guidance/directives given to him by BG Karpinski; filed locally.
- d. (U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not enforced. LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., Commander of the 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical Exploitation), testified that the saluting policy was enforced by COL Pappas for all MI personnel, and that BG Karpinski approached COL Pappas to reverse the saluting policy back to a no-saluting policy as previously existed. (ANNEX 53)
19. (U) I find that individual Soldiers within the 800th MP Brigade and the 320th Battalion stationed throughout Iraq had very little contact during their tour of duty with either LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG Karpinski. BG Karpinski claimed, during her testimony, that she paid regular visits to the various detention facilities where her Soldiers were stationed. However, the detailed calendar provided by her Aide-de-Camp, 1LT Mabry, does not support her contention. Moreover, numerous witnesses stated that they rarely saw BG Karpinski or LTC (P) Phillabaum. (Multiple Witness Statements)
20. (U) In addition I find that psychological factors, such as the difference in culture, the Soldiers' quality of life, the real presence of mortal danger over an extended time period, and the failure of commanders to recognize these pressures contributed to the pervasive atmosphere that existed at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility and throughout the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 1).
21. As I have documented in other parts of this investigation, I find that there was no clear emphasis by BG Karpinski to ensure that the 800th MP Brigade Staff, Commanders, and Soldiers were trained to standard in detainee operations and proficiency or that serious accountability lapses that occurred over a significant period of time, particularly at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), were corrected. AR 15-6 Investigations regarding detainee escapes were not acted upon, followed up with corrective action, or disseminated to subordinate commanders or Soldiers. Brigade and unit SOPs for dealing with detainees if they existed at all, were not read or understood by MP Soldiers assigned the difficult mission of detainee operations. Following the abuse of several detainees at Camp Bucca in May 2003, I could find no evidence that BG Karpinski ever directed corrective training for her soldiers or ensured that MP Soldiers throughout Iraq clearly understood the requirements of the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of detainees. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team )

22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was formally admonished in writing by LTG Sanchez regarding the serious deficiencies in her Brigade. LTG Sanchez found that the performance of the 800th MP Brigade had not met the standards set by the Army or by CJTF-7. He found that incidents in the preceding six months had occurred that reflected a lack of clear standards, proficiency and leadership within the Brigade. LTG Sanchez also cited the recent detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) as the most recent example of a poor leadership climate that “permeates the Brigade.” I totally concur with LTG Sanchez’ opinion regarding the performance of BG Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 102 and the Personal Observations of the Investigating Officer)

#### RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade be Relieved from Command and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
  - Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level detention facilities throughout Iraq had appropriate SOPs for dealing with detainees and that Commanders and Soldiers had read, understood, and would adhere to these SOPs.
  - Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade knew, understood, and adhered to the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
  - Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation Team as to the frequency of her visits to her subordinate commands.
  - Failing to obey an order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG McKiernan, regarding the withholding of disciplinary authority for Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer misconduct.
  - Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of a subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum.
  - Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade Staff including her XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4.
  - Failing to properly ensure the results and recommendations of the AARs and numerous 15-6 Investigation reports on escapes and shootings (over a period of several months) were properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinate commanders.
  - Failing to ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards throughout her command.
  - Failing to establish a Brigade METL.
  - Failing to establish basic proficiency in assigned tasks for Soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade.

- Failing to ensure that numerous and reported accountability lapses at detention facilities throughout Iraq were corrected.
2. (U) That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade, be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and Investigated UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
    - Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in and followed the IROE.
    - Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew, understood, and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
    - Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
  3. (U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from Command, be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and be removed from the Colonel/O-6 Promotion List for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
    - Failing to properly ensure the results, recommendations, and AARs from numerous reports on escapes and shootings over a period of several months were properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinates.
    - Failing to implement the appropriate recommendations from various 15-6 Investigations as specifically directed by BG Karpinski.
    - Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
    - Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
    - Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
    - Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
    - Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis and to task organize to accomplish his mission.
  4. (U) That LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be relieved from duty and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
    - Making material misrepresentations to the Investigating Team, including his leadership roll at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
    - Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control were properly trained in and followed the IROE.

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control knew, understood, and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
  - Failing to properly supervise soldiers under his direct authority working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
5. (U) That MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from his position as the Battalion S-3 and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
- Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he personally observed; GOMOR was returned to Soldier and not filed.
  - Failing to take corrective action and implement recommendations from various 15-6 investigations even after receiving a GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered; GOMOR was filed locally.
  - Failing to take appropriate action and report an incident of detainee abuse, whereby he personally witnessed a Soldier throw a detainee from the back of a truck.
6. (U) That CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from Command and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
  - Failing to properly supervise his Soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
  - Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
  - Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties as Platoon Leader and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
  - Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
  - Failing to properly establish and enforce basic Soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
8. (U) That SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from his duties and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
- Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating that he had “never” been admonished or reprimanded by BG Karpinski, when in fact he had been admonished for failing to obey an order from BG Karpinski to “stay out of the towers” at the holding facility.
  - Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating that he had attended every shift change/guard-mount conducted at the 320th MP Battalion, and that he personally briefed his Soldiers on the proper treatment of detainees, when in fact numerous statements contradict this assertion.
  - Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
  - Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
  - Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
  - Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
9. (U) That 1SG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties as First Sergeant of the 372nd MP Company and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
- Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP Company knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
  - Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
  - Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
  - Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
10. (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties, receive a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and receive action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
- Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

- Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
- Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
- Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
- Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct control, abused detainees by stomping on their bare hands and feet in his presence.

11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Contract US Civilian Interrogator, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his employment file, termination of employment, and generation of a derogatory report to revoke his security clearance for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

- Made a false statement to the investigation team regarding the locations of his interrogations, the activities during his interrogations, and his knowledge of abuses.
- Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations by “setting conditions” which were neither authorized and in accordance with applicable regulations/policy. He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse.

12. (U) That Mr. John Israel, Contract US Civilian Interpreter, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his employment file and have his security clearance reviewed by competent authority for the following acts or concerns which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

- Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in violation of the IROE, which is contrary to several witness statements.
- Did not have a security clearance.

13. (U) I find that there is sufficient credible information to warrant an Inquiry UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, be conducted to determine the extent of culpability of MI personnel, assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). Specifically, I suspect that COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, and Mr. John Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and strongly recommend immediate disciplinary action as described in the preceding paragraphs as well as the initiation of a Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of their culpability. (ANNEX 36)

## OTHER FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS

1. (U) Due to the nature and scope of this investigation, I acquired the assistance of Col (Dr.) Henry Nelson, a USAF Psychiatrist, to analyze the investigation materials from a psychological perspective. He determined that there was evidence that the horrific

abuses suffered by the detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) were wanton acts of select soldiers in an unsupervised and dangerous setting. There was a complex interplay of many psychological factors and command insufficiencies. A more detailed analysis is contained in ANNEX 1 of this investigation.

2. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during much of her testimony. What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its Soldiers. (ANNEX 45)
3. (U) Throughout the investigation, we observed many individual Soldiers and some subordinate units under the 800th MP Brigade that overcame significant obstacles, persevered in extremely poor conditions, and upheld the Army Values. We discovered numerous examples of Soldiers and Sailors taking the initiative in the absence of leadership and accomplishing their assigned tasks.
  - a. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Dennis McGlone, efficiently operated the HVD Detention Facility at Camp Cropper and met mission requirements with little to no guidance from the 800th MP Brigade. The unit was disciplined, proficient, and appeared to understand their basic tasks.
  - b. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Stephen J. Novotny, effectively maintained the MEK Detention Facility at Camp Ashraf. His Soldiers were proficient in their individual tasks and adapted well to this highly unique and non-doctrinal operation.
  - c. (U) The 165th MI Battalion excelled in providing perimeter security and force protection at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., demanded standards be enforced and worked endlessly to improve discipline throughout the FOB.

4. (U) The individual Soldiers and Sailors that we observed and believe should be favorably noted include:
  - a. (U) Master-at-Arms First Class William J. Kimbro, US Navy Dog Handler, knew his duties and refused to participate in improper interrogations despite significant pressure from the MI personnel at Abu Ghraib.
  - b. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company discovered evidence of abuse and turned it over to military law enforcement.
  - c. (U) 1LT David O. Sutton, 229th MP Company, took immediate action and stopped an abuse, then reported the incident to the chain of command.

## CONCLUSION

1. (U) Several US Army Soldiers have committed egregious acts and grave breaches of international law at Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore, key senior leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th MI Brigade failed to comply with established regulations, policies, and command directives in preventing detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bucca during the period August 2003 to February 2004.
2. (U) Approval and implementation of the recommendations of this AR 15-6 Investigation and those highlighted in previous assessments are essential to establish the conditions with the resources and personnel required to prevent future occurrences of detainee abuse.

## Annexes

1. Psychological Assessment
2. Request for investigation from CJTF-7 to CENTCOM
3. Directive to CFLCC from CENTCOM directing investigation
4. Appointment Memo from CFLCC CDR to MG Taguba
5. 15-6 Investigation 9 June 2003
6. 15-6 Investigation 12 June 2003
7. 15-6 Investigation 13 June 2003
8. 15-6 Investigation 24 November 2003
9. 15-6 Investigation 7 January 2004
10. 15-6 Investigation 12 January 2004
11. SIR 5 November 2003
12. SIR 7 November 2003
13. SIR 8 November 2003
14. SIR 13 December 2003
15. SIR 13 December 2003
16. SIR 13 December 2003
17. SIR 17 December 2003
18. Commander's Inquiry 26 January 2004
19. MG Ryder's Report, 6 November 2003
20. MG Miller's Report, 9 September 2003
21. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997
22. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001
23. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992
24. Fourth Geneva Convention, 12 August 1949
25. CID Report on criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib, 28 January 2004
26. CID Interviews, 10-25 January 2004
27. 800th MP Brigade Roster, 29 January 2004
28. 205th MI Brigade's IROE, Undated
29. TOA Order (800th MP Brigade) and letter holding witnesses
30. Investigation Team's witness list
31. FRAGO #1108
32. Letters suspending several key leaders in the 800th MP Brigade and Rating Chain with suspensions annotated
33. FM 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002
34. CID Report on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 8 June 2003
35. Article 32 Findings on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 26 August 2003
36. AR 381-10, 1 July 1984
37. Excerpts from log books, 320th MP Battalion
38. 310th MP Battalion's Inprocessing SOP
39. 320th MP Battalion's "Change Sheet"
40. Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center's (JIDC) Slides, Undated
41. Order of Battle Slides, 12 January 2004
42. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Actions Armed Forces, 10 July 2001

43. General Officer Memorandums of Reprimand
44. 800th MP Battalion's TACSOP
45. BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade
46. COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade
47. COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA Ministry of Justice
48. LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer, 800th MP Brigade
49. LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade
50. LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI Battalion (Tactical exploitation)
51. LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion
52. LTC Vincent Montera, Commander 310th MP Battalion
53. LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade
54. LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander 724th MP Battalion and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade
55. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion
56. MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade
57. MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP Brigade
58. MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade
59. MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
60. MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion
61. MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade
62. CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company
63. CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company
64. CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Battalion
65. CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion
66. CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade
67. LTC Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
68. CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company
69. CPT Michael A. Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP Company
70. CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade
71. 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company
72. 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-Camp to Brigade Commander, 800th MP Brigade
73. 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP Battalion
74. 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP Company
75. CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade
76. CSM Joseph P. Arrison, Command Sergeant Major, 320th MP Battalion
77. SGM Pascual Cartagena, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP Brigade
78. CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310th MP Battalion
79. 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP Company
80. SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion
81. MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company
82. MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th MP Battalion
83. SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company
84. SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company
85. SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company

86. SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company
87. SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler
88. SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler
89. MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler
90. Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian contract Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade
91. Mr. John Israel, US civilian contract Interpreter, Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade
92. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001
93. CJTF-7 IROE and DROE, Undated
94. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003
95. 800th MP Brigade Mobilization Orders
96. Sample Detainee Status Report, 13 March 2004
97. 530th MP Battalion Mission Brief, 11 February 2004
98. Memorandum for Record, CPT Ed Ray, Chief of Military Justice, CFLCC, 9 March 2004
99. SIR 14 January 2004
100. Accountability Plan Recommendations, 9 March 2004
101. 2LT Michael R. Osterhout, S-2, 320th MP Battalion
102. Memorandum of Admonishment from LTG Sanchez to BG Karpinski, 17 January 2004
103. Various SIRs from the 800th MP Brigade/320th MP Battalion
104. 205th MI Brigade SITREP to MG Miller, 12 December 2003
105. SGT William A. Cathcart, 372nd MP Company
106. 1LT Michael A. Drayton, Commander, 870th MP Company

# **Exhibit I**

**REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC)  
ON THE TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR  
AND OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ  
DURING ARREST, INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION**

**FEBRUARY 2004**

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  - 3.2 Military Intelligence section, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In its "Report on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and other protected persons in Iraq", the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) draws the attention of the Coalition Forces (hereafter called "the CF") to a number of serious violations of International Humanitarian Law. These violations have been documented and sometimes observed while visiting prisoners of war, civilian internees and other protected persons by the Geneva Conventions (hereafter called persons deprived of their liberty when their status is not specifically mentioned) in Iraq between March and November 2003. During its visits to places of internment of the CF, the ICRC collected allegations during private interviews with persons deprived of their liberty relating to the treatment by the CF of protected persons during their capture, arrest, transfer, internment and interrogation.

The main violations, which are described in the ICRC report and presented confidentially to the CF, include:

- Brutality against protected persons upon capture and initial custody, sometimes causing death or serious injury
- Absence of notification of arrest of persons deprived of their liberty to their families causing distress among persons deprived of their liberty and their families
- Physical or psychological coercion during interrogation to secure information
- Prolonged solitary confinement in cells devoid of daylight
- Excessive and disproportionate use of force against persons deprived of their liberty resulting in death or injury during their period of internment

Serious problems of conduct by the CF affecting persons deprived of their liberty are also presented in the report:

- Seizure and confiscation of private belongings of persons deprived of their liberty
- Exposure of persons deprived of their liberty to dangerous tasks
- Holding persons deprived of their liberty in dangerous places where they are not protected from shelling

According to allegations collected by ICRC delegates during private interviews with persons deprived of their liberty, ill-treatment during capture was frequent. While certain circumstances might require defensive precautions and the use of force on the part of battle group units, the ICRC collected allegations of ill-treatment following capture which took place in Baghdad, Basrah, Ramadi and Tikrit, indicating a consistent pattern with respect to times and places of brutal behavior during arrest. The repetition of such behavior by CF appeared to go beyond the reasonable, legitimate and proportional use of force required to apprehend suspects or restrain persons resisting arrest or capture, and seemed to reflect a usual modus operandi by certain CF battle group units.

According to the allegations collected by the ICRC, ill-treatment during interrogation was not systematic, except with regard to persons arrested in connection with suspected security offences or deemed to have an "intelligence" value. In these cases, persons deprived of their liberty under supervision of the Military Intelligence were at high risk of being subjected to a variety of harsh treatments ranging from

insults, threats and humiliations to both physical and psychological coercion, which in some cases was tantamount to torture, in order to force cooperation with their interrogators.

The ICRC also started to document what appeared to be widespread abuse of power and ill-treatment by the Iraqi police which is under the responsibility of the Occupying Powers, including threats to hand over persons in their custody to the CF so as to extort money from them, effective hand over of such persons to the custody of the CF on allegedly fake accusations, or invoking CF orders or instructions to mistreat persons deprived of their liberty during interrogation.

In the case of the "High Value Detainees" held in Baghdad International Airport, their continued internment, several months after their arrest, in strict **solitary confinement** in cells devoid of sunlight for nearly 23 hours a day constituted a serious violation of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.

The ICRC was also concerned about the **excessive and disproportionate use of force** by some detaining authorities against persons deprived of their liberty involved during their internment during periods of unrest or escape attempts that caused death and serious injuries. The use of firearms against persons deprived of their liberty in circumstances where methods without using firearms could have yielded the same result could amount to a serious violation of International Humanitarian Law. The ICRC reviewed a number of incidents of shootings of persons deprived of their liberty with live bullets, which have resulted in deaths or injuries during periods of unrest related to conditions of internment or escape attempts. Investigations initiated by the CF into these incidents concluded that the use of firearms against persons deprived of their liberty was legitimate. However, non-lethal measures could have been used to obtain the same results and quell the demonstrations or neutralize persons deprived of their liberty trying to escape.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the ICRC has regularly brought its concerns to the attention of the CF. The observations in the present report are consistent with those made earlier on several occasions orally and in writing to the CF throughout 2003. In spite of some improvements in the material conditions of internment, allegations of ill-treatment perpetrated by members of the CF against persons deprived of their liberty continued to be collected by the ICRC and thus suggested that the use of ill-treatment against persons deprived of their liberty went beyond exceptional cases and might be considered as a practice tolerated by the CF.

The ICRC report does not aim to be exhaustive with regard to breaches of International Humanitarian Law by the CF in Iraq. Rather, it illustrates priority areas that warrant attention and corrective action on the part of CF, in compliance with their International Humanitarian Law obligations.

Consequently the ICRC asks the authorities of the CF in Iraq:

- to respect at all times the human dignity, physical integrity and cultural sensitivity of the persons deprived of their liberty held under their control
- to set up a system of notifications of arrest to ensure quick and accurate transmission of information to the families of persons deprived of their liberty

- to prevent all forms of ill-treatment, moral or physical coercion of persons deprived of their liberty in relation to interrogation
- to set up an internment regime which ensures the respect of the psychological integrity and human dignity of the persons deprived of their liberty
- to ensure that all persons deprived of their liberty are allowed sufficient time every day outside in the sunlight, and that they are allowed to move and exercise in the outside yard
- to define and apply regulations and sanctions compatible with International Humanitarian Law and to ensure that persons deprived of their liberty are fully informed upon arrival about such regulations and sanctions
- to thoroughly investigate violations of International Humanitarian Law in order to determine responsibilities and prosecute those found responsible for violations of International Humanitarian Law
- to ensure that battle group units arresting individuals and staff in charge of internment facilities receive adequate training enabling them to operate in a proper manner and fulfill their responsibilities as arresting authority without resorting to ill-treatment or making excessive use of force.

## INTRODUCTION

1. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is mandated by the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions to monitor the full application of and respect for the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions regarding the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty. The ICRC reminds the High Contracting Parties concerned, usually in a confidential way, of their humanitarian obligations under all four Geneva Conventions, in particular the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions as far as the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty is concerned and under Protocol I of 1977 additional to the Geneva Conventions, confirmed and reaffirmed rules of customary law and universally acknowledged principles of humanity.

The information contained in this report is based on allegations collected by the ICRC in private interviews with persons deprived of their liberty during its visits to places of internment of the Coalition Forces (CF) between March and November 2003. The allegations have been thoroughly revised in order to present this report as factually as possible. The report is also based on other accounts given either by fellow persons deprived of their liberty inside internment facilities or by family members. During this period, the ICRC conducted some 29 visits in 14 internment facilities in the central and southern parts of the country. The testimonies were collected in Camp Cropper (Core Holding Area, Military Intelligence section, "High Value Detainees" section); Al-Salihyye, Tasferat and Al-Russafa prisons; Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility (including Camp Vigilant and the "Military Intelligence" section); Umm Qasr and Camp Bucca, as well as several temporary internment places such as Tallil Trans-shipment Place, Camp Condor, Amarah Camp and the Field Hospital in Shaibah.

The ICRC conditions for visits to persons deprived of their liberty in internment facilities are common for all countries where the organization operates. They can be expressed as follows:

- The ICRC must have access to all persons deprived of their liberty who come within its mandate in their place of internment
- The ICRC must be able to talk freely and in private with the persons deprived of their liberty of its choice and to register their identity
- The ICRC must be authorized to repeat its visits to the persons deprived of their liberty
- The ICRC must be notified of arrests, transfers and releases by the detaining authorities

Each visit to persons deprived of their liberty is carried out in accordance with ICRC's working procedures expressed as follows:

- At the beginning of each visit, the ICRC delegates speak with the detaining authorities to present the ICRC's mandate and the purpose of the visit as well as to obtain general information on internment conditions, total of interned population and movements of persons deprived of their liberty (release, arrest, transfer, death, hospitalization).
- The ICRC delegates, accompanied by the detaining authorities tour the internment premises.

- The ICRC delegates hold private interviews with persons of their choice who are deprived of their liberty, with no time limit in a place freely chosen and if necessary register them.
  - At the end of each visit, the delegates hold a final talk with the detaining authorities to inform them about the ICRC's findings and recommendations.
2. The aim of the report is to present information collected by the ICRC concerning the treatment of prisoners of war by the CF, civilian internees and other protected persons deprived of their liberty during the process of arrest, transfer, internment and interrogation.
3. The main places of internment where mistreatment allegedly took place included battle group unit stations; the military intelligence sections of Camp Cropper and Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility; Al-Baghdadi, Heat Base and Habbania Camp in Ramadi governorate; Tikrit holding area (former Saddam Hussein Islamic School); a former train station in Al-Kha'im, near the Syrian border, turned into a military base; the Ministry of Defense and Presidential Palace in Baghdad, the former *mukhabarat* office in Basrah, as well as several Iraqi police stations in Baghdad.
4. In most cases, the allegations of ill-treatment referred to acts that occurred prior to the internment of persons deprived of their liberty in regular internment facilities, while they were in the custody of arresting authorities or military and civilian intelligence personnel. When persons deprived of their liberty were transferred to regular internment facilities, such as those administered by the military police, where the behavior of guards was strictly supervised, ill-treatment of the type described in this report usually ceased. In these places, violations of provisions of International Humanitarian Law relating to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty were a result of the generally poor standard of internment conditions (long term internment in unsuitable temporary facilities) or of the use of what appeared to be excessive force to quell unrest or to prevent attempted escapes.

## 1. TREATMENT DURING ARREST

5. Protected persons interviewed by ICRC delegates have described a fairly consistent pattern with respect to times and places of brutality by members of the CF arresting them.
6. Arrests as described in these allegations tended to follow a pattern. Arresting authorities entered houses usually after dark, breaking down doors, waking up residents roughly, yelling orders, forcing family members into one room under military guard while searching the rest of the house and further breaking doors, cabinets and other property. They arrested suspects, tying their hands in the back with flexi-cuffs, hooding them, and taking them away. Sometimes they arrested all adult males present in a house, including elderly, handicapped or sick people. Treatment often included pushing people around, insulting, taking aim with rifles, punching and kicking and striking with rifles. Individuals were often led away in whatever they happened to be wearing at the time of arrest – sometimes in pyjamas or underwear – and were denied the opportunity to gather a few essential belongings, such as clothing, hygiene items, medicine or eyeglasses. Those who surrendered with a

suitcase often had their belongings confiscated. In many cases personal belongings were seized during the arrest, with no receipt being issued (*see section 6, below*).

7. Certain CF military intelligence officers told the ICRC that in their estimate between 70% and 90% of the persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq had been arrested by mistake. They also attributed the brutality of some arrests to the lack of proper supervision of battle group units.

8. *In accordance with provisions of International Humanitarian Law which oblige the CF to treat prisoners of war and other protected persons humanely and to protect them against acts of violence, threats thereof, intimidation and insults (Art. 13, 14, 17, 87, Third Geneva Convention; Art. 5, 27, 31, 32, 33 Fourth Geneva Convention), the ICRC asks the authorities of CF to respect at all times the human dignity, physical integrity and cultural sensitivity of the persons deprived of their liberty held under their control. The ICRC also asks the authorities of CF to ensure that battle group units arresting individuals receive adequate training enabling them to operate in a proper manner and fulfill their responsibilities without resorting to brutality or using excessive force.*

#### 1.1 Notification to families and information for arrestees

9. In almost all instances documented by the ICRC, arresting authorities provided no information about who they were, where their base was located, nor did they explain the cause of arrest. Similarly, they rarely informed the arrestee or his family where he was being taken and for how long, resulting in the de facto "disappearance" of the arrestee for weeks or even months until contact was finally made.

10. When arrests were made in the streets, along the roads, or at checkpoints, families were not informed about what had happened to the arrestees until they managed to trace them or received news about them through persons who had been deprived of their liberty but were later released, visiting family members of fellow persons deprived of their liberty, or ICRC Red Cross Messages. In the absence of a system to notify the families of the whereabouts of their arrested relatives, many were left without news for months, often fearing that their relatives unaccounted for were dead.

11. Nine months into the present conflict, there is still no satisfactorily functioning system of notification to the families of captured or arrested persons, even though hundreds of arrests continue to be carried out every week. While the main places of internment (Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib) are part of a centralized notification system through the National Information Bureau (and their data are forwarded electronically to the ICRC on a regular basis), other places of internment such as Mosul or Tikrit are not. Notifications from those places therefore depend solely on capture or internment cards as stipulated by the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.

Since March 2003 capture cards have often been filled out carelessly, resulting in unnecessary delays of several weeks or months before families were notified, and sometimes resulting in no notification at all. It is the responsibility of the detaining

authority to see to it that each capture or internment card is carefully filled out so that the ICRC is in a position to effectively deliver them to families. The current system of General Information Centers (GIC), set up under the responsibility of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACC), while an improvement, remains inadequate, as families outside the main towns do not have access to them, lists made available are not complete and often outdated and do not reflect the frequent transfers from one place of internment to another. In the absence of a better alternative, the ICRC's delivery of accurate capture cards remains the most reliable, prompt and effective system to notify the families, provided cards are properly filled out.

The ICRC has raised this issue repeatedly with the detaining authorities since March 2003, including at the highest level of the CF in August 2003. Despite some improvement, hundreds of families have had to wait anxiously for weeks and sometimes months before learning of the whereabouts of their arrested family members. Many families travel for weeks throughout the country from one place of internment to another in search of their relatives and often come to learn about their whereabouts informally (through released detainees) or when the person deprived of his liberty is released and returns home.

12. Similarly, transfers, cases of sickness at the time of arrest, deaths, escapes or repatriations continue to be notified only insufficiently or are not notified at all by the CF to the families in spite of their obligation to do so under International Humanitarian Law.

13. *In accordance with provisions of both the Third Geneva Convention (Art. 70, 122, 123) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (Art. 106, 136, 137, 138, 140), the ICRC reminds the CF of their treaty-based obligation to notify promptly the families of all prisoners of war and other protected persons captured or arrested by them. Within one week, prisoners of war and civilian internees must be allowed to fill out capture or internment cards mentioning at the very least their capture/arrest, address (current place of detention/internment) and state of health. These cards must be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in any manner. As long as there is no centralized system of notifications of arrest set up by CF, it is of paramount importance that these capture cards be filled out properly, so as to allow the ICRC to transmit them rapidly to the concerned families.*

14. *The same obligation of notification to families of captured or arrested persons applies to transfers, cases of sickness, deaths, escapes and repatriation and identification of the dead of the adverse party. All these events must be notified to the ICRC with the full details of the persons concerned, so as to allow the ICRC to inform the concerned families (Art. 120, 121, 122, 123 Third Geneva Convention; Art. 129, 130, 136, 137, 140 Fourth Geneva Convention).*

## 2. TREATMENT DURING TRANSFER AND INITIAL CUSTODY

15. The ICRC collected several allegations indicating that following arrest, persons deprived of their liberty were ill-treated, sometimes during transfer from their place of arrest to their initial internment facility. This ill-treatment would normally stop

by the time the persons reached a regular internment facility, such as Camp Cropper, Camp Bucca or Abu Ghraib. The ICRC also collected one allegation of death resulting from harsh conditions of interment and ill-treatment during initial custody.

16. One allegation collected by the ICRC concerned the arrest of nine men by the CF in a hotel in Basrah on 13 September 2003. Following their arrest, the nine men were made to kneel, face and hands against the ground, as if in a prayer position. The soldiers stamped on the back of the neck of those raising their head. They confiscated their money without issuing a receipt. The suspects were taken to Al-Hakimiya, a former office previously used by the *mukhabarat* in Basrah and then beaten severely by CF personnel. One of the arrestees died following the ill-treatment (██████████, aged 28, married, father of two children). Prior to his death, his co-arrestees heard him screaming and asking for assistance.

The issued "International Death Certificate" mentioned "Cardio-respiratory arrest – asphyxia" as the condition directly leading to the death. As to the cause of that condition, it mentioned "Unknown" and "Refer to the coroner". The certificate did not bear any other mention. An eyewitness' description of the body given to the ICRC mentioned a broken nose, several broken ribs and skin lesions on the face consistent with beatings. The father of the victim was informed of his death on 18 September, and was invited to identify the body of his son. On 3 October, the commander of the CF in Basrah presented to him his condolences and informed him that an investigation had been launched and that those responsible would be punished. Two other persons deprived of their liberty were hospitalised with severe injuries. Similarly, a week later, an ICRC medical doctor examined them in the hospital and observed large haematomas with dried scabs on the abdomen, buttocks, sides, thigh, wrists, nose and forehead consistent with their accounts of beatings received.

17. During a visit of the ICRC in Camp Bucca on 22 September 2003, a 61-year old person deprived of his liberty alleged that he had been tied, hooded and forced to sit on the hot surface of what he surmised to be the engine of a vehicle, which had caused severe burns to his buttocks. The victim had lost consciousness. The ICRC observed large crusted lesions consistent with his allegation.

18. The ICRC examined another person deprived of his liberty in the "High Value Detainees" section in October 2003 who had been subjected to a similar treatment. He had been hooded, handcuffed in the back, and made to lie face down, on a hot surface during transportation. This had caused severe skin burns that required three months hospitalization. At the time of the interview he had been recently discharged from hospital. He had to undergo several skin grafts, the amputation of his right index finger, and suffered the permanent loss of the use of his left fifth finger secondary to burn-induced skin retraction. He also suffered extensive burns over the abdomen, anterior aspects of the lower extremities, the palm of his right hand and the sole of his left foot. The ICRC recommended to the CF that the case be investigated to determine the cause and circumstances of the injuries and the authority responsible for the ill-treatment. At the time of writing the results of the report were still pending.

19. During transportation following arrest, persons deprived of their liberty were almost always hooded and tightly restrained with flexi-cuffs. They were occasionally

haematoma and linear marks compatible with repeated whipping or beating. He had wrist marks compatible with tight flexi-cuffs.

The ICRC also collected allegations of deaths as a result of harsh internment conditions, ill-treatment, lack of medical attention, or the combination thereof, notably in Tikrit holding area formerly known as the Saddam Hussein Islamic School.

22. Some CF military intelligence officers told the ICRC that the widespread ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty during arrest, initial internment and "tactical questioning" was due to a lack of military police on the ground to supervise and control the behavior and activities of the battle groups units, and the lack of experience of intelligence officers in charge of the "tactical questioning".

23. *In accordance with provisions of International Humanitarian Law which oblige the CF to treat prisoners of war and other protected persons humanely and to protect them against acts of violence, threats thereof, intimidation and insults (Art. 13, 14, 17, 87, Third Geneva Convention; Articles 5, 27, 31, 32, 33 Fourth Geneva Convention), the ICRC asks the authorities of the CF to respect at all times the human dignity, physical integrity and cultural sensibility of the persons deprived of their liberty held in Iraq under their control.*

*The ICRC also asks the authorities of the CF to ensure that battle group units transferring and/or holding individuals receive adequate training enabling them to operate in a proper manner and meet their responsibilities without resorting to brutality or using excessive force.*

### 3. TREATMENT DURING INTERROGATION

24. Arrests were usually followed by temporary internment at battle group level or at initial interrogation facilities managed by military intelligence personnel, but accessible to other intelligence personnel (especially in the case of security detainees). The ill-treatment by the CF personnel during interrogation was not systematic, except with regard to persons arrested in connection with suspected security offences or deemed to have an "intelligence" value. In these cases, persons deprived of their liberty supervised by the military intelligence were subjected to a variety of ill-treatments ranging from insults and humiliation to both physical and psychological coercion that in some cases might amount to torture in order to force them to cooperate with their interrogators. In certain cases, such as in Abu Ghraib military intelligence section, methods of physical and psychological coercion used by the interrogators appeared to be part of the standard operating procedures by military intelligence personnel to obtain confessions and extract information. Several military intelligence officers confirmed to the ICRC that it was part of the military intelligence process to hold a person deprived of his liberty naked in a completely dark and empty cell for a prolonged period to use inhumane and degrading treatment, including physical and psychological coercion, against persons deprived of their liberty to secure their cooperation.

### 3.1 Methods of ill-treatment

25. The methods of ill-treatment most frequently alleged during interrogation included

- Hooding, used to prevent people from seeing and to disorient them, and also to prevent them from breathing freely. One or sometimes two bags, sometimes with an elastic blindfold over the eyes which, when slipped down, further impeded proper breathing. Hooding was sometimes used in conjunction with beatings thus increasing anxiety as to when blows would come. The practice of hooding also allowed the interrogators to remain anonymous and thus to act with impunity. Hooding could last for periods from a few hours to up to 2 to 4 consecutive days, during which hoods were lifted only for drinking, eating or going to the toilets;
- Handcuffing with flexi-cuffs, which were sometimes made so tight and used for such extended periods that they caused skin lesions and long-term after-effects on the hands (nerve damage), as observed by the ICRC;
- Beatings with hard objects (including pistols and rifles), slapping, punching, kicking with knees or feet on various parts of the body (legs, sides, lower back, groin);
- Pressing the face into the ground with boots;
- Threats (of ill-treatment, reprisals against family members, imminent execution or transfer to Guantanamo);
- Being stripped naked for several days while held in solitary confinement in an empty and completely dark cell that included a latrine.
- Being held in solitary confinement combined with threats (to intern the individual indefinitely, to arrest other family members, to transfer the individual to Guantanamo), insufficient sleep, food or water deprivation, minimal access to showers (twice a week), denial of access to open air and prohibition of contacts with other persons deprived of their liberty;
- Being paraded naked outside cells in front of other persons deprived of their liberty, and guards, sometimes hooded or with women's underwear over the head;
- Acts of humiliation such as being made to stand naked against the wall of the cell with arms raised or with women's underwear over the head for prolonged periods – while being laughed at by guards, including female guards, and sometimes photographed in this position;
- Being attached repeatedly over several days, for several hours each time, with handcuffs to the bars of their cell door in humiliating (i.e. naked or in underwear) and/or uncomfortable position causing physical pain;
- Exposure while hooded to loud noise or music, prolonged exposure while hooded to the sun over several hours, including during the hottest time of the day when temperatures could reach 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit) or higher;
- Being forced to remain for prolonged periods in stress positions such as squatting or standing with or without the arms lifted.

26. These methods of physical and psychological coercion were used by the military intelligence in a systematic way to gain confessions and extract information or other forms of co-operation from persons who had been arrested in connection with suspected security offences or deemed to have an "intelligence value".

### 3.2 Military Intelligence section, "Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility"

27. In mid-October 2003, the ICRC visited persons deprived of their liberty undergoing interrogation by military intelligence officers in Unit 1A, the "isolation section" of "Abu Ghraib" Correctional Facility. Most of these persons deprived of their liberty had been arrested in early October. During the visit, ICRC delegates directly witnessed and documented a variety of methods used to secure the cooperation of the persons deprived of their liberty with their interrogators. In particular they witnessed the practice of keeping persons deprived of their liberty completely naked in totally empty concrete cells and in total darkness, allegedly for several consecutive days. Upon witnessing such cases, the ICRC interrupted its visits and requested an explanation from the authorities. The military intelligence officer in charge of the interrogation explained that this practice was "part of the process". The process appeared to be a give-and-take policy whereby persons deprived of their liberty were "drip-fed" with new items (clothing, bedding, hygiene articles, lit cell, etc.) in exchange for their "cooperation". The ICRC also visited other persons deprived of their liberty held in total darkness, others in dimly lit cells who had been allowed to dress following periods during which they had been held naked. Several had been given women's underwear to wear under their jumpsuit (men's underwear was not distributed), which they felt to be humiliating.

The ICRC documented other forms of ill-treatment, usually combined with those described above, including threats, insults, verbal violence, sleep deprivation caused by the playing of loud music or constant light in cells devoid of windows, tight handcuffing with flexi-cuffs causing lesions and wounds around the wrists. Punishment included being made to walk in the corridors handcuffed and naked, or with women's underwear on the head, or being handcuffed either dressed or naked to the bed bars or the cell door. Some persons deprived of their liberty presented physical marks and psychological symptoms, which were compatible with these allegations. The ICRC medical delegate examined persons deprived of their liberty presenting signs of concentration difficulties, memory problems, verbal expression difficulties, incoherent speech, acute anxiety reactions, abnormal behaviour and suicidal tendencies. These symptoms appeared to have been caused by the methods and duration of interrogation. One person held in isolation that the ICRC examined, was unresponsive to verbal and painful stimuli. His heart rate was 120 beats per minute and his respiratory rate 18 per minute. He was diagnosed as suffering from somatoform (mental) disorder, specifically a conversion disorder, most likely due to the ill-treatment he was subjected to during interrogation.

According to the allegations collected by the ICRC, detaining authorities also continued to keep persons deprived of their liberty during the period of interrogation, uninformed of the reason for their arrest. They were often questioned without knowing what they were accused of. They were not allowed to ask questions and were not provided with an opportunity to seek clarification about the reason for their arrest. Their treatment tended to vary according to their degree of cooperation with their interrogators: those who cooperated were afforded preferential treatment such as being allowed contacts with other persons deprived of their liberty, being allowed to phone their families, being given clothes, bedding equipment, food, water or cigarettes, being allowed access to showers, being held in a lit cell, etc.

### 3.3 Umm Qasr (JFIT) and Camp Bucca (JIF/ICE)

28. Since the establishment of Umm Qasr camp and its successor, Camp Bucca, persons deprived of their liberty undergoing interrogation, whether they had been arrested by British, Danish, Dutch or Italian armed forces were segregated from other internees in a separate section of the camp designed for investigation. This section was initially operated by the British Armed Forces who called it Joint Field Intelligence Team (JFIT). On 7 April, its administration was handed over to the US Armed Forces, which renamed it Joint Interrogation Facility/Interrogation Control Element (JIF/ICE). On 25 September 2003, its administration was handed back to the British Armed Forces.

29. CF intelligence personnel interrogated persons deprived of their liberty of concern to them in this section. They were either accused of attacks against the CF or deemed to have an "intelligence value". They could be held there from a few days to several weeks, until their interrogation was completed. During a visit in September 2003, the ICRC interviewed in that section several persons deprived of their liberty that had been held there for periods from three to four weeks.

30. Initially, inmates were routinely treated by their guards with general contempt, with petty violence such as having orders screamed at them and being cursed, kicked, struck with rifle butts, roughed up or pushed around. They were reportedly handcuffed in the back and hooded for the duration of the interrogation and were prohibited from talking to each other or to the guards. Hooding appeared to be motivated by security concerns as well as to be part of standard intimidation techniques used by military intelligence personnel to frighten inmates into cooperating. This was combined with deliberately maintaining uncertainty about what would happen to the inmates, and a generally hostile attitude on the part of the guards. Conditions of internment improved according to the degree of cooperation of the persons deprived of his liberty. Interrogated persons deprived of their liberty were held in two separate sections. Those under initial investigation were reportedly not allowed to talk to each other (purportedly to avoid exchange of information and "versions of events" between them). They were not allowed to stand up or walk out of the tent but they had access to water with which to wash themselves. Once they had cooperated with their interrogators, they were transferred to the "privileged" tent where the above-mentioned restrictions were lifted.

31. Persons deprived of their liberty undergoing interrogation by the CF were allegedly subjected to frequent cursing, insults and threats, both physical and verbal, such as having rifles aimed at them in a general way or directly against the temple, the back of the head, or the stomach, and threatened with transfer to Guantanamo, death or indefinite internment. Besides mentioning the general climate of intimidation maintained as one of the methods used to pressure persons deprived of their liberty to cooperate with their interrogators, none of those interviewed by the ICRC in Umm Qasr and Camp Bucca spoke of physical ill-treatment during interrogation. All allegations of ill-treatment referred to the phase of arrest, initial internment (at collecting points, holding areas) and "tactical questioning" by military intelligence officers attached to battle group units, prior to transfer to Camp Bucca.

### **3.4 Previous actions taken by the ICRC in 2003 on the issue of treatment**

32. On 1 April, the ICRC informed orally the political advisor of the commander of British Armed Forces at the CF Central Command in Doha about methods of ill-treatment used by military intelligence personnel to interrogate persons deprived of their liberty in the internment camp of Umm Qasr. This intervention had the immediate effect to stop the systematic use of hoods and flexi-cuffs in the interrogation section of Umm Qasr. Brutal treatment of persons deprived of their liberty also allegedly ceased when the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade took over the guarding of that section in Umm Qasr. UK Forces handed over Umm Qasr holding area to the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade on 09.04.03. The 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade then built Camp Bucca two kilometers away.

33. In May 2003, the ICRC sent to the CF a memorandum based on over 200 allegations of ill-treatment of prisoners of war during capture and interrogation at collecting points, battle group stations and temporary holding areas. The allegations were consistent with marks on bodies observed by the medical delegate. The memorandum was handed over to [REDACTED] US Central Command in Doha, State of Qatar. Subsequently, one improvement consisted in the removal of wristbands with the remark "terrorist" given to foreign detainees.

34. In early July the ICRC sent the CF a working paper detailing approximately 50 allegations of ill-treatment in the military intelligence section of Camp Cropper, at Baghdad International Airport. They included a combination of petty and deliberate acts of violence aimed at securing the cooperation of the persons deprived of their liberty with their interrogators: threats (to intern individuals indefinitely, to arrest other family members, to transfer individuals to Guantanamo) against persons deprived of their liberty or against members of their families (in particular wives and daughters); hooding; tight handcuffing; use of stress positions (kneeling, squatting, standing with arms raised over the head) for three or four hours; taking aim at individuals with rifles, striking them with rifle butts, slaps, punches, prolonged exposure to the sun, and isolation in dark cells. ICRC delegates witnessed marks on the bodies of several persons deprived of their liberty consistent with their allegations. In one illustrative case, a person deprived of his liberty arrested at home by the CF on suspicion of involvement in an attack against the CF, was allegedly beaten during interrogation in a location in the vicinity of Camp Cropper. He alleged that he had been hooded and cuffed with flexi-cuffs, threatened to be tortured and killed, urinated on, kicked in the head, lower back and groin, force-fed a baseball which was tied into the mouth using a scarf and deprived of sleep for four consecutive days. Interrogators would allegedly take turns ill-treating him. When he said he would complain to the ICRC he was allegedly beaten more. An ICRC medical examination revealed haematoma in the lower back, blood in urine, sensory loss in the right hand due to tight handcuffing with flexi-cuffs, and a broken rib.

Shortly after that intervention was sent, the military intelligence internment section was closed and persons deprived of their liberty were transferred to what became the "High Value Detainees" section of the airport, a regular internment facility under the command of the 115th Military Police Battalion. From this time onwards, the ICRC observed that the ill-treatment of this category of persons deprived of their liberty by

military intelligence declined significantly and even stopped, while their interrogation continued through to the end of the year 2003.

### **3.5 Allegations of ill-treatment by Iraqi police**

35. The ICRC has also collected a growing body of allegations relating to widespread abuse of power and ill-treatment of persons in the custody of Iraqi police. This included the extensive practice of threatening to handover these persons to the CF for internment, or claiming to act under the CF instructions, in order to abuse their power and extort money from persons taken in custody. Allegations collected by the ICRC indicated that numerous people had been handed over to the CF on the basis of unfounded accusations (of hostility against the CF, or belonging to opposition forces) because they were unable or unwilling, to pay bribes to the police. Alleged ill-treatment during arrest and transportation included hooding, tight handcuffing, verbal abuse, beating with fists and rifle butts, and kicking. During interrogation, the detaining authorities allegedly whipped persons deprived of their liberty with cables on the back, kicked them in the lower parts of the body, including in the testicles, handcuffed and left them hanging from the iron bars of the cell windows or doors in painful positions for several hours at a time, and burned them with cigarettes (signs on bodies witnessed by ICRC delegates). Several persons deprived of their liberty alleged that they had been made to sign a statement that they had not been allowed to read. These allegations concerned several police stations in Baghdad including Al-Qana, Al-Jiran Al-Kubra in al-Amariyya, Al-Hurriyyeh in Al-Doura, Al-Salhiyye in Salhiyye, and Al-Baiah. Many persons deprived of their liberty drew parallels between police practices under the occupation with those of the former regime.

36. In early June 2003, for instance, a group of persons deprived of their liberty was taken to the former police academy after they had been arrested. There, they were allegedly hooded and cuffed and made to stand against a wall while a policeman placed his pistol against their heads and pulled the trigger in a mock execution (the pistol was in fact unloaded); they were also allegedly forced to sit on chairs where they were hit on the legs, the soles of their feet and on their sides with sticks. They also allegedly had water poured on their legs and had electrical shocks administered to them with stripped tips of electric wires. The mother of one of the persons deprived of liberty was reportedly brought in and the policemen threatened to mistreat her. Another person deprived of his liberty was threatened with having his wife brought in and raped. They were made to fingerprint their alleged confessions of guilt, which resulted in their transfer to the CF to be interned pending trial.

37. *The ICRC reminds the authorities of the CF that prisoners of war and other protected persons in the custody of occupying forces must be humanely treated at all times; they must not be subjected to cruel or degrading treatment; and must be protected against all acts of violence (Art. 13, 14, Third Geneva Convention; Art. 27, Fourth Geneva Convention). Torture and other forms of physical and psychological coercion against prisoners of war and other interned persons for the purpose of extracting confession or information is prohibited in all cases and under all circumstances without exception (Art. 17 and 87, Third Geneva Convention; Art. 5, 31 and 32, Fourth Geneva Convention). Confessions extracted under coercion or torture can never be used as evidence of guilt (Art. 99, Third Geneva Convention, Art. 31, Fourth Geneva Convention). Such violations of International Humanitarian*

*Law should be thoroughly investigated in order to determine responsibilities and prosecute those found responsible (Art. 129, Third Geneva Convention and Art. 146, Fourth Geneva Convention).*

#### **4. TREATMENT IN REGULAR INTERNMENT FACILITIES**

##### **4.1. General conditions of treatment**

38. The ICRC assessed the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in regular internment facilities by CF personnel as respectful, with a few individual exceptions due to individual personalities or occasional loss of control on the part of the guards. Abusive behavior by guards, when reported to their officers, was usually quickly reprimanded and disciplined by superiors.

39. The ICRC often noted a serious communication gap between detention personnel and persons deprived of their liberty, primarily due to the language barrier, which resulted in frequent misunderstandings. This was compounded by a widespread attitude of contempt on the part of guards, in reaction to which persons deprived of their liberty, which often complained of being treated like inferiors, adopted a similar attitude.

40. The ICRC occasionally observed persons deprived of their liberty being slapped, roughed up, pushed around or pushed to the ground either because of poor communication (a failure to understand or a misunderstanding of orders given in English was construed by guards as resistance or disobedience), a disrespectful attitude on the part of guards, a reluctance by persons deprived of their liberty to comply with orders, or a loss of temper by guards.

41. Disciplinary measures included being taken out of the compound, handcuffed and made to stand, sit, squat or lie down in the sand under the sun for up to three or four hours, depending on the breach of discipline (disrespectful behavior towards guards, communication between persons deprived of their liberty transferring from one compound to another, disobeying orders); temporary suspension of cigarette distribution, and temporary segregation in disciplinary confinement sections of the detention facilities.

42. Despite the fact that reductions in the availability of water or food rations or, more commonly, cigarettes were occasionally observed, the prohibition on collective punishment provided for under International Humanitarian Law (Art. 26.6, 87.3, Third Geneva Convention and Art. 33, Fourth Geneva Convention) appeared to be generally respected by detaining authorities.

##### **4.2. "High Value Detainees" section, Baghdad International Airport**

43. Since June 2003, over a hundred "high value detainees" have been held for nearly 23 hours a day in strict solitary confinement in small concrete cells devoid of daylight. This regime of complete isolation strictly prohibited any contact with other persons deprived of their liberty, guards, family members (except through Red Cross Messages) and the rest of the outside world. Even spouses and members of the

same family were subject to this regime. Persons deprived of their liberty whose "investigation" was nearing completion were reportedly allowed to exercise together outside their cells for twenty minutes twice a day or go to the showers or toilets together. The other persons deprived of their liberty still under interrogation reportedly continued to be interned in total "segregation" (i.e. they were allowed to exercise outside their cells for twenty minutes twice a day and to go to the showers or toilets but always alone and without any contact with others). Most had been subjected to this regime for the past five months. Attempts to contact other persons deprived of their liberty or simply to exchange glances or greetings were reportedly sanctioned by reprimand or temporary deprivation of time outside their cells. Since August 2003, the detainees have been provided with the Koran. They have been allowed to receive books of a non-political nature, but no newspapers or magazines on current affairs. The internment regime appeared to be motivated by a combination of security concerns (isolation of the persons deprived of their liberty from the outside world) and the collection of intelligence. All had been undergoing interrogation since their internment, in spite of the fact that none had been charged with criminal offence.

On 30 October 2003, the ICRC wrote to the Detaining Authorities recommending that this policy be discontinued and replaced by a regime of internment consistent with the CF's obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

44. *The internment of persons in solitary confinement for months at a time in cells devoid of daylight for nearly 23 hours a day is more severe than the forms of internment provided for in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions (investigation of criminal offences or disciplinary punishment). It cannot be used as a regular, ordinary mode of holding of prisoners of war or civilian internees. The ICRC reminds the authorities of the Coalition Forces in Iraq that internment of this kind contravenes Articles 21, 25, 89, 90, 95, 103 of the Third Geneva Convention and Articles 27, 41, 42, 78, 82, 118, 125 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The ICRC recommends to the authorities of the CF that they set up an internment regime which ensures respect for the psychological integrity and human dignity of the persons deprived of their liberty and that they make sure that all persons deprived of their liberty are allowed sufficient time every day outside in the sunlight and the opportunity to move about and exercise in the outside yard.*

## **5. EXCESSIVE AND DISPROPORTIONATE USE OF FORCE AGAINST PERSONS DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIBERTY BY THE DETAINING AUTHORITIES**

45. Since March 2003, the ICRC recorded, and in some cases, witnessed, a number of incidents in which guards shot at persons deprived of their liberty with live ammunition, in the context either of unrest relating to internment conditions or of escape attempts by individuals:

**Camp Cropper, 24 May 2003:** In the context of a hunger strike, unrest broke out in the camp prior to ICRC visit. One person deprived of his liberty suffered a gunshot wound.

**Camp Cropper, 9 June 2003:** Six persons deprived of their liberty were injured by live ammunition after a guard opened fire on the group in an attempt to quell a demonstration.

**Camp Cropper, 12 June 2003:** Two, or possibly three, persons deprived of their liberty were shot at when they attempted to escape through the barbed wire fence. One of them, Akheel Abd Al-Hussein from Baghdad, was wounded and later died after being taken to the hospital. The other person deprived of his liberty was recaptured and received treatment for gunshot wounds.

**Abu Ghraib, 13 June 2003:** When unrest flared up, guards from three watchtowers opened fire at the demonstrators, injuring seven persons deprived of their liberty and killing another, Alaa Jasim Hassan. The authorities investigated the matter and concluded that the "shooting was justified as the "three tower [guards] determined that the lives of the interior guards were threatened".

**Abu Ghraib, late June 2003:** During unrest, one person deprived of his liberty was injured by live ammunition when a guard opened fire.

**Abu Ghraib, 24 November 2003:** During a riot four detainees were killed by US MP guards. The killing took place after unrest erupted in one of the compounds (no 4). The detainees claimed to be unhappy with the situation of detention. Specifically, lack of food, clothing, but more importantly the lack of judicial guarantees and, especially important during the time of Eid al-Fitr, lack of family visits or lack of contacts all together. The detainees alleged to have gathered near the gate whereupon the guards panicked and started shooting. Initially, non-lethal ammunition was used which was subsequently replaced by live ammunition.

The report handed over by the CF to the ICRC states that detainees were trying to force open the gate. It further states that several verbal warnings were given and non-lethal ammunition fired at the crowd. After 25 minutes deadly force was applied resulting in the death of four detainees.

~~Malik al-Husseini Saoud Al-Khalil (ICR 150010)~~

~~Prisoner of War (ICR 150011)~~

~~Prisoner of War (ICR 150012)~~

~~Prisoner of War (ICR 150013)~~

The narrative report furnished by the CF does not address the reason for the riot in any way and does not give any recommendations as to how a similar incident could be avoided. It does not question the use of lethal force during such an incident.

**Camp Bucca, 16-22 April 2003:** ICRC delegates witnessed a shooting incident, which caused the death of one person deprived of his liberty and injury of another. A first shot was fired on the ground by a soldier located outside the compound in a bid to rescue one of the guards, allegedly being threatened by a prisoner of war armed with a stick; the second shot injured a prisoner of war in the left forearm, and the third shot killed another prisoner of war.

**Camp Bucca, 22 September 2003:** Following unrest in a section of the camp, one person deprived of his liberty, allegedly throwing stones, was fired upon by a guard in a watchtower. He suffered a gunshot wound to the upper part of the chest, the bullet passed through the chest and exited from the back. The investigation undertaken by the CF concluded that "the compound guards correctly utilized the rules of engagement and that numerous non-lethal rounds were dispersed to no avail". The person deprived of his liberty "was the victim of a justifiable shooting". An ICRC delegate and an interpreter witnessed most of the events. At no point did the persons deprived of their liberty, and the victim shot at, appear to pose a serious threat to the life or security of the guards who could have responded to the situation with less brutal measures. The shooting showed a clear disregard for human life and security of the persons deprived of their liberty.

46. These incidents were investigated summarily by the CF. They concluded in all cases that a legitimate use of firearms had been made against persons deprived of their liberty, who, except perhaps in Abu Ghraib on 13 June 2003, were unarmed and did not appear to pose any serious threat to anyone's life justifying the use of firearms. In all cases, less extreme measures could have been used to quell the demonstrations or neutralize persons deprived of their liberty trying to escape.

47. In connection with the 22 September 2003 incident, the ICRC wrote on 23 October to the Commander of the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade and recommended the adoption of crowd control measures consistent with the rules and principles of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and other applicable international norms relating to the use of force or fire arms by law-enforcement personnel.

48. Since May 2003, the ICRC repeatedly recommended to the CF to use non-lethal methods to deal with demonstrations, riots or escape attempts. In Camp Cropper, its recommendations were heeded. After initial deplorable incidents no further shooting of persons deprived of their liberty has occurred since November 2003. In mid-July, the ICRC witnessed a demonstration in that camp: in spite of some violence by the persons deprived of their liberty, the problem was efficiently dealt with by the camp commander without any excessive use of force. He called in anti-riot military policemen, refrained from any act that might have provoked further anger from the persons deprived of their liberty, waited patiently for the emotions to calm down and then sought to establish dialogue with the persons deprived of their liberty through their section representatives. The unrest was quieted down without any violence.

49. *The ICRC reminds the authorities of the CF that the use of firearms against persons deprived of their liberty, especially against those who are escaping or attempting to escape is an extreme measure which should not be disproportionate to the legitimate objective to be achieved (to apprehend the individual) and shall always be preceded by warning appropriate to the circumstances (Art. 42 Third Geneva Convention).*

*The CF detaining personnel should be provided with adequate training to deal with incidents in their internment facilities. Firearms should not be used except when a suspected offender offers armed resistance or otherwise jeopardizes the lives of others and only when less extreme measures are not sufficient to restrain or*

*apprehend him (Article 3 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and Article 9 of the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials).*

*In every instance in which a firearm is discharged, a report should be made promptly to the competent authorities. All deaths or serious injuries of a person deprived of his liberty caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry should be immediately followed by a proper inquiry by the Detaining Power which should ensure the prosecution of any person(s) found responsible (Art. 121, Third Geneva Convention; Art. 131, Fourth Geneva Convention).*

## 6. SEIZURE AND CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE BELONGINGS OF PERSONS DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIBERTY

50. The ICRC collected numerous allegations of seizure and confiscation of private property (money, cars and other valuables) by the CF in the context of arrests. In only a few cases were receipts issued to the arrested person or his family, detailing the items confiscated. This was perceived by persons deprived of their liberty as outright theft or pillage. The following examples will serve to illustrate the allegations:

- [REDACTED] alleged that the CF took US\$22,000 in cash and his personal luggage during his arrest;
- [REDACTED] claimed that large amounts of money and personal effects were confiscated by the CF when he was arrested at his home on 27-28 May 2003. The items confiscated allegedly included 71,450,000 Iraqi dinars, 14,000 US dollars, two wedding rings, a video camera, a watch, real-estate property documents, his wife's residential documents, his father's will, his private diaries, as well as most of the family private documents and personal identity and other papers;
- [REDACTED] claimed that his car was confiscated when he was arrested by the CF in Basrah on 16 July 2003.
- [REDACTED] claimed that CF confiscated two million Iraqi dinars when arrested at his home on 21 August 2003;
- [REDACTED] claimed that his money and two cars were confiscated when he was arrested by the CF on 11 August 2003;

51. In Camp Cropper, Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib, a system was gradually put in place whereby personal belongings in the possession of persons deprived of their liberty at the time of their arrival in these facilities which they could not keep with them (money, other valuables, spare clothing, identity papers) were registered and kept until their release. In these cases, a receipt was usually issued to the person deprived of his liberty and his belongings were returned when he was released. However, this system took no account of the property seized during arrest.

52. In response to property loss or damage caused to property by the CF during raids and also to complaints regarding pension or salaries, the CF established a compensation system open to everyone, including internees and the general public. Complaints could be filed at General Information Centers (GIC), set up under the responsibility of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACC).

Supporting evidence, which is problematic given that arresting authorities rarely issue receipts, should back claims. The ICRC is not yet able to assess the efficiency of this compensation system although it has had the possibility to visit one of the GICs. There are nine GICs in the city of Baghdad and one in the city of Mosul, there are however none in the other parts of the country therefore depriving a large number of persons of the possibility to file complaints

53. *In accordance with international legal provisions, the ICRC reminds the authorities of the CF that pillage is prohibited by International Humanitarian Law (Art. 33, Fourth Geneva Convention), that private property may not be confiscated (Art. 46.2, 1907 Hague Convention No IV), and that an army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State. (Art. 53, 1907 Hague Convention No IV).*

*In addition, persons deprived of their liberty shall be permitted to retain articles of personal use. Valuables may not be taken from them except in accordance with an established procedure and receipts must be issued. (Art. 18, 68.2, Third Geneva Convention and Art. 97, Fourth Geneva Convention).*

## 7. EXPOSURE OF INTERNEES/DETAINEES TO DANGEROUS TASKS

54. On 3 September 2003 in Camp Bucca, three persons deprived of their liberty were severely injured by the explosion of what apparently was a cluster bomb:

[REDACTED] (bilateral below-knee amputation)

[REDACTED] (bilateral above-knee amputation)

[REDACTED] (left above-knee amputation)

They were part of a group of 10 persons deprived of their liberty involved in voluntary work to clear rubbish along the barbed-wire fence of the camp. They were transferred to the British Field Military Hospital where they received appropriate medical treatment. Their injuries required limb amputations.

55. On 23 October 2003, the ICRC wrote to the officer commanding the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade to request an investigation into the incident. The ICRC encouraged the CF not to engage persons deprived of their liberty in dangerous labour.

56. *The ICRC recommends to the authorities of the CF that all three victims be properly compensated as provided for by both Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions (Art. 68, Third Geneva Convention and Art. 95, Fourth Geneva Convention).*

## 8. PROTECTION OF PERSONS DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIBERTY AGAINST SHELLING

57. Since its reopening by the CF, Abu Ghraib prison has been the target of frequent night shelling by mortars and other weapons, which resulted, on several occasions, in persons deprived of their liberty being killed or injured. During the month of July, the Commander of the facility reported at least 25 such attacks. On 16 August, three mortar rounds landed in the prison compound, killing at least five and injuring 67 persons deprived of their liberty. Subsequent attacks caused further deaths and injuries. An ICRC team visited Abu Ghraib on 17 August and noticed the lack of protective measures: while the CF personnel were living in concrete buildings, all persons deprived of their liberty were sheltered under tents in compounds which had no bunkers or any other protection, rendering them totally vulnerable to shelling.

Persons deprived of their liberty alleged that they had not been advised on what to do to protect themselves in the event of shelling. They were dismayed and felt that the authorities "did not care". After these attacks, security was improved around the prison compound to reduce the risk of further attacks. However, steps taken to ensure the protection of persons deprived of their liberty remained insufficient. The inmates were allowed to fill and place sandbags around the perimeter of each tent. By late October, sandbags had not been placed around all tents and those sandbags that were in place did not offer adequate protection from shelling or projectile explosions.

58. *In accordance with International Humanitarian Law provisions, the ICRC reminds the authorities of the CF that the detaining power must not set up places of internment in areas particularly exposed to the dangers of war (Art. 23.1, Third Geneva Convention and Art. 83, Fourth Geneva Convention). In all places of internment exposed to air raids and other hazards of war, shelters adequate in number and structure to ensure the necessary protection must be made available. In the event of an alarm, the internees must be free to enter such shelters as quickly as possible (Art. 23.2, Third Geneva Convention and Art. 88, Fourth Geneva Convention). When a place of internment is found to be unsafe, persons deprived of their liberty should be transferred to other places of internment, offering adequate security and living conditions in accordance with the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.*

## CONCLUSION

59. This ICRC report documents serious violations of International Humanitarian Law relating to the conditions of treatment of the persons deprived of their liberty held by the CF in Iraq. In particular, it establishes that persons deprived of their liberty face the risk of being subjected to a process of physical and psychological coercion, in some cases tantamount to torture, in the early stages of the internment process.

60. Once the interrogation process is over, the conditions of treatment for the persons deprived of their liberty generally improve, except in the "High Value Detainee" section at Baghdad International Airport where persons deprived of their liberty have been held for nearly 23 hours a day in strict solitary confinement in small

concrete cells devoid of daylight, an internment regime which does not comply with provisions of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.

61. During internment, persons deprived of their liberty also risk being victims of disproportionate and excessive use of force on the part of detaining authorities attempting to restore order in the event of unrest or to prevent escapes.

62. Another serious violation of International Humanitarian Law described in the report is the CF's inability or lack of will to set up a system of notifications of arrests for the families of persons deprived of liberty in Iraq. This violation of provisions of International Humanitarian Law causes immense distress among persons deprived of their liberty and their families, the latter fearing that their relatives unaccounted for are dead. The uncaring behaviour of the CF and their inability to quickly provide accurate information on persons deprived of their liberty for the families concerned also seriously affects the image of the Occupying Powers amongst the Iraqi population.

63. In addition to recommendations highlighted in the report relating to conditions of internment, information given to persons deprived of their liberty upon arrest, and the need to investigate violations of International Humanitarian Law and to prosecute those found responsible, the ICRC wishes particularly to remind the CF of their duty:

- to respect at all times the human dignity, physical integrity and cultural sensitivity of persons deprived of their liberty held under their control;
- to set up a system of notifications of arrests to ensure that the families persons deprived of their liberty are quickly and accurately informed;
- to prevent all forms of ill-treatment and moral or physical coercion of persons deprived of their liberty in connection with interrogations;
- to instruct the arresting and detaining authorities that causing serious bodily injury or serious harm to the health of protected persons is prohibited under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions
- to set up an internment regime that ensures respect for the psychological integrity and human dignity of the persons deprived of their liberty
- to ensure that battle group units arresting individuals and staff in charge of internment facilities receive adequate training enabling them to operate in a proper manner and fulfill their responsibilities without resorting to ill-treatment or using excessive force.

The practices described in this report are prohibited under International Humanitarian Law. They warrant serious attention by the CF. In particular, the CF should review their policies and practices, take corrective action and improve the treatment of prisoners of war and other protected persons under their authority. This report is part of the bilateral and confidential dialogue undertaken by the ICRC with the CF. In the future, the ICRC will continue its bilateral and confidential dialogue with the CF in accordance with provisions of International Humanitarian Law, on the basis of its monitoring of the conditions of arrest, interrogation and internment of persons deprived of their liberty held by the CF.

- End of report -

1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2  
3 I, Jonathan H. Pyle, do hereby certify that on the 30th day of July 2004, I caused a true and  
4 correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint to be served via  
5 U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid, upon the following individuals at the addresses indicated:

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
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