IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

SUHAIL NAJIM ABDULLAH AL SHIMARI, Et al.,

Plaintiffs.

Civil No. 08-cv-827

VS. May 10, 2013

CACI INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

MOTIONS HEARING

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE GERALD BRUCE LEE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

BY: BAHER AZMY, ESQ.

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GINA SHAW. ESQ.

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BY: GEORGE BRENT MICKUM, IV, ESQ.

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BY: SHAREEF HADI ÁKEEL, ESQ.

PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER, LLP

BY: ROBERT PAUL LOBUE, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANT: STEPTOE & JOHNSON

BY: JOSEPH W. KOEGEL, JR., ESQ.

JOHN O'CONNOR, ESQ.

OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON, RMR, CRR

U.S. District Court

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(Thereupon, the following was heard in open court at 11:08 a.m. 2 THE CLERK: 08 civil 827, Al Shimari versus 3 CACI Premiere Technology, Incorporated. 4 MR. AZMY: Good morning, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Good morning. 6 MR. AZMY: Baher Azmy, A-Z-M-Y for the 7 plaintiffs. I'm joined by Bob LoBue, L-O capital B-U-E, 8 Shareef Akeel, Brent Mickum, and colleagues, Katherine Gallagher and Gina Shaw for the plaintiffs. 10 And just so you know, Your Honor, I'll be 11 arguing motions one and three, the ATS and sanctions, and 12 Mr. LoBue will be arguing the motion to dismiss the 1.3 common law claims. 14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 15 MR. KOEGEL: Good morning, Your Honor, Bill 16 Koegel and John O'Connor for defendant, CACI PT. 17 I will be arguing the ATS and sanctions 18 Mr. O'Connor will argue the second motion, the 19 choice of law motion. 2.0 Thank you very much. THE COURT: 21 Good morning. 22 All right, counsel, I'm ready. I think we 23 should probably start with the ATS motion if that's 24 acceptable to you all. 2.5

MR. KOEGEL: We agree, Your Honor, because 1 that presents an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 2 THE COURT: Well, did the Supreme Court 3 dramatically alter the landscape of this case as it 4 relates to Alien Tort Statute claims and have they in 5 effect said that it has no extra-territorial application? 6 7 MR. KOEGEL: They've said that in clear, unequivocal terms, Your Honor, that conduct occurring 8 outside the United States does not provide the Court with jurisdiction for alleged violations of international law. 10 It's very straightforward, and we think its application 11 of this case readily leads to dismissal of all nine ATS 12 counts in this case. 1.3 THE COURT: The Alien Tort Statute is a 14 jurisdictional statute; is that right? 15 MR. KOEGEL: Purely jurisdictional according 16 to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sosa 17 just a few years ago, no dispute, that it's purely 18 jurisdiction. 19 THE COURT: The power of the Court to act. 20 MR. KOEGEL: Pardon me, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: The power of the Court to act. 22 MR. KOEGEL: That's correct, it gives the 23 Court subject matter jurisdiction as reflected in the 24 fact that the Court's decision on April 17th in Kiobel, 2.5

affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit which had dismissed the complaint in that action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

So we think that the ATS claims at this point are without subject matter jurisdiction. In fact, that's the threshold issue that the parties disagree on.

The plaintiffs believe it's appropriately presented under Rule 12(b)(6), not as a 12(b)(1) subject matter jurisdiction argument. We think that's clearly wrong. It's clearly wrong because ATS is indisputably purely a jurisdictional statute. It provides no cause of action in and of itself. Rather it's a jurisdictional vehicle for aliens to assert certain claims arising under international law for which there's a universal consensus.

THE COURT: Well, the *Kiobel* case was before the Court on an issue involving subject matter jurisdiction; is that right?

MR. KOEGEL: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It was not 12(b)(6).

MR. KOEGEL: That is correct. It was 12(b)(1), subject matter jurisdiction. That was the basis for the Second Circuit's decision in *Kiobel*, which the Supreme Court affirmed.

So we think it's very clear that the ATS

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claims in this motion require the Court to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. And, we think it's clearly lacking given the effect of the *Kiobel* decision.

THE COURT: Does *Kiobel* create a safe haven for those who commit atrocities around the world and keep them safe from coming to federal court in the United States?

MR. KOEGEL: I wouldn't think it -- I wouldn't characterize as it a safe haven, Your Honor. That's not the way the Court approached it in *Kiobel*, keeping in mind that all nine justices concurred in the result in *Kiobel*.

THE COURT: I think one of plaintiff's arguments is if I read *Kiobel* the way you want me to read it then the law no longer has any effect to reach acts of atrocities that occur in other countries where the defendant might be here.

MR. KOEGEL: That's indisputably correct, Your Honor, that under the Supreme Court's decision in *Kiobel* if the conduct occurs outside the United States, there's no jurisdiction in a federal court in this country under ATS.

That's the holding in *Kiobel*.

THE COURT: There's discussion in *Kiobel* as

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well that the United States courts could not host lawsuits from various matters that occur around the world; is that right?

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MR. KOEGEL: That is correct, Your Honor.

The Court effectively said federal courts in this country are not -- not an international tribunal to serve as the world's policeman.

The Court was crystal clear in saying there's no jurisdiction for violations of international law that occur outside the United States. It's equally clear that all the violations alleged in this action with respect to the ATS claims occurred in Iraq. That's all that's really necessary to settle this matter.

The plaintiffs have three arguments that they ask the Court to adopt, to avoid what we believe is a direct and straightforward application of *Kiobel*.

First, they claim that well, Iraq is really part of the United States.

THE COURT: Well, I -- I understand. I'm going to give them a chance to make that argument -- that I should determine that the prison at Abu Ghraib was somehow part of the sovereign of the United States where a war is being conducted and wartime activities were being carried out there in terms of detention of detainees in a war, and that somehow the United States

had planted a flag in Abu Ghraib and that had become a part of the United States.

I'll give them a chance to make that argument. You don't have to make the argument for them.

MR. KOEGEL: Thank you, Your Honor. We believe we've adequately addressed that in our brief as to why that argument holds no water whatsoever.

THE COURT: Well, there is a question that I think, the plaintiff raise and that is that at the end of the opinion, there's a reference about whether to displace the presumption against extra-territorial application, and it uses the words "and even where the claims touching concerning the territory of the United States".

And, the argument that is being made is that because the defendant corporation is based here and was working with the government, with the military in this war activity in Iraq, that this should -- somehow falls within that and that's an exception.

Do you read that line as an exception that would give the Court extra-territorial jurisdiction in those circumstances?

MR. KOEGEL: Certainly not in this action, Your Honor. The Court was equally clear that "mere presence in the United States is insufficient to

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establish subject matter jurisdiction".

Second, it's conceded that all the tortious conduct alleged here occurred in Iraq. None of the conduct alleged as actionable under the ATS claims occurred in the United States.

Rather, they say, well, this was a United States corporation. That's true. That the United States hired employees in -- pardon me, the defendant hired employees in the United States. That's equally true. None of that is actionable conduct under ATS, and the touching concern language doesn't come remotely -- you know, can't be stretched nearly as far as plaintiffs would attempt to do.

THE COURT: I was trying to figure out from a judicial standpoint what was -- how would you interpret touching concerning the territory of the United States without their being some definition to it.

And I note that the Court in that cited the Morrison case. And Morrison was a securities case, and I think that the way Morrison is read, the Court was suggesting that there was no extra-territorial application securities laws outside the United States. And if Congress wants to change it, then it's up to Congress to change it.

MR. KOEGEL: That's exactly correct, Your

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Honor. And that point you just made supports our approach to this issue, because when Chief Judge Roberts in the *Kiobel* opinion was using the touching concern language, he cited *Morrison*.

And in *Morrison*, the Court held that the federal securities laws do not have extra-territorial application, even though there was evidence in that record that some conduct had occurred in Florida.

But the Court found it was -- that the conduct was outside the United States for purposes of its decision on extra-territoriality.

That is precisely analogous to the situation presented here. But, here we've got some additional assistance, and that assistance comes from the Fourth Circuit.

In the *French* decision, the Fourth Circuit had to determine whether the conduct alleged was territorial or extra-territorial.

And, it developed a standard. It developed a test to make that determination. And it looked toward the acts, the targets and the effects of the conduct alleged to violate the offense -- to constitute the offense in that action.

We explained how applying that standard to these facts leads inevitably to the conclusion that this

is extra-territorial conduct.

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And I think that the silence in plaintiff's brief speaks volumes on that. I think it's a fair statement, Your Honor, to say that in this action, over the five years it's been on file, it's been vigorously litigated, that point rarely go uncontested.

We had explained how the Court -- how the application of the *French* decision would lead easily to the conclusion that this conduct is extra-territorial. They neither cite nor address it in their opposition.

So, we think that in this circuit at least, the *French* decision provides an additional reason for concluding that the activity on which the Court must focus is purely exclusively 100 percent, extra-territorial. And the fact that there is a defendant that is incorporated in the United States that hired employees in the United States is not remotely sufficiently under *Kiobel* and under the *Morrison* decision to establish subject matter jurisdiction here.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KOEGEL: Keeping in mind that it is the plaintiff's burden, it's not a jump all on subject matter jurisdiction. They bear that burden. And faced with *Kiobel* and *Morrison*, we don't think they come remotely close.

THE COURT: All right. I've asked you the questions I have. Let me hear from plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Azmy.

MR. AZMY: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. AZMY: So, defendants have an implausibly, I think, simplistic reading of a Supreme Court decision.

The Court used the term "presumption". They did not say that the ATS would not apply abroad. They used the term "presumption".

And in part four of the opinion which is the application of the opinion, they said the presumption could be displaced in certain circumstances.

So, I imagine, Your Honor, we have presumptions all over the law, for example, a presumption of innocence. I imagine, Your Honor would be surprised to hear a defense lawyer say that the prosecutor cannot submit evidence that would rebut the presumption of innocence. And the Supreme Court suggested a way to overcome that presumption in part four of the opinion.

THE COURT: Well, before you go there, let's focus here for a second. Do you agree that the text of the ATS does not in its text set forth any indication of extra-territorial reach?

MR. AZMY: No, but I think the Supreme Court 1 said -- interpreted those arguments. The plaintiff's in 2 *Kiobel* said, well of course, the ATS embodies 3 extra-territorial principles and the defendants said no, 4 it didn't. The Court came in somewhere on the middle to 5 say there is a presumption against its application in 6 part because you don't want to interfere with sovereign 7 foreign relations in holding foreign corporations or 8 foreign governments responsible for violations in the U.S. courts, factors that are not present here. 10 THE COURT: 11

THE COURT: I thought that they started out first with just reading the terms of the statute as and that's what you're supposed to do with the mechanics of construction, is that right, to read the statute itself?

MR. AZMY: That's right. They read the terms of the statute and rejected plaintiff's argument that it would always have extra-territorial effect and instead said there would be a presumption against extra-territorial application which would become displaced as in part four of the opinion.

And I would stress --

THE COURT: Well, I want to focus if you would, before you go to part four just on what the Court actually held.

MR. AZMY: Uh-huh.

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THE COURT: It appears to me that the question presented, at least as set forth in the opinion, and the question presented is "whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under Alien Tort Statute for violations of law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States".

Did I read that correctly?

MR. AZMY: Yes.

THE COURT: Does that suggest to you that the focus was on whether or not the statute had extra-territorial application to events that occurred in a foreign land?

MR. AZMY: Yes, and under what circumstances is where part four comes in. So, there's a presumption that it won't apply, but that presumption can be overcome where the -- the torts touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to overcome it.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to get there.

Now, also, there's no question here but everything
occurred in Abu Ghraib in Iraq; is that right?

MR. AZMY: We disagree, Your Honor. For purposes of the extra-territorial analysis, we disagree in several ways.

THE COURT: Well, tell me how.

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MR. AZMY: Okay. Well, first, there's the --1 the notion that Abu Ghraib was under the -- the plenary 2 authority of the United States. And I know you want to 3 talk about this separately, and we can. And so that 4 therefore, it wouldn't interfere with any foreign 5 sovereign interests to apply U.S. law to this U.S. 6 7 corporation. THE COURT: Well, let's focus for a second. 8 The events occurred in Iraq; is that right? 9 MR. AZMY: It occurred in Iraq, yes. 10 THE COURT: The United States never took over 11 Iraq, did they? 12 MR. AZMY: As a legal matter, yes, they did, 1.3 14 15

MR. AZMY: As a legal matter, yes, they did, Your Honor. The Coalition Provisional Authority appointed a U.S. ambassador subject to the United States, the President of the United States, and authorized that entity to run the government of Iraq. And it had legal and political authority there which in the *Rasul* case suggests that that affects whether or not territory is U.S. territory in the extra-territoriality analysis. And it also --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MR. AZMY: It also -- so, it suggests that the territories function as the United States territory under *Rasul* and the *Vermilya-Brown* case from 1948 for

purposes of analyzing whether or not a statute should 1 apply extra-territorially. 2 It also suggests for the touch and concern 3 analysis that there is no interference with any foreign 4 sovereign interests here. We're --5 THE COURT: I don't think I have to reach all 6 that touch and concern --7 MR. AZMY: Okav. 8 THE COURT: -- if I'm just focused on what the 9 Court actually held --10 MR. AZMY: Uh-huh. 11 THE COURT: -- where all the facts occurred in 12 a foreign country. 13 Now, I understand your argument. Your 14 argument is that where the government has control of the 15 body, like at Guantanamo Bay, that there can be habeas 16 corpus jurisdiction. I think Rasul --17 MR. AZMY: And ATS jurisdiction, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: And ATS jurisdiction. But, that 19 was before *Kiobel*. That was before *Kiobel*. 2.0 Do you think that *Kiobel* suggests that there 21 remains a claim that can be brought where everything 22 occurred in Iraq? That's the ultimate question. Can you 23 answer that? 24 MR. AZMY: We don't concede that everything 2.5

occurred in Iraq, but we think Kiobel --

THE COURT: That's what you pled, haven't you? You haven't pled any facts that occurred in the United States. You pled that everything occurred in Iraq. What you pled about what occurred here was the cover up, right?

MR. AZMY: The cover up, the hiring, and that the contract was executed here, and also that the corporation was here which is relevant to the *Kiobel* analysis as well because the foreign corporation at issue in *Kiobel*, they had mere presence, and that mere presence was a foreign -- an investor relations office on Park Avenue. That was it.

And all of those sort of foreign cubed facts are very much unlike the facts here. And the touchstone of the presumption against extra-territoriality is the concern about comity and interference with foreign relations.

And also in *Kiobel*, the claim was that there was aiding and abetting the foreign government of Nigeria to commit torts, and the Court was very wary about that where you have a U.S. defendant acting in an area in a space subject to plenary U.S. authority, with U.S. servicemen pursuant to a U.S. contract.

THE COURT: But you're not suing the United

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States government, are you?
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                           No, but it --
                MR. AZMY:
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                THE COURT: You're not, because there would
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    be immunity.
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                Well, let's focus for a second. I want to go
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    to part four of the opinion.
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                MR. AZMY: Uh-huh.
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                THE COURT: And I've read this sentence to
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    Mr. Koegel, so I want to read it to you.
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                What is the test that I'm to apply under the
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    so-called -- where the claims touch and concern the
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    territory of the United States that they must do so with
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    sufficient force to displace presumption?
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                What am I to discern from that in a citation
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    to Morrison?
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                MR. AZMY: We suggest three things, Your
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    Honor.
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                THE COURT: I'm listening. What's number
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    one?
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                            Number one is the policy -- the
                MR. AZMY:
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    policy principles underlying the presumption which is
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    interference with international comity and foreign
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    governments interests which we say is not implicated
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    here, both because the -- the conduct occurred in a place
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    where the U.S. Government had control and also because
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there's a U.S. defendant. We're not holding a foreign corporation responsible for our loss.

That's number one.

Number two, we would suggest that the Court look to the kinds of factors the courts have look to in applying *Morrison*, including Your Honor's decision in Schreiber which was a Lanham Act case.

And that looked a lot like the kind of factors that Justice Breyer used in its concurrence which were not rejected by the majority and which was not uncommon. He suggested these are some -- these are some guidepost. Among those guidepost is whether or not a defendant is a U.S. entity, a U.S. citizen and whether or not it would have interfered with foreign relations.

THE COURT: Are you referring to -- what you're referring to, Breyer?

> MR. AZMY: Breyer, yes.

THE COURT: Was there holding in the case?

MR. AZMY: It's not the holding of the case.

The holding of the case is touch and concern. identify what touch and concern means, I think you can look to traditional foreign relations principles that Your Honor used in the *Schreiber* case which happens to map very much to what Justice Breyer did in his concurrence.

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And where there's a U.S. defendant, no interference with foreign -- foreign relations. Why would the Iraq government, unlike the Nigerian government or the Dutch government where the corporation was from, why would the Iraq government be upset if the United States were holding a U.S. corporation accountable for alleged crimes under international law?

THE COURT: Well, doesn't *Morrison* say that the Court is not going to apply the securities law extra-territorially and if Congress want to do so, they can amend the statute?

MR. AZMY: It does, but --

THE COURT: That's what's cited here as it relates to touch and concern, the displace, is that right?

MR. AZMY: *Morrison* says there will be a presumption and the presumption can be overcome. And on page 20 of our brief, Your Honor, we have cite, I think very relevant post-*Morrison* RICO cases which involve conspiracy. And those cases say, you need to have more than an incidental relationship to the United States. There has to be something -- something more.

And, we think -- frankly, Your Honor, I -- I can't see a constellation of facts post-*Kiobel* stronger

25 than those presented here.

The facts are so strong that -- the U.S. interests here are so strong that the U.S. Government saw fit to court marshal a number of the co-conspirators in this case for the very conduct at issue in this case and

This is not a foreign --

put them in U.S. prisons.

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THE COURT: What does that have to do with civil liability of this corporation?

MR. AZMY: It has to do with touching and concerning the interest of the United States. This is not an exotic action in Nigeria involving the Nigerian government and a Dutch organization. This is so intimately intertwined with U.S. conduct and U.S. interests that it would overcome the presumption.

And respectfully, I think if any case does, this case would.

THE COURT: All right. Well, as I read the opinion, the sentence that follows the issue of whether or not corporation's mere presence would be sufficient talks about "if Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific that the ATS would be required".

Should I infer from that that there is an exception that should be created judicially to make the judgment that there are facts that -- that displace a presumption?

Let me just develop that thought a little bit more.

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It occurs to me that if I accept your argument about the exception, then that means that the many atrocities that have occurred in Rwanda, that have occurred in other countries, that involve genocide and other very horrible human rights violations, that the United States would become the forum of choice under your theory for all those kinds of claims.

My recollection is that the United States doesn't even participate in any of the international tribunals that hear those cases. So why would I do that in this case?

MR. AZMY: Your Honor, that -- that assumption is wrong. We think -- those kinds of utterly foreign-cubed cases like the Rwanda atrocities or what was going on in Nigeria are the kind of cases that the majority was excluding and inviting Congress to say, "you know, Congress, if you want to create an international tribunal in the United States to hear case that are utterly foreign cubed, you can".

But the holding in this case which -- which got and needed the fifth vote of Justice Kennedy suggests that it is a presumption. And it may be a high presumption, but it can be overcome when interests touch

the United States. And Justice Kennedy did say, you know, this will have to be teased out in future cases.

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THE COURT: But, you're not giving me any guidance. I'm a trial judge. I'm not the Supreme Court and maybe the Supreme Court intended to somehow communicate to trial judges the facts or the legal principles under which to displace a presumption, and I'm certainly familiar with how presumptions are just ways to alleviate a person's burden of proof.

But here I'm dealing with matters as it relates to jurisdiction, which is the power of the Court to act and also the substance of extension of the law beyond our boarders.

There is -- in Justice Breyer's opinion, he says he "leaves for another day, the determination of just when the presumption against extra-territoriality may be overcome". But he doesn't tell me what to do.

MR. AZMY: Your Honor, you're in the regrettable position, as you may have been in the past, of being on the front lines of interpreting and applying a Supreme Court decision that doesn't provide you much guidance. And for better or worse, that seems to be how the Supreme Court works and how case percolate in the lower courts, which is why we stress so much how the constellation of these facts more than frankly any other

ATS case that I'm aware of in the country would meet the 1 touch and concern analysis because of U.S. legislative 2 control over Iraq at the time, because of the U.S. 3 corporation and because of continuing corporate practices 4 in the United States that contributed to the conspiracy. 5 THE COURT: Isn't there something called the 6 Tortured Victims Protection Act? 7 There is, Your Honor, but it MR. AZMY: 8 doesn't apply to the facts of this case. And in fact, 9 when Congress adopted the Tortured Victims Protection 10 Act, they cited cases, ATS cases that applied 11 extra-territorially. 12 And one more point about the safe haven, Your 1.3 Honor --14 THE COURT: Yes. 15 MR. AZMY: Breyer is concerned about that as 16 well. And there is a case -- the Filartiga case from 17 1979 that the --18 THE COURT: That was not cited in the 19 majority opinion, right? 20 MR. AZMY: It was cited in Sosa and affirmed 21 in Sosa but --22 THE COURT: But, it wasn't cited in the 23 majority opinion in this case, was it? 24 MR. AZMY: No, but it was cited in Sosa. 2.5

THE COURT: I know, I read Sosa. I read that.

MR. AZMY: And just that case suggests also that U.S. entities that commit torture should not have safe haven in the United States because there's in fact an -- speaking about comity, there is international obligation for domestic states to prosecute or provide remedies for their domestic entities who commit international crimes which is different than dragging in a Dutch corporation for crimes committed against Nigerian plaintiffs alleged to have been aiding and abetting the Nigerian government and therefore embarrassing the State Department and all of that. That's a very different situation than what we have in this case.

THE COURT: All right. I've asked you the questions I have.

MR. AZMY: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. KOEGEL: Let me first address the safe haven point that Your Honor raised.

THE COURT: Well, I only raised it because it appears to be in the briefs and it does appear in one of the concurrences, the issue of whether this decision will create a safe harbor.

MR. KOEGEL: Your Honor's reference to the Tortured Victims Protection Act is the segue to our

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position on this point. That is one of numerous federal statutes at the disposal of the United States of America or certain civil contexts.

The Anti-torture Statute, the War Crimes Act, the Military Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction Act, the Tortured Victims Protection Act. The United States of America has ample means with which to pursue criminal, civil or administrative sanctions and penalties against a United States corporation or even its employees.

And, it is undisputed and indisputable that in this action, the United States has taken no criminal, civil or administrative action against CACI PT or any of its employees in connection with the allegations made by the plaintiffs in this action.

So, there's --

THE COURT: They were been missing from the whole case, weren't they? The United States has never appeared in this case until the Fourth Circuit directed them to appear; isn't that right?

MR. KOEGEL: That's correct, Your Honor. So, there's absolutely no truth to the notion that dismissing the ATS claims creates some sort of safe haven in this country for United States corporations or their employees.

There's a slew of federal laws at the

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disposal of the government if they determine there are grounds to use them against a corporation or United States employees.

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THE COURT: Well, is there a touch and concern exception and in this case, plaintiff says that they have come forward with sufficient facts because this happened in connection with a U.S. military operation controlled by the government provisional authority and that somehow takes it into an exception that rebuts the presumption against extra-territoriality. What's your take on that? And I'm not -- there's no case to guide us on this, I don't think.

MR. KOEGEL: With the exception of the *French* case, for determining --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KOEGEL: -- whether conduct is territorial or extra-territorial, but here, all of the -- if you go to their third amended complaint, every single act alleged to constitute a violation of the ATS occurred in Iraq. That's undisputed.

The plaintiffs' argument is that the Supreme Court's decision in *Kiobel* that conduct occurring outside the United States leaves the Court without jurisdiction means something other than outside the United States.

And they've come up with this control and authority test.

You won't find that in *Kiobel*. You won't find it in *Rasul* either.

The -- the fact of the matter is, it's cut from a whole cloth. And it would call upon the Court to determine in the context of a war zone whether the United States in fact had control and authority.

How the Court would go about doing that for purposes of this analysis is left to the imagination and we believe that would present a quintessential political question, whether the Court had to conduct fact finding as to whether the United States was in sufficient control in a war zone to provide jurisdiction for aliens to bring ATS claims.

THE COURT: I think that we have exhausted my questions on this motion. I'd like to hear about the next motion.

MR. KOEGEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, the legal issue before the Court today is what law governs plaintiff Al Shimari's common law tort claims. Both parties agree that the starting place is Ohio's choice of law rules, and the reason for that is that plaintiff Al Shimari originally filed his lawsuit in Ohio.

Ohio's choice of law rules are well settled.

According to the *Morgan* case which both sides agree is

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the case that sets forth the standard, a presumption is created that the law of the place of injury controls "unless another jurisdiction has a more significant relationship to the lawsuit".

Now, plaintiffs in their opposition keep wanting to cross out the word "relationship" and put in the word "interest". But Ohio is not an interest analysis state for purposes of choice of law. It's a Second Restatement most significant relationship state.

The --

THE COURT: The injury is the key inquiry on where the law applies, where the injury occurred.

MR. O'CONNOR: Generally speaking, that's right, Your Honor. Now, there are other relationships that if they all point in other directions could lead to a different result. And those relationships are the place of injury which here is Iraq, the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, which here is Iraq, the domicile, residence and nationality of the parties which for plaintiff, Al Shimari, is Iraq. For CACI PT, it's Virginia, and I suppose Delaware is the state of incorporation. The place where the relationship between the parties, if any, is located, here that would be Iraq. And then there's any Section 6 factors from the Second Restatement that the Court might deem relevant.

And one of those Section 6 factors is the interest of the various jurisdictions.

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But, I would say that in a Second Restatement jurisdiction such as Ohio where all of these relationships point toward Iraq law, that maybe in an --maybe in an interest analysis state you could say, well I'm just going to disregard all that and going to apply the loss under the jurisdiction because I don't Iraq is very interested in this. But that isn't really the result that's available under the Second Restatement.

THE COURT: Well, to apply Iraqi law, does the provisional authority Section 6 and I think it's 13 apply here?

MR. O'CONNOR: Section 3.1, and Section 6 apply, yes, sir.

Iraq law is -- and both parties agree to this -- Iraq law provides a threshold defense to CACI PT for a common law tort claim. That's under Section 3.1 of CPA order 17.

And both sides agree that what CPA order 17 does in its place is it displaces subcenter of Iraq toward law and substitutes in Section 6 a claims process where a party with a claim of personal injury shall submit a claim to the parent state and that -- that parent state will decide that claim pursuant to the

national laws of the parent state.

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So, in our view, what -- the way that Iraq law works here is there is no common law tort claim available. Instead, as in *Saleh* where the D.C. Circuit recognized availability of administrative claim, what Section 6 does is it directs a plaintiff or a claimant to make a claim to the United States under the Foreign Claims Act which uses the exact same combat/noncombat dichotomy that's in Section 6 of CPA order 17 and that claim is decided by the United States and they allow it or they don't allow it.

And if the United States then feels that there is a reason to chase somebody else because it believes an employee, a soldier, or a contractor is actually responsible, then the United States is subrogated, and it can go do that.

THE COURT: So, Section 3 says "coalition contractor and its subcontractors, as well as the employees, shall not be subject to Iraqi laws relating to the terms and conditions of their contract".

And I think the claim here involves allegations that CACI PT's interrogators exceeded or breached the contract because they were engaged in acts that were not authorized by the contract or U.S. law; is that right?

MR. O'CONNOR: That's exactly right, Your 1 In fact, in our opening brief we cited seven or 2 eight places in the third amended complaint where 3 plaintiffs expressly allege that the injuries that they 4 allege were caused in some way by CACI PT were done in 5 violation of CACI PT's contract. So that's right. 6 7 And relating to -- we cited cases relating to -- well, we cited cases explaining that relating to 8 particularly when used it's in the preemption context is exceedingly broad. 10 THE COURT: That was going to be my next 11 question about relating to. 12 Now with respect to Section 6 --1.3 MR. O'CONNOR: Yes. sir. 14 THE COURT: -- it talks about "that do arise 15 in connection with military combat operations". So, in 16 connection with military combat operations shall be 17 submitted. And that's what you're talking about earlier. 18 They can submit a claim, right? 19 MR. O'CONNOR: I don't think that's guite 2.0 right, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. O'CONNOR: If it's in connection with 23 military combat operations, you're just out of luck. 24 That's excluded under Section 6. THE COURT: 2.5

MR. O'CONNOR: That's excluded under Section 6. And that would be for instance, the *A1-Shifa* case in the Federal Circuit States where the United States bombed a factory in Sudan because they thought it had chemical weapons. There's just no claim. You don't get a claim. That's unfortunate. That's life.

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THE COURT: I don't think there's any question this arises in connection with military combat in this case.

MR. O'CONNOR: Well, if that's the Court's view and we don't disagree with that and we said that we believe that's probably right in our opening brief.

THE COURT: Well, we're talking about a war and people being detained in a military -- in a prison at Abu Ghraib.

MR. O'CONNOR: You won't get --

THE COURT: It would be kind of hard for me to say it wasn't in connection with military operation, military contact, I think.

MR. O'CONNOR: You won't get any pushback from us on that, Your Honor. And that's our point is that if it arises out of military combat operations, there's just no claim available.

If it arises out of noncombat operations, then the Foreign Claims Act is available. A claim can be

submitted and it can be evaluated.

Now, I will say that, you know, statutory language, be it what it may be, the United States has taken the position that it will pay administrative claims from someone who has a bona fide claim detainee abuse. And that was referenced by the D.C. Circuit in *Saleh*.

Mr. Saleh had submitted a claim and the United States, they offered him \$5,000, but they found that the detainee abuse was just made up. So they were paying him for other things, but they didn't reject the detainee abuse claim as not covered. They would have paid him if he had a bona fide claim.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. O'CONNOR: But the -- while all this circles back to Ohio's choice of law rule is plaintiff's view is if there's no tort claim available under Iraq law, the Court should go look and find another jurisdiction that has a greater quote, unquote "interest".

We cited to the Court seven different cases where Ohio courts had done a choice of law analysis, found the Second Restatement jurisdiction that law should apply and said, that jurisdiction doesn't allow this claim, so the plaintiff is out.

They -- not one of those cases said that

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other jurisdiction doesn't allow the claim, so it's not very interested. Let's go find another jurisdiction.

In fact, plaintiffs have cited no cases in Ohio standing for that proposition of Ohio choice of law jurisprudence.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. O'CONNOR: And I would also say with respect to Virginia law, we just don't see how Virginia has an interest.

THE COURT: I don't think we will have to have a discussion about Virginia.

Thank you.

MR. O'CONNOR: Thank you.

MR. LOBUE: Good morning, Your Honor. Robert LoBue for plaintiff, Mr. Al Shimari, who is still interested in having his day in court.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. LoBue.

MR. LOBUE: Your Honor, we don't agree on many things with the defendants, but we do agree that you start with Ohio law choice of law principles. And we agree that under Ohio principles, the first place you look is Iraq to see what Iraq says about what's the governing law.

And the question is what is the governing Iraqi provision of law here. There is really only one

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place you need to look, and that's Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 which speaks directly to the issue at hand of claims against contractors.

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And, so I think we should take a look, if you would, at that order again. It's -- I know Your Honor has it.

What's paradoxical about the defendant's reading of that order is they want it to be controlling when it provides immunities as to domestic Iraqi tort law. But they don't want it to be controlling when it says that in a case like this, you go back and resolve it in the courts of and pursuant to the laws of the sending state or the parent state.

I think that's the plain reading of Section 6. And this order by the coalition and by Ambassador Brehmer was done not in ignorance of the underlying international law, but it was declaratory of the underlying international law. And the very second recital, it acknowledged that occupying powers and their military and employees accompanying the military are not subject to the local domestic law of the occupied territory.

And, this order implements that provision by saying that the people who are part of this coalition are not subject to Iraqi domestic law, and that any claims

must be prosecuted in the sending state, exactly what --

THE COURT: How am I to read the phrase that "do not arise in connection with military combat operations"?

MR. LOBUE: Two things, Your Honor, first of all, I will point out that the plaintiff -- I'm sorry, the defendants -- the defendant did not argue in its two briefs that what we have here is a claim arising out of military combat activities or operations. And they do argue that today or at least they say they won't disagree with the Court if the Court wants to go there.

I respectfully submit that is not what we have in this case.

The -- first of all, CACI's contract with the U.S. Government says that its employees will not engage in combat activities or operations.

If everything -- and so if they were engaged in combat operations, that would be not only a violation of their contract with the United States but a gross violation of domestic and international law to have non-uniformed civilians rather than members of the military conducting combat operations.

And I think that's probably why the defendant was perhaps a little bit obfuscatory in their brief and using the word "if".

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THE COURT: What am I to interpret Abu Ghraib
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    to be? What is Abu Ghraib?
                                  Is it a prison --
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                 MR. IOBUF:
                             It was --
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                 THE COURT: Let me finish.
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    that was being used by military to detain individuals in
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    connection with a war operation? Is that what Abu Ghraib
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    was?
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                MR. LOBUE:
                             That is correct, but, Your Honor,
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    if every --
                THE COURT: Just tell me what you think it
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         I've told you mine. What is your definition what
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    Abu Ghraib was?
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                MR. LOBUE:
                             It was a detention facility under
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    the control of the coalition.
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                THE COURT:
                             In Iraq.
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                MR. LOBUE: In Iraq.
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                THE COURT: In connection with the war; is
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    that right?
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                MR. LOBUE: It was in connection with the
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    war, and just about everything that was happening in Iraq
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    at that time was in connection with the war.
                                                   But if
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    every activity that in some way related to the war
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    efforts were deemed to be a military combat operation,
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    then the exception would swallow the rule in Section 6.
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                THE COURT: Well, is it normal to have people
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who are being -- in an -- occupied by outside military force bring a lawsuit against the force that invaded them for violations of their civil law. That's not a normal operation, is it, that the so-called enemy is able to bring a lawsuit into the offending -- the invading state's courts for tortures that occurred in connection with war. That not a normal occurrence; is it?

MR. LOBUE: Your Honor, it's probably not a frequent occurrence, but it's an occurrence that's provided for by law.

The United States on many occasions has adhered to international treatises that say that it of paramount important to provide a remedy for persons who suffer injuries in violation of international law.

And when the Coalition Provisional Authority in Section 6 says submit your claim in the parent country, it doesn't say submit it to the parent country by the way. But it says submit, and these claims will be submitted and dealt with according to the laws of the parent country.

THE COURT: All right. So, what law am I to look at? Shall be submitted in Delaware by the parent state.

MR. LOBUE: But the --

THE COURT: Let me finish.

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MR. LOBUE: I'm sorry. 1 THE COURT: Defense counsel said there is a 2 procedure by which an administrative claim can be filed. 3 Is that what is -- what is referred to here or am I 4 required to create a new federal common law tort action 5 here? 6 7 MR. LOBUE: Respectfully neither, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. 8 MR. LOBUE: It's state common law that 9 applies to these claims, and --10 THE COURT: Which state? 11 We think Virginia is the -- is MR. LOBUE: 12 the state that -- well, first of all --13 THE COURT: Tell me how you get to Virginia, 14 I'm curious. 15 MR. LOBUE: I've said it's Virginia, but 16 what's important to recognize here is that with one 17 possible exception involving the tort of negligent 18 supervision, the defendant has not suggested that there 19 is any difference, any conflict between the tort law of 20 Ohio and the tort law of Virginia. 21 And, ordinarily, if there is no suggestion of 22 a conflict, one applies the law of the forum. 23 these --24 THE COURT: Well, you know, I've been around 2.5

and around this case and plaintiff's counsel, Ms. Burke 1 knows there. Mr. Azmy knows this. We started out 2 assuming Virginia law apply. And of course, that would 3 turn out to be wrong on the putative plaintiffs' claims. 4 That turned out to be wrong from the Virginia Supreme 5 Court's decision. 6 7 And then plaintiff came back and said no, no, no, Ohio law applies. And so now today you're saying 8 Virginia law applies.

Now, Judge Wilkinson had a whole lot to say whether Virginia had an interest in that. So I'm very reluctant to go down that path. I just don't think that's going to happen here.

MR. LOBUE: Your Honor, I think I'm the one who is responsible for that. I came in last November and argued that Ohio statute of limitations principles should apply and --

THE COURT: I'm not going there again. I'm not going back to Virginia law. There is nothing in this case that relates to Virginia other than the courthouse is located in Virginia. Not one thing happened here.

MR. LOBUE: Your Honor, I'd like to make one final point --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LOBUE: -- in answer to one of your final

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The administrative process under the Foreign Claims Act does not cover claims against contractors for injuries caused by contractors in a foreign country.

Two things, number one, that is the plain language of the statute, 10 USC Section 2734.

I can also tell Your Honor, although this is not in our brief because it really only came up in reply, there has been correspondence between counsel -- among the counsel for plaintiffs and the Department of Defense which illustrates the position of the Department of the Defense that the Foreign Claims Act Administrative Procedure does not cover injuries suffered -- claims against contractors.

There are also decisions made by the Department of the Army which were made public in a Freedom of Information Act request a few years ago in which the Army denied claims when they were made for injuries caused by contractors.

If it's -- if it would be helpful to the Court, I would respectfully seek leave to submit those citations which I can do on Monday.

But in any event --

THE COURT: You can certainly submit them. think that I have asked you the questions that I have

concerning the choice of law question. 1 MR. LOBUE: Thank you, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Thank you. 3 MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, can I make one 4 brief comment? 5 If there's communication relating to 6 7 administrative claim between the plaintiffs and the United States, that would be news to us, even though we 8 expressly asked for documents to be produced relating to administrative claims between plaintiffs and the United 10 States. 11 Now, they've given us 14 pages of documents. 12 Maybe I missed in it there. But we have not received 13 anything. And we were told in an interrogatory response 14 that they've submitted no claims to the United States. 15 MR. LOBUE: If it please the Court, it's 16 not --17 THE COURT: Come back to the podium. 18 MR. LOBUE: I may have -- I may have been 19 imprecise, not a plaintiff in this case, one of the other 20 similarly-situated plaintiffs who --21 THE COURT: Oh, well, I need -- I'm only 22 concerned about what's going on in this case. 23 Let me hear from the plaintiff only on the 24 issue of sanctions. I have received the defendant's 2.5

brief, and the defendant could not be more clear what they think I should do concerning sanctions. So you tell me why I shouldn't.

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This case has gone on for many year and everybody knew sooner or later the plaintiffs have to come to federal court in Virginia.

MR. AZMY: Your Honor, the -- as Your Honor observed in your last ruling, based on the very same evidence in this case, that the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit does not permit dismissal under Rule 37 where, in fact, the *Wilson* case says it is never, quote, "never appropriate to dismiss where the failure to comply with the discovery order is due to inability as opposed to willfulness and bad faith", and they used the term "flagrant bad faith".

And all of the cases that the defendants recited in support of their motion involve the exact opposite circumstances that are present in this case.

THE COURT: Well, what do I have in the record here that explains the absence of the plaintiffs? There has been this suggestion that the individual plaintiffs were on the so-called No Fly List. But I don't see a document here called No Fly List that has their names on it. Do you see -- have such a document?

MR. AZMY: We do not have those documents.

We have attempted to obtain such documents by subpoenaing DHS and filing a motion to compel.

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THE COURT: So there is no record here even to prove to the Court's satisfaction that there is, one, a No Fly List, and two, that that list has these individuals names on it, is there?

MR. AZMY: There isn't. And I would submit that it -- that certainly doesn't suggest that the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed. The defendants have to show bad faith in their efforts to get here and --

THE COURT: I know. But what I understand is when the -- when the process of the Court is invoked, there is an obligation for the plaintiff to prosecute their claims. There may be cases that could be tried in absentia. And actually as a lawyer, I defended a corporation once where there was nobody present and did all right. But I'm not familiar with the civil case involving allegations like this where the plaintiffs do not ever have to appear.

The Court -- this Court is not going to keep it on the docket five years more. I promise you that.

MR. AZMY: Your Honor, as we -- we've cited I think it's on the order of 15 cases where video depositions were -- were taken, and we think that this --

that kind of remedy is entirely appropriate under the authority given to this Court by local Rule 30(a) which contemplates special circumstances.

THE COURT: So, you're saying we should have a video deposition trial. And so the jury can look at the video tape deposition of the plaintiffs, submit -- and in effect I would be conducting a trial from Iraq here; is that right?

MR. AZMY: Not necessarily, Your Honor. We would propose the following. First, video depositions and then can also be *de bene* in case they're unable to appear, and that's certainly, I think authorized under local Rule 30 and frankly compelled by the Supreme Court in the Fourth Circuit.

We will still make efforts to --

THE COURT: Are you saying there's a Fourth Circuit case that says I have to have a trial where the witnesses -- the complaining witnesses, the plaintiffs do not have to ever come into this courthouse and I can show to the jury on TV?

MR. AZMY: The Fourth Circuit cases speak to depositions being compelled as opposed to dismissal.

THE COURT: My question was very precise.

MR. AZMY: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: Are you able to cite a Fourth

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Circuit case that says I can conduct a trial, a jury
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    trial, in a tort case by video display to a jury --
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                MR. A7MY: We've cited --
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                THE COURT: -- and the parties never have come
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    in the courthouse?
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                 MR. AZMY: We've cite a number of cases Your
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    Honor, in which video testimony was taken by -- sorry,
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    trial testimony was taken by video.
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                And, of course, local -- the federal --
                THE COURT:
                           Where --
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                MR. AZMY:
                           I'm sorry.
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                THE COURT: You have a plaintiff case there
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    that you can cite a plaintiff did not appear in court and
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    the whole trial was done by video deposition?
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                MR. AZMY: Yes, Your Honor, on page 16.
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                THE COURT:
                           All right, okay.
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                MR. AZMY: And, those are -- those are ATS
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    cases and then on page 10.
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                THE COURT: This is from your brief?
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                MR. AZMY: Yes, of our brief. And then --
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    page -- page 10.
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                And then -- so sorry. I would say page 10
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    and pages 15 to 16.
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                THE COURT: All right. Under that procedure
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    then, was the -- how would the defendant be able to do
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their physical examinations of the witnesses?

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MR. AZMY: So, Your Honor, we're talking about the deposition or the trial?

THE COURT: I have been talking entirely about the trial. And I thought I was very clear. I kept saying the trial, and you're --

MR. AZMY: Sure.

THE COURT: I understand and we have had many cases in civil cases, even in Abu Ali criminal case, we had video tape depositions. But that was not of the party bringing the lawsuits seeking damages in front of a jury to do the whole trial by the video.

I've been doing this a long time and maybe you've done that. Have you done that somewhere in a federal court?

MR. AZMY: We came close in another context, Your Honor, a hearing to related Guantanamo. But that was a hearing, not necessarily a full trial before a jury.

THE COURT: Okay, okay.

MR. AZMY: But, I would say two things, Your Honor. First, we have not abandoned attempts to bring them here. And that's why we're suggesting this two step process of depositions for now while we continue to try and bring them here and we'll make every effort to still

try and get them here for a trial. 1 THE COURT: How many more years should I do 2 that? 3 MR. AZMY: Well, I think under the ordinary 4 course, Your Honor, you know, the defendants have 5 suggested they're going to file for summary judgment. 6 That will take more time, and so for all we know, they 7 could be here this summer or the fall. We just don't 8 know. So, I wouldn't necessarily give up hope and I 10 certainly would not suggest that Your Honor should 11 dismiss now in anticipation that they won't be able to 12 appear for trial. We could address that question later, 1.3 including the mechanics. 14 But I think that would be the -- the 15 appropriate case given the governing legal framework, 16 Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right, thank you very much. 18 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. AZMY: 19 Briefly, Your Honor. Discovery MR. KOEGEL: 20 closed two weeks ago. 21 Second, last week you granted our motion to 22 compel production of the plaintiff's travel documents. 23 After we learned that the plaintiffs had not informed us 24 they weren't going to be able to get here for the 2.5

depositions we scheduled in January. We submitted a request to them for the documents relating to their efforts to get into the United States.

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We were told it's irrelevant. We received no documents. Eventually, we moved to compel, particularly because the plaintiffs had dribbled in selective documents when it was in their interest to do so.

We said, that's fundamentally unfair. We moved to compel and pointed out that they had also waived the privilege by introducing for the Court's consideration in October 2012 e-mail to the plaintiffs directing them at that point in time that from one of Ms. Burke's associates, they needed to apply for visas by October 22, 2012.

The plaintiffs opposed that motion. Last Friday, the Court granted it. That same day, we wrote to Mr. Azmy and said that motion has been granted. We'd like production of those documents by Monday in view of the fact we had a reply memorandum due on Wednesday.

We received no response to that communication. We have received no documents in response to the Court's order.

A week's gone by with nothing but silence from the plaintiff's counsel with respect to the Court's order granting our motion to compel their documents.

They have put into the record when it was in their interest to do so selective documents relating to their efforts to get to the United States.

And in our opening brief which was filed before the Court's order of last Friday, we argued that it would be appropriate to draw an adverse inference from their failure to produce documents relating to their efforts to get into this country.

It was information within their control, and their failure to produce it, given its obvious relevance, they've come into this court on numerous occasions arguing "we've tried, Your Honor. We've made all conceivable efforts to be able to appear for depositions and medical examinations in this district as the Court ordered".

But, at the same time they made that argument to this Court, they told us the documents relating to those efforts to get into the United States is irrelevant.

The Court granted the motion, but we don't have a complete production of the plaintiff's travel documents.

Under Rule 37, the Court has the clear discretion to sanction their failure to comply with the Court's order of last Friday by prohibiting them from

relying upon the selective documents that are appended to Mr. Azmy's declaration which was filed in connection with their opposition. This consists of their opposition, Mr. Azmy's declaration and the exhibits. Many of those exhibits are plaintiff's travel documents, some of which we've seen before.

They had produced some travel documents in connection with their filings to us. But they're not in compliance with the Court's order of last Friday. They have not --

THE COURT: Sum up.

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MR. KOEGEL: They've not made a complete production of documents pursuant to the Court's order. That disqualifies them from offering selective documents for the Court's consideration with respect to their efforts to comply with the Court's order to appear for depositions and medical examinations in the United States.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

 $\mbox{MR. AZMY: }$ If I may briefly address that issue, Your Honor.

Under the -- we are not in violation of this Court's order. Under the local rules we have 11 days to comply with an order of production.

And, that's number one. So there would be no authority, I don't believe, for this Court to sanction us.

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Number two, the case the defendants rely on for sanction of an adverse inference is a case which involved affirmative evidence of destruction of documents.

Number three, there was no selective production of documents. We've produced hundreds of pages. There is a trifle more which we will pull together which looks very much like what we've already produced.

The defendants' suspicion that there's something we have hiding is -- you know, is -- we know that the defendants [sic] were granted visas and a boarding pass. It's -- and, all of the documents we have after that are attempts to communicate with the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security officials to find out, A, what happened, and B, can they do something about it.

So, there is no absence of compliance with this Court's order.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, there's certainly been a great deal of briefs submitted to me.

And I will take the matter under advisement and the

matter is submitted. I'll issue a ruling in due course.

Thank you.

MR. KOEGEL: Your Honor, we have one housekeeping matter, may we address with the Court.

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The current scheduling order has a summary judgment deadline of, I believe, next Friday. We would request that the Court suspend that pending the issuance of the ruling and the determination of what date for filing summary judgment motions might be appropriate.

MR. AZMY: We have no objection to that request, Your Honor.

We -- on the discovery -- the pending discovery order, we believe there's some ambiguity about the scope of the discovery order with respect to privileged documents.

And so, we would request either a stay of production of privileged documents which could be massive going back to 2008 or the opportunity to seek clarification on the scope of that portion of the discovery order.

We will produce all non-privileged documents under the Court's -- pursuant to the Court's order from last Friday.

THE COURT: I believe under our rules there are requirements that you must meet to assert a privilege

in connection with discovery and a privilege log with itemization of the assertion of what the privilege is. I can't give you guidance on what it is, but I'm sure you'll be able to find it. There's case law of what you have to do if you are going to assert privilege. And I need to know which privilege it is and what the basis of it is for each item. MR. AZMY: All right, Your Honor. Thank you. (Proceeding concluded at 12:11 p.m.)

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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Renecia Wilson, an official court reporter for the United State District Court of Virginia, Alexandria Division, do hereby certify that I reported by machine shorthand, in my official capacity, the proceedings had upon the motions in the case of Suhail Al Shimari vs. CACI PT.

I further certify that I was authorized and did report by stenotype the proceedings and evidence in said motions, and that the foregoing pages, numbered 1 to 55, inclusive, constitute the official transcript of said proceedings as taken from my shorthand notes.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereto subscribed my name this <u>24th</u> day of <u>May</u>, 2013.

Renecia Wilson, RMR, CRF Official Court Reporter

RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON, RMR, CRR