EXHIBIT K

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Bigwood v. DOD, 1:11-cv-00602-KBJ

Exhibit KSample Documents Referencing Sources Not Produced

#	Bates No.	Date(s)	Vaughn Index Description	Source Material Referenced	Location in Document
1	SOUTHCOM751- SOUTHCOM762	7.22.09	"Highlights"	- AMEMBASSY Managua email 19 Jul 09; - IIR 641 00228 08; - TAT Tegucigalpa correspondence Coordinated with JIATF- S	pp. 753, 758
2	SOUTHCOM927- SOUTHCOM937	6.29.09	"Highlights"	- AMEMBASSY Tegucigalpa Cables, 281458Z JUN 09; 231433Z JUN 09; 181742Z HUN 09; 100141Z JUN 09.	p. 928
3	SOUTHCOM1020- SOUTHCOM1030	9.23.09	"Highlights"	- TAT Honduras; email exchange, 22 SEP 09; 401-09, 221628ZSEP09; 135-09, 221613ZSEP09; 221613ZSEP09; 403-09, 221739ZSEP09; 500906-09, 221822ZSEP09; 83-09, 221813ZSEP09; 404-09, 221909SEP09; 500908-09	p. 1023
4	SOUTHCOM617- SOUTHCOM620	12.17.09	"Highlights"	- AMEMBASSY 09TEGUCIGALPA1290; 09 TEGUCIGALPA1289	p. 618
5	SOUTHCOM681- SOUTHCOM684	12.9.09	"Highlights"	- TAT Tegucigalpa e-mail correspondence 08 DEC 09	p. 683
6	SOUTHCOM 707 - SOUTHCOM 717	7.29.09	"Highlights"	- AMEMBASSY Managua email 23 JUL 09.	p. 709

EXHIBIT K: DOCUMENT 1



Intelligence Executive Highlights



UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

22 JUL 2009

(U) Crisis Monitoring

Watch Condition Levels

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)

Active Warning Problems

Honduras

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)

(S//NF) Micheletti and Zelaya's representatives will continue to participate in mediation facilitated by Costa Rican President Arias. Demonstrations and civil unrest in Honduras will continue and may increase if Zelaya follows through on his promise to return (possibly 22 or 24 JUL). If Zelaya attempts to return or returns without a previously arranged compromise, violent clashes will almost surely occur. (as of 090720)

Haiti:

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)

(C//REL to USA, ACGU) Illegal migration remains above three year norms (350 -450 people per month), but no mass migration event is imminent. Social protests in Port Au Prince will continue to test security forces, but currently, no direct threat exists to US persons. A collateral threat will exist in protest areas. (as of 090720)

Regional Pandemic

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)

(U//FOUO) US personnel in USSOUTHCOM's Area of Focus (AOF) could be at risk of contracting the H1N1 Virus. The full extent of the H1N1 outbreak in USSOUTHCOM's AOF is undetermined due to the lack of diagnostic capabilities in the region. The governments of Argentina and Chile report rises in deaths and persons affected. Paraguay declared a nationwide state of emergency; Argentina declared a state of emergency in Buenos Aires Province. USG issued a travel alert for Argentina. (as of 090720)

SOUTHCOM

(U) Terrorism Warning Levels

DoD Terrorism Threat Level Definitions

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)

Active Warning Problems

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Regional

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)


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
Responsive



(U) Force Protection Warning Issues


NSTR





SECRET//NOFORN


SOUTHCOM0753




(U) Terrorism, Illicit Trafficking and Crime

(U/FOUO) Colombia – FARC Attack a Possible Diversion

- (U) On 19 JUL, FARC combatants attacked a Colombian National Police (CNP) checkpoint in Corinto, Cauca Department
- (U) The FARC initiated the attack by throwing a grenade near a two story bakery and firing on police and civilians from a nearby street and hillside
- (U) The CNP assesses the FARC's 6th Front was responsible for the attack, which killed 3 civilians and wounded 18, including two CNP officers



Source: (U) El Tiempo, Tres Muertos y 17 Heridos Dejaron Combates Entre Las FARC y La Policia en Corinto (Cauca) 19 JUL 09. (U) CARACOL, Mueren Tres Civiles Durante Combates Entre Las FARC y La Policia en Corinto (Cauca) 19 JUL 09



(U) Political-Military Issues

(U) Chile – Indigenous Mapuches Allegedly Attack Another Rural Target

- (U) Open press states at least eight hooded assailants attacked and burned a Forestal Mininco Lumber Company truck outside the town of Collipulli (350M south of Santiago)
- (U) This is the second attack on Mininco's trucks since 01 JUL

UNCLASSIFIED

- (U) Allegedly, armed members of the Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM) conducted the attack; CAM is a militant faction of Chile's Mapuche Indians
- (U) The attacks occurred after a crackdown by Chilean security forces and within the week following the arrest of Chile's most wanted fugitive, CAM's leader Hector Llaitul Carrillanaca


(U) Llaitul outside trial proceedings. 20 JUL 09

(C//REL TO USA, ACGU) Comment:

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d)

STATE

(Source: Santiago Times, 20 JUL 09; Latin American Herald Tribune, 21 JUL 09)



(U) Guyana - Unidentified Attacks

- (U) On 17 JUL, arsonists destroyed two Ministry of Health buildings
 - (U) Several "channa" bombs similar to molotov cocktails were recovered
 - (U) Officials fired the security firm on duty during the attack
- (U) On 20 JUL, police removed two more channa bombs from the Ministry of Public Works and Communications
- (U) In MAY 08, gunmen attacked the Ministry of Culture with two channa bombs which failed to ignite

Unclassified



(U) Ministry of Health building on fire

- (U) In APR 04, three men attacked the Ministry of Home Affairs with channa bombs burning the building's first two floors
- (U) To date, no one claims credit for the recent attacks

(U) Honduras: Military Lacks Common Operating Picture (COP)

(U//FOUO) Comment: Officials are not certain what motivated the attacks. Initially, allegations arose that the bombing targeted Minister of Health Dr. Leslie Ramsammy's offices to destroy financial records he had as part of an unnamed investigation. While possible, duplicate records are stored in Kingston, Guyana. Conversely, some speculate that members of his own political party may have targeted the ministry's building to pressure Ramsammy to bow to the wishes of the People's Progressive Party. Allegedly, they sought to send Ramsammy the message that he was too outspoken in seeking the Prime Minister position. The government is enhancing security procedures as is the US Embassy. Currently, no direct threat exists to US persons.

(Sources: Stabroek News, "Fire completely destroys Ministry of Health building" 17JUL09; Stabroek News, "Probe into Health Ministry fire ongoing", 21JUL09; Stabroek News, "Ramsammy Adamant Security Breach in Health Ministry Fire", 19JUL09; OSC, "Guyana: Arson Destroys Ministry of Health Buildings", 19JUL09; DOS AMEMBASSY Georgetown, Georgetown EAC Meeting on Fire at Guyana Ministry of Health, DTG: 172044ZJUL09)


•	
•	(C//REL TO USA, ACGU) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d) the Honduras
	military is unable to track in real time drug trafficking aircraft and ships entering Honduras
	because the USG stopped feeding them the Cooperative Nations Information Exchange
DIA, STAT	
DIA, STAT	(b)(4) C 4 ((c) C 4 ((d)
•	(D)(1),Sec. 1.4(d)
DIA -	(C) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d) the military remains unaware of much drug trafficking
	occurring within Honduras
	<u> </u>
•	(
	from Nicaragua; the source opined that some of the aircraft are likely searching for landing
	strips to smuggle ousted President Zelaya back into Honduras
102	
1	S//NF)-COMMENT:
7	Pacityre (Anthric 1 - ox - track residents)
	(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d)
274111111111111111111111111111111111111	With or without military access to CNIES, Honduras will remain a transit country for
STAT	smuggling from the source zone to Mexico and on to the US.
_ r	(b)(1),3ec. 1.4(d)

Responsive

STATE (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d) While Honduran military officials likely want information to track drug aircraft in their airspace, the most compelling current desire for a Responsive COP is to identify/track any aircraft possibly meant to smuggle Zelaya into Honduras. (Sources: (b)(3):10 USC 424 IIR 641 0228 09, El Herald 12 JUL: TAT Tegucigalpa correspondence) Coordinated with JIATF-S


(U) Paraguay/Brazil – Possible Itaipu Dam Negotiation

- (U) The Itaipu Treaty (1973) stipulates Paraguay and Brazil each own 50% of the electricity generated from the Itaipu Dam
- (U) Per the treaty, Paraguay is obligated to sell its surplus electricity exclusively to Electrobras (Brazil's State Electric Company)
- (U) Brazil currently consumes approximately 90-95% of the electricity produced; open sources on 20 JUL state Brazil plans to allow Paraguay to sell its share of excess electricity to Brazil's commercial energy market
- (U) Paraguay's Foreign Minister Hector Lacognata said he awaits Brazil's official proposal to confirm this change in the agreement
- (U) Open press states Mercosur's leaders will meet in Asuncion from 23-24JUL for a summit; reportedly, Paraguay's President Lugo and Brazil's President Lula will sign the agreement at the summit
- (U) Brazil pays about US \$8 per Kilowatt (KW) for electricity; the fair market rate is about US \$80 per KW



(Sources: LAP20090721008001, 21 0110Z JUL 09; LAP20090720025001, 20 1226Z JUL 09; en.mercopress.com/2009/07/21/brazil-accepts-discussions-on-itaip-surplus-power-distribution-and-prices, 21JUL09; ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43812, 05SEP08)





(U) Counterintelligence Issues

NSTR


(U) Cyber, C2, Information Operations Issues

NSTR

(U) Collection Requirements
(Colombia Daily, GWOT Tuesdays, AOF Wednesdays) CLASSIFICATION: S//REL TO ACGU//20340721 SOUTHCOM Daily ISR—22JUL09 (Information current as of 211900ZJUL09)


(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)

DIA



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SECRET//NOFORN_



23	Jul	MERCOSUR Heads of state summit in Paraguay
26	Jul	CUB: Anniversary of the birth of the Revolution and JUL 26 th Revolution
28	Jul	PER: Independence Day
28	Jul	VEN: Hugo Chavez' 55 th birthday
01	Aug	TTO: Emancipation Day
03	Aug	GRN: Emancipation Day
06	Aug	BOL: Independence Day
07	Aug	COL: Battle of Boyaca Day
10	Aug	ECU: Independence Day
10	Aug	ECU: UNASUR meeting
25	Aug	URY: Independence Day
31	Aug	TTO: Independence Day
07	Sep	BRA: Independence Day
18	Sep	CHL: Independence Day
21	Sep	BLZ: Independence Day

EXHIBIT K: DOCUMENT 2



Intelligence Executive Highlights



UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

29 JUN 2009

(U) Crisis Monitoring

Watch Co	ondition Levels		
(b)(1),Sec	. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)		
Active Wa	rning Problems	- 2	
Honduras:	(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)		
(S://NF) President Zelaya's forced departure at the beconcern. Supreme Court and Congressional declaracteries support the military's role in his removal. Ruadd to the potential for instability or violence. No diwill exist if clashes occur. Warning time may be lim	ations challenge Zelaya's imors of VEN and Cuban i rect threat to US personne	recent activities but do not involvement supporting Zelaya	
Haiti: (b)(1)),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)		
(U//FOUO) Although illegal migration continues at a thre imminent. Continuing social protests in Port Au Prince v Currently, no direct threat exists to US persons, but a co 090625)	vill test security forces; viole	ent acts are likely to occur.	
Guatemala Internal (GTMINT):	(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.	4(c)	
(C//REL TO USA, ACGU) President Colom appears to remains in power. Illicit traffickers continue to threaten of			

SOUTHCOM

(U) Terrorism Warning Levels

DoD Terrorism Threat Level Defin	itions
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)	
Active Warning Problems	20
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Regional:	(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)


-SECRET//NOFORN (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c) Islamic Extremist Regional: (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c) SOUTHCOM (S//NF) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)

(U) Force Protection Warning Issues

NSTR	
(U) Hot Topics	ı
 (U) Honduras – Zelaya Ousted (C) 29 JUN Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) arrested President Manuel Zelaya at the Presidential Palace and flew him by military aircraft to Costa Rica 	ſ
• (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d)	DIA, SOUTHCOI
 (U) Poll intended to seek voter approval for a constituent assembly to rewrite the Constitution, allowing Zelaya to run for office again (U) Congress and Judiciary declared the poll illegal; therefore the HOAF was prevented from carrying out the poll despite Zelaya's orders 	Responsive
• (C) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d)	STATE, SOUTHCOM
 (C) Reportedly, Roberto Michelleti, President of the National Congress, asserts Zelaya violated the law by publishing the poll in the official Gazette (C) Michelletti was sworn in as the President of Honduras until the 29 NOV national elections; the Vice President, Aristides Mejia, planned to return to Honduras from Miami on 28 JUN until he learned of a warrant for his arrest in Honduras 	
	STATE,
Reportedly, some members of the military feared Zelaya was on the verge of dissolving Congress, a drastic move he had threatened previously. Zelaya's pursuit of a non-binding poll from the electorate to convene a constituent assembly in the 29 NOV general elections was doomed from the start; he required congressional approval to place the question on the ballot, had meager political capital and overwhelming opposition from government officials and his own Liberal party. There is no direct threat to US personnel in JTF-B or Tegucigalpa, but US persons have been advised to remain inside.	OUTHCOM
((S//NF) Source: MILGP Honduras; (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c) JUN; AMEMBASSY Tegucigalpa Cables, 281458Z JUN 09; 231433Z JUN 09; 181742Z JUN 09; 100141Z JUN 09; www.nowpublic.com; (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USCA 403-1(i) tin News Daily 24 JUN 09)	DIA
(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) SECRET//NOFORN	

(U) Venezuela – Chavez Reacts to Honduran Crisis

- (U) On 28 JUN, Chavez condemned the removal of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya by the Honduran Military, which he called an illegal "abduction" perpetrated by "rebel officers"
 - (U) Chavez compared the Honduran action to the coup which briefly removed Chavez from power in APR 02
 - (U) Chavez characterized the current crisis as a class struggle between the Honduran people and the political elite
- (U) Chavez also threatened to take military action if his embassy in Honduras or its personnel were harmed
- (U) Venezuela's regional news outlet Telesur carried exclusive interviews with the ousted Zelava
- (U) Chavez called for an extraordinary meeting of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) to be held on 29 JUN in Managua, Nicaragua to discuss the Honduran crisis
- (U) The regional reaction to Zelaya's removal has been overwhelmingly negative



(Sources: LAP20090628001002, 281742Z JUN 09; (U) Honduras/Venezuela: An Up-Hill Battle for Bolivarian Influence, SOUTHCOM RASER Assessment, 28 NOV 08; LAP20090627045003, 272027Z JUN 09; LAP20090628026002, 281746Z JUN 09)


(U) Terrorism, Illicit Trafficking and Crime


(S) Guatemala – Europe-Based Guatemalan Official Provides Visas to SIAs


- (S) Guatemala (GTM)-based special interest alien (SIA) smuggler, Orlando Escobar Leon, aka Sammy-Two, provided contact and travel information to at least one Eritrean in Italy and one Ethiopian in Germany to facilitate their travel to GTM
- (S) Escobar instructed the SIAs to contact "Dr. Thomas"—possibly Dr. Thomas P. Knaak, the Guatemalan Consul General in Dusseldorf—who could issue original Guatemalan visas
 - (S) Escobar did not personally know "Dr. Thomas," however, his name is well-known by SIAs throughout Europe
 - (S) "Dr. Thomas" reportedly does not scrutinize SIAs' real travel intentions during the approval process
- (S) In the event that Guatemalan officials asked too many questions, Escobar instructed
 the SIAs to state that they were going on vacation and heard that Antigua, GTM was a very
 nice place


- (S) Escobar had recently had problems smuggling SIAs through Madrid, Spain to Belize, so he instructed the Ethiopian male to fly from Amsterdam, Netherlands to Guatemala City, GTM
- (S) Comment: The Escobar network continues to move Ethiopians, Somalis and Eritreans using new routes from Amsterdam to Guatemala City vice its usual path of South Africa to Latin America and on into Mexico. This new route, coupled with the reliable source of legitimate visas in Central America, could serve to expand Escobar's operations and capabilities and establish him as an international smuggler.

(Sources: DODSPECSEVEN San Antonio, TX, SUBJ: SIA Smuggling: Guatemala-Based Orlando Escobar Leon Coordinates Movement of SIAs through Italy and Germany; Escobar and Panama-Based Sergio Rugama Garcia Experience Problems in Mexico, DTG:22JUN09; Guatemalan Embassy (Berlin) Website)










Case 1:11-cv-00602-KBJ Document 30 Filed 03/18/14 Page 24 of 109

SECRET//NOFORN

		a.
(Sources:	(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403g	DIA
	DOS, 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,	35
DTG:1MA	R08; DOS, 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, DTG:27FEB09)	

(U) Venezuela – Legislating Victory

- (U) The proposed Electoral Process Law currently under review by the Venezuelan National Assembly would grant sweeping new powers to the National Electoral Council
 - (U) The law would allow the National Electoral Council to redraw district lines (gerrymandering) to ensure President Chavez's continued electoral success
 - (U) Existing districts could become new municipalities, parishes, or broken down into communal councils
 - (U) The law would also greatly expand Chavez's party's (PSUV) legislative authority by changing the method to select candidates to limit small and opposition parties' access
- (U) On 23 JUN, opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez, a possible contender for the 2012 presidential election, proposed primary elections for the coming municipal council and National Assembly elections in 2010; Lopez claimed a lack of unity in both ideology and candidates undercut the opposition's performance in the NOV 08 regional elections



(Sources: El Universal, 22 JUN 09; Caracas Chronicles, 22 JUN 09; Latin America Herald Tribune, 24 JUN 09)

(U) Counterintelligence Issues


NSTR

(U) Cyber, C2, Information Operations Issues


NSTR

(U) Collection Requirements
(Colombia Daily, GWOT Tuesdays, AOF Wednesdays)

CLASSIFICATION: SHREL TO ACGUH20340628



(U) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance



	(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c) DIA
	(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)
19 – 25 Jul	(U) Intelligence Analysis Seminar in Haiti. Seminar provides
	intelligence analysis fundamentals and instructions to analysts in
	the Haiti Joint Information Coordination Center (CICC)
27 – 30 Jul	(U) Paraguay Vice Minister of Defense and Paraguayan J2 visit to
	USSOUTHCOM, JIATF-S, and Ft. Huachuca
27 – 31 Jul	(U) Maritime Intelligence Analysis Seminar Ph 1 to Guatemalan Armed
	Forces

Significant Dates (60 Days)

16 Jun – 07	Jul	ECU: Naval exercise "Operacion Entrenamiento II" (training for maritime
		domain control)
29	Jun	COL: President Uribe meets with U.S. President in Washington, DC
30	Jun	GTM: Armed Forces Day
01	Jul	PAN: Inauguration of President Martinelli
04	Jul	PRY: MERCOSUR heads of state summit
05	Jul	VEN: Independence Day
09	Jul	ARG: Independence Day
13 – 15	Jul	PRY: Transportation workers scheduled to strike
20	Jul	COL: Independence Day
26	Jul	CUB: Anniversary of the birth of the Revolution and JUL 26 th Revolution
28	Jul	PER: Independence Day
28	Jul	VEN: Hugo Chavez' 55 th birthday
01	Aug	TTO: Emancipation Day
03	Aug	GRN: Emancipation Day
06	Aug	BOL: Independence Day
07	Aug	COL: Battle of Boyaca Day
10	Aug	ECU: Independence Day
10	Aug	ECU: UNASUR meeting

EXHIBIT K: DOCUMENT 3



Intelligence Executive Highlights



UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

23 SEP 2009

(U) Crisis Monitoring

Watch Condition Levels

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)

Active Warning Problems

Honduras

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)

(C//REL TO USA, ACGU) Ousted President Zelaya returned to Honduras and took refuge in the Brazilian Embassy. Security forces are deployed to the area to maintain order and arrest Zelaya if he leaves the embassy. Clashes with security forces reported; violence will likely escalate in the near term. No direct threat to US persons, but a collateral threat exists in protest areas. (as of 090922)

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)

(U//FOUO) No mass migration event is imminent; migration will probably remain steady through 2009 pending natural disasters. Small, intermittent social protests in Port Au Prince will continue. No direct threat exists to US persons, but a collateral threat will exist in protest areas. (as of 090921)

Regional Pandemic:

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)

(U//FOUO) US personnel in USSOUTHCOM's Area of Focus (AOF) remain at risk from the H1N1 Virus. H1N1 infections are stabilizing throughout the region; however identified areas within Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela are reporting new H1N1 cases. No reporting indicates the H1N1 outbreak will have an operational impact on the PANAMAX exercise or USSOUTHCOM operations. (as of 090921)

(U) Terrorism Warning Levels

DoD Terrorism Threat Level Definitions

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)

Active Warning Problems

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Regional

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)


(S)

SOUTHCOM

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d)


SECRET//NOFORN

Responsive




SOUTHCOM

(U) Cyber Warning Levels



(U) Force Protection

NSTR



SOUTHCOM1021

 (U) On 22 SEP, Honduras de facto President Micheletti said he planned to send a letter to Brazil demanding it turn Zelaya over to Honduran authorities or grant him asylum; Micheletti said President Chavez supported Zelaya's return

UNCLASSIFIED

 (U) On 22 SEP, Honduras Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez warned the international community against intervening in Honduran affairs

• (C//NF) Honduras Armed Forces (HOAF) are using minimum force, primarily water

cannons, tear gas, loud speakers, and clubs but no rubber bullets to disperse demonstrators IVO Brazil's Embassy; pro-Zelaya demonstrators burned a police vehicle

 (U) Open media reports HOAF closed pro-Zelaya media outlet Channel 36

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c)



(U) HOAF looks on as Honduras police recover a vehicle burned by pro-Zelaya demonstrators

(U) Reportedly the de facto government cut all water, electricity, communications, and access to the embassy for over twelve hours; water and electricity service is restored

(S//REL USA, FVEY)

(C//NF)

(S//NF)

DIA

CIA

CIA

STATE

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c)

(EOUO) Officials are negotiating the peaceful release of Brazilians and Hondurans from the embassy

• (C//NF) (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d) (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d) (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(c)

External:

 (U) On 22 SEP, Secretary General of the OAS Jose Miguel Insulza said he would attempt to negotiate with the de facto government although past attempts were fruitless; the Micheletti government will not negotiate with Insulza

(S//REL USA, FVEY)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c)

UNCLASSIFIED

San Jose Accord Key Points

- •Return public authorities to positions held prior to 28 June (including Zelaya)
- Political amnesty for all involved, including the military
- •Form a national unity and reconciliation government
- •Create a verification commission and a truth commission to ensure the agreement is carried out
- •Normalize relations between Honguras and the international community

Responsive

Prensa, HND,

SECRET//NC

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c)

(U) Lula warned the embassy's immunity must be respected; he asked Micheletti to accept a solution that is democratic and negotiated to allow Zelaya's return to power

(S//REL USA, FVEY)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c)

(U) El Salvador's President Funes said he does not know how Zelaya reentered Honduras

Force Protection Concerns:

- (S) FPCON level remains at BRAVO; US Embassy is closed; US Ambassador's residence is on lockdown; small fire reported near Ambassador residence; Ambassador not target
- (SBU) RSO issued a warning to all Embassy personnel and families to avoid unnecessary travel until further notice; consular section is preparing a warden message for American citizens; Embassy continues to assess the security situation and provide updates; to date, no crowds at or in the vicinity of the Embassy
- (U) De facto government extended the nationwide curfew from until 1800L on Wednesday
- (U) De facto government has ordered all international airports closed and secured by Honduran Air Force

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Assessment: Currently, no direct threat exists to US persons, but a collateral threat exists in any protest area. Zelaya proponents will use the UN General Assembly venue to call for Zelaya's immediate reinstatement and full acceptance of the San Jose accords.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c)

(S) Most Likely COA 24-48: The international community continues to pressure Micheletti. Micheletti continues to call for the arrest and trial of Zelaya. Zelaya will remain in Brazilian Embassy. Zelaya supporters will continue attempts to mass and challenge security forces. Security forces will be strained but maintain control.

(S) Most Dangerous COA: Pro-Zelaya demonstrations overwhelm security forces and become more violent. Zelaya, accompanied by a mob, attempts to return to the Casa Presidencial. Security forces may engage with lethal force.

USSOUTHCOM PIR: Objective 2.1 USSOUTHCOM CCIR: 3.0 and 7.0

(Sources: www.tiempo.hn, 22SEP09; www.elheraldo.hn, 22SEP09; www.laprensahn.com, 22SEP09; TAT Honduras; email exchange, 22SEP09; (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USCA 403-1(i) 401-09, 221628ZSEP09; 135-09, 221613ZSEP09; 403-09, 221739ZSEP09; 500906-09, 221822ZSEP09; 83-09, 221813ZSEP09; 404-09, 221909ZSEP09; 500908-09; (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c) (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c)

1

CIA

(U) Terrorism, Illicit Trafficking and Crime


(S//NF) (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c)

• (S//NF) (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c)

SECRET//NOFORN

SOUTHCOM1023

Responsive




(U) Cuba: Impact of the Embargo


 (U) On 16 SEP, Cuba will present a report to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) detailing the effect of the US embargo on Cuba's economy, public health, and education systems


- (U) According to the report, Cuba's economy suffered approximately US \$236.2B in losses since the 47-year-old trade embargo was established
- (U) Foreign Minister Rodriguez said the US is the principal obstacle to Cuba's development

그 경우 가장에 살았는 이사들이 되면 가장에 가장 그 아픈 맛이 아이를 하고 있다. 하는 아이를 맞아지는 것이라면 그 이 가는 없는 사람이 되었다. 그 아이를 다 있다면 하는 것이 없어 나를 다 했다.	nerating Cuba's lost revenue since the installment of			
the trade embargo, Cuba's report will only bolster the UNGA's position against the US				
embargo; the UN assembly voted 17 tim	es against US sanctions on Cuba since 1992.			
CLASSIFICATION UPGRADED BY STATE DEPT	(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d)			

(Sources: Associate Press, Cuba says US should lift embargo unconditionally, 17 SEP; ABC News, US/Cuba mull direct postal service, 17 SEP; BBC News, Obama renews Cuba trade embargo, 15 SEP)








(U) Venezuela: Chavez Announces "Stimulus Package"

- (U) President Chavez says he will increase public spending to boost economic growth;
 Chavez hinted 40 new economic measures may go into effect on 01 OCT
 - (U) Chavez said the government stimulus package will invest in houses, schools, hospitals, roads, and other public works projects
 - (U) Chavez said he would inject US \$5B into the economy in the form of bonds
 - (U) The measures are intended to tame inflation (currently at 15.5% for AUG) and rejuvenate the economy, which contracted another 2.4% in the second quarter of 2009
- (U) In mid-SEP, the Venezuelan National Assembly approved US \$14M in additional resources to fund "various expenditures for the Presidency of the Republic;" the expenditures include:
 - (U) Parts and maintenance for Chavez's Airbus A319; his primary method of transportation for his trips abroad
 - (U) Per diem and plane tickets for Chavez's staff
 - (U) Back pay and bonuses for existing government employees and wages and benefits for newly hired workers at Miraflores Palace



(Sources: OSC LAP 20090920344001, 201717Z SEP 09; Associated Press,18 SEP 09; Latin America Herald tribune, 20 SEP 09; Petroleum World, 18 SEP 09; OSC LAP20090918062006, 182031Z SEP 09)

(U) Counterintelligence Issues

NSTR

(U) Cyber, C2, Information Operations Issues
SECRET//NOFORN


NSTR

(U) Collection Requirements (Colombia Daily, GWOT Tuesdays, AOF Wednesdays)

CLASSIFICATION: S//REL TO ACGU//20340922



SECRET//NOFORN



(U) Significant Dates (60 Days)

23	Sep	CUB: Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs releases report on effects of US embargo			
25	Sep	ABW: Legislative and executive elections			
26	Sep	VEN: Second South America-Africa Summit, Margarita Island, VEN			
30	Sep	HTI: Anniversary Military Coup, President Aristide seeks exile in France			
04	Oct	BRA: President Lula in Belgium			
09	Oct	CUB: Anniversary of Che Guevara's Death			
09	Oct	PER: National Day			
09	Oct	ECU: President Correa to Russia			
10	Oct	CUB: Independence Day from Spain (1868)			
12	Oct	VEN: Indigenous Resistance Day (Columbus Day)			
18	Oct	BOL: Black October Anniversary			
18	Oct	SLV: Birthday of President Mauricio Funes (born 1959)			
19	Oct	JAM: National Heroes' Day			
19	Oct	CHL: Host Multinational Air Exercise (19 Oct-01Nov)			
20	Oct	GUY: Revolution Day			
20	Oct	BLZ: Celebration of overthrow of dictator Jorge Ubico			
20	Oct	BRA: (S//NF) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c) SOUTHCOM			
25	Oct	URY: Presidential and Legislative Elections			
27	Oct	BRA: President Lula's 64 th Birthday			
03	Nov	PAN: Independence Day			


EXHIBIT K: DOCUMENT 4



17 December 2009

(Morning Update)

(U) In-Brief



(U) Hot Items

(U) Honduras: Update

- (U) Some de facto government officials and select members of the international community are pressuring de facto President Micheletti to step down
- (U) Micheletti remains deeply concerned about the terms of President Zelaya's potential departure; Micheletti still believes Zelaya would be a security threat who could undermine the de facto government
- (U) Zelaya wants to leave the uncomfortable environment of the Brazilian embassy, but relishes his international status as a victim of a coup
- (U) Open sources on 16 DEC state a pro-Micheletti journalist was attacked by gunmen; the
 journalist escaped, but another person in the car died
- (U) Reporting since OCT 09 details 15 murders/kidnappings and 17 violent attacks on proand anti-de facto government supporters

(U//FOUO) Assessment: Micheletti loathing for Zelaya continues to increase and he remains adamant to serve until 27 JAN 2010. At best, Micheletti would step down just prior to 27 JAN to meet the letter of the San Jose Accord and open the door for greater international recognition of President-elect Lobo. Zelaya has two options: seek asylum on Micheletti's terms, or face charges of treason. Zelaya will probably seek a last minute deal for safe passage out of Honduras on Micheletti's terms. While reporting does not prove a coordinated effort is underway to kill multiple members of each group, the frequency and nature of attacks clearly suggests more politically-motivated killings will occur. Given the significance of 27 JAN to both

Responsive

sides, these killings may increase beginning in mid-JAN 2010. Currently, no direct threat exists to US persons.

Responsive

(Sources:

(b)(3):10 USC 424 AMEMBASSY 09TEGUCIGALPA1290; 09TEGUCIGALPA1289; www.laprensahn.com)

(U) Political – Military

(U) Peru: Planned Military Acquisitions

- (U) Defense Minister Rafael Rev announced plans to purchase 12 x A-29 Super Tucanos from Brazil
- (U) Open sources state three or four of the aircraft would immediately support operations against Sendero Luminoso (SL) operating in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley region
- (U) Peru's currently has 18 x EMB-312 Tucano trainer aircraft
- (U) Rey also announced Peru is negotiating with China for MBT-2000 tanks with a contract date set for late JAN 10






(U) Brazilian A-29 Super Tucano

(U//FOUO) Assessment: Super Tucanos possess a good air-to-ground capability. Recent military engagements with SL resulted in the loss of helicopters due to small arms fire; if the Super Tucanos participate in operations, their ability to provide close air support would likely mitigate much of the small arms threat to the helicopters. Despite the desire to employ the aircraft immediately, Peru's Air Force will need to train pilots and ground forces in close air support operations; such training will likely take several months.

CLASSIFICATION UPGRADED BY STATE DEPT.


(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d)

(Sources: LAP20091214209001, 14 2220Z DEC 09; LAP20091215018001, 15 0214Z DEC 09)



SOUTHCOM0618


STATE



(U) Upcoming Elections

18	DEC	DMA: Parliamentary election
17	JAN	CHL: Presidential election run-off
07	FEB	CRI: Presidential and parliamentary election
28	FEB	HTI: Legislative elections

(U) Collection Requirements



CLASSIFICATION: S//REL TO ACGU//20341216

SOUTHCOM ISR Outlook – Next 72 Hours (Information current as of 161940ZDEC09)	
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)	SOUTHCOM

EXHIBIT K: DOCUMENT 5




Intelligence Executive Highlights




UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

09 December 2009

(Morning Update)





SOUTHCOM (C//NF) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c) two men on motorcycles pulled alongside his vehicle and shot him

> (U) Allegations immediately arose that the murder was retaliation for the Honduran Army's recent successes against drug planes, specifically, the take down of a drug plane on 05 DEC

(U) General (ret) Julian Aristides Gonzalez

DIA, SOUTHCOM SECRET//NOFORN

- (C//NF) Later on 08 DEC, (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d) stated unknown persons also killed retired Army Colonel Jose Osiris O'Connor Bain in the village of Pena Blanca Santa Cruz de Yojoa on CA-5 between Siguatepeque and San Pedro Sula
 - (C//NF) Bain is a cousin of de facto President Roberto Micheletti
 - (C//NF) Bain's brother is head of security for Congress
 - (C//NF) The motive for the killing is unknown

(C//NF) Assessment: No reporting indicates the two killings are related or part of renewed operations by the Resistance Front. The allegations that Gonzalez was killed to retaliate for counterdrug successes appear plausible. The lack of details regarding the killing of Bain limits an assessment, but his relationship to Micheletti and the location of the killing in a pro-Zelaya area suggest resistance radicals may be involved. No reporting suggests a direct threat exists to US persons.

Responsive

(Sources: (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USCA 403-1(i)

Washington Post A. P. 8 DEC 09)

(U) Upcoming Elections

13 DEC CHL: Legislative and first round of presidential elections

18 DEC DMA: Parliamentary election

(Information current as of 081940ZDEC09)

07 FEB CRI: Presidential and parliamentary election

10 FEB HTI: Presidential election

(U) Collection Requirements

CLASSIFICATION: S//REL TO ACGU//20341208
SOUTHCOM Daily ISR-09DEC09

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)

SECRET//NOFORN

NGA.

SOUTHCOM

SOUTHCOM ISR Outlook – Next	classification: S#REL TO ACGU#20341208 72 Hours	
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)		NGA

EXHIBIT K: DOCUMENT 6



Intelligence Executive Highlights



UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

29 JUL 2009


(U) Crisis Monitoring

Watch Condition Levels	
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)	
Active Warning Problems	
Honduras: (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)	The second
(S//NF) Demonstrations will continue and may increase if Zelaya follows through on his promise to return. (as of 090727)	Responsiv
Haiti (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)	-
(C//REL to USA, ACGU) Illegal migration remains above three year norms (350-450 people per month), but no mass migration event is imminent. Social protests in Port Au Prince will continue to test security forces, but currently, no direct threat exists to US persons. A collateral threat will exist in protest areas. (as of 090727)	
Regional Pandemic: (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)	
(U//FOUO) US personnel in USSOUTHCOM's Area of Focus (AOF) could be at risk of contracting the H1N1 Viru The full extent of the H1N1 outbreak in USSOUTHCOM's AOF is undetermined due to the lack of diagnostic capabilities in the region. The governments of Argentina and Chile report rises in deaths and persons affected. Paraguay declared a nationwide state of emergency; Argentina declared a state of emergency in Buenos Aires Province. USG issued a travel alert for Argentina. (as of 090727)	3.

SOUTHCOM

(U) Terrorism Warning Levels

DoD Terrorism Threat Level Defin	itions	
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)		
Active Warning Problems		
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Regional:	(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)	
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)		



(U) Force Protection Warning Issues

NSTR

Responsive

(U) Hot Items

(U) HONDURAS: Situation Update Internal:

- (U) Ousted President Zelaya remains in Ocotal Nicaragua; he is contemplating moving to other unidentified border areas
- (U) Open source reporting cites Zelaya as instigating armed resistance among his supporters, the Popular Resistance Militia, in Nicaragua
- (U) On 28 JUL, a Honduran judge allowed the First Family to cross the border area and reunite with DIA Zelaya; (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 130b,Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d) Zelaya may attempt to cross back into Honduras surrounded by his family
- (SBU) Embassy personnel are reporting potential flashpoints for violence at the Honduran Nicaraguan border where pro-Zelaya supporters have congregated:

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


(U) Zelaya Rallying His Supporters at the Nicaraguan-Honduran border

 (SBU) Human rights groups have lodged protests against Honduran security forces claiming citizens have been denied freedom of **UNCLASSIFIED**

movement throughout the country

(U) Zelaya supporters cross into Nicaragua via HOAF "blind spots"



(U) No major demonstrations in Tegucigalpa today, though 600 pro-Zelaya demonstrators gathered then disbanded near the airport

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c) SOUTHCOM

SECRET//NOFORN


SOUTHCOM0708

28 JUL09 HND, Tribuna, Ľa'

External:

 (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Zelaya is reaching out to Brazilian President Lula to call a Rio group meeting to implement measures against those responsible for the coup against him

(U) Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Aguirre states Zelaya's use of Nicaraguan territory as a platform to rally support is dangerous for Nicaragua



SOUTHCOM


Responsive

Force Protection Concerns:

- (U) Nation-wide curfew continues until further notice
 (S//REL_TO_USA, ACGU) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c) prepared to increase restrictions and FPCON if necessary
- (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c) restricted travel outside of Tegucigalpa

(C//REL TO USA, ACGU) MOST LIKELY SCENARIO 24-48 HRS: Zelaya will continue his grandstanding for the international media and his supporters. He is unlikely to attempt a cross over into Honduras. Honduran Congress and Supreme Court are reviewing the San Jose Accords. The de facto government will remain steadfast in its intention to arrest Zelaya if he enters Honduras without an agreement. Demonstrations will continue but diminish further. Chavez or leftist leaders in country could try to instigate violence against Honduran security forces, causing them to over react and start a downward spiral of protests and violence.

(C//REL TO USA, ACGU) WORST CASE SCENARIO: Zelaya unexpectedly returns with the help of outside assistance. Violence breaks out when security forces attempt to arrest him. This sparks violent demonstrations resulting in extensive loss of life with security forces firing on civilians.





(U) Terrorism, Illicit Trafficking and Crime





(S//NF) Comment: USSOUTHCOM assesses with high confidence this meeting will not occur as described and the report may have been passed to influence US policy regarding Venezuela. One of the alleged FARC attendees, Gabino, died in late JUL 08 from wounds suffered in a clash with the COLMIL. In addition, Romana is located several hundred miles west of the meeting location in the vicinity of La Macarena and reportedly recovering from injuries suffered in a recent bombing. Furthermore, it is doubtful that President Chavez would enter Colombian territory to meet with mid-level FARC commanders, especially considering he could safely meet with a FARC Secretariat member currently residing in Venezuela. While the meeting as described lacks credibility, other intelligence reporting indicates Chavez may increase his government's clandestine support to the FARC in response to ongoing discussions between the US and Colombia to establish a cooperative security location (CSL) in Colombia.






(U) Brazil: Renewed Interest in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

 (U) According to open press, the Brazilian Air Force is seeking UAVs and UAV technologies for surveillance missions

- (U) Denel Dynamics, a South African state owned defense industrial group, proposed joint development of the Bateleur, a mediumaltitude-long-endurance surveillance UAV
- (U) Open press states as of mid-July 09, the Brazilian Federal Police (PF) was testing an Israeli-made UAV in the Tri-border area (TBA) of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina
- (U) The PF is considering the purchase of three UAVs; the UAVs will likely be based out of the San Miguel do Iguazu, a civilian airport in TBA and will be used to combat illicit activities in there



(U) Artists rendering of the Bateleur UAV

(C//REL TO USA, ACGU) Comment: Development of an organic UAV program is integral to Brazil's defense modernization plan, along with nuclear submarines for the navy and new armored personnel carriers for the army. Brazil developed its own hand-launched micro UAV, but has not successfully produced a medium altitude or long endurance capability. The government of Brazil will use the UAVs to patrol its extensive borders, and provide surveillance of the TBA. Brazil will only accept the South African proposal if it includes a technology transfer agreement.

(Sources: OSC, LAP20090717021003; OSC, AFP20090707560011; OSC, 20090718010001; OSC, GMP20090724739002; OSC, LAP200907230008001; OSC, FBS20090722415828)

(U) Cuba: Addressing Accountability

- (U) Raul Castro addressed a crowd of 200K in Holguin during Cuba's 56th Days of National Rebellion celebration; Raul emphasized cultivating food as "a matter of national security"
- (U) Raul promoted the success of land reform programs and urged Cubans to "make [the land] produce," despite the US blockade and drought issues
- (U) He announced a scheduled meeting by the Council of Ministers to address the struggling national economy
- (U) Raul stated that the creation of a General Comptroller of the Republic, "to strengthen the enforcement of compliance with current legislation," will face debate within the National Assembly



(U) Raul Castro challenges Cubans to 'Produce or die'

(C) Comment: Cuba's ministerial meetings will likely produce more bleak economic predictions such as in late-MAY when the government announced a lower GDP growth prediction from 6% to 2.5%. Raul charged citizens to take advantage of state land to produce food and ease reliance on imported consumables.

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d)

Miami Herald.com, 26JUL09

STATE

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d)

(Sources: The Miami Herald, www.miamiherald.com, Raul Castro says Cuba must put land to better use, DTG: 26 JUL 09; CAN, www.cubanews.ain.cu, Raul Castro Highlights Resilience of Cuban People During July 26 Speech, DTG: 27 Jul 09; OSC, LAP20090726391003, DTG: 261526Z JUL 09; USINT Havana, E.O. 12958, DTG: 271833Z MAY 09)

(U) Peru: Free Trade Push

- (U) Open press reports that a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Peru and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) will occur when an unspecified technical issue related to Norway is corrected; the EFTA comprises Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway
- (U) Open press on 27 JUL stated the government of Peru seeks to establish Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with Russia, India, Morocco and South Africa in 2010
- (U) On 27 JUL, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Liebermand met with Peruvian Foreign Minister Jose Antonio Garcia Belaunde to discuss strengthening trade and investment between the two countries
 - (U) The Foreign Ministers began negotiations for a bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement
 - (U) Foreign Minister Belaunde stressed the importance of finalizing a Visa Elimination Agreement with Israel
- (C) Comments: The trade and investment agreements come shortly after Peru experienced sporadic, and sometimes deadly, demonstrations from indigenous groups and labor unions demanding concessions, including repeal of the country's existing FTAs. Despite this,

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d)

continue to emphasis FTAs as a priority for his administration.

(Sources: CPP20090728968122, 280223Z JUL 09; LAP20090727018001, 280155Z JUL 09; LAP20090727053008, 280018Z JUL 09)


(U) St. Kitts and Nevis: Closer Ties to Cuba?

- (U) Cuban Vice President Estaban Lazo attended the recent seventh session of the Joint Commission for Economic and Technical Cooperation (JCET) in St. Kitts and Nevis
 - (U) JCET is an annual meeting between the two countries designed to enhance cooperation in agriculture, health, tourism, disaster management and community development sectors
 - (U) This marks the first JCET session yielding contractual agreements (NFI)
- (U) On 20 JUL, Astona Browne, St. Kitts and Nevis Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, traveled to Cuba to activate a Bilateral Consultation and Coordination Mechanism agreement
 - (U) The agreement was originally signed in 2000 and designed to promote economic, cultural, social and technical development between the two nations
- (U) On 17 JUN, St. Kitts and Nevis' Prime Minister Douglas announced the receipt of a US \$50M loan from ALBA; St. Kitts and Nevis has openly expressed their desire to become the 4th CARICOM nation to join ALBA

(U) Comment	(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d) CLASSIFICATION UPGRADED BY STATE DEPT]	
(U) Comment:	(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d) CLASSIFICATION UPGRADED BY STATE DEPT	_	

STATE

STATE



	Strategic Operational Command (CEO – JCS equivalent) and Foreign Ministry officials to explore the creation of a common defense force among ALBA member states	
•	(S//NF) (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c)	
•	(U) In JAN 08, President Chavez called for the creation of an ALBA "joint strategic defense force" to "respond as one" to US aggression against any ALBA member state (U) In MAR 09, Venezuela ratified the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) new South American Defense Council charter, as did fellow ALBA members Ecuador and Bolivia, calling for respect for the territorial integrity of South American states and non-interference in their internal affairs	
•	(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USCA 403-1(i),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)	BI, CIA
(S ,	//NF) Comment: (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d)	STATE, CIA
	purces: (S//NF) (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403g,Sec. 1.4(c) (U) OSC, LAP 20080129002001, 271540Z JAN 08; (U) OSC, P20090312045001, "South American Defense Ministers Create UNASUR Defense Council", 10 MAR 09; (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 403-1(i),Sec. 1.4(a)	FBI
	(U) Counterintelligence Issues	

NSTR

(U) Cyber, C2, Information Operations Issues


NSTR

(U) Collection Requirements (Colombia Daily, GWOT Tuesdays, AOF Wednesdays)

CLASSIFICATION: S//REL TO ACGU//20340728 SOUTHCOM Daily ISR-29JUL09 (Information current as of 281900ZJUL09) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c) OUTHCOM, ION-ITTRIBUTABLE



(U) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance



(U) Theater Intel Engagement Activities (Next 30 Days):

27 – 30 Jul	(U) Paraguayan J2 visit to USSOUTHCOM, JIATF-S, and Ft. Huachuca
27 – 31 Jul	(U) Maritime Intelligence Analysis Seminar Ph 1 to Guatemalan
	Armed Forces
2 – 6 Aug	(S) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c) SOUTHCOM
10 - 14 Aug	(U) Central America Regional Intelligence Conference (CRIC) in Dom Rep
17 – 21 Aug	(U) XII Strategic Intelligence Congress (SIC) in Buenos Aires, Argentina

23 - 29 Aug

(U) Intelligence Analysis Seminar Phase I in Bahamas (BHS), this will be the last TSC event covered by SOUTHCOM. NORTHCOM takes over BHS Intel events from here on.

Significant Dates (60 Days)

30	Jul	CHL: State visit to Brazil (Sao Paulo)
01	Aug	TTO: Emancipation Day
03	Aug	GRN: Emancipation Day
06	Aug	BOL: Independence Day
07	Aug	COL: Battle of Boyaca Day
10	Aug	ECU: Independence Day
10	Aug	ECU: UNASUR meeting
25	Aug	URY: Independence Day
31	Aug	TTO: Independence Day
07	Sep	BRA: Independence Day
18	Sep	CHL: Independence Day
21	Sep	BLZ: Independence Day

EXHIBIT L

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U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch

By U.S. Mail

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Trial Attorney

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Thomas.D.Zimpleman@usdoj.gov

January 10, 2014

Pamela Spees Center for Constitutional Rights 666 Broadway, 7th Floor New York, NY 10012-2317

RE: Bigwood v. United States Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, Case No. 11-00602 (D.D.C.)

Dear Ms. Spees,

I write on behalf of the United States Southern Command ("Southcom") in response to your letter of December 23, 2013, and our conference call of that same date. In your letter, you inquired as to why certain documents, referenced as sources of information contained in intelligence highlights produced by Southcom, were not included in Southcom's second production of documents. During our conference call, you also raised additional questions concerning the search for documents in response to your client's Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request, and the exemptions applied to those documents.

1. Documents Not Included in the Second Production

After reviewing the documents cited in your December 23 letter and discussing this issue with Southcom, it appears that those documents are not agency records that Southcom could find or produce in response to a FOIA request. Generally, Southcom does not gather or produce its own intelligence; rather, subcomponents have access to documents created and controlled by other agencies while carrying out its mission. Those documents are referenced in the daily intelligence highlights produced by Southcom, but the source documents are not, as a rule or practice, maintained by Southcom. For example, your letter cites cables from the United States Embassy in Tegucigalpa (e.g., 8/6/09 IEH, 8/26/09 IEH, 10/1/09 IEH) but those records would not be maintained by Southcom. Further, the prefix "LAP," which appears before numerous sources cited in your letter (e.g., 7/8/09 IEH, 8/5/09 IEH), appears to refer to open-source material.

Southcom's review of the documents cited in your letter indicates that the only Southcom subcomponent from which any of the cited documents originated is MILGP Honduras. At least one of the cited documents was included in Southcom's first production: USMILGP SITREP 9 AUG 09, cited as a missing document from the 11/13/09 IEH, was produced at pages 116-117 of the first

production. That production included all of the daily situation reports that MILGP Honduras was able to locate and which contained responsive information.

On our conference call, you also referenced fifteen dates for which daily intelligence highlights were not produced.¹ Southcom's FOIA office tasked the intelligence subcomponent with searching for responsive records from May 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009, and turned over the records it was able to locate which contained responsive information. Southcom has no reason to believe that the reports for the fifteen additional dates that you mentioned on our conference call contain responsive information.

2. Search of subcomponents

As I indicated on our conference call, four subcomponents of Southcom were tasked with searching for records for the second production: J2 (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconaissance); J3 (Operations); MILGP Honduras (attached to the embassy in Tegucigalpa); and Joint Task Force Bravo (Soto Cano Air Force Base). They were tasked with searching for responsive records using various search terms involving the coup against President Manuel Zelaya, with a timeframe of March 1, 2009 through the date of the search in 2012. Some of these subcomponents were tasked with additional, more specific searches for the first or second productions, including J2 (which was tasked with searching for records of interagency communications regarding the coup in Honduras and for daily intelligence highlights from May 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009), MILGP Honduras (which was tasked with locating all daily situation reports during the relevant timeframe), and Joint Task Force Bravo (which was tasked with locating any relevant After Action Reports). The relevant records produced by these searches were included in the first and second productions.

3. Headline News Summaries

During our conference call, you also inquired as to why Southcom had not produced additional headline news summaries involving events in Honduras. The July 1, 2009 headline news summary contained in the second production is a compilation produced by the Office of Public Affairs that occasionally includes outside news articles relevant to Southcom's area of focus. The search of the subcomponents discussed above produced only the July 1, 2009 version as containing responsive information. The Office of Public Affairs was also tasked with searching for responsive records for the first production.

4. Overbroad Redactions

Finally, on our conference you discussed some concerns you have that certain exemptions may have been applied too broadly. Specifically, you expressed concern that your review of the documents suggested that portions exempted from release because they contain classified information did not need to be classified and exempted from release under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). In processing these documents for release Southcom conferred with other components and agencies possessing an interest in these records to determine whether information contained in those

¹ Those dates are 7/16/09, 8/4/09, 8/11/09, 8/13/09, 8/17/09, 8/18/09, 8/19/09, 8/27/09, 9/2/09-9/4/09, 9/10/09, 9/11/09, 9/15/09, and 9/17/09.

documents needed to remain classified or whether it could be released. The exemptions were applied to information that Southcom (or another component or agency) determined needed to remain classified and exempted from release. Given the time and agency resources already committed to reviewing these records, Southcom does not believe that it is in a position to engage in further review.

As I mentioned to you on conference call, we appreciate the Plaintiff's effort to narrow down the areas of disagreement in this case prior to summary judgment. If you have any further issues that you would like to discuss, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Thomas D. Zimpleman

EXHIBIT M



Pre-Decisional Only

Mission Analysis: Potential Support to DOS in Honduras

"...the only President that the United States recognizes in Honduras is President Zelaya, and I want everyone to be clear about that." SECSTATE Clinton 28 June 09 Press Conference

011300R July 09 Director Security and Intelligence





DECRET

Pre-Decisional Only

Agenda

- ☐ Current Situation
- ☐ Intelligence Assessment
- □ Force Laydown
- □ Facts
- Assumptions
- □ Authorities
- Operational Limitations:

Constraints and Restraints

- ☐ Specified & Implied Tasks
- □ Proposed Mission Statement
- ☐ Options & Risk Assessment/Mitigation
- □ Challenges
- Recommendations



CJCS, GEN Romeo Vasquez (center)



Deployed Honduran forces in Tegucigalpa



SECRET

Pre-Decisional Only

Current Situation

 □ (U/FOUO) On 28 JUN, Armed Forces detained President Zelaya and flew him via aircraft to Costa Rica; Micheletti confirmed to USDAO he told the military to detain □ (U) New government asserts no coup occurred; claims this was a constitutional surrequired to prevent Zelaya from carrying out illegal actions deemed by the Congress Supreme Court 	Zelaya ccession
☐ (U) Pro- and anti-government demonstrations will continue; anti-government protest the greatest potential to become violent	sts have
☐ (U) Zelaya states he will return to Honduras on 4 JUL accompanied by international Micheletti states Zelaya will be arrested and charged; Zelaya faces 5 charges in Holling If Zelaya returns, anti-government protests will likely spike	10
☐ (U) Security forces postured to use non-lethal means to quell potential protests	
□ (U) Micheletti's strategic message is changing to portray Zelaya as treasonous and supported by Venezuela (VEN); patriotic appeals emphasize possible VEN invasion has very limited military capability to invade HND	
☐ (U) New government appears willing to endure international sanctions; new election	ns will
likely be sooner than scheduled (NOV 09)	110
☐ (U) Currently, no direct threat to US persons	anin
- DECEMBER -	5.1.11





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Intelligence Assessment

1 (C//REL TO USA, ACGU) MOST LIKELY COA: Micheletti's government will attent to wait out the political storm by weathering pro-Zelaya protests and resisting pressure from the international community. (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d)	mpt SOUTHCOM
The government will stress the ruling of the Supreme Court against Zelaya and claim Congressional backing existed. The government will likely consider moving elections forward fro NOV 09 to appease the international community and display its intent to bring democratic rule back to Honduras as soon as possible.	m
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d)	SOUTHCOM
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(d)	10 P 5 C 5 C 5 C 5 C 5 C 5 C 5 C 5 C 5 C 5

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
Force Laydown

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Assumptions

DOS will request DOD support if the security situation deteriorates significantly	SOUTHCO
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)	
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)	
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)	
An uncertain political and security environment will exist during a NEO	<u>, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(b),Sec. 1.4(d) SOUTHCOM STATE DEPT.	
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)	
HND security and military forces will neither hinder nor help in NEO	
Commercial/contract air will be available for evacuation	SOUTHCOM
US will be able to use all international APODs and SPODs	
> (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)	
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(c)	1.1

SECRET





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Authorities

- ☐ (U) Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the US has the right to protect/evacuate AMCITs in foreign nations, when the foreign nation is no longer willing or able to provide protection
- ☐ (U) Under certain circumstances, the US has the right to protect/evacuate non-US citizens in foreign nations under collective self-defense or humanitarian assistance authorities
- ☐ (U) NEO requires DOS request and SECDEF approval







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Constraints and Restraints

100							
Co	Constraints (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)						
	D. Domain neutral						
	IXCIII	ain neutral					
		(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)					
		(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)					
		(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)					
		(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)	-				
		(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)					
	>	(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)					
	>	(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)					
Restrai		(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)					
(b)	(1),Sec.	.4(a)					
		(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)					
		(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)					
		(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)					
1,11							



GEORET

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Specified Tasks

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)	SOUTHCOM
(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)	








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Implied Tasks










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Proposed Mission






(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c) SOUTHCOM





Pre-Decisional Only

Challenges









Pre-Decisional Only

Recommendations

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)







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BACK UP







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Way Ahead

- ☐ Request CDR's Guidance and approval of:
 - > Assumptions
 - > Mission Statement
 - End State

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)

SOUTHCOM

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)

- > Identify authorities
- > Develop potential timeline
- Conduct action officer coordination with components, Joint Staff and interagency partners








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NEO site: Tegucigalpa







SOUTHCOM



OFFICE

Pre-Decisional Only

NEO site: San Pedro Sula



(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)

Regularly scheduled US flights:

American - MIA (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)

Continental - HOU (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)

Delta - ATL (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)

Spirit - FLL (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a)



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Other NEO Sites










Pre-Decisional Only

PAX movement







OECRET

Pre-Decisional Only

NEO Questions







Pre-Decisional Only

Situation

☐ "Road to Crisis":

- December 2005 President Zelaya is democratically elected
- May 2007 President Zelaya orders all radio stations to play two hours of Govt. propaganda
- August 2008 President Zelaya turns "left" of the Liberal party platform and joins VZ led Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA)



President Zelaya (center), MOD Orellana (left) and CJCS, GEN Romeo Vasquez (right)

- In 2009 President Zelaya calls for a non-binding popular referendum to hold a November vote to create constituent assembly to rewrite the Constitution IOT amend the HND Constitution to extend Presidential term limits beyond four years
- 24 June 2009 President Zelaya fires GEN Vasquez after his refusal to deliver ballots (HND military is required by law to deliver voting ballots); MOD Orellana & Service Chiefs resign
- 25 June 2009 HND Supreme Court rules the referendum is unconstitutional and President Zelaya unlawfully fired GEN Vasquez; HND troops deploy to govt. buildings
- > 28 June 2009 HND troops seize President Zelaya and fly him to Costa Rica; Mr. Micheletti is sworn in as interim President of HND; USG condemns HND actions and calls for Zalaya's immediate return to HND as President




SECRET

Pre-Decisional Only

Honduras

1 of 2






- Soto Cano / JTF-B (approximately 45 miles NW of Tegucigalpa)
- ☐ Miami to Tegucigalpa is 911 miles
- ☐ Atlanta to Tegucigalpa is 1,350 miles
- ☐ Dallas to Tegucigalpa is 1,400 miles ☐
- ☐ Pope AFB to Tegucigalpa is 1,570 miles



Pre-Decisional Only

Honduras






CEORET

Pre-Decisional Only

Facts 1 of 3



(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a) SOUTHCOM

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(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a) SOUTHCOM

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a) SOUTHCOM



-OLONET

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SOUTHCOM

Operational Implied Tasks

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a) □ (C) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a) □ (C) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a) □ (C) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a) (S) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a) □ (S) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a) □ (S) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a) □ (S) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(b),Sec. 1.4(d) SOUTHCOM STATE DEPT □ (S) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a),Sec. 1.4(b),Sec. 1.4(d) □ (S) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), Sec. 1.4(b), Sec. 1.4(d) SOUTHCOM STATE DEPT ☐ (U) Prepare to receive and support USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs (SCPA) deployment of the DOD National Media Pool and/or Joint Information Bureau (JIB), should HN request assistance via USIS representative. ☐ (U) Provide liaison to CDR USSOUTHCOM as well as Chief of Mission in area of operations. □ (S) (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a) (U) Ensure site survey teams assist in personnel and physical security. SOUTHCOM ☐ (U) Assist and operate evacuation control center (ECC), as directed by COM. □ (S) (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(a) ☐ (U) Accept OPCON or TACON of forces from CDR USSOUTHCOM. Establish positive command and control over all assigned and supporting forces involved in the operation