From: Sutheerat, Somyot  
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2005 5:34 PM  
To: Cole, James F  
Subject: RE: ARTICLES on AQ suspects in Thailand

Prime Minister Thaksin, at his weekly meet the press conference this afternoon, said in English in respond to a question by a foreign reporter on the Washington's Post article naming Thailand as one of eight secret sites operated by the CIA in detaining top al-Qaeda operatives that "You know sometimes the famous name doesn't have to, 'reliable,' you are talking about the Washington Post. The CIA Spokesman has come out to deny the allegations already. Especially for Thailand we have no information at all. We have only one arrest, Hambali, and we already sent him to the US already long ago. We have no detention or any secret jails whatsoever. So we therefore totally deny."

Meanwhile, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs agreed to set up a sub-committee to make a study on the Washington Post's article.
Okay, please keep an eye on the media (radio and TV too). Issues have a way of flaring and then disappearing in Bangkok, so this may end up being a tempest in a teacup. Thanks. Jim

From: Chansiri, Chanchaw
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2005 11:27 AM
To: Cole, James F
Cc: Sutheerat, Somyot
Subject: RE: ARTICLES on AQ suspects in Thailand

I found no other reaction nor public comment in any Thai press of today than the initial comment given by the Government Spokesman as mentioned in the e-mail of Khun Somyot. If any of such info is found later on, we will give you a summary.

Regards,
Tuk

From: Cole, James F
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2005 11:19 AM
To: Sutheerat, Somyot; Chansiri, Chanchaw
Subject: RE: ARTICLES on AQ suspects in Thailand

Could you prepare a summary (1-2 paragraphs) today on Thai general reaction to this article? I'm not looking to solicit people's comments – would prefer this whole thing quietly fade away, but I'm interested in any public comments (or the lack of public comments). Thanks. Jim

From: Sutheerat, Somyot
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2005 8:30 AM
To: Cole, James F
Cc: Chansiri, Chanchaw
Subject: RE: ARTICLES on AQ suspects in Thailand

The Thai government has not yet issued any statement or formal reactions to the article on the Washington Post except an initial comment from the Government Spokesman Surapong Sueb Songlee, who categorically denied the existence of secret sites operated by the CIA to detain and interrogate al-Qaeda operatives in Thailand, and said the Government will assign the MFA to clarify this issue to the international community. Foreign Minister Kantathli Suphamongkhon has just said on the radio program that the Government has no information related to this article, and has already instructed the Ministry to coordinate with the US Embassy in Bangkok to seek further information. We will monitor and keep you updated.

From: Cole, James F
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2005 8:00 AM
To: Chansiri, Chanchaw
Cc: Sutheerat, Somyot
Subject: ARTICLES on AQ suspects in Thailand

Could you forward whatever you have on RTG reactions to Washington Post article alleging Al Qaeda prisoners being held in Thailand. Thanks. Jim
Suggested Opening Comments

- During their recent meeting in Washington, President Bush and PM Thaksin agreed that our countries should hold a Strategic Dialogue.

- The purpose of the Dialogue has been to bring together Thai and American civilian and military officials to discuss collectively major issues of concern across a wide range of topics.

- The talks have been very successful, and explored bilateral and regional issues, deepening our relationship through a free-flowing discussion. Key areas of discussion included
  - How to work together in ASEAN and other fora
  - Promoting educational exchanges
  - Developments in the region
  - How to improve our military to military relationship
  - Non-proliferation of WMD
  - Counterterrorism

Provisional Talking Points:

Why Now

Q. Were the talks stopped, as is commonly assumed, because the U.S. response to the Asian Financial Crisis soured the relationship?

- I understand that we had planned to hold a Dialogue about eight years ago, but scheduling problems intervened.
- In the intervening years we have maintained regular rounds of visits by senior leaders from both countries.

Q. Why have you restarted the Dialogue after a nine year hiatus?

- Experts in both countries felt we should renew the Dialogue as a way to bring experts together informally to explore ways to enhance the relationship.

U.S. Prisons/Bases in Thailand

Q. Can you respond to the Dana Priest story in the Washington Post suggesting there was a "black" CIA interrogation site in Thailand that was closed in 2003?

- We have nothing to add to the Department Spokesman's previous comments on this subject.

Q. Is/was the VOA transmission facility at Udorn the site of a "black" CIA interrogation site as reported in some Thai media?
That is ridiculous.

The VOA facility at Udorn is a radio transmission facility established and operated in full cooperation with the Thai government.

The VOA transmission facility has hosted numerous tours for Thai officials and interested groups, including a large group of Thai students as recently as August. Tours of the facility are part of the facility's outreach to the local community with which it is closely engaged. The new Provincial Governor toured the VOA facility this morning (November 8) and was just the latest visitor to confirm the VOA site is only a radio transmission facility only.

Q. Did you discuss setting up U.S. bases in Thailand?

- The United States has no bases in Thailand and has no intention of asking for bases in Thailand.
- We have shared interests in a number of key areas, including countering terrorism, and we have a robust joint/combined exercise program.
- As we witnessed during the response to the Tsunami, our military relationship provides valuable benefits to both of our countries and to the region.

Southern Situation

Q. Is the U.S. concerned about the situation in the South?

- The United States remains concerned about the continuing unrest in southern Thailand. We look to the Thai government to resolve the situation in order to prevent further violence and address differences peacefully.
- We do not have any definitive evidence on who is responsible for the violence or where they may have received training.

Q. Will the U.S. offer assistance to Thailand to address problems in far southern Thailand?

- We understand that the violence in the South is a domestic issue that the Thai government is working to resolve.
- We have no plans to send U.S. troops in the South.

Q. Did you discuss allegations of Thai human rights violations in the South?

- We always urge security forces to conform with international human rights norms while conducting operations.

China

Q. Did you discuss China?
We have a longstanding, and very strong, relationship with Thai Military and security forces.

This close partnership is evidenced by our many annual exercises, which is highlighted by the annual Cobra Gold exercise, which is the most important military exercise in the region.

We also have numerous other exchanges and training programs with all branches of the Thai military. For example, hundreds of senior Thai military officers have received training, and there is even a Thai cadet enrolled at the U.S. Military Academy West Point.

We have assisted Thailand defending its sovereignty and independence. The US supported the Seri Thai during WWII. We were allies during the Cold War. Today, Thailand is part of the international coalition opposing terrorism.

Our relationship was cemented when our two militaries worked side by side to provide disaster assistance to the region immediately after the December 2004 tsunami.

■ I think it is important to credit our alliance with Thailand for a great part of the success in working together to alleviate some of the suffering caused by the Tsunami last year.
  ■ Our cooperation in mitigating the damage in Phuket and Phang Nga, the speed with which we were able to turn Utapao Thai Naval Air Station into the hub for regional tsunami relief, and our ability to work together to save lives in Aceh and Sri Lanka was only possible because of decades of training together in exercises.
  ■ In Thailand, U.S. Navy aircraft and SEALs almost immediately joined the search and rescue effort. The SEALs used their special skills to search in hard-to-reach areas like mangrove swamps and on remote islands. The U.S. military carried over 3 million pounds of much-needed supplies and equipment to Phuket and Krabi. Our scientists and doctors joined hands with their Thai counterparts to tackle the devastating task of dealing with so many dead.
- Now, we are using many of the lessons we learned during the Tsunami recovery efforts to assist in the Philippines in the aftermath of the horrific mudslide.

- Together, we must work to keep this relationship strong, so that when the call comes to help or to defend, we will be there.

**Southern Thailand**

- We are concerned about the ongoing separatist violence in the far South.

- We consider this an internal Thai issue. We have no plans to become directly involved in the region.

- We have seen no clear evidence of direct foreign terrorist involvement.

**RENDITIONS, SECRET PRISONS**

**Q: What is your reaction to the Council of Europe report on alleged CIA secret prisons and “outsourcing torture?”**

➢ These are the same allegations that have been repeated numerous times over the past two months. The facts have not changed:

➢ With respect to detainees, the United States Government complies with its Constitution, its laws and its international treaty obligations.

➢ The United States does not condone torture. Nor does it transport detainees from one country to another for the purpose of being tortured.

➢ We have also stated that as a matter of policy the U.S. will not authorize interrogations involving cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, as defined by U.S. obligations under the Torture Conventions, regardless of where those interrogations occur.

➢ The recently-enacted Detainee Treatment Act, which represents constructive cooperation between the executive branch and Congress and which received strong bipartisan support, codifies this policy and should send an important message underscoring the commitment of the United
States to uphold the values of freedom and humanity on which it was founded.

➢ The United States works closely with allies around the world in facing the threat of terrorism. We respect fully the sovereignty of our partners as we collaborate to capture, detain and question terrorists.

➢ Rendition is a vital tool in combating international terrorism. It is not new. Renditions are permissible under international law and have been used by other U.S. Administrations and by other governments.

➢ This tool is consistent with the responsibilities of those governments to protect their citizens.

➢ As the Secretary has made clear, we need a more balanced dialogue on this issue, one which recognizes:
  
  o the serious threat posed by terrorists,

  o the appropriateness of making use of military and intelligence tools in confronting this threat, and

  o that most of the criticism, including unfortunately the criticism contained in this report, is based on misperceptions and not facts.

[If pressed for specific comments on specific allegations:]

➢ As regards specifics or locations, we have not changed our policy of not talking about intelligence matters.

THAILAND: PM THAKSIN’S RESIGNATION FOLLOWING ELECTION

EAP PRESS GUIDANCE
April 4, 2006

Q: --Any comment on Prime Minister Thaksin’s announcement that he will step down?
A: -- WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY STATED THAT IT IS UP TO THE
THAI TO WORK OUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION, AND THAT
WE ARE CONFIDENT THEY WILL RESOLVE THIS IN A
PEACEFUL MANNER THAT RESPECTS THE RULE OF LAW
AND WILL OF THE PEOPLE.

-- DEVELOPMENTS TODAY SUGGEST THE THAI ARE MOVING
TOWARD SUCH A RESOLUTION.
Bangkok, 11/03-04/2005: IRC Teaches Thai Journalists How to Find Accurate Information about America
Program: Embassy: IRC Outreach/Event
Subject: Public Diplomacy/Mutual understanding/Exchanges

Report:
On November 3-4, 2005, the Information Resource Center in Bangkok provided training to 40 journalists from the Naew Na Newspaper (Thai-language daily newspaper, readership: 50,000). The topic of the training was how to retrieve accurate information about America from the Internet. The journalists were introduced to web resources for the media, including major information resources provided by the Department of State.

Result:
Excellent. Participants were delighted to find out about the wealth of information available for journalists. Among the many encouraging comments from the trainees, one journalist remarked, “I wish we had longer time. The training provided us with useful tips on searching the Internet. We are now able to more precisely locate information necessary for our jobs. I graded this training an A+."

Photo Caption: Thai journalists, guided by IRC Director Patha Suwannarat, finding out how to search for accurate information on the Internet.

Bangkok, 11/04/05: Student Advising at Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University
Program: Embassy: Seminar/Conference/Tour
Subject: Public Diplomacy/Education

Report: The Cultural Unit organized a booth and gave a talk on “Higher Education for Arts Students” at the prestigious Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University, on
November 4. This event showcased for Faculty of Arts students and lecturers the possibilities of furthering their advanced studies in several countries, including the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Japan.

Result: Excellent. The information on the U.S. was provided to approximately 150 students and lecturers at the booth and approximately 40 participants attended the session asking about student visas and scholarship opportunities.

Photo Caption 1: Students visit the U.S. Embassy's booth asking about scholarships and student visa information at the Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University.

Photo Caption 2: Cultural Unit staff give a presentation on "Study in the U.S." to Faculty of Arts students and lecturers at Chulalongkorn University.

Bangkok, 11/04/05: Thai Prosecutors and Police Engage in First-Ever Dialogue on Task Force Development with U.S. Law Enforcement Officials
Program: Embassy: American Centers/Corners
Embassy: Seminar/Conference/Tour
Subject: Democracy and Human Rights/Civil Rights,
Public Diplomacy/Mutual understanding/exchanges
Security\Regional stability,
Global Issues\Crimes, Global Issues\Drugs

Report:
PAS Bangkok, in cooperation with the Narcotics Affairs Section and the U.S. Department of Justice, conducted a digital video conference on task force development linking experts in Honolulu and San Diego to two audiences of approximately seventy senior Thai prosecutors and police officials in both Bangkok and Chiang Mai. Speakers from the U.S. Attorney's Office in Hawaii, including the United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, and federal prosecutors and federal law enforcement agents from the U.S. Attorney's Office in San Diego, explained the process of creating and developing joint prosecution and law enforcement task forces. The experts provided Thai officials, mostly from the Office of the Attorney General, the Department of Special Investigation, the Immigration Bureau and the Mahidol
University Criminology Department, with a description of how to create and develop a task force. They also addressed matters such as budget concerns and asset allocation.

Thai prosecutors and police officials engaged the U.S. speakers on questions about allocation of personnel and about who handles the promotion of officers, given that members of joint task forces represent different agencies. They also asked about how tensions between different agencies can be diffused in cases where task force members disagree. They were also interested in the prosecutorial discretion of federal prosecutors in determining which cases from the task forces are ultimately charged by the U.S. Attorney's Office.

At the American Corner in Chiang Mai there was an audience of twenty eight-- including six attorneys, one police officer, two professors, and thirteen Chiang Mai University students taking a course in Public International Law, Government and American Politics. The students demonstrated a great deal of interest by passing written questions to the speaker.

Result: Excellent. The DVC engaged participants in a ground-breaking discussion on how Thai prosecutors and police can come together to bring cases to court sooner and more efficiently. Thailand lacks a fully developed task force among law enforcement officials. The DVC linked Bangkok and Chiang Mai to Hawaii and San Diego. With over seven U.S. speakers contributing to the discussion, the Thai audiences were exposed to a rare glimpse of the real-life challenges and successes of task forces in the U.S.

Photo Caption 1: Over thirty prosecutors, police officials, and professors attended the Task Force Development DVC in Bangkok- making this the second time PAS Bangkok has facilitated a DVC with experts in Honolulu, San Diego, and Chiang Mai.

Photo Caption 2: At the American Corner in Chiang Mai, the audience of thirty people were comprised of law and government students. Students posed several questions to the U.S. attorneys in Honolulu and San Diego.

Bangkok, 11/08/05: Proving a Negative: Embassy Proves No CIA Covert Prison at IBB Station
Program: Embassy: Press Event/Product/Interview
Subject: Security/Counter-terrorism

Report:
PAS facilitated access for press to accompany a provincial governor's tour of the U.S. International Broadcasting Bureau's short-wave radio broadcasting facility in Udon Thani Province after some Thai media printed anonymous accusations that there was a secret CIA prison hidden in the compound. Approximately 80 people including 50 local and Bangkok-based reporters as well as police and other Thai security and provincial officials, all led by the Udon Thani governor, were received by IBB and PAS staff.

Results:
Excellent. On the same day, Channel 3 (reach: 3,060,000), Channel 5 (reach: 680,000), Channel 7 (reach: 10,030,000), Channel 9 (reach: 1,700,000), Channel 11 (reach: 340,000), and iTV (reach: 1,700,000), during their primetime and late-night news programs, aired footage of the press event plus an explanation by IBB's staff that there was no CIA's secret prison hidden in the compound.

On November 9, 2005, an English-language paper The Nation (readership: 69,000) printed on page 4A an article under the headline “No Secret Terror Jail in Udon,” while Post Today (readership: 69,000) headlined the article on page A8 “U.S. Embassy Leads Press Tour to Ban Dung; Hopes to Silence Report on CIA’s Secret Prison.” Matichon (readership: 670,000) carried a photo of the station on front page and headlined its article on page 13 “Media Visit VOA Station; no Secret Prison Found,” while Daily News (readership: 5,700,000) printed an article on page 14 under the headline “Media Visit American Radio Station.” Khao Sod (readership: 697,000), Naew Na (readership: 50,000), and Krungthep Turakit (readership: 113,000) printed the photos of the station and the group of reporters led by Undon Thani governor on page 14, 6, and 4 respectively with captions saying that there was no CIA’s prison in the compound.

After the press coverage on November 8-9, 2005, the speculation and reports about the CIA’s covert prison in Thailand have decreased.
media reaction: alleged CIA prisons overseas, avian flu, trade: anti-dumping duties on shrimp, Thai-U.S. strategic dialogue; Bangkok.

1. The Thai press, November 5-7, carried commentary on watch list items: a) Alleged CIA prisons overseas; b) Avian Flu; c) Trade: Anti-dumping duties on shrimp; and d) Thai-U.S. Strategic Dialogue.

2. Watch list: Alleged CIA prisons overseas

“No Place For Secret Prisons”

The lead editorial in the independent, English language The Nation read (11/5), “Thailand and the U.S. have traditionally been close allies, as well as partners in the U.S.-led global war on terror. This has involved a wide range of cooperation, involving intelligence sharing and the extradition of known international terrorists, not to mention the deployment of hundreds of Thai troops to Iraq for non-combat duty. But any cooperative arrangement that involves covert operations by foreign agents on Thai territory must be avoided, because of the possibility that such operations could run counter to Thai law and cause diplomatic problems with or resentment among Thailand’s neighbors. In denying the report, Thaksin made explicit reference to the 2003 arrest of Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, in Ayutthaya, who has since been handed over to US authorities and held in U.S. custody at a secret location. There was nothing unusual about Hambali’s case; any friendly country would have complied with the U.S. request for such a prominent terrorist suspect. But Thailand, with its own shabby record of brutal treatment of Muslim detainees, would do well to avoid associating itself too closely with the U.S., especially in regard to the treatment of prisoners, for which the U.S. has been reviled by the international community ever since the Abu Ghrailb prison fiasco.”

3. Watch list: Avian Flu

“Don’t Hit The Flu Panic Button Yet”

The lead editorial in the top-circulation, moderately conservative, English language Bangkok Post read (11/5), “In the last three years we have been through the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) health crisis and are battling our third outbreak of bird flu. With so much experience, we should be confident in our ability to handle medical emergencies and have quarantine and control honed to a fine art. And perhaps all of us would have this confidence, were it not for those alarmists fanning the flames of hysteria with their predictions of a pandemic of biblical proportions. Yes, we should do everything in our power to control this latest threat and people are right to be scared of it. We must, and are, taking it seriously. But, no, there is no reason to panic or smuggle in illicit tubes of vaccine from China to secretly immunize birds, avoid cooked chicken, refuse to eat eggs or head for the hill. So let’s calm down, stop hyping this up and scaring ourselves half to death, and start making sensible contingency plans.”

4. Watch list: Trade: Anti-dumping duties on shrimp

“A Different Kind Of Byrd Problem”
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BANGKOK, THAILAND

December 13, 2005

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Ambassador

THROUGH: DCM – Alex Arvizu

FROM: PAO – Mark Larsen

SUBJECT: Scenario for Interview with Sutthichai Yoon (Thai Language) to Air on Channel 9

You have agreed to host an interview with Sutthichai Yoon for his new one-hour international affairs program to air on Channel 9 on Monday, January 2, 2006. The program’s production staff has provided the following details of the interview.

Language: Thai

Time: Wednesday, December 14, 2005, 3:00pm-4:00pm

Location: Living room of EMR; following the sit-down portion of the interview, Khun Suttichai would also like a guided on-camera tour of the grounds

Possible Topics: Thai-U.S. relations in recent history; regional security; security at the Embassy; black sites; Tsunami recovery; FTA; Burma; the U.S. in ASEAN

Staff: AIO Laura Stone (01-821-7697) and FSN Subhabhong Rarueysong (04-066-2759)

POC: AIO Laura Stone x4415
Q: The U.S. continually calls on other countries to respect human rights, and yet incidents such as Abu Ghraib have occurred. Is the U.S. being hypocritical? We recognize that there have been violations of the law by U.S. personnel. United States personnel engaged in detention operations are required to comply with U.S. domestic law, the law of war, and our international treaty obligations, including the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

Those who have failed to adhere to these treatment standards have and will continue to be held accountable.

Q: The U.S. continually calls on other countries to respect human rights, and yet detains prisoners at Guantanamo Bay without trial. Is the U.S. being hypocritical? Although many in the international community have called for the closure of Guantanamo, no one has suggested a viable alternative for dealing with the very dangerous men that are held there.

In response to Al-Qaida’s attacks on the United States, the United States and a coalition of allies initiated a campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The UN Security Council, in Resolution 1373, reaffirmed our right of self-defense in relation to the attacks of September 11.

Detainees brought to Guantanamo were captured waging war against the United States. They are terrorist trainers, bomb makers, recruiters and facilitators, terrorist financiers, bodyguards for Bin Laden, and potential suicide bombers. More than 700 of these men were so dangerous that they could not be safely detained in Afghanistan.

The United States has no interest in detaining enemy fighters any longer than is absolutely necessary. Unfortunately, of those already released from Guantanamo, approximately 15 have returned to acts of terror and been recaptured. Those who remain in Guantanamo are there to prevent their return to battle.

Terrorists held at Guantanamo are not soldiers; they do not represent any state or government, nor do they adhere to the rules of war. Al-Qaida is not a party to any international treaties or conventions.

Nevertheless, those detained by our armed forces at Guantanamo have in practice, as a matter of policy, been treated humanely and received many of the protections that the Third Convention affords. Detainees, like prisoners of war, have a right to be free from torture or abuse.

Detainees at Guantanamo Bay are provided with shelter, food, clothing, reading materials, medical care, and the opportunity to worship, including prayer beads, rugs and copies of the Koran in their native language.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has access to every detainee at Guantanamo Bay, just as it would have to prisoners of war.

Where allegations of unlawful treatment of detainees by Department of Defense personnel surfaces, it is reviewed, and when factually warranted, investigated.

Q: Are there secret prisons or black sites in Thailand?
The President confirmed in September that the United States had a program under which 14 leaders and operatives of al Qaeda were held and questioned by CIA. With respect to detainees, the United States Government complies with its Constitution, its laws and its international treaty obligations. The United States does not condone torture. Nor does it transport detainees from one country to another for the purpose of being tortured.

For national security reasons, the President did not disclose the number of sites and locations.

Northeast Asia

Q: Is China considered by the U.S. to be an economic, military or political threat?
No -- we have no containment policy towards China. We are concerned about some aspects of the Chinese military build-up and would like to see greater transparency on China's part, but at the same time, we have a good relationship with China.

Q: Is the U.S. planning to decrease troops in South Korea and Japan?
As a result of the global repositioning and force modernization talks we have had with both Japan and South Korea, there will be changes that the Defense Department believes will enhance our defense capabilities in both countries and will also in both cases involve some redeployments of forces out of each country.

We continue to work closely with Japan, advancing our relations toward a more mature partnership, one in which Japan plays an increasingly effective role in advancing our mutual interests regionally and globally. President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi promised to transform our alliance by improving its deterrent capabilities, will also addressing the concerns of base hosting communities in Japan, thus strengthening domestic support here.

We have also consolidated our partnership with South Korea. We have begun reducing our troop presence in a prudent way, at the same time enhancing our deterrent capability by restructuring and organizing our forces. Meanwhile, our relationship with South Korea is moving beyond its original security rationale as the nation begins to play a global political role commensurate with its economic stature. South Korea is the third-largest troop contributor state to international operations in Iraq.

Q: What is the U.S. position on the North Korean nuclear program?
Our goals remain clear: peace and security in Northeast Asia and a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. We will do what is necessary to achieve these goals. We will support our
 allies in the region. We will work with the United Nations, and together, we will ensure that North Korea understands the consequences if it continues down its current path.

The greatest challenge to the nonproliferation regime comes from countries that violate their responsibilities under the Nonproliferation Treaty. The North Korean Government has been one such case. So is Iran. The Iranian regime is watching how the world responds to North Korea's behavior and it can now see that the international community will confront this threat.

Q: What is the status of the 6 party talks with North Korea? We welcome the announcement that North Korea plans to return to the six-party talks. We expect talks to resume in November or December.

North Korea did not set any conditions regarding sanctions or other matters for returning to the six-party talks. We are prepared to discuss a range of issues within the context of the six-party talks.

Q: Will sanctions against North Korea succeed? The Bush administration's strategy of urging allies to step up border and cargo inspections and deploy radiation monitors will only go so far and can't guarantee that North Korea won't export its nuclear technology.

We are working closely with other countries in the region to implement additional measures to improve our ability to detect radiological and non-radiological material that may flow from North Korea. Establishing a robust detection architecture in the region, in particular, is a critical step in our implementation efforts.

An effective detection architecture is established by installing nuclear detection technology, conducting exercises and other training with our regional partners, and sharing information we gather on North Korean proliferation to ensure that we are building a layered defense against North Korea proliferation.

As the Secretary has stated, we are tracking North Korea's actions closely and discussing these with our partners. As Secretary Rice has said, we seek not an escalation, but a de-escalation of this crisis. It goes without saying, however, that any further attempt by North Korea to proliferate only deepens North Korea's isolation.

Burma

Q: What is U.S. policy towards Burma? It is fitting that the UN Security Council has placed Burma on its permanent agenda. Despite the NLD's decisive victory in Burma's 1990 national election, the military junta ruling Burma continues to harass and arrest NLD members and refuses to engage the democratically elected representatives of the Burmese people in a meaningful process of political reform.
MEMORANDUM

TO: The Ambassador

THROUGH: DCM – Alex Arvizu

FROM: PAO – Mark Larsen

SUBJECT: Scenario for Television Interview with Sutthichai Yoon (Thai Language)

You have agreed to an interview with Sutthichai Yoon to air on his new one-hour international affairs program on Channel 9. The program’s production staff has provided the following details of the interview.

Language: Thai

Time: Thursday, February 2, 2006, 2:30pm-3:30pm

Location: Living room of EMR; following the sit-down portion of the interview, Khun Sutthichai would also like a guided on-camera tour of the grounds

Possible Topics: The programs producers have told us they would like to discuss: Thai-U.S. relations in recent history; Thai-U.S. security relations; regional security; Tsunami recovery; FTA; Burma; the United States and ASEAN (note: they originally also asked to discuss black sites/secret prisons and Embassy security, but seem to have backed away from those topics)

Staff: AIO Laura Stone (01-821-7697) and FSN Subhabhong Rarueysong (04-066-2759)
President Bush’s Speech/Secret Prisons:
“Bush admits CIA operates secret prisons.” (TP9/Thai Post), (wire services)
“Finally Bush admits secret prisons; Europe presses hard to get sites revealed.”
(KS7/Khao Sod), (BBC)
“Bush admits CIA’s secret prisons exist abroad; 14 suspects transferred to Gitmo.”
(KT16/Krungrhep Turakit), (wire services)
“Bush admits existence of secret prisons.” (KCL12/Kom Chad Luek), (wire services)

Ly Tong/Extradition Case:
“Court extradites Ly Tong back to Vietnam; 15 days to appeal.” (TR19/Thai Rath).

Local Events:
“Sgt. Yak (one of car bomb suspects) confesses Gen. P. leads car bomb team; RPGs
as Plan B; coup Plan C.” (TR1)
“Military reshuffle list sent to PM; Senate selects ECs today.” (TR1)
“Sgt. Yak claims general orders car bomb.” (KCL1)
“Anti-PAD banners mushroom in Chiang Mai.” (KCL1)
“Royal Household Office to take back Suan Lumpini Night Bazaar; vendors vow to
fight on.” (KCL1)
“Chulalongkorn’s Faculty of Engineering says Suvarnabhumi Airport not ready.”
(KT1)
Paiboj citing lack of evidence.” (KT18)
“Senate Speaker Suchon vows to finish selecting new ECs in one day.” (KT18)
“Sgt. Yak links Gen. P. to car bomb.” (TP1)
“Chulalongkorn’s Faculty of Engineering opposes opening of Suvarnabhumi Airport;
reveals hiring security guards worth Bt.5 billion.” (TP1)
BURMA:

Note: POL agreed that since Ambassador John is very well versed on Burma, and as there have been no new talking points from EAP in recent weeks, it would be best to provide bullets from recent statements made by Khalilzad (at UN on Jan 17) and Marcel during his current trip in the region. See below.

Khalilzad
- Our view is that in order for success to be achieved, in order for the credibility of the Council not to be undermined, we need to increase the pressure on the junta.
- We need to be prepared to reduce the gap between where things are and where things need to be.
- A policy of both engagement on the one hand through Mr. Gambari and pressure on the other hand, and preparedness to increase the pressure as appropriate, is the right mix for the (Security) Council to adopt.

Marcel
- What's really key is for the entire international community -- China but also ASEAN, Japan, the United States, Europe, India, everyone -- to be sending the same message to the regime that we are not anti-Burma. The international community needs to keep up the pressure on the junta.
- The country is going is in the wrong direction, it's having negative effects not only for the Burmese people, but for the region. We all want the country to move in a positive direction.
- The regime is absolutely refusing to take any positive steps, either in response to its own people or to the international community. Going back to business as usual isn't an option because the problems, the root causes that led to the protests and the violence in September, haven't been addressed.
- The regime needs to seriously engage in inclusive dialogue, beginning with the release of ASSK and other members of the '88 generation.

REFUGEES:

- The Thailand program for resettling Burmese was the largest US refugee program in the world last year. Over 10,000 entered from
UNCLASSIFIED

Thailand, most during last summer. Expect to resettle even more this year.
- Most Burmese resettled to date are ethnic Karen from camps in Tak Province. Anticipate processing Karen refugees in camps in Mae Hong Son later this year.
- No educational or vocational skill requirements for refugees to be considered for US resettlement. UNHCR forwards names of those interested, DHS interviews to determine if a well-founded fear of return to home country.
- US concerned that 7,800 Lao Hmong in the army camp in Petchabun be properly vetted to identify those with well-founded fear of return. Interview process by RTG closed so far.
- The 152 Lao Hmong confined in the Nong Khai IDC include 90 children. UNHCR-recognized refugees and should not be jailed or forcibly returned to Laos.
- Unlike Burmese, no large scale resettlement program for Lao Hmong planned. US can accept individual referrals of Lao Hmong refugees from UNHCR.
- (IF ASKED) No comment on the US resettlement of North Koreans from Thailand.

CIA SECRET PRISON:

- We do not comment on intelligence matters.
On November 3, CIA spokeswoman denies Washington Post's report on CIA secretly establishing a covert prison network (Black sites) in 8 countries around the world to detain al-Qaeda suspects, but she didn’t give any more comments.

Earlier Washington Post dated 2nd November cited classified White House, CIA, Justice Department and Congress documents which revealed that CIA has held al-Qaeda suspects in secret facilities called "Black Sites" in 8 countries, including Thailand, Afghanistan and several democracies in Eastern Europe as well as a small one in Guantanamo in Cuba after the September 11, 2001, attacks.

Washington Post estimated that CIA has held more than 100 suspects. The paper said that the al-Qaeda major terrorists held in Thailand are Abu Zubaida – al-Qaeda’s operations chief and Ramzi Binalshibh – planner of September 11 attacks. Both were held in a secret underground detention facility in Thailand but released after this news was published in June 2003 and Thai officials demanded that CIA close the facility. Since then, the cooperation on counter-terrorism between the two countries has become cold.

U.S. national security adviser Stephen Hadley says that US has to do what is necessary to defend the country against terrorists and to win the war on terror, and that the president has been very clear that they're going to do that in a way that is consistent with US values and that is why he has been very clear that the United States will not torture.

Both Stephen Hadley and White House spokesman Scott McClellan neither acknowledge nor deny the Washington Post's report on CIA establishing covert detention facilities in several countries.

Mr. Kajadpai Burutpat, former National Security Council secretariat, says in an interview with BBC that this news is not confirmed yet because it's still information, not information confirmed as correct. In his experience, he has never seen such information. He believes that the US doesn't open such a facility in Thailand and that Thailand won't allow such a facility to be established here.

Professor Rohan Gunaratna, Singaporean Institute of Defense & Strategic Studies, says that such a covert facility exists, but it is in Afghanistan or the Middle East. It's doubtful that there is a covert terrorist detention facility in Southeast Asia or in Thailand.

Dr. Clive Williams, Australian National University counter-terrorism expert, says that it's unlikely that such a facility will exist in Eastern Europe or Asia because those countries would not allow that. He thinks that such terrorist suspect detention facilities, apart from
one in Guantanamo, should be on US bases around the world as the US has the rights over said areas, such as Diego Garcia island in the Indian Ocean.

Thaksin says that CIA spokesperson has already denied the report, that's why he said that sometimes when media wanted to present attention-grabbing news, the information is untrue. Therefore, please check for accuracy, or other people will be damaged.

When asked if foreign media are trying to connect Thailand to international terrorism, PM denies that and says we can explain our problems to other countries. The important thing is that media should not hastily publish news without checking.

Mr. Nathee Jitsawang, Correction Department director, says that Thailand has never had a secret prison and as far as he knows the US has never contacted Thailand to set up a detention facility in Thailand. He thinks that the news is not true as it's difficult to set up a covert prison.

Mr. Porapol Adireksarn, TRT Saraburi MP, says as a Senate Foreign Affairs commissioner that the Commission has agreed to set up a sub-committee to study the Washington Post report. Mr. Charoen Kanthawong will be the chairman. The first meeting will be held on November 9.

Mr. Ong-art Klampaiboon, Democratic BKK MMP, says that as a parliament member he has submitted 5 questions to govt: 1. Does this secret prison really exist? 2. Who allowed its establishment? 3. If the govt didn't give permission, is it possible that the CIA itself did it by CIA agents in Thailand? 4. Is this report true: al-Qaeda leaders are held there? 5. Is it true that govt ordered this facility closed in 2003 after the truth was disclosed to the public?

Mr. Sirishoke Sopa, Democratic Songkla MP, says that if the report is groundless, RTG should sue the newspaper.

On the same day, a high-level source from the Govt House comments that the “Black Site” or said detention facility might be in Ban Dung district, Udonthani, on the same premises as Voice of America. The area is over 1,000 rai divided into several zones. The innermost zone is off-limits to all Thais.

Another interesting point is the very high security there. It is said that this area is so special that it cannot be photographed by satellite or sabotaged. This area is also a secret mission training venue for Thai officials. This latter piece of information is well known by Thai intelligence. Thai intelligence has for two years got the information that it is a working place for CIA agents who work in Thailand.
Thailand

Q: What would the U.S. response be if Thailand were to request military assistance to deal with the situation in the south of Thailand?

A: The Thai Government has made it clear that the situation in the south is a domestic problem. We share technical expertise with our Thai allies but we do not offer military assistance.

Q: สหรัฐฯ จะมีคำตอบอย่างไร ถ้าไทยขอความช่วยเหลือทางทหารจากสหรัฐฯ เพื่อแก้ปัญหาความไม่สงบทางภาคใต้?

A:

รัฐบาลไทยได้กล่าวอย่างชัดเจนแล้วว่าสถานการณ์ทางภาคใต้เป็นปัญหาในประเทศ สหรัฐฯ แบ่งปันความรู้และความเห็นกับไทยแต่เราไม่ได้เสนอที่จะให้ความช่วยเหลือทางทหารแก่ไทย
Q: Are there secret prisons or black sites in Thailand?

A: The President confirmed in September that the Untied States had a program under which 14 leaders and operatives of al Qaeda were held and questioned by CIA. With respect to detainees, the United States Government complies with its Constitution, its laws and its international treaty obligations. The United States does not condone torture. Nor does it transport detainees from one country to another for the purpose of being tortured.

For national security reasons, the President did not disclose the number of sites and locations.

Q: มีคุกใต้ดินหรือคุกมิดในประเทศไทยหรือไม่?

A: ประธานาธิบดีรัฐบาลสหรัฐฯ ได้เปิดเผยว่ามีคุกใต้ดินที่อยู่ในหลายประเทศ

มีโครงการขยับคุกมิด 14 อายุ ซึ่งคุณจะไม่สามารถเห็นได้ ตามกฎหมายและพันธมิตรของสหรัฐฯ ไม่เซ็นต์ในประเทศทํานาน

และไม่ได้รับการคุรุกข์จากประเทศใดประเทศหนึ่งเพื่อทํานาน

อย่างไรก็ตาม

ประธานาธิบดีรัฐบาลสหรัฐฯ ได้เปิดเผยค่าของสถานที่ซึ่งส่งผลต่อ

อัลกอฮอล์และคิ้งกล่าว
From: Casper, Anne S  
Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2008 3:05 PM  
To: Brown, Cynthia A; Turner, Michael R  
Subject: RE: Thailand, interrogation, CIA  

I think - "we don't comment on intel issues" is pretty standard and fine. Sound ok to you two?

Anne S. Casper  
Counselor for Public Affairs  
U.S. Embassy Bangkok  
tel: 66-2-205-4486  
casperas@state.gov  
Website: http://bangkok.usembassy.gov

From: Brown, Cynthia A  
Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2008 3:03 PM  
To: Turner, Michael R; Casper, Anne S  
Subject: RE: Thailand, interrogation, CIA  

I agree that we should look at another, softer way of saying it. As I learned in IO Training 101. Lesson #2 after "Don't Lie." "Don't use the phrase, 'No Comment.'"

From: Turner, Michael R  
Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2008 3:00 PM  
To: Casper, Anne S; Brown, Cynthia A  
Subject: Thailand, interrogation, CIA  

The DCM called me just now to alert me to this story below, and reminded me that our response should be "no comment."

I think there's another way of saying that without exactly saying that. Something like: "We do not usually comment on intelligence matters." Can either of you think of something better but says essentially the same thing?

mrt

Station Chief Made Appeal To Destroy CIA Tapes  
Lawyer Says Top Official Had Implicit Approval  
By Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus
In late 2005, the retiring CIA station chief in Bangkok sent a classified cable to his superiors in Langley asking if he could destroy videotapes recorded at a secret CIA prison in Thailand that in part portrayed intelligence officers using simulated drowning to extract information from suspected al-Qaeda members.

The tapes had been sitting in the station chief’s safe, in the U.S. Embassy compound, for nearly three years. Although those involved in the interrogations had pushed for the tapes’ destruction in those years and a secret debate about it had twice reached the White House, CIA officials had not acted on those requests. This time was different.

The CIA had a new director and an acting general counsel, neither of whom sought to block the destruction of the tapes, according to agency officials. The station chief was insistent because he was retiring and wanted to resolve the matter before he left, the officials said. And in November 2005, a published report that detailed a secret CIA prison system provoked an international outcry.

Those three circumstances pushed the CIA’s then-director of clandestine operations, Jose A. Rodriguez Jr., to act against the earlier advice of at least five senior CIA and White House officials, who had counseled the agency since 2003 that the tapes should be preserved. Rodriguez consulted CIA lawyers and officials, who told him that he had the legal right to order the destruction. In his view, he received their implicit support to do so, according to his attorney, Robert S. Bennett.

In a classified response to the station chief, Rodriguez ordered the tapes’ destruction, CIA officials say. The Justice Department and the House intelligence committee are now investigating whether that deed constituted a violation of law or an obstruction of justice. John A. Rizzo, the CIA’s acting general counsel, is scheduled to discuss the matter in a closed House intelligence committee hearing scheduled for today.

According to interviews with more than two dozen current and former U.S. officials familiar with the debate, the taping was conducted from August to December 2002 to demonstrate that interrogators were following the detailed rules set by lawyers and medical experts in Washington, and were not causing a detainee’s death.

The principal motive for the tapes’ destruction was the clandestine operations division’s worry that the tapes’ fate could be snatched out of their hands, the officials said. They feared that the agency could be publicly shamed and that those involved in waterboarding and other extreme interrogation techniques would be hauled before a grand jury or a congressional inquiry -- a circumstance now partly unfolding anyway.

"The professionals said that we must destroy the tapes because they didn’t want to see the pictures all over television, and they knew they eventually would leak,” said a former agency official who took part in the discussions before the tapes were pulverized. The presence of the tapes in Bangkok and the CIA’s communications with the station chief there were described by current and former officials.
Congressional investigators have turned up no evidence that anyone in the Bush administration openly advocated the tapes' destruction, according to officials familiar with a set of classified documents forwarded to Capitol Hill. "It was an agency decision -- you can take it to the bank," CIA Director Michael V. Hayden said in an interview on Friday. "Other speculations that it may have been made in other compounds, in other parts of the capital region, are simply wrong."

Many of those involved recalled conversations in which senior CIA and White House officials advised against destroying the tapes, but without expressly prohibiting it, leaving an odd vacuum of specific instructions on a such a politically sensitive matter. They said that Rodriguez then interpreted this silence -- the absence of a decision to order the tapes' preservation -- as a tacit approval of their destruction.

"Jose could not get any specific direction out of his leadership" in 2005, one senior official said. Word of the resulting destruction, one former official said, was greeted by widespread relief among clandestine officers, and Rodriguez was neither penalized nor reprimanded, publicly or privately, by then-CIA Director Porter J. Goss, according to two officials briefed on exchanges between the two men.

"Frankly, there were more important issues that needed to be focused on, such as trying to preserve a critical [interrogation] program and salvage relationships that had been damaged because of the leaks" about the existence of the secret prisons, said a former agency official familiar with Goss's position at the time.

Rodriguez, whom the CIA honored with a medal in August for "Extraordinary Fidelity and Essential Service," declined requests for an interview. But his attorney said he acted in the belief that he was carrying out the agency's stated intention for nearly three years. "Since 2002, the CIA wanted to destroy the tapes to protect the identity and lives of its officers and for other counterringelligence reasons," Bennett said in a written response to questions from The Washington Post.

"In 2003 the leadership of intelligence committees were told about the CIA's intent to destroy the tapes. In 2005, CIA lawyers again advised the National Clandestine Service that they had the authority to destroy the tapes and it was legal to do so. It is unfortunate," Bennett continued, "that under the pressure of a Congressional and criminal investigation, history is now being revised, and some people are running for cover."

Recorded on the tapes was the coercive questioning of two senior al-Qaeda suspects: Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Hussein, known as Abu Zubaida, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, who were captured by U.S. forces in 2002. They show Zubaida undergoing waterboarding, which involved strapping him to a board and pouring water over his nose and mouth, creating the sensation of imminent drowning. Nashiri later also underwent the same treatment.

Some CIA officials say the agency's use of waterboarding helped extract information that led to the capture of other key al-Qaeda members and prevented attacks. But others, including former CIA, FBI and military officials, say the practice constitutes torture.

The destruction of the tapes was not the first occasion in which Rodriguez got in trouble for taking a provocative action to help a colleague. While serving as the CIA's Latin America division chief in 1996, he appealed to local Dominican Republic authorities to prevent a
childhood friend, and CIA contractor, who had been arrested in a drug investigation, from being beaten up, according to a former CIA official familiar with the episode.

Such an intervention was forbidden by CIA rules, and so Rodriguez was stripped of his management post and reprimanded in an inspector general's report. But shortly after the reprimand, he was named station chief in Mexico City and, after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, was promoted to deputy director of the fast-expanding counterterrorism center. He served under the center's director then, J. Cofer Black, who had been his subordinate in the Latin America division.

When Black -- who played a key role in setting up the secret prisons and instituting the interrogation policy -- left the CIA in December 2002, Rodriguez took his place. Colleagues recall that even in the deputy's slot, Rodriguez was aware of the videotaping of Zubaida, and that he later told several it was necessary so that experts, such as psychologists not present during interrogations, could view Zubaida's physical reactions to questions.

By December 2002, the taping was no longer needed, according to three former intelligence officials. "Zubaida's health was better, and he was providing information that we could check out," one said.

An internal probe of the interrogations by the CIA's inspector general began in early 2003 for reasons that have not been disclosed. In February of that year, then-CIA General Counsel Scott W. Muller told lawmakers that the agency planned to destroy the tapes after the completion of the investigation. That year, all waterboarding was halted; and at an undisclosed time, several of the inspector general's deputies traveled to Bangkok to view the tapes, officials said.

In May 2004, CIA operatives became concerned when a Washington Post article disclosed that the CIA had conducted its interrogations under a new, looser Bush administration definition of what legally constituted torture, several former CIA officials said. The disclosure sparked an internal Justice Department review of that definition and led to a suspension of the CIA's harsh interrogation program.

The tapes were discussed with White House lawyers twice, according to a senior U.S. official. The first occasion was a meeting convened by Muller and senior lawyers of the White House and the Justice Department specifically to discuss their fate. The other discussion was described by one participant as "fleeting," when the existence of the tapes came up during a spring 2004 meeting to discuss the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal, the official said.

Those known to have counseled against the tapes' destruction include John B. Bellinger III, while serving as the National Security Council's top legal adviser; Harriet E. Miers, while serving as the top White House counsel; George J. Tenet, while serving as CIA director; Muller, while serving as the CIA's general counsel; and John D. Negroponte, while serving as director of national intelligence.

Hayden, in an interview, said the advice expressed by administration lawyers was consistent. "To the degree this was discussed outside the agency, everyone counseled caution," he said. But he said that, in 2005, it was "the agency's view that there were no legal impediments" to the tapes' destruction. There also was "genuine concern about agency people being identified," were the tapes ever to be made public.
Hayden, who became CIA director last year, acknowledged that the questions raised about the tapes' destruction, then and now, are legitimate. "One can ask if it was a good idea, or if there was a better way to do it," he said. "We are very happy to let the facts take us where they will."

Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.

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Anne, Jim---

Just received a call from Shawn Crispin, Asia Times, asking about the CIA tapes/prison issue. I told him that we do not comment on intelligence matters and he seemed to understand. But he is working the story, so we'll see what Asia Times comes up with over the next few days.

This has been the only call we've received on this issue.

FYI---Jim, Shawn used to work for Far Eastern Economic Review, and was almost kicked out of the country in 2002 for writing an article about the tension between Thaksin and the King. The Embassy raised this issue with the PM's office. Eventually, Shawn was allowed to stay.

Michael R. Turner
Press Attaché
U.S. Embassy Bangkok
tel. 02-205-4232
fax. 02650-8919
e-mail: TurnerMR@state.gov
From: Bailes, Kenneth N  
Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 6:56 AM  
To: Casper, Anne S  
Cc: Stone, Laura M  
Subject: RE: NYT article on USG interrogation in TH  
Revised, cleared guidance will be included in today's e-mail from EAP/P.

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From: Casper, Anne S  
Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 7:32 AM  
To: Bailes, Kenneth N  
Cc: Stone, Laura M  
Subject: FW: NYT article on USG interrogation in TH  

Fyi, Ken. We got hit with the article below this morning and put together guidance, just in case (still waiting for Front Office response too). Amazingly, no calls, but we'll see what comes up tomorrow.

Anne

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From: Casper, Anne S  
Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 2:10 PM  
To: Arvizu, Alex A; Sutton, Susan M  
Cc: Stone, Laura M  
Subject: FW: NYT article on USG interrogation in TH  

I've added just a bit to Laura's guidance. So far, we have not had one call on this!

Anne

---

From: Stone, Laura M  
Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 12:31 PM  
To: Casper, Anne S; Sutton, Susan M  
Cc: Arvizu, Alex A  
Subject: RE: NYT article on USG interrogation in TH  

<< File: black site points.doc >>

Some suggested points, drawn mostly from Washington guidance. Just a starting point...

Not quite sure who needs to see this.

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From: Casper, Anne S  
Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 11:45 AM  
To: Sutton, Susan M  
Cc: Stone, Laura M  
Subject: RE: NYT article on USG interrogation in TH  

Yes, thanks! We discussed i briefly at the Senior Staff. Amb's interview played Friday and Sunday on ITV in which he denied black sites in Ubon and, when pressed, denied any exist in Thailand at all. Laura is doing up some general guidance for clearance around.

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From: Sutton, Susan M  
Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 11:22 AM
To: Casper, Anne S  
Subject: FW: NYT article on USG interrogation in TH  

Presume you guys were already alerted to this?

From: Minor, James  
Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 10:38 AM  
To: Sutton, Susan M; Crosby, Colin T; Lambert, Mark B; Salmon, Larry D  
Cc: Fliffick, Paul J; Loftus, Andrew J; Turner, David L; Burkes, Robert A; O'Dell, Priscilla M  
Subject: NYT article on USG interrogation in TH  

From NYTimes on line article 9/10/06  

James Minor  
Deputy Regional Security Officer - Bangkok  
Street Address: 120 Wireless Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok 10330 Thailand  
(US Mail addr: RSO Box 16, APO AP 96546-0001)  
Tel (24 hrs): 66-2-205-4000 (RSO Office x4123) [In Thailand calls, add leading "0": 02-205-4000]  
Fax: 66-2-256-0335  
E-mail (U): minorj@state.gov  
Sipnet: minorj@state.gov

September 10, 2006  

At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared Over Tactics  

By DAVID JOHNSTON  

WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 — Abu Zubaydah, the first Osama bin Laden henchman captured by the United States after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, was bloodied and feverish when a C.I.A. security team delivered him to a secret safe house in Thailand for interrogation in the early spring of 2002. Bullet fragments had ripped through his abdomen and groin during a firefight in Pakistan several days earlier when he had been captured.

The events that unfolded at the safe house over the next few weeks proved to be fateful for the Bush administration. Within days, Mr. Zubaydah was being subjected to coercive interrogation techniques — he was stripped, held in an icy room and jarred by earsplittingly loud music — the genesis of practices later adopted by some within the military, and widely used by the Central Intelligence Agency in handling prominent terrorism suspects at secret overseas prisons.

UNCLASSIFIED
President Bush pointedly cited the capture and interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah in his speech last Wednesday announcing the transfer of Mr. Zubaydah and 13 others to the American detention center in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. And he used it to call for ratification of the tough techniques employed in the questioning.

But rather than the smooth process depicted by Mr. Bush, interviews with nearly a dozen current and former law enforcement and intelligence officials briefed on the process show, the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah was fraught with sharp disputes, debates about the legality and utility of harsh interrogation methods, and a rupture between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the C.I.A. that has yet to heal.

Some of those interviewed offered sharply contrasting accounts, but all said that the disagreements were intense. More than four years later, these disputes are foreshadowing the debate that Mr. Bush’s new proposals are meeting in Congress, as lawmakers wrangle about what rules should apply as terrorism suspects are captured, questioned and, possibly, tried before military tribunals.

A reconstruction of Mr. Zubaydah’s initial days of detention and interrogation, based on accounts by former and current law enforcement and intelligence officials in a series of recent interviews, provides the first detailed account of his treatment and the disputes and uncertainties that surrounded it. The basic chronology of how the capture and interrogation unfolded was described consistently by sources from a number of government agencies.

The officials spoke on the condition that they not be identified because many aspects of the handling of Mr. Zubaydah remain classified and because some of the officials may be witnesses in future prosecutions involving Mr. Zubaydah.

This week, President Bush said that he had not and never would approve the use of torture. The C.I.A. declined to discuss the specifics of the case on the record. At F.B.I. headquarters, officials refused to publicly discuss the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah, citing what they said were “operational sensitivities.”
Some of the officials who were interviewed for this article were briefed on the events as they occurred. Others were provided with accounts of the interrogation later.

Before his capture, Mr. Zubaydah was regarded as a top bin Laden logistics chief who funneled recruits to training bases in Afghanistan and served as a communications link between Al Qaeda’s leadership and extremists in other countries.

As interrogators dug into his activities, however, they scaled back their assessment somewhat, viewing him more as the terror network’s personnel director and hotelier who ran a string of guest houses in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Mr. Zubaydah’s whereabouts in Pakistan had been determined in part through intercepted Internet communications, but for days after his capture his identity was in doubt. He had surgically altered his appearance and was using an alias. But when agents used a nickname for Mr. Zubaydah, he acknowledged his true identity, which was confirmed through analysis of his voice, facial structure and DNA tests.

By all accounts, Mr. Zubaydah’s condition was rapidly deteriorating when he arrived in Thailand. Soon after his capture, Mr. Zubaydah nearly died of his infected wounds. At one point, he was covertly rushed to a hospital after C.I.A. medical officers warned that he might not survive if he did not receive more extensive medical treatment.

According to accounts from five former and current government officials who were briefed on the case, F.B.I. agents — accompanied by intelligence officers — initially questioned him using standard interview techniques. They bathed Mr. Zubaydah, changed his bandages, gave him water, urged improved medical care, and spoke with him in Arabic and English, languages in which he is fluent.

To convince him they knew details of his activities, the agents brought a box of blank audiotapes which they said contained recordings of his phone conversations, but were actually empty. As the F.B.I. worked with C.I.A.
officers who were present, Mr. Zubaydah soon began to provide intelligence insights into Al Qaeda.

For the C.I.A., Mr. Zubaydah was a test case for an evolving new role, conceived after Sept. 11, in which the agency was to act as jailer and interrogator for terrorism suspects.

According to accounts by three former intelligence officials, the C.I.A. understood that the legal foundation for its role had been spelled out in a sweeping classified directive signed by Mr. Bush on Sept. 17, 2001. The directive, known as a memorandum of notification, authorized the C.I.A. for the first time to capture, detain and interrogate terrorism suspects, providing the foundation for what became its secret prison system.

That 2001 directive did not spell out specific guidelines for interrogations, however, and senior C.I.A. officials began in late 2001 and early 2002 to draw up a list of aggressive interrogation procedures that might be used against terrorism suspects. They consulted agency psychiatrists and foreign governments to identify effective techniques beyond standard interview practices.

After Mr. Zubaydah’s capture, a C.I.A. interrogation team was dispatched from the agency’s counterterrorism center to take the lead in his questioning, former law enforcement and intelligence officials said, and F.B.I. agents were withdrawn. The group included an agency consultant schooled in the harsher interrogation procedures to which American special forces are subjected in their training. Three former intelligence officials said the techniques had been drawn up on the basis of legal guidance from the Justice Department, but were not yet supported by a formal legal opinion.

In Thailand, the new C.I.A. team concluded that under standard questioning Mr. Zubaydah was revealing only a small fraction of what he knew, and decided that more aggressive techniques were warranted.

At times, Mr. Zubaydah, still weak from his wounds, was stripped and placed in a cell without a bunk or blankets. He stood or lay on the bare floor, sometimes with air-conditioning adjusted so that, one official said, Mr. Zubaydah seemed to turn blue. At other times, the interrogators piped in
deafening blasts of music by groups like the Red Hot Chili Peppers. Sometimes, the interrogator would use simpler techniques, entering his cell to ask him to confess.

"You know what I want," the interrogator would say to him, according to one official's account, departing leaving Mr. Zubaydah to brood over his answer.

F.B.I. agents on the scene angrily protested the more aggressive approach, arguing that persuasion rather than coercion had succeeded. But leaders of the C.I.A. interrogation team were convinced that tougher tactics were warranted and said that the methods had been authorized by senior lawyers at the White House.

The agents appealed to their superiors but were told that the intelligence agency was in charge, the officials said. One law enforcement official who was aware of events as they occurred reacted with chagrin. "When you rough these guys up, all you do is fulfill their fantasies about what to expect from us," the official said.

Mr. Bush on Wednesday acknowledged the use of aggressive interview techniques, but only in the most general terms. "We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped talking," Mr. Bush said. He said the C.I.A. had used "an alternative set of procedures" after it became clear that Mr. Zubaydah "had received training on how to resist interrogation.

"These procedures were designed to be safe, to comply with our laws, our Constitution and our treaty obligations," Mr. Bush said. "The Department of Justice reviewed the authorized methods extensively and determined them to be lawful."

In his early interviews, Mr. Zubaydah had revealed what turned out to be important information, identifying Khalid Shaikh Mohammed — from a photo on a hand-held computer — as the chief planner of the Sept. 11 attacks. Mr. Zubaydah also identified Jose Padilla, an American citizen who has been charged with terrorism-related crimes.

But Mr. Zubaydah dismissed Mr. Padilla as a maladroit extremist whose hope to construct a dirty bomb, using conventional explosives to disperse
radioactive materials, was far-fetched. He told his questioners that Mr. Padilla was ignorant on the subject of nuclear physics and believed he could separate plutonium from nuclear material by rapidly swinging over his head a bucket filled with fissionable material.

Crucial aspects of what happened during Mr. Zubaydah’s interrogation are sharply disputed. Some former and current government officials briefed on the case, who were more closely allied with law enforcement, said Mr. Zubaydah cooperated with F.B.I. interviewers until the C.I.A. interrogation team arrived. They said that Mr. Zubaydah’s resistance began after the agency interrogators began using more stringent tactics.

Other officials, more closely tied to intelligence agencies, dismissed that account, saying that the C.I.A. had supervised all interviews with Mr. Zubaydah, including those in which F.B.I. agents asked questions. These officials said that he proved a wily adversary. “He was lying, and things were going nowhere,” one official briefed on the matter said of the early interviews. “It was clear that he had information about an imminent attack and time was of the essence.”

Several officials said the belief that Mr. Zubaydah might have possessed critical information about a coming terrorist operation figured significantly in the decision to employ tougher tactics, even though it later became apparent he had no such knowledge.

“As the president has made clear, the fact of the matter is that Abu Zubaydah was defiant and evasive until the approved procedures were used,” one government official said. “He soon began to provide information on key Al Qaeda operators to help us find and capture those responsible for the 9/11 attacks.”

This official added, “When you are concerned that a hard-core terrorist has information about an imminent threat that could put innocent lives at risk, rapport-building and stroking aren’t the top things on your agenda.”

*Douglas Jehl contributed reporting.*
From: Stone, Laura M  
Sent: Thursday, September 07, 2006 12:25 PM  
To: Casper, Anne S  
Cc: Byrd, Heather X; Boonpharad, Channarish  
Subject: RE: Guantanamo -- ACTION  

Anne,

I looked at the stuff on the Black Sites -- it is definitely not appropriate for use here. If ITV ask anything about the Black Sites here, I think we should stick to what we have done before: deny flat out that they exist. Here is what the President said:

"..."

In some cases, we determine that individuals we have captured pose a significant threat, or may have intelligence that we and our allies need to have to prevent new attacks. Many are al Qaeda operatives or Taliban fighters trying to conceal their identities, and they withhold information that could save American lives. In these cases, it has been necessary to move these individuals to an environment where they can be held secretly [sic], questioned by experts, and -- when appropriate -- prosecuted for terrorist acts.

Some of these individuals are taken to the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It's important for Americans and others across the world to understand the kind of people held at Guantanamo. These aren't common criminals, or bystanders accidentally swept up on the battlefield -- we have in place a rigorous process to ensure those held at Guantanamo Bay belong at Guantanamo. Those held at Guantanamo include suspected bomb makers, terrorist trainers, recruiters and facilitators, and potential suicide bombers. They are in our custody so they cannot murder our people. One detainee held at Guantanamo told a questioner questioning him -- he said this: "I'll never forget your face. I will kill you, your brothers, your mother, and sisters."

In addition to the terrorists held at Guantanamo, a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and questioned outside the United States, in a separate program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This group includes individuals believed to be the key architects of the September the 11th attacks, and attacks on the USS Cole, an operative involved in the bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and individuals involved in other attacks that have taken the lives of innocent civilians across the world. These are dangerous men with unparalleled knowledge about terrorist networks and their plans for new attacks. The security of our nation and the lives of our citizens depend on our ability to learn what these terrorists know.

Many specifics of this program, including where these detainees have been held and the details of their confinement, cannot be divulged. Doing so would provide our enemies with information they could use to take retribution against our allies and harm our country. I can say that questioning the detainees in this program has given us information that has saved innocent lives by helping us stop new attacks -- here in the United States and across the world. Today, I'm going to share with you some of the examples provided by our intelligence community of how this program has saved lives; why it remains vital to the
security of the United States, and our friends and allies; and why it deserves the support of the United States Congress and the American people.

..." End of President's remarks

From:  Casper, Anne S
Sent:  Thursday, September 07, 2006 11:00 AM
To:  Stone, Laura M; Boonpharod, Chamarish
Cc:  Byrd, Heather X
Subject:  Guantanamo -- ACTION

Susan S. had a good idea which is to make sure we cull from the speech and make sure the Amb gets points on what the President said on the “black sites.” Also, to have prepared suggestions for him about what we want to do re this. Though it’s not an issue here, it is a major Washington directive and she is also looking at things to do on her side as well.

I’ll be back around noon – let’s talk again.

Anne
Sorry – we’ve been basically “all coup all the time.” The Sept 6 speech got modest straight coverage, mostly translations of news wire articles.

The most common issues have been: 1) the question of whether there is a “secret prison” here in (maybe in Udorn) which we have repeatedly denied, and 2) we have also gotten some flap for using a “double standard” when we criticized detention of pro-Thaksin types as being non-transparent.

This is not a major issue for us – obviously right now our thoughts are elsewhere....

All Thai-language dailies on September 8 carried on their foreign news page wire-service reports on President Bush’s admittance of overseas CIA prisons. A short report in the independent, English language The Nation (9/8) headlined “No secret US jail here” read, “Representatives of the Foreign Ministry and US embassy yesterday rejected any suggestion that Thailand had hosted one of the secret prisons that US president George Bush acknowledged this week...Foreign Ministry deputy spokesman Kittikhun Chartprasert said yesterday that, despite strong speculation, Thailand never had one of these so-called black sites.”

A headline on the foreign page of the sensationalist, Thai language Khao Sot (9/12) read “Thailand refutes American media’s revelation of CIA secret prisons”. The report read, “Thailand’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kitt Wasinond dismissed as groundless the New York Times report about the detention and torture of Abu Zubaydah, Osama bin Laden’s henchman, in a CIA prison in Thailand. Kitt reaffirmed that the Thai government had never allowed the CIA to use Thailand as a base for secret prisons for the interrogation of terrorist suspects.”

Other than the above reports, there were no other commentaries or editorials on the subject.

Anne and Kit (and Ken and Laura),

I’m writing to follow up with you on the attached action item concerning the detainee issue. I know you’ve got your hands full working on democracy grants and other issues, but would be grateful if you could send
me at least a brief response to the survey questions by next Monday, October 2. I've added Ken and Laura to this message as they may want to share their input on this issue.

Thanks and regards,

Joe

From: Bookbinder, Joseph A
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 4:46 PM
To: Casper, Anne S; Boyle, Kathleen L
Subject: Action Item: Survey on PD Efforts in Thailand on the Detainee Issue
Importance: High

Anne and Kit,

As the EAP/PD Policy Officer, I participate in a weekly Sub-PCC meeting on Public Diplomacy for Detainee Issues. Based on instructions from the NSC and in an effort to enhance and support PD efforts on this issue, the Chairs of the Sub-PCC have prepared a concise one-page survey (see attachment below) for key posts to fill out. I would be grateful if you would take the time to fill out the survey and return it to me by Wednesday morning, Sept. 27 (Washington, DC time). I have been assured that your responses will be passed up the chain of command to the NSC and to others involved in detainee policymaking, so this is a good opportunity to share your thoughts on this issue.

Thank you very much for your time and effort.

Best regards,

Joe

Public Diplomacy
Outreach Effo...

**********************************************************************
Joseph Bookbinder
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Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Phone: 202-736-4524
Fax: 202-647-7033
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**********************************************************************
Monday, June 18, 2007

The US Was Behind It: I Should Have Known

There are all kinds of conspiracies which circulate around in Thai politics. They range from the ludicrous, the Finland Plan to the somewhat hysterical - that Thaksin instigated the riot and the burning of the Thai Embassy in Cambodia.

Kazi Mahmood, who often writes as a guest columnist for Malaysia Today - see this recent article on the violence in the South, has his own website where he publishes some opinion pieces. From this about us page:

> World Futures on line or WFOL as he calls it has been instituted to counter the lies which the US is spreading about Islam.

**COMMENT:** I just know there was going to be a conspiracy theory coming about the US being involved in the South, but I really wasn't expecting this from November 2006:

The fall of Thaksin Shinawatra as Prime Minister of Thailand is a ploy designed to bring a pro-U.S., party in power in Bangkok says fresh reports, which insist of a possible collusion between U.S. intelligence and the Thai military leaders prior to the coup of September last. These reports indicate that Thailand, a major non-NATO ally of the U.S., in the ASEAN is of utmost importance to Washington and will not be allowed to sway in any other direction, hence the removal of Thaksin from power.

**COMMENT:** Ok, not so bad now. I think he is wrong as I think Surayud has moved slightly towards China

The shift in Thailand’s foreign policy, which was focusing on 'look east' policies coupled with a series of anti-American measures may have lead to the coup while Thaksin was visiting no other capital but Washington. World Futures is able to reveal, once again, the inner story behind Thaksin’s swift removal from power and the installation of a U.S. bred former military chief as new Prime Minister.

**COMMENT:** Surayud US bred? Series of anti-American measures? See below for more.

The entire coup was a major success thanks to the support of the U.S., military and intelligentsia in the making of the coup. The Thai military had to wait for Thaksin to be in the U.S., to carry out the well laid plan of overthrowing a regime that showed its total independence from the U.S., in far too many occasions.
COMMENT: Perhaps, Thaksin showed his total independence from the US. Perhaps, it was this:
In December 2001, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra met with President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to express a willingness to contribute forces in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

... 

After much deliberation, the Thai MND offered engineering support, and, on 25 July, CENTCOM issued a formal request for a company-sized engineer unit. On 13 September, the Thai Government accepted.

Or Thailand announced that it would provide troops to assist in the humanitarian effort in Iraq - Thaksin chose to announce this during his trip to the US, to meet with President Bush, in June 2003. 443 troops arrived in Iraq in September 2003 "to conduct reconstruction tasks".

Hambali is captured in Thailand and turned over to the US. You also have the CIA black site in Thailand.

Such independence!

NOTE: The comments in this thread on the immediate aftermath of September 11 though.
In Washington, the coup was welcomed since the U.S., knew how the entire process will be carried out and who will head the caretaker government after the coup. The U.S., is now expecting a radical change in the local political landscape, with the total collapse of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) or Thai Love Thai party and the formation of a pro-U.S., regime by 2008.

COMMENT: Wait to see who will lead this pro-US regime
In fact, well before the coup was planned and organized, the anti-Thaksin opposition in Bangkok was under the influence of these powerful external forces, not satisfied with Taksin's approach toward strengthening ties with China and Russia.

COMMENT: Yeah, and what the US bred leader's visit to China earlier this year. Umm. Thaksin isn't a Hugo Chavez.

The acquisition by Singapore's Temasek Holdings of telecom giant Shin Corp raised public concerns over the deal's threat to national security, economic development and media independence.

Criticism grew after the Shinawatra and Damapong families, in a series of transactions, completed the sale of 1.48 billion Shin shares to two holding vehicles controlled by Temasek of Singapore for 73.3 billion baht.
The spin doctors from Washington, eager to interfere in the running of Thailand's local politics started to post paid articles in the local press, with commentaries by local academics and political observers. These observers criticized the sale to foreigners of radio frequencies and satellite broadcasting, which they say are national assets. They fear it could jeopardize political stability and therefore national security, hence creating a national backlash against Thaksin and his party. This ended up in the coup that forced Thaksin out.

COMMENT: Well we know some local academics and political observers are not adverse to being paid for their services, but is there any evidence the US started paying for this last year. Is this new government more US-friendly than Thaksin? The U.S., spin doctors furthermore decided that a retiring Muslim army chief would be the right choice to lead the toppling of Thaksin, thus focusing the coup on the failure by the Thaksin regime to deal with the rebellion in the south and the growing discontent among local police officials and military army officials in the Pattani region.

COMMENT: This I don't get. He author has set up a site to counter the lies the US spreads about Islam, but he now thinks the US would but a Muslim army chief in place? I guess Prem is some US proxy.

Besides Washington, Singapore was strategically informed of the potential of a coup in Thailand. A coup that would remove Thaksin and confirm the deal of the Temasek take over of Shin Corp. The military junta and its appointed government does not have the capacity to either shed the deal between Temasek and Shin Corp. However, they have the ability to renegotiate the deal and possibly offer the Temasek a lesser share percentage to calm the spirits of the local folks in Bangkok over issues regarding the security of the country's communications network if it fell into the hands of foreign counterparts.

... With the coup, Singapore is set to win its deal with Shin Corp as the deal will never be canceled, thus ensuring Thaksin's and Damapong's families would still have a breakthrough in the deal. This financial breakthrough is currently being used by the military junta and the regime in place in Bangkok to make a new deal with Thaksin for his non-involvement in the politics of Thailand in the near future.

COMMENT: And Singapore has done so well out of this coup. Come on. You have to be kidding.

Trying to put pressure on Bangkok certain American politicians, like Rumsfield (U.S. Secretary of Defense) and Powell – a retired politician – declared, ahead of the coup,
that Thaksin was unable to resolve the Southern provinces problems without external help. They urged Thailand to accept an East Timor Scenario, where the South would be allowed to decide by referendum on its future, failing which the U.S., would offer its assistance to open a military base in the South in a bid to settle the problem for Bangkok.

**COMMENT:** Actually, it was Thaksin who asked Rumsfeld for help - well, according to Kavi. Where are these declarations? There will be no US bases in Thailand.

Nowadays Washington is satisfied with the changes in Thailand as the Americans are sure that the future political steps of the new cabinet will coincide with the US plans in South East Asia. That's the reason why Washington is urging 'the democratic elections' thus lobbying for the rise of pro-American forces like the Democratic Party, to power.

**COMMENT:** The pro-American Democrat Party. You mean the same party where an MP believes the CIA is responsible for the violence in the South, or who have an official policy of neutrality. I actually don't think the Democrat Party would change things that much as well Abhisit is all rhetoric. I do wonder whether the Democrat Party with its large southern contingent would have agreed to send soldiers to Afghanistan and Iraq.

The USA is now very active in strengthening ties with Bangkok in economic spheres.

The group of Thai specialists are invited to the USA by Microsoft and Boeing corporations to study the possibility of signing contracts to buy computers with Windows Vista for state agencies as well as US-made aircraft - since Airbus is now kaput.

**COMMENT:** Oooh. This is the evidence of better US-Thai relationships. Thais going to buy Windows Visata. I wonder what US drug companies and US government officials think about the US coup.

The Americans hope the FTA's with Thailand will proceed as expected after the military coup and that Thailand will from now on be under the control of Washington and will not move its dices towards Russia, China or elsewhere than Washington. China was to invest heavily in some projects (ports and pipelines) in Thailand while Russia was to make a strong Oil and Gas deal with Bangkok that would have given Thailand a larger role in the Oil and Gas industry in the region. Military deals between Bangkok and Beijing was also not discounted.

**COMMENT:** Ummm.. Don't you just love how oil is mentioned. Thailand under the control of Washington. What FTA?

Surayud Chulanont, the new Prime Minister in Bangkok is well-known for his ties with the US military circles. He was formed by a U.S., academy. It was almost certain that Surayud will be chosen as the next PM since he is popular with the locals and with
Washington. His job is to plan the take over of the country by a pro-U.S., political organization in the future polls, which should be organized in early 2008.

**COMMENT:** What his love of China and visits there? You would think he was some US lackey. Yeah, I am sure his whole life was formed by his time in the US.

**Most of the bombings in the South has the thumb print of the local military** and only after suspicion grew of a possible link between local Muslim rebels (who are not in large numbers and are not well equipped to fight the military) had some contacts with Muslim rebels from Chechnya. A few of the bombs that exploded in Narathiwat were found to have had the same imprint of those used by Muslim rebels in Chechnya. This indicated – though not confirmed and denied by local insurgents who spoke to WFOL – the possibility of a stronger local rebellion against a government and a military that has been harsh on the Muslims. It also indicated that the military or the local drug mafia's in Southern Thailand were not alone in procuring bombs in the war that was going on between the police, the military and the drug and prostitution warlords.

Thaksin's regime had the intent to rid the country of drugs, prostitution and illegal gambling. This mission failed since the members of the former political elite in Thailand had allied with local mafia's and the local police (accused of being involved in drug dealing by Thaksin's government) to combat the military sent by Thaksin to clean the act in the South.

**COMMENT:** And the terrorists what are they doing? I mean not in large numbers. It is a guerilla insurgency, you don't need large numbers. Does the author not realise that Thaksin is a former police officer? He favoured the police not the military.

Some of the issues that made Washington turn anti-Thaksin are as follows:

**The Thaksin government rejected the offer by the US to open a US military base in Southern Thailand and to later** - after the base was established - allow US forces to patrol the Straits of Malacca, in the US war against terror.

The Thaksin regime also rejected any idea of a U.S. base in Southern Thailand to help the Thai forces deal with insurgency and terror in the region.

**COMMENT:** This is why the author thinks the US staged the coup. Thaksin wouldn't allowed a US base in Thailand. And how is progress on the US base going now some 9 months into the coup? Anywhere? No. It is going nowhere. There will be no US base.

Posted by Bangkok Pundit at 11:55 PM
Anne,

Here are some points distilled from the cable. I would recommend that the Ambassador not bring this up unless asked, since I don’t think that it will get much play on ITV unless we push it. If they do bring it up, it is probably going to be from the Thai angle (was there a base in Udom), which our answer is still a resounding “no”.

Laura
-- In a major speech today the President announced that 14 leaders and operatives of al Qaeda have been moved from classified locations, where they were being held and questioned by CIA, to DOD custody where they can be brought to justice for their crimes.

-- This group included those believed to have orchestrated the 9/11 attacks and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, and those believed to have been involved in the bombings of our embassies in East Africa.

-- The International Red Cross has been notified and will have access to them at Guantanamo. No detainees remain in CIA custody.

-- After the September 11 attacks, we took the offensive to deny terrorists safe haven and kill or capture al Qaida operatives. We had many successes, some publicly known, some not.

-- Information from captured terrorists is one of the most vital tools we have to stop new attacks. Information from captured terrorists has saved lives in the United States and overseas.

-- We created a program, run by the CIA, to focus on a small number of the most dangerous terrorists and operatives, many of whom we believed knew the terrorists' secrets about potential attacks -- secrets that would help us save innocent lives.

-- The President has sent legislation to Congress to (1) make clear the standards for questioning of captured terrorists, and (2) authorize the creation of military commissions to try terrorists for their crimes.

QUESTION: Why is this program being disclosed now? Why is it being decided to bring these detainees to GTMO now, after all this time, and disclose that we have them?

ANSWER:
-- Most of the intelligence value of these detainees has at this time been exhausted.

-- The President decided that it is important if possible to prosecute these key terrorist leaders and operatives for their crimes.

-- The Supreme Court's decision this summer in Hamdan required new legislation to try these operatives under military commissions.

-- In light of that decision, we are now asking that Congress both authorize military commissions to try these terrorists, and
that they provide a clear legal framework for military and intelligence operations in our conflict with al Qaeda.

**QUESTION:** How many detainees remain in this program?

**ANSWER:**
-- None. However, we expect that we will continue to capture key terrorist leaders and operatives in the future.

**QUESTION:** How many detainees have been in the program since its inception?

**ANSWER:**
-- Since the development of this program in mid-2002, fewer than 100 terrorist detainees have been held for detention and questioning in CIA's custody. The program was designed only for a small number of the most dangerous terrorist leaders and operatives.

**QUESTION:** Were the detainees provided basic human necessities during detention?

**ANSWER:**
-- Yes. Terrorists held by CIA have been provided with basic human necessities.

**QUESTION:** How many CIA detention sites exist and where are these sites?

**ANSWER:**
The number of sites and locations will not be disclosed. Providing locations of CIA's detention sites would put our allies at risk of terrorist retaliation and also betray relationships built on trust that are vital to winning the war against al Qaeda and its affiliates.
Thanks Clay – I agree there doesn't seem to be any consular action, particular as we got them from some private e-mail address. I am passing them on to Jeff Gorsky in CA on an FYI basis. I assume we haven’t, but I wouldn’t respond the lovelibby address. If they push for an answer in the future, we could refer them to the office of the legal advisor in the Dept., but hopefully ACS won’t hear from them again on this. Bill

From: Adler, Clay K
Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 11:06 AM
To: Bartlett, William M; Coley, Theodore R
Subject: FW: USDC DC Judge Roberts orders US Embassy Thailand, JUSMAGTHAI and Thailand to preserve evidence

This email was forwarded from "lovelibby@gmail.com” and I thought it might be a hoax, but I forwarded it to Chris Sonderby, who thinks they are genuine. I asked him to forward on as appropriate. I don’t think there is any action for consular, but if real, maybe for other sections. I’m not sure how this would normally come in.

From: Sonderby, Christopher P
Sent: Thursday, January 31, 2008 3:50 PM
To: Adler, Clay K
Subject: RE: USDC DC Judge Roberts orders US Embassy Thailand, JUSMAGTHAI and Thailand to preserve evidence

Thanks, Clay. I think they’re genuine.

From: Adler, Clay K
Sent: Wednesday, January 30, 2008 5:24 PM
To: Sonderby, Christopher P
Subject: FW: USDC DC Judge Roberts orders US Embassy Thailand, JUSMAGTHAI and Thailand to preserve evidence

Chris - Is this for real? I thought it was until I read the part about Islamic psychopaths. Happy reading, Clay

From: Bangkok ACS
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2008 4:22 PM
To: Anantakul, Rumpa Daeng; Adler, Clay K
Subject: FW: USDC DC Judge Roberts orders US Embassy Thailand, JUSMAGTHAI and Thailand to preserve evidence

Regards,
American Citizen Services

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

From: R P [mailto:ilovelibby@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, January 26, 2008 10:53 AM
To: Bangkok ACS; admin@jusmagthai.com; Wimmer Michael - Bangkok - Political Attache; Koen.Pieters@diplobel.fed.be; fpiobetha@hotmail.com; Ellen_Steury@dcd.uscourts.gov; kenneth.wainstein@usdoj.gov; criminal.division@usdoj.gov; adam.kirschner@usdoj.gov; greg.brooker@usdoj.gov; noelle.corbo@usdoj.gov
Subject: USDC DC Judge Roberts orders US Embassy Thailand, JUSMAGTHAI and Thailand to preserve evidence
MEMORANDUM ORDER

Petitioner Hani Saleh Rashid Abdullah, a foreign national detained at Guantanamo Bay in the custody of the United States, has filed a motion to compel respondents to report on their compliance with a preservation order that required respondents to "preserve and maintain all evidence, documents and information, without limitation, now or ever in respondents' possession, custody or control, regarding the individual detained petitioner[] in th[is] case[]." Mem. Order, July 18, 2005. Respondents have acknowledged that after the preservation order was entered, they destroyed video-records of interrogations of another detainee, Abu Zubaydah, dating from the year 2002. See Abdah v. Bush, Civil Action No. 04-1254 (HHK), Hr'g Tr. at 22:7-9, Dec. 21, 2007. In his motion papers, petitioner has made a colorable showing that information obtained from Abu Zubaydah during 2002 likely included information regarding petitioner, and was therefore subject to the preservation order. (See Pet'r's
Reply ¶ 1.) He also notes his own handling in detention and raises the valid questions of whether it, too, may have been videotaped and whether any such tapes have been destroyed. (See Pet’r’s Mot. ¶¶ 3, 4.)

Respondents oppose petitioner’s motion by arguing that prudence cautions against granting the motion. They do not challenge the court’s authority to enforce its own orders. See also id. at 24:4-6 ("We are not arguing that the court lacks jurisdiction to inquire into compliance with the court’s own order entered by the court in this case.") They also do not dispute or otherwise respond directly to petitioner’s allegations that they knowingly destroyed evidence pertaining to this petitioner that was subject to the July 18, 2005 preservation order entered in this case. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for relief be, and hereby is, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is denied to the extent that it seeks in-court questioning of respondents’ witness. It is granted to the extent that it seeks a substantive report from respondents. Respondents are ordered to file by February 14, 2008, a report detailing what they have done since the preservation order was entered in July 2005, and what they are now doing, to ensure compliance with the July 18, 2005 preservation order, and the nature of any evidence potentially
subject to the protective order that has been destroyed or otherwise spoliated.

SIGNED this 24th day of January, 2008.

/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge