sidered DoD support to all of these agencies, but we focused primarily on DoD support to the CIA. (The CIA cooperated with our investigation, but provided information only on activities in Iraq.) It is important to highlight that it was beyond the scope of our tasking to investigate the existence, location or policies governing detention facilities that may be exclusively operated by OGAs, rather than by DoD.

(U) DoD personnel frequently worked together with OGAs to support their common intelligence collection mission in the Global War on Terror, a cooperation encouraged by DoD leadership early in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In support of OGA detention and interrogation operations, DoD provided assistance that included detainee transfers, logistical support, sharing of intelligence gleaned from DoD interrogations, and oversight and support of OGA interrogations at DoD facilities. However, we were unable to locate formal interagency procedures that codified the support rules and processes.

(U) In OEP and OIF, senior military commanders were aware of guidance that required notification to the Secretary of Defense prior to the transfer of detainees to or from other federal agencies. The administrative transfer guidance was followed, with the notable exception of occasions when DoD temporarily held detainees for the CIA - including the detainee known as "Triple-X" - without properly registering them and providing notification to the International Committee of the Red Cross. This practice of holding “ghost detainees” for the CIA was guided by oral, ad hoc agreements and was the result, in part, of the lack of any specific, coordinated interagency guidance. Our review indicated, however, that this procedure was limited in scope. To the best of our knowledge, there were approximately 30 “ghost detainees,” as compared to a total of over 50,000 detainees in the course of the Global War on Terror. The practice of DoD holding “ghost detainees” has now ceased.

(U) Aside from the general requirement to treat detainees humanely, we found no specific DoD-wide direction governing the conduct of OGA interrogations in DoD interrogation facilities. In response to questions and interviews for our report, however, senior officials expressed clear expectations that DoD-authorized interrogation policies would be followed during any interrogation conducted in a DoD facility. For example, the Joint Staff J-2 stated that “[o]ur understanding is that any representative of any other governmental agency, including CIA, if conducting interrogations, debriefings, or interviews at a DoD facility must abide by all DoD guidelines.” On many occasions, DoD and OGA personnel did conduct joint interrogations at DoD facilities using DoD-authorized interrogation techniques. However, our interviews with DoD personnel assigned to various detention facilities throughout Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that they did
not have a uniform understanding of what rules governed the involvement of OGAs in the interrogation of DoD detainees. Such uncertainty could create confusion regarding the permissibility and limits of various interrogation techniques. We therefore recommend the establishment and wide promulgation of interagency policies governing the involvement of OGAs in the interrogation of DoD detainees.

Medical Issues Related to Interrogation (U)

(U) In reviewing the performance of medical personnel in detention and interrogation-related operations during the Global War on Terror, we were able to draw preliminary insights in four areas: detainee screening and medical treatment; medical involvement in interrogation; interrogator access to medical information; and the role of medical personnel in screening and reporting detainee abuse. We note that the Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently developing specific policies to address all of the issues raised below.

(U) First, the medical personnel that we interviewed understood their responsibility to provide humane medical care to detainees, in accordance with U.S. military medical doctrine and the Geneva Conventions. The essence of these requirements is captured succinctly in a DoD policy issued by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs on April 10, 2002, “DoD Policy on Medical Care for Enemy Persons Under U.S. Control Detained in a Conjunction with Operation Enduring Freedom.” The policy states, “[In any case in which there is uncertainty about the need, scope, or duration of medical care for a detainee under U.S. control, medical personnel shall be guided by their own professional judgments and standards similar to those that would be used to evaluate medical issues for U.S. personnel, consistent with security, public health management, and other mission requirements” (emphasis added). Few U.S. personnel, however, had received specific training relevant to detainee screening and medical treatment. As a result, in Afghanistan and Iraq we found inconsistent field-level implementation of specific requirements, such as monthly detainee inspections and weight recordings. Thus there is a need for a focused training program in this area so that our medical personnel are aware of and comply with detainee screening and medical treatment requirements.

(U) Second, it is a growing trend in the Global War on Terror for behavioral science personnel to work with and support interrogators. These personnel observe interrogations, assess detainee behavior and motivations, review interrogation techniques, and offer advice to interrogators. This support can be effective in helping interrogators collect intelligence from detainees; however, it must be done within proper limits. We found that behavioral science personnel were not involved in detainee
medical care (thus avoiding any inherent conflict between caring for detainees and crafting interrogation strategies), nor were they permitted access to detainee medical records for purposes of developing interrogation strategies. However, since neither the Geneva Conventions nor U.S. military medical doctrine specifically address the issue of behavioral science personnel assisting interrogators in developing interrogation strategies, this practice has evolved in an ad hoc manner. In our view, DoD policy-level review is needed to ensure that this practice is performed with proper safeguards, as well as to clarify the status of medical personnel (such as behavioral scientists supporting interrogators) who do not participate in patient care.

(U) Another area that deserves DoD policy-level review (and that is unaddressed by the Geneva Conventions or current DoD policy) is interrogator access to detainee medical information. Interrogators often have legitimate reasons for inquiring into detainees' medical status. For example, interrogators need to be able to verify whether detainees are being truthful when they claim that interrogations should be restricted on medical grounds. Granting interrogators unfettered access to detainee medical records, however, raises the prospect that detainee medical information could be inappropriately exploited during interrogations. Such access might also discourage detainees from being truthful with medical personnel, or from seeking help with medical issues, if detainees believe that their medical histories will be used against them during interrogation. Although U.S. law provides no absolute confidentiality of medical information for any person, including detainees, DoD policy-level review is necessary in order to balance properly these competing concerns. This is especially true given the substantial variation that was found in field-level practices for maintaining and securing detainee medical records. While access to medical information was carefully controlled at Guantanamo, we found in Afghanistan and Iraq that interrogators sometimes had easy access to such information. Nevertheless, we found no instances where detainee medical information had been inappropriately used during interrogations, and in most situations interrogators had little interest in detainee medical information even when they had unfettered access to it.

(U) Finally, it was not possible for us to assess comprehensively whether medical personnel serving in the Global War on Terror have adequately discharged their obligation to report (and where possible, prevent) detainee abuse. However, our interviews with medical personnel indicated that they had only infrequently suspected or witnessed abuse, and had in those instances reported it through the chain of command. Separately, we performed a systematic review of investigative notes and autopsy results in order to assess the roles of medical personnel, especially in any case where detainee abuse was suspected. We reviewed 68 detainee deaths: 63 in Iraq and five in Afghanistan;
there were no deaths at GTMO. (These deaths were not all abuse-related, and therefore do not correlate directly to the death cases described in our analysis of abuse.) Of these deaths, we identified three in which it appeared that medical personnel may have attempted to misrepresent the circumstances of death, possibly in an effort to disguise detainee abuse. Two of these were the previously described deaths in Bagram, Afghanistan in December 2002, and one was the aforementioned death at Abu Ghraib in November 2003. The Army Surgeon General is currently reviewing the specific medical handling of these three cases.

Conclusion (U)

(U) Human intelligence in general and interrogation in particular, are indispensable components of the Global War on Terror. The need for intelligence in the post-9/11 world, and our enemy’s ability to resist interrogation, have caused our senior policy makers and military commanders to reevaluate traditional U.S. interrogation methods and search for new and more effective interrogation techniques. According to our investigations, this search has always been conducted within the confines of our armed forces’ obligation to treat detainees humanely. In addition, our analysis of 70 substantiated detainee abuse cases found that no approved interrogation techniques caused these criminal abuses; however, two specific interrogation plans approved for use at GTMO did highlight the difficulty of precisely defining the boundaries of humane treatment.

(U) It bears emphasis that the vast majority of detainees held by the U.S. in the Global War on Terror have been treated humanely, and that the overwhelming majority of U.S. personnel have served honorably. For those few who have not, there is no single, overarching explanation. While authorized interrogation techniques have not been a causal factor in detainee abuse, we have nevertheless identified a number of missed opportunities in the policy development process. We cannot say that there would necessarily have been less detainee abuse had these opportunities been acted upon. These are opportunities, however, that should be considered in the development of future interrogation policies.
Introduction (U)

(U) In early 2004, revelations of detainee abuse in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison, potentially involving U.S. Army military intelligence as well as military police personnel, suggested the need for an investigation of Department of Defense interrogation policy and implementation. On May 25, 2004, the Secretary of Defense directed the Naval Inspector General, through the Secretary of the Navy, to conduct a comprehensive review of Department of Defense interrogation techniques related to the following:

- (U) Guantanamo Bay detainee and interrogation operations from January 8, 2002;
- (U) Operation ENDURING FREEDOM;
- (U) Operation IRAQI FREEDOM;
- (U) Joint Special Operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility; and
- (U) The Iraq Survey Group.

Specifically, the Naval Inspector General was tasked to identify and report on all Department of Defense interrogation techniques. The Secretary's directive specified that the Review must:

- (U) Examine all DoD interrogation techniques considered, authorized, prohibited, and employed during the Operations listed above;
- (U) Determine whether (and if so, to what extent) techniques prescribed for use in one command or Operation were adopted for use in another; and
- (U) Inquire into any DoD support to, or participation in, the interrogation operations of non-DoD entities.

In subsequent meetings with the Naval Inspector General, the Secretary of Defense emphasized his desire to investigate thoroughly and present all relevant facts to the Congress and the American people.

Scope of the Review (U)

(U) This independent review is intended to provide a comprehensive chronology regarding the development, approval and implementation of interrogation techniques. In order to meet desired timelines, minimize impact to ongoing operations, and avoid conducting multiple interviews of the same personnel, a decision was made to draw upon numerous other investigations and reviews of interrogation and detention operations, which are summarized in a later section of this report.

(U) Additionally, the Naval Inspector General was designated as the Secretary of Defense's principal representative to the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations (hereinafter referred to as the "Independent Panel"). Secretary Rumsfeld asked the Independent Panel, which was chaired by the Honorable James R. Schlesinger — a former Director of Central Intelligence, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy — to provide independent, professional advice on the issues that you
consider most pertinent related to the various allegations [of abuse at DoD detention facilities], based on [a] review of completed and pending investigative reports and other materials and information." During the course of our review, information was shared with the Independent Panel to facilitate its deliberations and to avoid duplication of effort in studying interrogation policy and procedures. (In addition to the Honorable James Schlesinger, the Independent Panel included the Honorable Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Tillis K. Fowler, former U.S. Representative from Florida; and retired Air Force General Charles A. Horner, who commanded coalition air forces during Operation DESERT STORM, and subsequently commanded the North American Aerospace Defense Command.)

(U) Our review focuses on the specific tasking in the Secretary's memorandum of May 25, 2004. As such, it does not address some issues that may be of importance but are nevertheless not directly related to our tasking. Issues dealing with the interpretation of international law, rationale for specific decisions by senior officials, the value and success of ongoing strategic intelligence efforts, and legal definitions are only addressed when specifically and directly determined to be relevant to our tasking. Finally, any information discovered that was related to potential abuse of detainees was referred to the appropriate criminal investigative authority.

Investigative Approach (U)

(U) On June 1, 2004, the Naval Inspector General, Vice Admiral Albert T. Church III, USN, assembled a planning staff that brought together experienced investigators, interrogation and detention subject matter experts, and representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the applicable Combatant Commands (the U.S. Southern, Central and Special Operations Commands). The planning staff developed a nucleus of background knowledge that facilitated the creation of traveling assessment teams, organized to conduct field interviews and document collection, and a Washington team, which would merge and analyze the data collected. The planning staff included Dr. James Blackwell, Executive Director of the Independent Panel, in order to ensure the smooth coordination of our activities with those of the Independent Panel. In addition, William McSwain, an Assistant United States Attorney, was selected to serve as the Executive Editor for our report. Collectively, this group was designated the Interrogation Special Focus Team (ISFT).

(U) The ISFT's intent was to conduct a thorough investigation, including in-theater interviews, with a minimum of disruption to ongoing military operations. To that end, during the month of June 2004, the ISFT began detailed research into DoD interrogation policy and doctrine, as well as available information concerning specific interrogation operations in Guantánamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The research encompassed
informational interviews with interrogation subject matter experts and the review of policy and doctrine documents (many provided by multiple DoD agencies in response to ISFT data calls). This enabled the development of standard interview templates used to collect statements from interrogation-related personnel in the theaters of operation, as well as key senior military and civilian officials. Persons interviewed or who provided written responses would include:

- (U) Senior DoD policymakers, including the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and others (see figure below)
- (U) General and Flag officers, including the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander, U.S. Central Command, and others (see figure below)
- (U) Military Intelligence leaders
- (U) Interrogators, interpreters and intelligence analysts
- (U) Military Police
- (U) Staff judge advocates
- (U) Medical personnel
- (U) Chaplains
- (U) Interrogation instructors
- (U) Personnel involved in "point of capture" questioning of detainees (e.g., infantry soldiers)

Senior-Level ISFT Interviewees and Respondents (U)

**Senior Civilians**
- Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Dr. Stephen Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
- Mr. Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Mr. William Haynie, General Counsel of the Department of Defense
- Mr. Matt Wassman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs
- Ms. Mary Walker, General Counsel, Department of the Air Force
- Mr. Steven Morello, General Counsel, Department of the Army
- Mr. Alberto More, General Counsel, Department of the Navy
- Mr. Jacques Grimes, SES, Chief of Survey Center, Iraq Survey Group (ISG)

**General and Flag Officers**
- Gen Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- GEN John Abizaid, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command
- GEN Dan McNeill, USA, United States Army Forces Command, former Commander, JTF-180
- LTG Anthony Jones, USA, Deputy CG/Chief of Staff, USA Training & Doctrine Command
- LTG Ricardo Sanchez, USA, CG, V Corps, former Commander, CJTF-7 (Iraq)
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- LTG Keith Alexander, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-2
- LTG David Barno, USA, Commander, Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan (CFC-A)
- LtGen James Conway, USMC, Director, J-8, Joint Staff, former Commanding General, I MEF
- VADM Lowell Jacoby, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- VADM David Nichols, USN, Commander, NAVCENT/Commander, UTF-11 Fleet
- MG Geoffrey Miller, USA, DCG Detainee Ops/CQ, TF 134 MNF-I, former CTF-GTMO
- MG Keith Dayton, USA, Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, G-3; Former Commander, Iraq Survey Group
- MG Thomas Romig, USA, Judge Advocate General of the Army
- MG Eric Olson, USA, CG, CJTF-76, Afghanistan
- MG Peter Chiarelli, USA, Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division
- MG Walter Woyjakowski, USA, Deputy Commanding General, V Corps
- MG George Fay, USA, Deputy Commander (IMA); USA Intelligence & Security Command
- MG Ronald Burgess, USA, Director J-3, Joint Staff
- MG Stanley McChrystal, USA, CG, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
- MG Barbara Fast, USA, former C-2, MNF-I
- MG Martha Dumpsey, USA, CG, 1st Armored Division
- MG Michael Dunseedy (Retired), USAR, former CJTF-170 and CTF-GTMO
- MajGen Thomas Casey, USAF, Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
- MajGen James Mattis, USMC, CG, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, former Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
- RADM Michael Leir, USN, Judge Advocate General of the Navy
- BG Jerry Hood, USA, Commander, JTTF-GTMO
- BG John Quast, USA, Director for Intelligence, J-2, US, Central Command
- BG Charles Jacoby, USA, DCG Support, CJTF-76, Afghanistan
- BG Michael Ennis, USMC, Deputy Director for Human Intelligence, DIA
- BG Joseph McManamin, USMC, Director, Iraq Survey Group
- BG Kevin Sandkuhler, USMC, SJA to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
- RADM William McRaven, USN, Deputy CG for Operations, JSOC

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(U) We made a decision not to interview the detainees themselves in order to minimize any impact on ongoing interrogation operations; however, we did review many reports provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

(U) In late June through early July 2004, the assessment teams traveled to Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan and Iraq in order to conduct interviews and first-hand examinations of detention and interrogation facilities and operations. In total, the ISFT collected more than 800 statements from personnel involved in detainee operations. In addition, a series of follow-on questions was asked of senior officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff during the course of the investigation. The information thus collected provided the foundation for the findings presented in this report. Throughout our effort, we were impressed by the high level of cooperation and accommodation we received, particularly from combat forces in the field.

(U) Following this introduction, the report is divided into nine main sections.

- (U) The second section provides a summary of previous reports that address detention and interrogation operations in the Global War on Terror.
- (U) The third section provides an analysis of detainee abuse investigations during the Global War on Terror.
- (U) The fourth, fifth, and sixth sections describe the evolution of interrogation techniques considered, authorized, prohibited, and employed in the course of the Global War on Terror in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq respectively.
- (U) The seventh section examines the role of contractors in DoD interrogations.
- (U) The eighth section examines DoD support to, or participation in, the interrogation operations of non-DoD entities, also termed other government agencies, or OGAs.
- (U) The ninth section examines the role of U.S. medical personnel in interrogation.
Department of Defense Interrogation: Law, Policy, Doctrine and Training (U)

(U) Timely and accurate intelligence is essential to the effective conduct of military operations. Defense Department interrogators, both military and civilian, seek to gain human intelligence (HUMINT) from enemy prisoners of war and other detainees in order to support DoD missions, from the tactical (e.g., counter-insurgency patrols in Iraq or Afghanistan) to the strategic (e.g., defense of the U.S. homeland against a catastrophic terrorist attack).

(U) This section of our report provides the background for our subsequent discussion of the law and policy governing DoD interrogations. It begins with an overview of international law, U.S. law, Department of Defense policy, and doctrine governing detention and interrogation, including a discussion of the President's February 7, 2002 determination regarding the legal status of al Qaeda and Taliban members under the Geneva Conventions. It then provides a summary of the limited doctrine for detention operations, including the doctrinal relationship between military police (MP) and military intelligence (MI) personnel. Next, this section provides a summary of the limited doctrine pertaining to joint, coalition and interagency interrogation facilities. It concludes with an overview of the force structure and training for DoD interrogators.

Interrogation: Law and Policy (U)

(U) Army Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, states that "the goal of any interrogation is to obtain reliable information in a lawful manner, in a minimum amount of time, and to satisfy intelligence requirements of any echelon of command" (emphasis added). Interrogators are at all times bound by applicable U.S. laws, including treaty-based laws, and U.S. policies.

(U) Applied to detention and interrogation operations in time of armed conflict, this body of law and policy is intended to ensure the humane treatment of individuals who fall into the hands of a party to the conflict. In the following paragraphs, we will review the legal and policy framework governing detention and interrogation before turning to the subject of interrogation doctrine.

(U) DoD personnel are bound by U.S. law, including the law of armed conflict, found in treaties to which the U.S. is a party. Among other things, these laws prohibit torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of detainees. International and U.S. laws define torture in the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and in Title 18, Section 2340 of U.S. Code, respectively; note, however, that there is no treaty-defined or universally accepted definition of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment.
(U) It is U.S. policy to use the Geneva Conventions as a baseline for humane treatment even when the Conventions are not legally binding (in the words of DoD Directive 5100.77, "during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized"). The Geneva Conventions indicate that the irreducible minimum standard of treatment is "humanity" without further defining the term. Thus, the concept of humane treatment remains undefined, and well-meaning individuals analyzing interrogation techniques might differ on whether certain techniques are in fact humane.

(U) In addition, DoD personnel engaged in armed conflict are bound by the law of war, enumerated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The law of war is intended to "diminish the evils of war" by regulating the means of warfare, aid by protecting the victims of war, both combatant and civilian. An overview of the purpose and scope of the Geneva Conventions, their implementation in DoD policy, and their application in the Global War on Terror is provided below.

(U) Purpose and Scope of the Law of War

(U) The Geneva Conventions pertinent to detention and interrogation operations are the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, herein abbreviated as GPW, and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, abbreviated as GC. The GPW provides protection for captured enemy military personnel, including military medical personnel and chaplains (referred to as "retained persons"). The GC protects civilian internees captured in a belligerent's home state or occupied territory. Private citizens who engage in unauthorized acts of violence and who fail to meet the criteria set forth in the GPW are unprivileged belligerents.

(U) Detainees meeting Geneva criteria are entitled to the protection commensurate with their category (prisoner of war or civilian protected person). The figure on the next page provides a list which, while not all-inclusive, describes the protections that are most relevant to interrogation operations. In all cases, DoD personnel are obliged to uphold the basic standard of humane treatment of detainees, and to obey laws prohibiting assault, torture, homicide, and other forms of maltreatment.

(U) GPW explicitly addresses those instances when capturing forces cannot immediately determine the status of a detainee: "should any doubt exist as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to the categories enumerated in (GPW) Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of [prisoners of war] until such time as their status has been determined by a com-
Geneva Convention Protections: Prisoners of War and Protected Persons (U)

(U) Protections afforded to prisoners of war (GPW):
- (U) Shall be humanely treated at all times. (GPW, Article 13)
- (U) No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. (GPW, Article 17)

(U) Protections afforded to protected persons (GC):
- (U) Shall be humanely treated at all times. (GC, Article 27)
- (U) No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties. (GC, Article 31.)

petent tribunal" (GPW, Article 5). Though the Geneva Conventions do not describe the composition of such a tribunal, DoD policy provides specific guidance, as will be described below.

(U) In sum; DoD personnel are always bound to treat detainees humanely, at a minimum; and enemy prisoners of war and civilians covered by the Geneva Conventions are to be granted the additional protections prescribed by Geneva.

(U) The following section provides a survey of the DoD policy documents that amplify and assign responsibilities with regard to U.S. law of war obligations.

(U) DoD Policy

(U) Two Department of Defense Directives, or DoDDs, specify DoD policy regarding the law of war and detainee operations: DoDD 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program, and DoDD 2310.1, DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War and Other Detainees. These directives highlight several key points:

- (U) It is DoD policy to ensure that the law of war obligations of the United States are observed and enforced by the DoD Components.
(U) It is DoD policy to comply with the principles, spirit and intent of the international law of war, both customarily and codified, to include the Geneva Conventions.

(U) Captured or detained personnel must be accorded an appropriate legal status under international law. In addition, DoD personnel must comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations.

These directives assign executive responsibility for the DoD law of war and detainee programs to the Secretary of the Army, and specify that individuals captured or detained by U.S. military forces should normally be handed over for safeguarding to U.S. Army MPs as soon as practical.

(U) Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War; Retained Personnel, Civilian Internes, and Other Detainees, implements the detainee program and policies outlined in DoDD 2310.1. AR 190-8 has been adopted by all four Services, and is applicable with regard to treatment of detainees in the custody of the U.S. armed forces. In addition to describing the administration of the DoD detainee program, AR 190-8 establishes standard DoD terminology for detainee categories, derived from the Geneva Conventions (see figure on the next page). (The current edition of AR 190-8 was approved in 1997.)

(U) In addition, AR 190-8 sets forth the requirements for "competent tribunals" for the determination of detainee status when such status is in doubt, as mandated by the Geneva Conventions. AR 190-8 requires that tribunals be convened by commanders holding general courtmartial authority, be composed of three commissioned officers (at least one of whom must be field grade—a major or equivalent—or higher), and hear the testimony of the detainee, if so requested. Detainees determined not to be EPWs may not, as a matter of DoD policy (subject to other direction by higher authority) be imprisoned or otherwise penalized without further proceedings to determine what act they have committed and what the punishment should be.

(U) Army FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, provides further amplification of Geneva Convention obligations pertaining directly to interrogation operations: "[the Geneva Conventions] and US policy expressly prohibit acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation." Further, FM 34-52 prohibits physical or mental coercion, defined in the manual as "actions designed to unlawfully induce another...to act against one's will. Such actions would include, for example, committing or threatening torture, or implying that rights accorded by the Geneva Conventions will not be provided unless the detainee cooperates with the interrogator.

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Army Regulation 190-8: Detainee Categories (U)

(U) Detainee Categories:

- (U) EPW: Enemy prisoners of war.
- (U) CI: Civilian internees.
- (U) RP: Retained persons (medical personnel and chaplains).
- (U) OD: Other detainees. (AR 190-8 defines ODs as detainees who have not yet been classified as EPW, CI, or RP. ODs are entitled to EPW treatment until such a classification has been made by a competent tribunal.)

(U) Geneva and the War on Terror

(U) In a memo dated February 7, 2002, President George W Bush determined that Taliban detainees were "unlawful combatants" not legally entitled to prisoner of war status, and al Qaeda members also did not qualify as prisoners of war, for the following reasons:

1. (U) The Taliban. Afghanistan is a party to the Geneva Conventions; however, members of the Taliban have not fulfilled the obligations of lawful combatants laid out in GPW
2. (U) Al Qaeda. As a non-state organization, al Qaeda is not—and cannot be—a party to any international treaty, including the Geneva Conventions.

(U) Notwithstanding their legal status, the President determined that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees were to be treated "humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva."

(U) As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, U.S. military operations since September 11, 2001 have taken place within an established legal and policy framework. The Global War on Terror is distinct from traditional conflicts such as the World Wars because of our adversaries' disregard for the law of war; however, U.S. forces continue to be governed by the law of war and by U.S. policy with an emphasis on the humane treatment of all detainees.

Interrogation: Doctrine (U)

(U) There is no master DoD interrogation doctrine; however, the U.S. Army tactical interro-
The interrogation doctrine forms the de facto basis for interrogations conducted by DoD intelligence personnel. This doctrine is currently codified in the 1992 Army Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, and consists of seventeen interrogation techniques - called "approaches" in the manual - which may be used singly or in combination in order to elicit information from detainees. FM 34-52 specifies that these techniques, listed in the figure on the next page, are not intended to constitute an all-inclusive list; rather, they constitute a compilation of methods and procedures that have proven successful over time. Additionally, the techniques are described in broad terms, and leave room for creativity in their implementation. However, FM 34-52 explicitly requires that all interrogations be conducted in accordance with the detainees protections guaranteed by the laws and policies described above: "The approach techniques are not new nor are all the possible or acceptable techniques discussed below. Everything the interrogator says and does must be in concert with the [Geneva Conventions] and [the Uniform Code of Military Justice]."

(U) Prior to its approval in 1992, FM 34-52 was reviewed for legal sufficiency by the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army. Though FM 34-52's 17 techniques are not inherently legal or illegal, the stipulation that interrogators must adhere at all times to the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provides the backstop intended to prevent abuse.

(U) As previously noted, there is no official DoD-wide interrogation doctrine. Though the Joint Staff is developing a Joint interrogation doctrine, at present FM 34-52 constitutes the standard guide for conducting interrogations.

(U) Questioning and Interrogation: From Capture to Internment

(U) Recognizing that the value of intelligence information may decrease with time, U.S. military doctrine states that detainees may be
Interrogation Techniques (U)

(U) Source: U.S. Army Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation

1. (U) Direct. The interrogator asks questions directly related to information sought, making no effort to conceal the interrogation's purpose. Always the first approach to be attempted, and reportedly highly effective during past conflicts (e.g., Operation DESERT STORM).

2. (U) Incentive. The interrogator uses luxury items (e.g., cigarettes) above and beyond those required by Geneva to reward the detainee for cooperation, with the implication that such items will be withheld for failure to cooperate. FM 34-52 cautions that any withholding of items must not amount to a denial of basic human needs - thus food, medicine, etc. may not be withheld.

3. (U) Emotional Love. The interrogator plays on the detainee's existing emotional tendencies to create a psychological "burden" which may be eased by cooperation with the interrogator. An "Emotional Love" technique might involve telling a detainee with apparent high regard for his fellow soldiers that cooperation will help shorten the conflict and ease their suffering.

4. (U) Emotional Hate. An "Emotional Hate" technique might involve telling a detainee with apparent contempt for his fellow soldiers that cooperation with the interrogator will allow allied forces to destroy the detainee's old unit, thus affording him a measure of revenge.

5. (U) Fear Up (Harsh). The "Fear Up" technique takes advantage of a detainee's pre-existing fears to promote cooperation. For example, an interrogator might exploit a detainee's fear of being prosecuted for war crimes. "Fear Up (Harsh)" involves the interrogator behaving in an overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice, perhaps even throwing objects around the interrogation room. The intent is to convince the detainee that he does in fact have something to fear, but that the interrogator offers a possible way out of the "trap." FM 34-52 notes that of the 17 doctrinal approaches, "Fear Up"
approaches have the greatest potential to violate the law of war, and that interrogators must take great care to avoid threatening or coercing a detainee in violation of the Geneva Convention. In addition, "Fear Up (Hard)" is generally recommended only as a last resort, because other approaches may not be effective in generating rapport with the detainee once it has been used.

6. (U) Fear Up (Mild). "Fear Up (Mild)" uses a calm, rational approach to take advantage of the detainee's pre-existing fears, again in an attempt to convince the detainee that cooperation with the interrogator will have positive consequences.

7. (U) Fear-Down. The detainee is soothed and calmed in order to build rapport and a sense of security regarding the interrogator.

8. (U) Pride and Ego-Up. The detainee is flattered by the interrogator, prompting him to provide information in order to gain further praise (e.g., by demonstrating how important he was to his country's war effort).

9. (U) Pride and Ego-Down. The interrogator goads the detainee by challenging his loyalty, intelligence, etc.; the detainee may then reveal information in an attempt to demonstrate that the interrogator is wrong.

10. (U) Futility. The interrogator rationally persuades the detainee that it is futile to resist questioning, because (for example) the US will inevitably win the conflict; everyone talks eventually, etc. This technique is not used by itself; rather, it is used to paint a bleak picture for the detainee, which can be exploited using other techniques (e.g., Emotional Love).

11. (U) We Know All. The interrogator employs test questions to which answers are already known in order to convince the detainee that the interrogator is all-knowing and resistance to questioning is therefore pointless.
12. (U) File and Dossier. The interrogator prepares a dossier with complete information on the detainee's background, possibly padding the file with additional paper to increase its bulk. If this technique is successful, the detainee will be intimidated by the size of the file, and conclude that everything is already known and that resistance is pointless.

13. (U) Establish Your Identity. The interrogator insists that the detainee is not who he says he is, but rather an infamous person wanted on serious charges by higher authorities. The detainee may divulge information in an attempt to clear his name.

14. (U) Repetition. The interrogator repeats each question and answer multiple times until, in order to satisfy the interrogator and break the monotony, the detainee answers questions fully and candidly.

15. (U) Rapid Fire. The interrogator asks questions in rapid succession so that the detainee does not have time to answer fully. This may confuse and annoy the detainee, leading to contradictory answers; ultimately, the detainee may begin to speak more freely in order to make himself heard and explain inconsistencies pointed out by the interrogator.

16. (U) Silent. The interrogator silently looks the detainee squarely in the eye for an extended period, until the detainee becomes nervous or agitated. The interrogator breaks the silence when the detainee appears ready to talk.

17. (U) Change of Scene. The interrogator engages the detainee in an environment other than an interrogation room in order to ease the detainee's apprehension, or catch him with his guard down. For example, an interrogator might invite the detainee to another setting for coffee and pleasant conversation; alternatively, an interrogator might pose as a guard in the detention area and engage the detainee in conversation there.
interrogated prior to their arrival at detention facilities, as noted in AR 190-8: "Prisoners may be interrogated in the combat zone. The use of physical or mental torture or any coercion to compel prisoners to provide information is prohibited...Interrogations will normally be performed by intelligence or counterintelligence personnel." Additionally, non-MI personnel may doctrinally conduct "tactical questioning" of detainees in the field prior to their delivery to short- or long-term detainee holding facilities.

(U) Detainees may be captured or collected in the field by any U.S. service member. Therefore, doctrine provides for basic, direct questioning of detainees by capturing forces to ascertain information of immediate tactical value. The figure on the following page provides an example of two memory aids created for U.S. Army soldiers for these purposes.

(U) After capture and tactical questioning by MI personnel (collectively termed "field processing"), detainees are normally transferred to Army MP units trained and organized to operate detention or internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities. (Though the Army has the primary responsibility for detention operations within DoD, other services may operate detention facilities as long as all of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and AR 190-8 are fulfilled.) Detention and I/R doctrine is contained in Army Field Manual 3-19.40, Military Police Detention and Internment/Resettlement Operations.

(U) By doctrine, there are three broad categories of detention facility: collecting points (normally operated by MP companies attached to Army divisions), holding areas (normally operated by MP companies attached to Army corps), and I/R facilities (normally operated by specially trained MP I/R battalions under MP brigades reporting to the theater commander). Division collecting points (CPs) and corps holding areas (CHAs) are intended to provide for the immediate safety and well-being of detainees, while preventing them from impeding combat operations on the battlefield. CP size may vary depending on the detainee capture rate, and facilities may range from simple concertina wire enclosures to existing structures such as abandoned schools or warehouses. CHAs may hold up to 2,000 detainees, and are established in existing structures or specially constructed camps. Internment/resettlement (I/R) facilities are intended to provide for long-term detention away from the combat zone, and normally consist of semi-permanent structures capable of holding up to 4,000 detainees.

(U) Division collecting points are further classified as either forward or central CPs. Closest to the battlefield, forward CPs are typically the most austere detention facilities, and by doctrine, should not house detainees for more than 12 hours.
Basic Detainee Capture and Questioning Procedures (U)

(U) Source: U.S. Army Special Text 2-91.6, Small Unit Support to Intelligence

(U) Handling of Enemy Prisoners of War and Detainees: "The Five S's"

- (U) Search - A thorough search of the person for weapons and documents.
- (U) Silence - Do not allow the EPW/detainees to communicate with one another, either verbally or with gestures. Keep an eye open for potential troublemakers and be prepared to separate them.
- (U) Segregate - Keep civilians and military separate and then further divide them by rank, gender, nationality, ethnicity, and religion.
- (U) Safeguard - Provide security for and protect the EPW/detainees. Get them out of immediate danger and allow them to keep their personal chemical protective gear, if they have any, and their identification cards.
- (U) Speed - Information is time sensitive. It is very important to move personnel to the rear as quickly as possible. An EPW/detainee's resistance to questioning grows as time goes on. The initial shock of being captured or detained wears off and they begin to think of escape. HUMINT soldiers who are trained in detailed exploitation, who have the appropriate time and means, will be waiting to talk to these individuals.

(U) Tactical Questioning: "JUMPS"

- (U) J - Job: What is your job? What do you do? If military: what is your rank? If civilian: what is your position title?
- (U) U - Unit: What is your unit or the name of the company you work for? Ask about chain of command and command structure.
- (U) M - Mission: What is the mission of your unit or element? What is the mission of the next higher unit or element? What mission or job were you performing when you were captured or detained?
- (U) P - Priority Questions: Ask questions based on small unit's tasking as briefed before patrol, roadblock, etc. Ensure questions are asked during natural conversation so unit's mission is not disclosed.
- (U) S - Supporting Information: Anything not covered above.
prior to their transfer to a central CP. Central CPs are located further from the battlefield, and are intended to house detainees for up to 24 hours prior to their transfer to CHAs.

(U) Corps holding areas normally retain detainees for up to 72 hours, but may retain detainees for the duration of hostilities if required. Typically, one CHA is to be established per division conducting combat operations. Detainees in CHAs may be transferred to I/R facilities, where they remain until hostilities end or they are otherwise released.

(U) In sum, a detainee captured on the battlefield would typically be processed as follows: tactical questioning at the point of capture, followed by detention and possible interrogation at a forward CP for up to 12 hours, a central CP for up to 24 hours, a CHA for up to 72 hours (or longer as required), and finally an I/R facility (or CHA) until hostilities end or the detainee is approved for release. Detainees may also be turned over to facilities at any higher echelon immediately following capture. By doctrine, detainees are not to be released until they have been fully processed for control and accounting purposes by I/R-trained MP units.

(U) As noted in AR 190-8 and FM 34-52, interrogation by properly trained intelligence personnel may be conducted at any stage of the capture and detention process. In addition, AR 190-8 specifies that commanders of I/R facilities must provide an area for intelligence collection efforts (i.e., interrogation).

(U) Doctrinal Relationship Between Military Police and Military Intelligence

(U) Doctrine does not clearly and distinctly address the relationship between the Military Police (MP) operating [intervention/resettlement] facilities and the Military Intelligence (MI) personnel conducting intelligence exploitation at those facilities.

- from Detainee Operations Inspection Report, Department of the Army Inspector General, July 21, 2004

(U) The [Geneva Conventions] and US policy expressly prohibit acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation.

- from Field Manual 34-62, Intelligence Interrogation

(U) Coercion is not inflicted upon captives and detainees to obtain information...Inhumane treatment, even if committed under stress of combat and with deep provocation, is a serious and punishable violation under national law and international law...

(U) Previous investigations of detainee abuse, such as the Department of the Army Inspector General report quoted above, have correctly pointed out that MP and MI doctrine do not completely describe the functional relationship between detention and interrogation operations. Existing guidance regarding the direct involvement of MPs in the interrogation mission - as opposed to external support for interrogation - is vague (see figure on the next page), and non-existent with regard to the implementation of techniques that are employed outside the interrogation room. Examples of such techniques include environmental and dietary manipulation, as described in the declassified April 16, 2003 Secretary of Defense memorandum approving interrogation techniques for use at Guantanamo Bay. However, the second and third excerpts cited above - one drawn from an MI manual, the other from an MP manual - demonstrate that doctrine clearly and specifically forbids the inhumane treatment of detainees.

(U) As previously described, MPs are responsible for establishing and operating detention facilities, which are typically found at the division, corps- and theater levels (collecting points, corps-holding areas and internment/resettlement facilities respectively). Within these facilities, MPs are responsible for the security, discipline, health, welfare, and humane treatment of detainees. In addition, MPs must maintain complete accountability for all detainees, assigning each an internment serial number (ISN) and forwarding it to the National Detainee Reporting Center (NDRC), as mandated by Army Regulation 190-8.

(U) As the subsequent figure illustrates, MPs are also responsible for coordinating with MI personnel to facilitate the collection of intelligence from detainees. The most extensive discussion of this responsibility is contained in FM 3-19.40, Military Police Interrogation/Resettlement Operations. MP responsibilities related to detainee intelligence collection, including interrogation, drawn from FM 3-19.40 are summarized in the subsequent figure.

(U) The figure demonstrates that MP administrative procedures pertaining to interrogation operations are well defined, and stress accountability for detainees at every stage of the detention and interrogation process. FM 3-19.40 goes so far as to specify that if a detainee is removed from the receiving/processing line at a detention facility by MI personnel, the detainee and his or her possessions must first be accounted for on DD Form 2706 - Receipt for Inmate or Detained Person - and Department of the Army (DA) Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document.) In directing MPs to “assist MI personnel by identifying detainees who may have useful information,” doctrine clearly permits MPs to conduct passive intelligence collection within deten-
MP, MI and Detainee Intelligence Collection: Existing Doctrine (U)

(U) From Army Regulation 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War; Retained Personnel: Civilian Internees and Other Detainees

"The [enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee] facility commander will provide an area for intelligence collection efforts."

(U) From Field Manual 3-19.1, Military Police Operations

"The MP perform their...function of collecting, evacuating, and securing EPWs throughout the [area of operations]. In this process, the MP coordinate with MI to collect information that may be used in current or future operations."

(U) From Field Manual 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations

"The MP work closely with military intelligence interrogation teams...to determine if captives, their equipment, and their weapons have intelligence value."

(U) From Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation

"Screeners coordinate with MP holding area guards on their role in the screening process. The guards are told where the screening will take place, how EPWs and detainees are to be brought from the holding area, and what types of behavior on their part will facilitate the screenings." (NOTE: FM 34-52 defines screening as "the selection of sources for interrogation." Screening is not interrogation.)

[Text continues]
MP Responsibilities Related to Detainee Intelligence Collection (U)


(U) Facilitate collection of enemy tactical information by allowing MI to station interrogation teams at detention facilities. MI personnel may be permitted to observe arriving detainees in order to expedite the collection process.

(U) Work closely with MI interrogators to determine whether detainees have intelligence value.

(U) Coordinate with MI to establish operating procedures that ensure accountability for detainees and their equipment and documents. (Before MI conduct interrogations, detainees must be provided with DoD (DD) Form 2745, "RPW Capture Tag," and documented on DD Form 2708, "Receipt for Inmate or Detained Person."

(U) Assist MI personnel by identifying detainees who may have useful information.

(U) Conduct personal searches of detainees when requested by MI. (Within detention facilities, FM 3-19.40 specifies that this must be done out of sight of other detainees, by guards of the same gender as the detainee being searched.)

(U) Plan "MI screening sites" including interrogation areas. Interrogation areas should accommodate an interrogator, a captive, a guard and an interpreter.

(U) Escort captives to and from the interrogation area.

(U) Establish procedures to inform MI which detainees will be moved to, from or within the facility, and when the movement is to take place.
coordination outside the interrogation room. For example, it is not clear under existing doctrine whether MP or MI personnel should affect an altered detainee sleep cycle. In the absence of a clear doctrinal division of labor, commanders must develop local policies for the employment of such techniques. A particular hazard of this arrangement is that if MPs are not adequately trained on approved interrogation techniques and their limits, they may make inappropriate individual judgments regarding the appropriateness of techniques ordered or implied by MI personnel.

(U) Similarly, doctrine appears to permit the presence of MP guards during interrogations (see FM 3-19.40's requirement that interrogation areas accommodate guards in addition to intelligence personnel), but does not describe what role they should play or prohibit any particular roles. This could also lead to inappropriate behavior if the limitations of interrogation techniques and requirements related to detainee treatment are not well understood by all parties involved.

(U) Two additional areas of MP doctrine that warrant discussion are the employment of military working dogs (MWD) and strip searches. Though MP doctrine prescribe these for security purposes only, their misuse could lead to abuse, as we have seen at Abu Ghraib.

(U) Military Working Dogs

(U) Existing MWD doctrine pertaining to detainee operations (modified in Army Regulation 190-12, Military Working Dogs, and Department of the Army Pamphlet 190-12, Military Working Dog Program) notes that patrol dogs may be used to secure the perimeter of EPW detention facilities, and to deter escape. The presence of dogs during interrogation is neither specifically authorized nor specifically prohibited. As with other interrogation techniques that are not described in FM 34-52, the presence of dogs - even if approved by appropriate authorities - could become problematic in the absence of additional, specific training.

(U) Strip Searches

(U) FM 3-19.40 not only permits, but actually prescribes the strip-searching of both EPWs and CIs during in-processing into detention or internment facilities. No particular cautions are listed; however, the manual does state that MPs of the same gender as the detainee should perform the searches.

(U) Finally, doctrine does not address the variety of detainee classifications that have arisen in the course of the Global War on Terror. Terms such as “unlawful combatant,” “security internee,” “high-value detainee,” etc., are not always easily paired with the Geneva Convention categories. Without specific instruction by commanders, this could cause confusion regarding whether and which Geneva Convention protec-
(U) Despite the concerns noted above, however, MP and MI doctrine clearly states the requirement that, at a minimum, all detainees must be treated humanely. The excerpts that introduce this section illustrate that it leaves no doubt that abusive behavior is prohibited.

Interrogation Facilities: Joint, Interagency, and Coalition Policy (U)

(U) Though U.S. military doctrine permits (and in fact requires) the provision of intelligence collection areas at IR facilities, and also permits interrogations at any point in the capture-internment continuum, there is no DoD policy or doctrine that specifically addresses the establishment and operation of Joint, interagency, or coalition interrogation facilities. The Army Inspector

Doctrine Related to Joint/Interagency Interrogation Facilities (U)

(U) From Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation:

(U) Theater Interrogation Facility: Established above the corps level (e.g., at an IR facility); may support a Joint or Unified Combatant Command. Staffed by multiple Services and national agencies as required; may include interrogators from allied nations. Interrogates prisoners of war, high-level political and military personnel, civilian internees, defectors, refugees, and displaced persons.

(U) From Field Manual 3-31, Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook:

(U) Joint Interrogation Facility: Conducts initial screening and interrogation of prisoners of war. Forwards key reports to the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center;

(U) Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center: Conducts follow-on exploitation of prisoners of war in support of Joint Task Force and higher requirements. May also interrogate civilian detainees, refugees, and other non-prisoner sources.
General's report of 21 July 2004, Detainee Operation Inspection, found that the two relevant doctrinal publications - FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, and FM 3-31, Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook (also adopted by the Marine Corps), contain inconsistent guidance on the structure and function of facilities variously termed Theater Interrogation Facilities (TIFs), Joint Interrogation Facilities (JIFs) and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Centers (JIDCs). Outside of the described Army and Marine Corps doctrine (summarized in the figure above), there are no standard DoD policies governing the interaction of the military Services within interrogation facilities, nor are there policies governing the interaction of DoD interrogators and CIA, FBI, or other US Government law enforcement and intelligence personnel. (There are, however, various directives issued since the inception of the Global War on Terror that govern specific, unique interrogation-related DoD organizations such as the Criminal Investigative Task Force, or CITTF). As the figure shows, the limited existing doctrine pertaining to joint or interagency interrogation facilities is not specific or consistent, and makes implicit distinctions between categories of detainees that do not correspond to international law or DoD policy. The Department of Defense is now developing doctrine for the establishment and manning of joint, interagency, and coalition interrogation facilities.

DoD Interrogators: Force Structure and Training (U)

(U) Department of Defense intelligence interrogators are found in each military service, and in the Defense HUMINT Service (DIA/DH), a component of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Though we did not conduct a detailed review of DoD interrogator force structure, our interviews with MI leaders and interrogators firmly supported the conclusions of previous reports - namely, that there are not enough interrogators and linguists to meet the demands of the Global War on Terror. We are aware, however, that significant efforts are underway within DoD to address and rectify the shortfall of interrogators and associated support personnel, particularly linguists.

(U) Within the military services, enlisted personnel are the primary interrogators, with warrant officer interrogators in technical supervisory positions. Commissioned MI officers charged with overall command of intelligence units typically receive overviews of interrogation techniques during their training. Our interviews confirmed that warrant officers were typically the senior service members directly involved in interrogations. As the reader will learn in later
sections of this report, individual interrogators' compliance with approved interrogation policies was often proportional to the "fidelity of transmission" from higher headquarters to the unit level, and then to the interrogators via warrant officer and senior enlisted leadership. Our interviews indicated that the details of approved theater interrogation policies were often lost during this process, frequently during the latter stage (though many units never received the approved policies at all). In these cases, interrogators generally fell back on schoolhouse training, which focused on FM 34-52 and the law of war. Nevertheless, to a significant degree this left implementation of interrogation techniques up to individual interrogators' judgment. (This will be described at length later in the report.)

(U) In contrast with military interrogators, Defense HUMINT Service (DH) personnel are trained as "strategic debriefers" - focusing on strategic intelligence, rather than the tactical intelligence that forms the focus of service interrogation training, and using primarily the Direct Questioning technique - but are generally familiar with FM 34-52. In some cases, DH personnel have received service interrogation training prior to details assigning them to support MI operations.
Summary of Previous Reports Relating to Interrogation or Detainee Abuse (U)

(U) There have been a number of previous reports—some completed before the misconduct at Abu Ghraib came to light, or otherwise unrelated to Abu Ghraib, and others in response to Abu Ghraib—that provide the backdrop to our report. Several of these reports were concerned with detainee operations in a broad sense, and none addressed interrogation techniques or detainee abuse at a level of detail similar to this report. These reports do inform our analysis, however, as they often contain observations and recommendations that bear directly on interrogation operations or detainee abuse. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication of effort, we have where possible leveraged the interviews and witness statements collected by others. These previous reports are listed below, followed by a summary of their major conclusions, with an emphasis on those aspects that shed light upon our investigation of interrogation techniques and detainee abuse.

(U) There have been three previous reports concerning interrogation operations at GTMO.

- (U) First, Stuart Herrington, a retired Army colonel with a military intelligence background, visited GTMO on March 16-21, 2002, and on March 22, 2002 provided MG Michael Duilavley, USA, the Commander of JTF-170 at GTMO, an assessment of the intelligence collection efforts of JTF-170 (hereinafter “Herrington GTMO Report”). COL Herrington also provided a copy of this report to MG Gary Speer, USA, then the Acting Commander, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

- (U) Second, COL John Custer, USA, led a Joint Staff team from August 14 through September 4, 2002, in reviewing intelligence collection operations at GTMO, and on September 10, 2002 issued a report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers (hereinafter “Custer Report”). The Custer Report was originally requested by MG Speer at SOUTHCOM.

- (U) Third, VADM Church led a review on May 4-7, 2004 into the treatment of enemy combatants detained at GTMO (and at the Naval Consolidated Brig in Charleston, South Carolina), and on May 11, 2004, briefed Secretary Rumsfeld with his findings (hereinafter “Church Review”).

(U) There have been eight previous reports on interrogation or detainee operations focusing on Iraq that are relevant to our investigation.

- (U) First, MG Geoffrey Miller, the Commander, JTF-GTMO, led a team to Iraq from August 31 to September 9, 2003 and issued a report that assessed the ability of military intelligence forces in Iraq “to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence” (hereinafter “Miller Report”). The appointing
authority for the Miller Report is not clear from the report itself, but it was apparently commissioned at the request of the Commander of CJTF-7, LTG Ricardo Sanchez, USA.

• (U) Second, MG Donald Ryder, USA, the Army Provost Marshal General, conducted an assessment from October 13 to November 6, 2003 of detainee operations in Iraq, and on November 6, 2003 issued a report to LTG Sanchez (hereinafter "Ryder Report").

• (U) Third, COL Herrington visited Iraq on December 2-9, 2003 to evaluate intelligence operations, and on December 12, 2003; provided his report to MG Barbara Fast, the senior intelligence officer for CJTF-7 (hereinafter "Herrington Iraq Report").

• (U) Fourth, LTC Natalie Lee, USA investigated from January 23 to February 23, 2004 reports of detainee abuse that had allegedly occurred in the summer of 2003 at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) facility at Camp Cropper, Iraq. On February 22, 2004, LTC Lee issued her report, pursuant to the procedures of AR 15-6, to the Deputy Commanding General, CJTF-7, MG Walter Wojdakowski (hereinafter "Lee Report").

• (U) Fifth, MG Antonio Taguba, USA, Deputy Commanding General for Support, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), led an investigation from January 31 to February 28, 2004 into the detention operations of the 800th Military Police Brigade, with particular emphasis on operations at the Abu Ghraib detention facility, and provided his report on March 9, 2004 to the Commander, CFLCC, LTG David McKiernan (hereinafter "Taguba Report"). The Taguba Report was originally requested by the Commander of CJTF-7, LTG Sanchez.

• (U) Sixth, the Army Inspector General, LTG Paul T. Mikolashek, conducted an inspection from February to June 2004 of detainee operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. LTG Mikolashek issued his report on July 21, 2004 to Acting Secretary of the Army R.L. Brownlee (hereinafter "Mikolashek Report").

• (U) Seventh, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Army, G2, MG George Fay, USA, was appointed by LTG Sanchez on March 31, 2004 to investigate potential misconduct by 205th Military Intelligence Brigade personnel at Abu Ghraib between August 15, 2003 and February 1, 2004. MG Fay's report was released in August 2004 (hereinafter "Fay Report").

• (U) Eighth, in June 2004, as a result of the evidence MG Fay had gathered to that point, LTG Sanchez, the Commander, CJTF-7,
requested that a more senior investigating officer be appointed to examine whether actions of the commander and staff of CJTF-7 contributed to any misconduct related to interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. The Acting Secretary of the Army selected GEN Paul Kern, USA, the Commander of Army Material Command, to act as the new appointing authority. LGG Anthony Jones, USA, the Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, was appointed as an additional investigating officer. LGG Jones' report was released in August 2004 (hereinafter 'Jones Report').

(U) In addition to the Mikolaichak Report, which addressed detainee operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, one other report focused on detainee operations and facilities in Afghanistan. BG Charles Jacoby, USA, the Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76) Deputy Commanding General, was appointed on May 16, 2004 by the Commander, CJTF-76, MG Eric Olson, USA, to conduct a 'top to bottom review of ... detainee operations' in the Combined Forces Command Afghanistan Area of Responsibility. BG Jacoby's assessment was completed in August 2004 (hereinafter 'Jacoby Report').

(U) Finally, in May 2004, the Secretary of Defense appointed former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger and Harold Brown, former Congresswoman Tillie Fowler, and retired Air Force Gen. Charles Horner to an Independent Panel "to provide independent professional advice on detainee abuses, what caused them and what actions should be taken to preclude their repetition." The Independent Panel was charged with examining detention and interrogation operations worldwide. The Independent Panel's report was released on August 24, 2004 (hereinafter "Independent Panel" or "Independent Panel Report").

GTMO Reports (U)

(U) Herrington GTMO Report

(U) The JTF-170 Commander at GTMO, MG Dunlavy, USAR, invited COL Herrington to GTMO in March 2002 to assess the status of JTF-170's intelligence collection effort. This short, nine-page report was prepared only a few months after interrogation operations at GTMO began, and thus it offers some general observations about the strengths and weaknesses of JTF-170, as well as recommendations for the future.

(U) The most important aspect of this report is that it came out strongly in favor of subordinating the security function (i.e., military police, represented by JTF-160) to the intelligence collection function (i.e., military intelligence, represented by JTF-170). More specifically, the report stated that "to effectively carry out its intelligence exploitation mission, JTF-170 and its interagency collaborators need to be in full control of the
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detainees’ environment. Treatment, rewards, punishment, and anything else associated with a detainee should be centrally orchestrated by the debriefing team responsible for obtaining information from that detainee” (emphasis added). For example, the report explained, “If a security guard wants to adopt a hard line with a detainee, single him out for a shakedown, or take any measures...that impact on that detainee’s state of mind, the authority to either approve, disapprove, or postpone the planned action should be the call of the intelligence entity.”

(U) Moreover, the report stated broadly that “[t]here is unanimity among all military and interagency participants in JTF-170 that the security mission is sometimes the tail wagging the intelligence dog (i.e., impacting negatively)” (emphasis added). The report took pains to explain that this was not a criticism of JTF-190 personnel, but instead “a basic principle of human intelligence exploitation” (emphasis added). COL Herrington drew upon his own experience in both Panama and the Persian Gulf, noting that “one day, we might instruct the guards to be particularly warm and cheerful toward a given detainee - because that approach would work on that day to the advantage of the debriefer. On another day, with a different detainee, a cold, firm demeanor by the guards might be more suitable - again, depending upon where the debriefer might be in his efforts to unlock the information possessed by the detainee.” In contrast to these examples, JTF-170 was “currently caught between two separate efforts, security and exploitation,” and only by “deconflicting” these efforts could the intelligence exploitation effort achieve success.

(U) The other significant conclusion of the Herrington GTMO Report was that the youth and inexperience of the Defense HUMINT Service (DH) and Army interrogators, and their lack of foreign language training, inhibited their ability to extract intelligence from the detainees. The report noted that “a young debriefer normally will have a problem ‘establishing the kind of controlling relationship required with an older, trained, and savvy detainee,” and recommended that the JTF Commander put out a request for “senior, older debriefers with experience and refined language skills.” In this regard, COL Herrington pointed out that the U.S. Army INSOM “contract linguists augmentees on site are one of the brightest stars on the ground,” and that the interrogators “could not function without them.”

(U) Custer Report

(S) The Acting Commander of SOUTHCOM, MG Gary Speer, in June 2002 requested through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, an external review...
(U) Church Review

(U) In the wake of revelations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, the Secretary of Defense commissioned this brief "review" of detainee operations at GTMO (and the Naval Consolidated Brig in Charleston, SC). The review culminated in a series of slides briefed to Secretary Rumsfeld on May 11, 2004, and was not accompanied by a separate, written report.

(U) The Church Review described itself as a "snapshot" of existing conditions at GTMO, and not a comprehensive historical review. The review found that detainees at GTMO were being treated properly and humanely. The review found "no evidence, or even suspicion, of serious or systemic problems," and no evidence of non-compliance with DoD orders. More specifically, there was no indication that unauthorized interrogation techniques were being used on the detainees.

(U) The Church Review concluded that appropriate procedures were in place at GTMO to detain, interrogate and report information, supported by effective SOPs and a strong chain of command. GTMO also had an effective training program, including instruction on the principles of the Geneva Conventions, and a positive command climate in which personnel appeared willing to report any concerns. In addition, the review noted that the roles of military police and military intelligence were separate and well-defined, yet still coordinated.
(U) While the Church Review was primarily a snapshot of current conditions, it also summarized the reported instances of detainee abuse, whether as a result of inappropriate interrogation techniques or otherwise, since the initiation of intelligence operations at GTMO in January 2002. The review cited three instances of inappropriate interrogation techniques that led to abuse.

- (U) First, a female interrogator sexually assaulted a detainee on April 17, 2003, by running her fingers through a detainee's hair, and made sexually suggestive comments and body movements, including sitting on the detainee's lap, during an interrogation. The female interrogator was given a written admonishment for her actions.

- (U) Second, on April 22, 2003, an interrogator, using the fear-up harsh technique, assaulted a detainee by having MPs repeatedly bring the detainee from standing to a prone position and back. A review of medical records indicated superficial bruising to the detainee's knees. The interrogator was issued a letter of reprimand; furthermore, MG Miller, the Commander of JTF-GTMO, prohibited further use of the fear-up harsh technique, and also specifically prohibited MPs from direct involvement in interrogations.

- (U) Third, a female interrogator at an unknown date, in response to being spat upon by a detainee, assaulted the detainee by wiping dye from a red magic marker on the detainee's shirt and telling the detainee that the red stain was blood. The female interrogator received a verbal reprimand for her actions.

- (U) The Church Review also summarized three incidents of alleged misconduct by MPs, two of which resulted in substantiated abuse.

- (U) First, an MP assaulted a detainee on September 17, 2002, by attempting to spray him with a hose after the detainee had thrown an unidentified, foul-smelling liquid on the MP. The MP received non-judicial punishment in the form of seven days restriction and reduction in rate from E-4 to E-5.

- (U) Second, on March 23, 2003, an MP sprayed pepper spray on a detainee who was preparing to throw an unidentified liquid on another MP. The MP who had used the pepper spray requested a court martial in lieu of non-judicial punishment and was acquitted at a special court martial.

- (U) Finally, on April 10, 2003, after a detainee had struck an MP in the face (causing the MP to lose a tooth) and bitten another MP, the MP who was bitten had struck the detainee with a handheld radio. This
MP was given non-judicial punishment in the form of 45 days extra duty and reduced in rate from E-4 to E-3.

(U) The Church Review noted that the MP force generally operated under significant stress, as assaults against MPs were common, averaging fourteen per week. Detainees, for example, routinely physically assaulted MPs, spat upon them, and threw liquid, foods, or bodily fluids.

(U) In addition to the above incidents, the Church Review also identified two minor infractions.

- (U) First, on February 10, 2004, an MP inappropriately joked with a detainee, dared the detainee to throw water on him, and engaged in inappropriate casual conversations with the detainee. The MP was removed from duty.

- (U) Second, on February 18, 2004, a barber intentionally gave two detainees unusual haircuts, including an "inverse Mohawk," in an effort to frustrate the detainees' requests for similar haircuts as a sign of unity. The barber and his company commander were both counseled as a result of this incident.

Iraq Reports (U)

(U) From August 31 to September 9, 2003, the JTF-TFMO commander, MG Geoffrey Miller, led a team to assess interrogation and detention operations in Iraq. (MG Miller's visit was the result of an August 18, 2003 message from the Joint Staff's Director for Operations [J-3], requesting that the SOUTHCOM commander provide a team of experts in detention and interrogation operations to provide advice on relevant facilities and operations in Iraq. The need for such assistance in light of the growing insurgency had originally been expressed by CJTF-7 and CENTCOM, and the Joint Staff tasking message was generated following discussions with both CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM.)

(U) The overarching theme of the Miller Report was that "tactical interrogation operations differ greatly from strategic interrogation operations." While CJTF-7 had proven itself effective in accomplishing the tactical mission, it was now necessary to transition to strategic interrogation operations as CJTF-7 entered a new, counter-insurgency phase in the conflict in Iraq. This new phase involved a different "category of internes to interrogate," and required new "analytical back-stopping," as well as a "clear strategy for implementing a long-term approach and clearly defined interrogation policies and authorities." In this regard, the report observed that CJTF-7 had not
disseminated to its units any "written guidance specifically addressing interrogation policies and authorities." The Miller Report cautioned that such guidance should be accompanied by a legal review, as the "application of emerging strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new approaches and operational art." Therefore, "[l]egal review and recommendations of internee interrogation operations by a dedicated command staff judge advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness."

(U) The Miller Report's most significant recommendation for making the transition from tactical to strategic interrogation was that "the detention operations function must act as an enabler for interrogation," by helping to "set conditions for successful interrogations." Significantly, the report did not offer any specifics on what MPs should or should not do in their role as "enablers," but it did state that "[i]t is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees," and that "[j]oint strategic interrogation operations are hampered by lack of active control of the internees within the detention environment" (emphasis added). In sum, the report observed, "[d]etention operations must be structured to ensure [the] detention environment focuses the internee's confidence and attention on their interrogators," and the "MP detention staff should be an integrated element supporting the interrogation functions."

(U) The Miller Report made several other recommendations that drew upon lessons learned at GTMO. For example, the report recommended that CJTF-7 establish and train "Interrogation Tiger Teams comprised of [sic] one interrogator and one analyst, both with SSCI access." The report also recommended the establishment of a Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT), composed of behavioral psychologists and psychiatrists who could help develop "integrated interrogation strategies and assess interrogation intelligence production." In addition, MG Miller recommended the interrogation mission be consolidated at "one Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC)/strategic interrogation facility under CJTF-7 command," and noted that "[t]his action has been initiated." Finally, the report offered a number of training recommendations, to include training the "MP detention staff on training programs utilized by JTF-GTMO."

(U) Ryder Report

(S) LTG Sanchez commissioned the Ryder Report in August 2003, to assess detention and corrections operations in Iraq. The Ryder Report, like the Miller Report, was an outgrowth of LTG Sanchez' interest in identifying and implementing improvements in detention and interrogation operations in August 2003, when these operations were taking on increased importance in light of the insurgency in Iraq and the need to rebuild Iraq's prison system. The Ryder Report, which was com-
pleted on November 5, 2003, just two months after
the Miller Report, was a detailed review of deten-
tion and corrections operations in Iraq. A key
objective of the report was "developing recom-
mendations on how to bridge from current opera-
tions to an Iraqi-run prison system," and thus much of
the information in the report was not directly rele-
vant to interrogation operations. Nevertheless,
the report did address several detention issues that
bear at least indirectly on interrogations or poten-
tial detainee abuse, which are summarized below.

(S) One of the most significant, and cer-
tainly the most surprising, aspects of this report is
that the assessment team members did not identify
any military police units purposely applying
inappropriate confinement practices. The Ryder
team conducted its assessment from October 13 to
November 6, 2003, and as MG Taguba pointed out
in his report on military police operations at Abu
Ghraib, the most serious abuses at Abu Ghraib
occurred in late October and early November 2003.
It should be noted, however, that the team’s visit to
Abu Ghraib was an announced, escorted walk-
through.

(S) The Ryder Report did, however, identify
several problem areas within detention operations
in Iraq. For example, the 800th MP Brigade –
which was tasked to secure the detainee population
throughout Iraq, and was at that time supporting
15 separate detention facilities, including Abu
Ghraib - was struggling to adapt its organizational
structure, training and equipment resources from
a unit designed to conduct standard EPW opera-
tions, to its current mission of essentially running
an entire country’s prison system. Making matters
worse was that the Brigade did not receive
Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections
specific training during its mobilization period.
This problem was further exacerbated by the fact
that the Battalions within the Brigade were gener-
ally understaffed. Moreover, the report observed,
"[s]everal Division/Brigade collection points and
US monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insuffi-
ciently detailed use of force and other standing
operating procedures or policies."

(S) The Ryder Report also weighed in on
the debate about the proper relationship between
military intelligence and military police units,
concluding that military police should not be sub-
ordinate to military intelligence. The report
explained that according to Army doctrine, "AR
190-8 requires military police to provide an area
for intelligence collection efforts within EPW
facilities. Military police, though adept at passive
collection of intelligence within a facility, do not
participate in Military Intelligence supervised
interrogation sessions." While not mentioning
the Miller Report by name, the Ryder Report
nonetheless rejected the Miller Report’s central
recommendation, stating that "[r]ecent intelligence
collection in support of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM has posited a template whereby military police actively set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state." MG Ryder therefore recommended that procedures be established "that define the role of military police soldiers securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel" (emphasis added). Significantly, the report concluded that the 800th MP Brigade had not been asked to change its procedures "to set the conditions for MI interviews, nor participate in those interviews."

(U) An additional, interrogation-related problem that the report identified was that Iraqi criminal detainees were sometimes co-located with other types of detainees, including security interns and EPWs. This was generally due to the lack of prison facilities and ongoing consolidation efforts at Abu Ghraib. The report noted that this was in violation of the Geneva Convention, and as a practical matter the management of multiple disparate groups of detained persons in a single location by members of the same unit invites confusion about handling, processing, and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer of information between different categories of detainees. The report stated flatly that "detainees must be segregated and managed by their designation," and pointed out that doing so would establish "better control over the [detainees'] environment," which should "increase their intelligence yield."

(U) Harrington Iraq Report

(U) The highest ranking intelligence officer in Iraq at the time, then-BG Barbara Fast, the C2 for CJTF-V, requested COL Harrington's assistance via the Army C-3 to evaluate human intelligence operations in Iraq. In his 14-page report, COL Harrington, the author of the first GTMO report, provided a summary of his site-specific impressions gained from a week-long visit to Iraq in December 2003. The most significant aspect of the report was the observations about the lack of resources and poor conditions at Abu Ghraib. The prison overcrowding and lack of MP personnel sometimes forced "MI soldiers with inadequate training and equipment" to assume the MP mission. Adding to the tension at the prison complex were "dangerous and difficult conditions," including frequent mortar attacks. Security at the facility was also compromised by the presence of Iraqi police, some of whom were apparently inadequately vetted and had on one occasion smuggled a weapon to a detainee. The situation was so dire that COL Thomas Pappas, the 205th MI Brigade Commander (and forward operating base commander for Abu Ghraib), LTC Steven Jordan, the Deputy Director of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC), and MAJ Michael Sheridan of the 800th MP Brigade expressed the
view that if the overcrowding—which they referred to as a “pressure cooker” that could lead to a prisoner uprising—was not alleviated, “bad things” were likely to result, to include death, injury, or hostage situations involving U.S. personnel. COL Herrington recommended that CJTF-7 “urgently devote more resources to the Abu Ghraib challenge.”

(U) The report credited JIDC personnel with doing the best they could under difficult conditions, and obtaining and reporting “significant information from detainees.” And despite the conditions at Abu Ghraib, COL Herrington nonetheless stated that, “we neither saw nor learned of any evidence that detainees are being illegally or improperly treated at Abu Ghraib.” The report acknowledged, however, that “on occasion,” JIDC personnel had at the request of OGA personnel held “ghost detainees” (those without any ISN number assigned to them) at Abu Ghraib. COL Herrington warned that this practice “carries with it certain risks, not the least of which is that it may be technically illegal or in violation of C2 policy,” and recommended that C2 staff address the issue.

(U) The report commented on the relationship between MP and MI units at various facilities, and consistent with his observations in his GTMO report, COL Herrington argued that military intelligence should be directing military police. For example, he complimented the “organized, clean, well-run, and impressive” Division Interrogation Facility of the 1st Armor Division, where the “MP/MI interface was as it should be, with the MI people in the lead.” In contrast, he was unimpressed with the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) JIDC, which “fell far short of what we expected to see,” and where the MPs were “the visible masters (versus the interrogators)” and the detainees were permitted too much communication with one another.

(U) The report referenced allegations that prisoners arriving at the [redacted] who had been captured by [redacted] showed signs of being beaten by their captors. Medical personnel had documented these signs of abuse, and the Officer-in-Charge of the [redacted] at Camp Cropper stated that he had not reported the alleged abuse up the chain of command because “[e]verybody knows about it.”

(U) Finally, the report made two recommendations of note. First, high-ranking and senior Iraqi detainees held by the ISG (such as general officers, or ministerial-level officers) should be housed in better facilities, commensurate with their status. This was not only required by the Geneva Convention, but also made sense from an intelligence exploitation perspective. Second, the
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report suggested that the Army "build a corps of strategic interrogators/debriefers who are officers or senior civilians." This would help to eliminate the incongruity of capturing enemy leadership and archives, and then relying for intelligence on "tactical interrogator [non-commissioned officers] who are too young and inexperienced" for such a mission.

(U) Lee Report

(U) The Lee Report "did not find information that would lead to a finding that there was a systematic problem." LTC Lee stated that she "was sure that there were isolated incidents where detainees arrived in less than pristine conditions," but she "would attribute some of this to the results of combative detentions at the time of capture." In any event, she could "find no proof to substantiate the allegations against the [special operations forces] or Army community." Nor could she find any evidence to suggest a "lack of knowledge of Geneva Convention requirements."

(U) The Lee Report itself was extremely brief and cursory, and there were obvious gaps in the investigation methodology. For example, LTC Lee noted that she had been unable to find contact information for certain key personnel (and in one case had not received responses to her questions), yet did not describe her efforts to procure the information. In fairness, the passage of time between the principal allegations (summer 2003) and the assignment of the investigation (January 23, 2004) made LTC Lee's work more difficult. This passage of time is unexplained, and represents a lost opportunity to address potential detainee abuse in Iraq early on.

(U) Taguba Report

(U) On January 31, 2004, the Commander of the Combined Forces Land Component
Command (CFLCD), LTG McKiernan, appointed MG Taguba, the CFLCD Deputy Commanding General for Support, to investigate the 800th Military Police Brigade’s "detention and internment operations" since November 1, 2003. LTG Sanchez, the Commander, CTF-7, requested the investigation based upon the accumulation of a wide range of incidents and prior investigations, culminating in an Army Criminal Investigation Command investigation "into specific allegations of detainee abuse committed by members of the 372d MP Company" at Abu Ghraib. The 372d MP Company was then a subordinate unit of the 320th Military Police Battalion and the 800th Military Police Brigade. While portions of the Taguba Report remain classified, the bulk of the report, and almost all of its annexes, have become available to the public through unauthorized disclosure to several major media organizations (as well as official release of a redacted version of the report and many of its annexes). MG Taguba and other officials associated with the investigation have also provided public testimony before Congress on the matters contained in the report.

(U) MG Taguba's overall conclusion was that "several U.S. Army Soldiers have committed egregious acts and grave breaches of international law at Abu Ghraib/BCCF (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility) and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore, key leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th MI Brigade failed to comply with established regulations, policies and command directives in preventing detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bucca during the period August 2003 to February 2004." Although MG Taguba endorsed the team's psychiatrists' determination that "there was evidence that the horrific abuses suffered by the detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) were wanton acts of select soldiers in an unsupervised and dangerous setting," and were from a behavioral perspective the product of "a complex interplay of many psychological factors and command insufficiencies," he also found that there was "sufficient credible information to warrant an inquiry" to "determine the extent of culpability" of military intelligence personnel.

(U) MG Taguba made a number of preliminary observations on the Miller Report and the Ryder Report, including the comment that "the recommendations of MG Miller's team that the 'guard force' be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations of MG Ryder's Team and AR 190-8 that the military police do not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation sessions." MG Taguba cited with approval the Ryder Report's conclusion "that the OEF template whereby military police actively set the favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility."

(U) As a reflection of his tasking, MG
Taguba divided his specific findings and recommendations into three sections. First, he examined "all the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of detainee abuse," with particular emphasis on "maltreatment at Abu Ghraib." Second, he examined "detainee escapes and accountability lapses," again with particular emphasis on "events at Abu Ghraib." Third, he investigated "the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate of the 800th MP Brigade."

(U) With regard to the allegations of detainee abuse, MG Taguba found "that between October and December 2003" the military police guard force at Tier 1A of Abu Ghraib "inflicted... numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses... on several detainees." While MG Taguba did not set out deliberate definition of conduct that he considered to be "abuse," he referred exclusively to "intentional" acts of "criminal" misconduct.

(U) MG Taguba found that "the intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel included:"

- (U) "punching, slapping, kicking...;"
- (U) "videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;"
- (U) "forcibly arranging detainees in... sexually explicit positions...;"
- (U) "forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several days at a time;"
- (U) "forcing naked male detainees to wear women's underwear;"
- (U) "forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate...;"
- (U) "arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;"
- (U) "positioning a naked male detainee on an MRE box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;"
- (U) "writing 'I am a rapist' (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;"
- (U) "placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee's neck and having a female Soldier pose for a picture with the prisoner;"
- (U) "a male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;"
- (U) "using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee; and"
- (U) "taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees for other than official purposes."

MG Taguba did not provide a precise count of the number of incidents of abuse, or of the numbers of soldiers, contractors or detainees involved.

(U) MG Taguba found that a contributing factor in the abuses was the failure of the 800th
Military Police Brigade leadership to communicate clear standards to their soldiers, or to ensure their tactical proficiency. MG Taguba cited as an example the fact that although "an extensive CID investigation determined that four soldiers from the 320th Military Police Battalion had abused a number of detainees during processing at Camp Bucca" well before the battalion assumed responsibility for detention operations at Abu Ghraib, neither the battalion nor the brigade leadership took "any steps to ensure that such abuse was not repeated."

(U) MG Taguba made nine recommendations regarding detainee abuse. The first was that the appropriate headquarters "immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated multi-discipline Mobile Training Team (MTT) comprising subject matter experts in internment/resettlement operations, international and operational law, interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques ... and others "to oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects of detainee and confinement operations." MG Taguba also recommended that "a single commander ... be responsible for overall detainee operations throughout Iraq ...." His remaining recommendations related to deficiencies in training, manpower, resourcing, and leadership.

(U) With regard to detainee escapes and accountability lapses, MG Taguba found that there was a "general lack of knowledge, implementation and emphasis of basic legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP Brigade and its subordinate units." By and large, accountability standard operating procedures "were not fully developed and ... were widely ignored." At Abu Ghraib in particular, "there was a severe lapse in the accountability of detainees." This lack of accountability made it impossible for the 800th Military Police Brigade to determine how many detainees had escaped from the facility.

(U) MG Taguba found that "the Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities" were "significantly over their intended maximum capacity while the guard force" was "undermanned and under resourced." Although these conditions contributed to poor accountability and increased escapes, MG Taguba also found that "no lessons learned" from previous incidents and escapes "seem to have been disseminated ... to enable corrective action." In MG Taguba's evaluation, "had the findings and recommendations contained within the Brigade's own investigations been analyzed and actually implemented ... many of the subsequent escapes, accountability lapses and causes of abuse may have been prevented."

(U) MG Taguba observed that "the various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs)," referring to the Central Intelligence Agency, "without accounting for the detainees, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention." MG Taguba reported that "the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called
these detainees 'ghost detainees.' MG Taguba noted that "on at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of 'ghost detainees' (6-8) ... that they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team." MG Taguba characterized "this maneuver" as "deceptive, contrary to Army doctrine, and in violation of international law."

(U) MG Taguba made 17 recommendations regarding accountability lapses and escapes, generally related to leadership, training, and resourcing. He also observed that units conducting detainee operations "must know, train on, and constantly reference the applicable Army doctrine and ... command policies," noting that "the references provided in [his] report cover nearly every deficiency ... enumerated." "Although," MG Taguba offered, the references "do not, and cannot, make up for ... leadership shortfalls, all soldiers, at all levels, can use them to maintain standardized operating procedures and efficient accountability practices."

(U) With regard to the "training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate of the 800th MP Brigade," MG Taguba found a host of deficiencies. "Morale suffered in the brigade, apparently as a result of the widespread but erroneous belief that the unit would be redeployed from Iraq once the Iraqi armed forces had been defeated. However, he observed, "there did not appear to have been any attempt by the Command to mitigate this problem." MG Taguba found that in general, "the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately trained." "Soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade were not proficient in their basic [Military Occupational Specialty] skills," yet there was "no evidence that the Command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted to correct them in any systematic manner." "Almost every individual witness we interviewed," he noted, "had no familiarity with the provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40," the Army regulation and field manual that describe and govern detention operations. Despite these obvious shortfalls, no "Mission-Essential Task List (METL) based on their ... missions was ever developed, nor was a training plan implemented throughout the Brigade."

(U) MG Taguba found that "without adequate training for a civilian internee detention mission, Brigade personnel relied heavily upon individuals within the Brigade who had civilian corrections experience." Further, "because of past associations and familiarity of soldiers within the Brigade, it appears that friendship often took precedence over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships."

(U) MG Taguba found that these internal shortcomings were exacerbated by the fact that "the 800th MP Brigade as a whole was understrength for the mission for which it was tasked," a
problem that grew progressively worse as the units suffered attrition through casualties, statutorily mandated demobilizations, and other separations. These losses could not be replaced because "Reserve Component units do not have an individual replacement system to mitigate ... losses." What is more, "the quality of life for soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCP) was extremely poor." A "seriously undermanned" unit staffed a "seriously overcrowded prison," with no dining facility, exchange, barbershop, or recreational facilities. There were numerous mortar attacks, random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious threat to soldiers and detainees in the facility.

(U) "With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission at Abu Ghraib," MG Taguba found, "there was clear friction and a lack of effective communication between the Commander, 205th MI Brigade, who controlled" Forward Operating Base (FOB) "Abu Ghraib ... after 19 November 2003, and the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, who controlled detainees operations inside the FOB." "There was no clear delineation of responsibility between commands, little coordination at the command level, and no integration of the two functions." MG Taguba observed that "coordination occurred at the lowest possible levels with little oversight by commanders." Further, in his view, the decision to place the Military Intelligence Brigade in control of the security of detainees and force protection at Abu Ghraib was "not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agendas assigned to each of these respective specialties."

(U) MG Taguba also cited an extensive list of disciplinary actions involving leaders within the 800th Military Police Brigade as further evidence of the dysfunctional nature of the command. MG Taguba made numerous recommendations regarding disciplinary actions to be taken against members of the 800th Military Police Brigade and the military intelligence personnel assigned to duties at Abu Ghraib, up to and including the commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, COL Thomas Pappas, and the commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade, BG Janis Karpinski.

(U) MG Taguba noted that he "found particularly disturbing" BG Karpinski's "complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers." MG Taguba recounted, discussed, and refuted a number BG Karpinski's assignments of blame to her subordinates, the military intelligence leadership, the Civil Affairs Command, and the court-martial convening authority of the soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca incidents for the shortcomings of her command. For the failures discussed above, as well as "material representations to the Investigation Team," MG Taguba recommended BG Karpinski be relieved for cause.
(U) Mikolashek Report

(U) On February 10, 2004, Acting Secretary of the Army Brownlee ordered the Army Inspector General, LTG Mikolashek, to assess "detainee operations in Afghanistan and Iraq." This inspection was not intended to be "an investigation of any specific incidents or units, but rather a comprehensive review of how the Army conducts detainee operations in Afghanistan and Iraq." The assessment did not extend to "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or Defense HUMINT Services (DHS) [sic] operations," nor did it include "operations at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base."

(U) The Acting Secretary of the Army approved the Mikolashek Report on July 21, 2004, releasing the unclassified bulk of the report to the public, withholding only Appendix G, which is classified due to discussion of current operations and sensitive intelligence. LTG Mikolashek and other officials associated with the investigation have also provided public testimony before Congress on the matters contained in the report.

(U) In the course of their inspection, LTG Mikolashek's team conducted interviews, sensing sessions, and a survey, inspected units involved in detention and interrogation operations, and examined "policies, plans, records ... and other related documents." A "sensing session" is a moderated, guided discussion of a designated topic by moderately-sized groups of designated soldiers. While the "inspection tools," the blank interview questionnaires, sensing prompts, survey questions, etc., are included in the report, the soldiers' and leaders' statements are not. The report also does not indicate how many soldiers and leaders were interviewed, sensed, and surveyed, or precisely who they were. The report did indicate, however, that "all interviewed and observed commanders, leaders and soldiers treated detainees humanely and emphasized the importance of humane treatment."

(U) LTG Mikolashek's team reviewed 103 summaries of "Criminal Investigative Division (CID) reports of investigation and 22 unit investigation summaries ... involving detainees death or alleged abuse." Of those 125 investigations, 71 had been completed as of the time of LTG Mikolashek's analysis. Abuse, defined by LTG Mikolashek as "wrongful death, assault, battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, or theft," was substantiated in 40 of the 71 completed investigations. "No abuse was determined to have occurred in 31 cases," and 54 cases remained "open or undetermined" at the time of the report. "Based upon" his team's "review and analysis and case summaries of investigations" from all 125 investigations, founded, unfounded, and pending, LTG Mikolashek "could not identify a systemic cause for the abuse incidents."

(U) In a foreword to the report, LTG Mikolashek urged that "these abuses ... be viewed as what they are - unauthorized actions taken by a few individuals," actions that "in a few cases" were "coupled with the failure of a few leaders to provide..."
(U) Training

- (U) The potential for abuse increases when interrogations are conducted in an emotionally charged environment by untrained personnel who are unfamiliar with the approved interrogation techniques;
- (U) Not all interrogators were trained;
- (U) To satisfy the need to acquire intelligence as soon as possible, some officers and noncommissioned officers with no training in interrogation techniques began conducting their own interrogation sessions;
- (U) Military Intelligence officers are not adequately trained on human intelligence.

(U) Doctrine

- (U) Detainee ... policy and doctrine do not address operations conducted in the current operating environment;
- (U) Current doctrine does not clearly specify the interdependent roles, missions, and responsibilities of Military Police and Military Intelligence units in the operation of interrogation facilities;
- (U) Failure of MP and MI personnel to understand each other's specific missions and duties could undermine the effectiveness of safeguards associated with interrogation techniques and procedures;
- (U) Tactical leaders held detainees
longer than doctrinally recommended at Forward Operating Bases because the leaders believed the intelligence infrastructure was failing to provide "timely tactical intelligence," despite the fact that such locations lacked the "infrastructure, medical care, ... trained personnel, logistics and security" required to hold detainees for more than a brief period of time and that the "personnel at these locations ... were unaware of or unable to comply with ... detainee processing ... and interrogation" policies and legal standards;

(U) Resources

- (U) "Military Intelligence units are not resourced with sufficient interrogators and interpreters."

(U) With regard to broader issues related to detention and interrogation operations, LTG Mikolashek recommended that:

- (U) the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, in coordination with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and The Judge Advocate General of the Army, "revise doctrine to identify interrogation ... techniques that are acceptable, effective and legal for non-compliant detainees;"

- (U) the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations "update the Military Intelligence force structure at the division level and below to ensure adequately trained personnel are available in sufficient numbers to accomplish the mission;"

- (U) the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Provost Marshal General revise doctrine and policy "for the administrative processing of detainees to improve accountability, movement, and disposition in a non-linear battlespace;"

- (U) the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command "establish and identify resource requirements for a standardized 'Detainee Field Processing Kit' that will enable capturing units to properly secure and process detainees quickly, efficiently, and safely;"

- (U) the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations "integrate a prescribed detainee operations training program into unit training;" and

- (U) the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, "in coordination with the Office of the Judge Advocate General, mandate that ... Law of War training have specific learning objectives, be conducted by an instructor/evaluator in a structured manner, and be presented and evaluated annually using the established training conditions and performance standards."
(U) Fay Report

(U) As a result of MG Taguba's findings, the Commander, CJTF-7, LTG Sanchez, appointed the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Army, G2, MG Fay, on March 31, 2004 to investigate potential misconduct by 205th Military Intelligence Brigade personnel at Abu Ghraib between August 15, 2003 and February 1, 2004. LTG Sanchez specifically tasked MG Fay to examine whether 205th Military Intelligence Brigade personnel "requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited Military Police" to abuse detainees, and whether 205th Military Intelligence Brigade personnel "comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations" during interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib.

(U) While portions of the Fay Report remain classified, a redacted version of the bulk of the report has been released to the public. MG Fay and other officials associated with the investigation have also provided public testimony before Congress on the matters contained in the report.

(U) In his findings, MG Fay found military intelligence personnel "not to have fully comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations." He identified 44 "alleged instances or events of detainee abuse" by soldiers and contractors at Abu Ghraib during the period under investigation. In 16 of those 44 instances, MG Fay found the alleged abuse was "requested, encouraged, condoned or solicited" by military intelligence personnel, although "the abuse ... was directed on an individual basis and never officially sanctioned." In 11 of those 16 instances, MG Fay found military intelligence personnel were "directly involved" in the alleged abuse.

(U) MG Fay defined abuse to include not only clearly criminal acts, such as the various forms of assault that occurred, but also the application of certain "non-doctrinal interrogation techniques" that he deemed to be unlawful: the use of military working dogs, nudity, and isolation. While the purposeless terrorization of minors by two particular Military Working Dog handlers, described in Incident 26, was greatly abusive by any measure, MG Fay also termed the mere presence of a silent, muzzled Military Working Dog during an interrogation, described in Incident 29, "abuse."

(U) In his findings, MG Fay provided a brief description of each of the 44 alleged instances of abuse, identifying a total of 50 individual soldiers and 4 individual contractors as either "responsible" or criminally "culpable" for each of the events. Of the 54 named as responsible or culpable, 10 soldiers had already been referred for disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Of the remaining 44 soldiers and contractors, MG Fay believed 27 to be "culpable" in one or more instance of abuse, while he assessed 17 soldiers and contractors to have become involved in abuse as a result of "misunderstanding of policy, regulation or law." MG Fay found that responsibility for the abuse extended up to the commanders of the 205th
Military Intelligence Brigade and the 800th Military Police Brigade.

(U) MG Fay also found that "systemic problems ... also contributed to the volatile environment in which the abuse occurred." By MG Fay's count, he made 24 additional findings and two observations regarding "systemic failures." The major contributing factors "included inadequate interrogation doctrine and training," a "lack of a clear interrogation policy for the Iraq Campaign," "acute" shortages of military police and military intelligence personnel, a "lack of clear lines of responsibility" between military police and military intelligence, in doctrine, training, and operations, and "intense pressure felt by personnel on the ground to produce actionable intelligence from detainees."

(U) MG Fay found that "inadequacy of doctrine for detention ... and interrogation operations was a contributing factor to the situations that occurred at Abu Ghraib." Noting that existing Army interrogation doctrine, published in the 1992 Field Manual 34-52, "Intelligence Interrogation," is designed for the tactical interrogation of Enemy Prisoners of War in a conventional conflict, MG Fay observed that various "non-doctrinal approaches, techniques and practices were developed and approved" for the strategic interrogation of unlawful combatants "in the Global War on Terrorism." According to MG Fay, the soldiers and contractors at Abu Ghraib "were not trained on non-doctrinal interrogation techniques" used in Afghanistan and Guantanamo, yet "the non-doctrinal, non-field manual approaches and practices" approved for limited use in those other theaters of operation were introduced into Abu Ghraib by the transfer of both "documents and personnel" from Afghanistan and Guantanamo. "These techniques became confused at Abu Ghraib and were implemented without proper authorities or safeguards," contributing both directly and indirectly to the conduct defined by MG Fay as abuse.

(U) MG Fay also found that what he called "theater Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policies (ICRP)," the interrogation policies promulgated by CJTF-7, were "poorly defined, and changed several times," and that "as a result, interrogation activities sometimes crossed into abusive activity." He observed that "by October 2003," just prior to the most egregious abuses at Abu Ghraib, the Combined Joint Task Force 7 "interrogation policies in Iraq had changed three times in less than thirty days and it became very confusing as to what techniques could be employed and at what level non-doctrinal approaches had to be approved."

(U) MG Fay found that "acute" shortages of both military intelligence and military police personnel also contributed to abuses at Abu Ghraib. By his count, 6 different military intelligence battalions and groups were called upon to provide the 180 military intelligence personnel conducting and
supporting interrogation operations in the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib by December 2003. These soldiers were supported at various times by a Mobile Training Team from Fort Huachusa, Arizona, three Tiger Teams from Guantanamo Bay, contract interrogators from CACI International, and contract linguists from the Titan Corporation. Because "the JIDC was created in a very short period of time with parts and pieces," MG Fay found, "it lacked unit integrity, and this lack was a fatal flaw."

(U) MG Fay found that clear conflicts between military police and military intelligence doctrine, training and guidance caused "predictable tension and confusion" which "contributed to abusive interrogation practices at Abu Ghraib." "The military police," he noted, "referred DoD-wide regulatory and procedural guidance that clashed with the theater interrogation and counter-resistance policies that the military intelligence interrogators followed." "Further," MG Fay concluded, "it appeared that neither group knew or understood the limits of the other group's authority. He also found that the "lack of clear lines of responsibility" between military police and military intelligence, combined with "the leadership's failure to monitor operations adequately," caused the systemic "safeguards to ensure compliance and to protect against abuse" to fail.

(U) MG Fay found that "intense pressure felt by personnel on the ground to produce actionable intelligence from detainees" was a "contributing factor to the environment that resulted in abuses." He found that the "pressure for better results" manifested itself at least in part in "directed guidance and prioritization from 'higher'...to pursue specific lines of questioning with specific detainees, and high priority VIE Direct taskings to the lowest levels in the JIDC." Although "this pressure should have been expected in such a critical situation," MG Fay concluded that it "was not managed by the leadership."
LTCG Anthony Jones, the Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, was appointed as an additional investigating officer. MG Fay continued to serve as an investigating officer until completion of the action. MG Fay and LTC Jones produced separate reports, each with separate but related series of findings and recommendations. While portions of the Jones Report remain classified, a redacted version of the bulk of the report has been released to the public. LTC Jones and other officials associated with the investigation have also provided public testimony before Congress on the matters contained in the report.

(U) In June 2004, as a result of the evidence he had gathered to that point, MG Fay requested that a more senior investigating officer be appointed to examine whether actions of the commander and staff of CJTF-7 contributed to any misconduct related to the interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. MG Fay's request was passed by LTC Sanchez to the Commander, U.S. Central Command, who in turn forwarded the request to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense directed the Acting Secretary of the Army to designate a new appointing authority and a new or additional investigating officer, senior to LTC Sanchez. The Acting Secretary of the Army selected GEN Paul Kern, the Commander of U.S. Army Material Command, to act as the new appointing authority.

(U) GEN Kern appointed LTC Jones "specifically ... to focus on whether organizations or personnel higher than the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade were involved, directly or indirectly, in the ... detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib" on June 25, 2004. LTC Jones reviewed the material developed by MG Fay, as well as the majority of the reports discussed above. He then interviewed LTC Sanchez and MG Barbara Fast, the Commander and Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, respectively, of CJTF-7 at the time of the alleged abuse.

(U) Noting in his report that the "events at Abu Ghraib cannot be understood in a vacuum," LTC Jones made several preliminary findings related to the "background and operational environment" in Iraq at the time of the abuses. First, LTC Jones found that "throughout the period
under investigation," the CJTF-7 headquarters "was not resourced adequately to accomplish the missions," lacking "adequate personnel and equipment." Second, the mission of "providing operational support to the Coalition Provisional Authority ... required greater resources than envisioned." Third, "operational plans envisioned ... a relatively non-hostile environment," when, "in fact, opposition was robust," a circumstance which required that Combined Joint Task Force 7 conduct "tactical counter-insurgency operations, while also executing ... planned missions" in support of the Coalition Provisional Authority and general stabilization.

(U) LTG Jones found that "no organization or individual higher than the chain of command of the 205th MI Brigade was directly involved in the questionable activities regarding alleged detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib." Further, in LTG Jones' assessment, "no policy, directive or doctrine directly or indirectly caused violent or sexual abuse," the most egregious misconduct. Rather, "the primary causes of these actions were relatively straight-forward - individual criminal misconduct."

(U) LTG Jones did find, however, that CJTF-7 "leaders and staff actions ... contributed indirectly to ... detainee abuse." Specifically, "policy memoranda promulgated by the ... Commander led indirectly to some of the non-violent and non-sexual abuses," the CJTF-7 "Commander and Deputy Commander failed to ensure proper staff oversight of detention and interrogation operations," and; some "staff elements reacted inadequately to earlier indications and warnings that problems existed at Abu Ghraib."

(U) LTG Jones found that "the existence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation techniques contributed to the belief that additional interrogation techniques were condoned in order to gain intelligence." This was compounded by "Soldier knowledge of interrogation techniques permitted in GTMO and Afghanistan," "the availability of information on Counter-Resistance Techniques used in other theaters," and interactions with "non-DoD agencies" where "there was at least the perception, and perhaps the reality, that non-DoD agencies had different rules."

(U) LTG Jones' finding that the failure of the CJTF-7 Commander and Deputy Commander ... to ensure proper staff oversight of detention and interrogation operations" was manifested by "the lack of a single ... staff proponent for detention and interrogation operations" and dispersion of "staff responsibility ... among the Deputy Commanding General, the C2, C3, C4 and SJA." This dispersion of staff responsibility "resulted in no individual staff member focusing on these operations."

(U) LTG Jones' finding that some "staff elements reacted inadequately to earlier indications and warnings that problems existed at Abu Ghraib" is related to the dispersion of staff respon-
sibility. As examples, LTG Jones cited "the investigation of an incident at Camp Cropper," presumably referring to the subject of the Lee Report, discussed above; "the International Committee of the Red Cross ... reports on ... subordinate units" and "Abu Ghraib," criminal investigations; "disciplinary actions being taken by commanders; the death of a detainee under the control of an OGA at Abu Ghraib; "the lack of ... accountability of detainees," and; "continual concerns that intelligence information was not returning to the tactical level."

(U) LTG Jones tempered his finding that CJTF-7 "leaders and staff actions ... contributed indirectly to ... detainee abuse" with the caution that "command and staff actions and inaction must be understood in ... context." "In light of the operational environment," the "under-resourcing" of the CJTF-7 "staff and subordinate units, and increased missions," LTG Jones determined that the "Commander had to prioritize efforts." As a matter of "professional judgment," LTG Jones concluded that CJTF-7 appropriately "devoted its resources to fighting the counter-insurgency and supporting the CPA." "In the overall scheme of CIR," LTG Jones concluded, "the CJTF-7 Commander and staff performed above expectations."

(U) In contrast, LTG Jones found that although the "205th MI Brigade and 800th Military Police Brigade," like their higher headquarters, "also had missions throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operations," the operational environment did not excuse the fact that their "leaders at Abu Ghraib failed to execute their assigned responsibilities." LTG Jones found that "leaders from these units located at Abu Ghraib, or with supervision over Soldiers and units at Abu Ghraib failed to supervise subordinates or provide direct oversight of this important mission." Specifically, "these leaders failed to properly discipline their soldiers, ... failed to learn from prior mistakes and failed to provide continued mission-specific training." "The absence of effective leadership" specifically "at the brigade level and below," in LTG Jones' judgment, "was a factor in not sooner discovering and taking actions to prevent both the violent/sexual abuse incidents and the misinterpretation/confusion incidents."

(U) In findings similar to those of MG Fay, LTG Jones had also found that "facilities at Abu Ghraib ... created a poor climate to conduct interrogation and detention operations to standard" and that "force protection" was a major concern; that the intelligence units were "undermanned, under-equipped, and inappropriately organized" to complete the mission, with shortages "specifically in the interrogator, analyst and linguist fields," and the 800th Military Police Brigade suffered from "under-resourcing of personnel," and; that both the military intelligence and military police missions were significantly different from those
originally planned.

(U) Given these observations, the finding that the leadership of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and the 809th Military Police Brigade should be held responsible because they contributed to "both the violent/sexual abuse incidents and the misinterpretation/confusion incidents" through their inaction, regardless of "operational circumstances," while the leadership of CJTF-7, who "contributed indirectly to the questionable activities regarding alleged detainee abuse" through their "actions and inaction," should be excused as a result of "operational circumstances" is difficult to reconcile. It also appears that significant aspects of the operational circumstances of the military intelligence and military police brigades that contributed to the incidents at Abu Ghraib, such as the selection of Abu Ghraib as the interrogation operations' site and the underresourcing of the interrogation center, were within the direct control of their higher headquarters, CJTF-7.

(U) Like MG Fay, LTG Jones concluded that "interaction with ... other agency interrogators who did not follow the same rules" as the Military Intelligence interrogators was among the "contributing factors" that led to the abuse of detainees. "There was at least the perception, and perhaps the reality, that non-DOD agencies had different rules regarding interrogation and detention operations." LTG Jones found that "such a perception encouraged soldiers to deviate from prescribed techniques."

Afghanistan Reports (U)

(U) Jacoby Report

(U) On May 19, 2004, the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76), MG Eric Olson, appointed BG Charles Jacoby, the CJTF-76 Deputy Commanding General, to conduct a "top to bottom" review of "detainee operations" in the Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) Area of Responsibility. Specifically, BG Jacoby was directed to identify "best practices," make "recommendations, both specific and general, for ... changes," list "corrective actions," and provide "suggestions with regard to future command ... initiatives ... to ensure adherence to operational and regulatory guidance."

(U) BG Jacoby found that "while theater forces understood the need for humane treatment and unit processes ... consistent with the spirit of extant doctrine, there was otherwise a consistent lack of knowledge regarding theater detention operations guidance." This "lack of thoroughly authorized, disseminated, and understood guidance and procedures," in BG Jacoby's assessment, "created opportunities for detainee abuse and the loss of intelligence value throughout the process."
(S) BG Jacoby noted that he was not directed to investigate "detainee abuse allegations," a task that is the province of military law enforcement, but rather to inspect "current detainee operations." Nonetheless, acknowledging that "allegations of detainee abuse have been substantiated," many of his findings examine the relationship of areas of concern to the potential abuse of detainees.

(U) "Very significantly," BG Jacoby found, there was "inadequate authority for the interrogation techniques and approaches authorized by the Detainee Operations SOP" in effect at the time of his investigation. The impact of the lack of authority for some of the measures authorized by the policy, however, was mitigated by the fact that "only one-third of the bases had the SOP" and "it was generally not...known or relied upon in the field." Most interrogators, BG Jacoby found, looked to their training rather than the command policy for guidance. He cautioned that the "inconsistent and unevenly applied standards" that result from such circumstances "increase the possibility of the abuse of detainees, especially in the forward battle area."

He recommended the establishment of clear criteria and procedures for the transfer of detainees.

His recommendations included modification of interrogation and detention procedures, increases in manning and resourcing detention operations, and structural changes with the task force. BG Jacoby concluded with the observation that while his inspection had "revealed no systematic or widespread mistreatment of detainees, opportunities for mistreatment...ongoing investigations, and a maturing battlefield argue for modifications to the
current detainee operations process" in Afghanistan.

**Independent Panel Report (U)**

(U) In May 2004, the Secretary of Defense appointed an Independent Panel to Review Detention Operations "to provide independent professional advice on detainee abuses, what caused them and what actions should be taken to preclude their repetition." Unlike the Taguba, Fay and Jones Reports, the Independent Panel was charged with examining detention and interrogation operations worldwide. The members of the Independent Panel were former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger and Harold Brown, former Congresswoman Tillie Fowler, and retired Air Force Gen. Charles Horner. During the course of their investigation, the members of the Independent Panel reviewed the reports of investigations completed prior to the Panel's report, the statements, documents, and other evidence gathered by the Fay/Jones investigations and our inquiry, and conducted a series of interviews of senior officers and defense officials, up to and including the Secretary of Defense. The Independent Panel Report, dated August 24, 2004, is unclassified and has been released to the public.

(U) The Independent Panel found that "the pictured abuses" at Abu Ghraib, "unsuitable even in wartime, were not part of authorized interrogations nor were they even directed at intelligence targets." In the Panel's evaluation, the abuse photographed at Abu Ghraib represented "deviant behavior and a failure of military leadership and discipline." However, the Panel also found that there were other abuses that "were not photographed" that "did occur during interrogation," at Abu Ghraib and at other locations.

(U) The panel estimated that as of the date of their report our forces had detained approximately 50,000 individuals during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Of the approximately 200 abuse allegations lodged against our forces in that time, the Panel reported that commanders and law enforcement agents had completed investigations into 155 of the allegations, and had substantiated 66 of the allegations. The Panel noted that of the substantiated cases, "approximately one-third ... occurred at the point of capture or tactical collection point, frequently under uncertain, dangerous and violent circumstances." Nonetheless, the Panel emphasized that despite the fact that the abuses were "inflicted on only a small percentage of those detained," were "of varying severity," and "occurred at differing locations and in differing circumstances and context," the abuses "were serious in both number and effect."

(U) Although the Independent Panel found that "there is no evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or military authorities,"
and "no approved procedures called for or allowed the kinds of abuse that in fact occurred," the Panel nonetheless concluded that "the abuses were not just the failure of some individuals to follow known standards, and they are more than the failure of a few leaders to enforce proper discipline." In the Panel's view, "there is both institutional and personal responsibility at higher levels."

(U) The Independent Panel prefaced their discussion of interrogation operations with the observation that "any discussion of interrogation techniques must begin with the simple reality that their purpose is to gain intelligence that will help protect the United States, its forces and interests abroad." Recounting the development of the policies that have framed the Global War on Terror at the national level and within the Department of Defense, the Panel observed that with "the events of September 11, 2001, the President, Congress and the American people recognized we were at war with a different kind of enemy." The nature and severity of the post-September 11, 2001 terrorist threat and the escalating insurgency in Iraq, threats which are essentially different from an enemy force composed of massed troops, tanks, artillery, ships, and aircraft, made "information gleaned from interrogations especially important." The panel noted, "interrogations are inherently unpleasant, and many people find them objectionable by their very nature." Yet, in the Panel's assessment, "when lives are at stake, all legal and moral means of eliciting information must be considered." Further, the Independent Panel warned, "the conditions of war and the dynamics of detainee operations carry inherent risks for human mistreatment and must be approached with caution and careful planning and training."

(U) The Panel concluded that "in the initial development" of the Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policies promulgated by the Secretary of Defense for the interrogation of unlawful combatants held at Guantanamo Bay, "the legal resources of the Services' Judge Advocates General and General Counsels were not used to their full potential." In the Panel's view, "had the Secretary of Defense had a wider range of legal opinions and a more robust debate regarding detainee policies and operations," the fluctuations in policy that occurred between December 2002 and April 2003 might well have been avoided.

(U) The Independent Panel found "it is clear that pressures for additional intelligence ... resulted in stronger interrogation techniques that were believed to be needed and appropriate in the treatment of detainees defined as unlawful combatants," some of whom were presenting a "tenacious resistance" to doctrinal interrogation methods. "At Guantanamo," the Panel observed, "interrogators used those additional techniques with only two detainees, gaining important and time-urgent information in the process." While a limited application of those more aggressive techniques proved successful in Guantanamo, the
Panel cautioned that "it is important to note that techniques effective under carefully controlled conditions in Guantanamo became far more problematic when they migrated and were not adequately safeguarded."

(U) Inevitably, the Panel found, "interrogators and lists of techniques circulated from Guantanamo and Afghanistan to Iraq." In Afghanistan, the Panel noted, "more aggressive interrogation of detainees appears to have been ongoing" independent of the Guantanamo Counter-Resistance Policies. Standard Operating Procedures containing techniques adopted by Special Operations Forces and conventional Military Intelligence units in Afghanistan migrated to Iraq. Many interrogators served in both operations. In Iraq, the combined knowledge and experience of the interrogators and their leaders, which encompassed operations in both Afghanistan and Guantanamo, were brought together. Combined Joint Task Force 7 promulgated a series of inconsistent policies that "allowed for interpretation in several areas and did not adequately set forth the limits of the interrogation techniques." In the Panel's assessment, "the existence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation ... policies contributed to the belief that additional interrogation techniques were condoned."

(U) Addressing the integration of detention and interrogation operations, the Independent Panel contrasted the operations at Guantanamo to those at Abu Ghraib. At Guantanamo, a system was eventually established where the Military Police and Military Intelligence worked "cooperatively, with the Military Police 'setting the conditions' for interrogations" conducted by Military Intelligence. In concept, the Panel noted, "setting the conditions" for interrogations included passive collection on detainees as well as supporting incentives recommended by the military interrogators. In the Panel's assessment, "these collaborative procedures worked well at Guantanamo," where the ratio of Military Police to detainees was "approximately 1 to 1," but failed Abu Ghraib, where the ratio was "at one point 1 to about 75," with the Military Police challenged "even to keep track of prisoners."

(U) The Independent Panel found that "in Iraq, there was not only a failure to plan for a major insurgency, but also to quickly and adequately adapt to the insurgency that followed ... major combat operations." As the insurgency grew, so did the population of the detention facilities. "The largest, Abu Ghraib, housed up to 7,000 detainees in October 2003," when the major abuses began at the facility, yet had "a guard force of only about 90 personnel from the 80th Military Police Brigade." The Panel, like MG Fay and LTG Jones, concluded that "Abu Ghraib was seriously overcrowded, under-resourced, and under continual attack."

(U) The Independent Panel noted that
"problems at Abu Ghraib" could be traced "in part to the nature and recent history of the military police and military intelligence units" that staffed the operations at the prison. The 800th Military Police Brigade (Enemy Prisoner of War), a Reserve Component unit whose subordinate elements are spread across several states in peacetime, was designed to run prisoners of war facilities. The panel found that as a result of widespread military police mobilizations after September 11, 2001, however, the brigade had been unable to conduct any major training in its primary mission due to "disruption in soldier and unit availability." Further, many of the brigade's soldiers who had been activated "shortly after September 11, 2001, began reaching" the limit of their "two-year mobilization commitment, which, by law, mandated their redeployment and deactivation." In the panel's judgment, the resulting "deterioration in the readiness condition of the brigade should have been recognized by CFLCC and CENTCOM by late summer 2003," and that "by October and November" of 2003, "commanders and staffs all the way to CENTCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew ... the serious deficiencies of the 800th MP Brigade." This led the Panel to conclude that the CJTF-7, CFLCC and CENTCOM failure to request additional forces was an avoidable error.

(U) The Independent Panel also found that the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, an Active Component unit, "was insufficient to provide the kind of support needed ... especially with regard to interrogators and interpreters." Although "some additional units were mobilized" from the reserves, other Active Component units deployed, and contract interpreters and interrogators hired, a large portion of the effort fell to the soldiers of A Company, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion (Airborne), who had only just returned from an extended deployment to Afghanistan where they had conducted interrogation operations at the primary detention facility in that theater. The hodgepodge of "elements of as many as six different units" that were tossed into the interrogation mission at Abu Ghraib lacked "unit cohesion," a flaw that was exacerbated "by friction between military intelligence and military police personnel, including the brigade commanders themselves."

(U) Regarding policy and command responsibilities, the Independent Panel found that "interrogation policies with respect to Iraq, where the majority of the abuses occurred, were inadequate or deficient in some respects at three levels: Department of Defense, CENTCOM/CJTF-7, and Abu Ghraib." Overall, the Panel found, "policies to guide the demands for actionable intelligence laggard behind battlefield needs." Fluctuations in the Counter-Resistance Policy for Guantanamo approved by the Secretary of Defense, "although specifically limited ... to Guantanamo," were in the Panel's view "an element contributing to uncertainties in the field as to which techniques were authorized." The Panel found that "in the absence of specific guidance from CENTCOM, interroga-
tors in Iraq relied upon" the field manual "and unauthorized techniques that had migrated from Afghanistan." These conditions, followed by a series of short-lived and poorly drafted CJTF-7 policies "clearly led to confusion on what practices were acceptable." Although "we cannot be sure how much the number and severity of abuses would have been curtailed had there been early and consistent guidance from higher levels," the Independent Panel concluded that "nonetheless such guidance was needed and likely would have had a limiting effect."

(U) Other factors that contributed to the leadership failures at Abu Ghraib included an "unclear Military Intelligence chain of command," the "confusing and unusual assignment of MI and MP responsibilities at Abu Ghraib," and the placement of the 600th Military Police Brigade under the tactical control of CJTF-7, while maintaining the brigade under the CFLCC for all other purposes. Finally, in the view of the Panel, "the failure to react appropriately to the October 2003 ICRC report," which described a number of the abuses that would remain uninvestigated until a soldier reported later incidents to his chain of command, was "indicative of the weakness of the leadership at Abu Ghraib."

(U) The Independent Panel made the following recommendations, among others:

- (U) "The United States should further define its policy ... on the categorization and status of all detainees;"

- (U) "The Department of Defense needs to ... develop joint doctrine to define the appropriate collaboration between Military Intelligence and Military Police in a detention facility;"

- (U) The nation must acquire "more specialists for detention/interrogation operations, including linguists, interrogators," and others;

- (U) "Joint Forces Command should ... develop a new operational concept for detention operations," including preparation "for conditions in which normal law enforcement has broken down in an occupied or failed state;"

- (U) Although "clearly, the force structure in both MP and MI in the Army is inadequate to support the armed forces in this new form of warfare," there are "other forces besides the Army in need of force structure improvements" to accomplish the detention and interrogation missions. Accordingly, the Panel recommended "that the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force undertake force structure reviews of their own;"
• (U) Because "well-documented policy and procedures on approved interrogation techniques are imperative to counteract the current chilling effect the reaction to the abuses have had on the collection of valuable intelligence through interrogations," such policies must be promulgated;

• (U) A "professional ethics program" must be developed for all who participate in detention and interrogation operations;

• (U) "Clearer guidelines for the interaction of CIA with the Department of Defense in detention and interrogation operations must be defined;"

• (U) "The United States needs to redefine its approach to customary and treaty international humanitarian law, which must be adapted to the realities of the nature of the conflict," and

• (U) "The Department of Defense should continue to foster its operational relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross."
Examination of Detainee Abuse (U)

Overview (U)

(U) During our inquiry, we examined individual cases of detainee abuse in order to discern any relationship to detainee operations in general, and to interrogation in particular. We detail some of these cases in the sections covering GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq; however, in this section, we will provide an overview of our analytic method, and a high-level summary of DoD abuse investigations.

(U) As of September 30, 2004, the military services and DoD agencies had initiated 317 investigations in response to allegations of detainee abuse by DoD personnel and contractors in GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq. (In order to complete our analysis in a timely fashion, we chose September 30 as the cutoff date for the incorporation of investigations in this report. All of the following information is current as of September 30, except where otherwise noted.) For the purposes of our analysis, we define "abuse" as conduct that constitutes Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) offenses against persons (or would constitute such an offense if the perpetrator were subject to the UCMJ, in the case of contractors). These offenses include murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, assault, rape, indecent assault, cruelty and maltreatment, reckless endangerment, and communicat-
### DOD Detainee-Related Investigations Summary (U)

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| TOTAL          | 27          | 274  | 16   | 16    | 317          | 71

(U) The status of the 317 open and closed investigations is again depicted in the following two charts on the next page, which break the investigations into death-related (in the first chart) and non-death related investigations (in the second chart).

(U) As the first chart demonstrates, of the 61 detainee death investigations, 33 have been closed; and in six cases it was determined that the deaths resulted from abuse. The remaining 23 closed death investigations resulted in determinations that the fatalities resulted from either natural causes or justifiable homicides, or that the allegations of wrongdoing were unsubstantiated or unfounded. As the second chart shows, detainee abuse not resulting in death was substantiated in 65 of 149 closed investigations.

(U) Because information provided by open cases may not be reliable, and may ultimately be proven unfounded, we focused our analysis primarily on the 71 closed investigations that substantiated abuse. Of these, eight concerned incidents at
### Detainee Death Investigations (U)

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- Army Related Cases
- Navy Related Cases
- USMC Related Cases
- Other Related Cases

All data as of 30 Sep 2004.

### Detainee Non-Death Abuse Investigations (U)

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</table>

- Army Related Cases
- Navy Related Cases
- USMC Related Cases
- Other Related Cases

All data as of 30 Sep 2004.
GTMO, three concerned incidents in Afghanistan, and 60 concerned incidents in Iraq. These 71 cases involve at least 123 victims, and so far, disciplinary or administrative action has been taken against 115 service members for misconduct. (This action includes numerous non-judicial punishments, 16 summary courts-martial, 12 special courts-martial, and 9 general courts-martial.) Criminal investigation of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, which has already resulted in the preferral of court-martial charges against seven service members and a guilty plea from three of those members, remains open.

(U) In addition, we concluded that one closed, substantiated investigation did not constitute abuse for our purposes. This case involved a soldier at GTMO who dared a detainee to throw a cup of water on him, and after the detainee complied, reciprocated by throwing a cup of water on the detainee. The soldier was removed from that camp as a consequence of inappropriate interaction with a detainee. We discarded this investigation, leaving us 70 detainee abuse cases to analyze.

(U) A comparison of our detainee abuse analysis with those of the Jones, Fuy, and Taguba reports is provided later; in our section discussing Iraq. Unlike those reports, however, we did not investigate specific allegations of misconduct. Rather, our examination consisted of a broad review of investigative reports, focusing on factors that may have played a role in these incidents of abuse. Our review was intended neither as a legal assessment of specific cases, nor as a recommendation for commanders in the independent exercise of their responsibilities under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or other administrative procedures.

Categorizing Abuse Cases (U)

(U) As an initial matter, we examined the abuse cases for any trends related to geographic areas or individual units within Afghanistan and Iraq; however, we found no such trends.

(U) We next analyzed the 70 closed, substantiated abuse cases by grouping them by severity and location, and then by whether they were related to interrogation. We also categorized the cases by service component (e.g., U.S. Army Reserve) of the personnel involved. Our results are described below.

(U) Severity of Abuse

(U) As noted previously, we considered serious abuse to be misconduct resulting, or having the potential to result, in death or grievous bodily harm. We used the definition of "grievous bodily harm" contained in the Manual for Courts-Martial (2002 edition): "Grievous bodily harm" means serious bodily injury. It does not include minor injuries such as a black eye or bloody nose, but does include...
fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the body, serious damage to internal organs, and other serious bodily injuries. In addition, we considered all sexual assaults (in the Manual for Courts-Martial termed "Indecent Assault"), threats to inflict death or grievous bodily harm, and maltreatment likely to result in death or grievous bodily harm to be serious abuse.

(U) As reflected in the chart below, there were a total of six substantiated deaths (one in Afghanistan and five in Iraq), 26 serious abuse incidents that did not result in death (all in Iraq), and 38 minor abuse incidents (two in Afghanistan, seven in GTMO, and 29 in Iraq). (We should note that the cases involving the two Bagram PUC deaths were substantiated and closed on October 8, 2004, after the majority of our analysis had been completed. These cases, therefore, are not included in the data that we analyzed.) Of the 64 non-death abuse cases analyzed, two were sexual assaults. The majority of
the remaining cases were assaults and other forms of physical abuse.

(U) Location of Abuse

(U) For the purposes of our analysis, we considered "point of capture" (POC) incidents to include any deaths or abuse occurring outside of holding facilities, including those that occurred during detainee transportation. Facilities at the division level and below were considered Temporary Holding Facilities (THF) (e.g., Corps Holding Areas or Division Collection Points), and internment/resettlement facilities were considered Detention Facilities (DF) (e.g., Abu Ghraib). These terms are functional in nature rather than doctrinal and are used here only for the purpose of our analysis.

(U) The chart below depicts abuses by detention locations. Of the 70 cases analyzed, 23
occurred at POC, 25 at THFs, 16 at DFs, and six at unidentified locations. Included in those figures are the six death cases: four at POC, one at a THF, and one at a DF.

(U) Service and Component

(U) There were 48 Active Component investigations, 21 Reserve/National Guard (nine Reserve, eight National Guard, and four mixed), one from an unknown unit, and two contractor-related cases. The data are displayed in the chart above.

(U) Relationship of Abuse to Interrogation

(U) We categorized abuses arising from questioning of detainees by any DoD personnel, not just MI interrogators, as interrogation-related. In categorizing abuse as "interrogation-related," we took an expansive approach. For example, if a soldier slapped a detainee for failing to answer a question at the point of capture, we treated that misconduct as interrogation-related abuse. Of the 70 investigations analyzed, 20 met this criteria. Closed substantiated interrogation related abuse cases are further categorized by theater of operations and type of site in the chart on the next page.

Analysis of Abuse Investigations (U)

(U) Methodology
(U) After categorizing the substantiated abuse cases, we reviewed each investigation report to identify possible explanations for the abuse. For abuses investigated by a service criminal investigative agency (CID or NCIS), we reviewed the complete investigative reports. These investigations generally contained statements from eyewitnesses and, in some cases, statements from suspects and purported victims. For investigations conducted by individual commands, which generally addressed the less serious incidents, we reviewed summaries or reports of the substantiated abuse.

(U) Findings

(U) Our review suggested that there is no single explanation for why abuses occurred; rather, a combination of factors played a role. After hundreds of interviews, however, one point is clear—we found no direct (or even indirect) link between interrogation policy and detainee abuse. We note that our conclusion is consistent with the findings of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, chaired by the Honorable James R. Schlesinger, which in its August 2004 report determined that “[n]o approved procedures called for or allowed the kinds of abuse that in fact occurred. There is no evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or military authorities.” In fact, interviews that we conducted at point of capture and temporary holding facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that a large majority
of interrogators and most field officers interviewed at those locations were unaware of the specific guidance promulgated and relied solely on their respective training and experience. This point will be reiterated and discussed in more detail in later report sections focused on interrogation operations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan and Iraq.

(U) If approved interrogation policy did not cause detainee abuse, the question remains: what did? While we cannot offer a definitive answer, we studied the DoD investigation reports for all 70 cases of closed, substantiated detainee abuse to see if we could detect any patterns or underlying explanations. Our analysis of these 70 cases showed that they involved abuses perpetrated by a variety of active duty, reserve and national guard personnel from three services at varying dates and in varying locations throughout Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a small number of cases at GTMO. While this lack of a pattern argues against a single, overarching reason for abuse, we did identify several factors that may help explain why the abuse occurred.

(U) First, 23 of the abuse cases, roughly one third of the total, occurred at the point of capture in Afghanistan or Iraq - that is, during or shortly after the capture of a detainee. This is the point at which passions often run high, as service members find themselves in dangerous situations, apprehending individuals who may be responsible for the death or serious injury of fellow service members. Because of this potentially volatile situation, this is also the point at which the need for military discipline is paramount in order to guard against the possibility of detainee abuse, and that discipline was lacking in some instances.

(U) Second, the nature of the enemy in Iraq (and to a lesser extent, in Afghanistan) may have played a role in the abuse. Our service members may have at times permitted our enemy's treacherous tactics and disregard for the law of war - exemplified by improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings - to erode their own standards of conduct. (Although we do not offer empirical data to support this conclusion, a consideration of past counterinsurgency campaigns - for example, during the Philippine and Vietnam wars - suggests that this factor may have contributed to abuse.) The highly-publicized case involving an Army Lieutenant Colonel in Iraq provides an example. On August 20, 2003, during the questioning of an Iraqi detainee by field artillery soldiers, the Lieutenant Colonel fired his weapon near the detainee's head in an effort to elicit information regarding a plot to assassinate U.S. service members. For his actions, the Lieutenant Colonel was disciplined and relieved of command.

(U) Finally, a breakdown of good order and
discipline in some units could account for other incidents of abuse. This breakdown implies a failure of unit-level leadership to recognize the potential for abuse in detention and interrogation operations, to detect and mitigate the enormous stress on our troops in detention and interrogation operations, and a corresponding failure to provide the requisite oversight to prevent such abuse. As documented in previous reports (including MG Fay's and MG Taguba's investigations), stronger leadership and greater oversight would have lessened the likelihood of abuse.

**Chronological Analysis of Abuse Cases (U)**

(U) **Overview**

(U) We also conducted a chronological analysis to determine whether there was any correlation between particular events and the rate of detainee abuse. Specifically, we considered the relationship between the rate of abuse and the issuance of new interrogation-related policy directives to U.S. forces in each theater, and whether intensified combat operations or enemy resistance might help explain increases or decreases in detainee abuses. To determine whether abuse rates could be correlated to such events, we examined abuse cases on a month-to-month basis.

(U) The total number of cases considered in this portion of our analysis is larger than in earlier sections, because we examined not only closed cases, but also certain open cases. In the chronological analysis we considered 189 cases, including 69 of the 71 closed, substantiated cases— one case was omitted because it did not identify the date of abuse, and we again omitted the GTMO water-throwing case - and 120 of 130 open cases (10 did not contain dates or were thefts). We recognize that many of the open cases may be eventually proved unsubstantiated or unfounded; however, we felt that including the open cases in chronological analysis might help identify potential trends.

(U) **Results**

(U) **GTMO**

(U) Relatively few abuses have occurred at GTMO. As we will describe at further length in the GTMO section, we believe that this is attributable to, among other things, effective leadership, aggressive oversight, and a highly structured environment. While three of the abuse cases at GTMO occurred in April 2003, the same month that the Secretary of Defense approved a new interrogation policy for use there, the new interrogation policy did not cause those abuses to occur: as the GTMO section will describe, those abuses were completely unrelated to interrogation policy. We also found no correlation with other interrogation policies, issued in December 2002 and January 2003. (In
(U) Afghanistan

(U) Since Operation ENDURING FREEDOM began in October 2001, in no single month were there more than three cases of alleged abuse. With the limited numbers of reported abuse cases spread over many months, there is no discernable correlation of those abuses to CJTF 180's detention and interrogation policies (issued in January 2003, March 2004, and June 2004), combat operations, or other events.

(U) Iraq

(U) The total number of abuses in Iraq far exceeds those in GTMO and Afghanistan, which is not surprising based on the scale of combat operations and the ensuing insurgency. From the beginning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in March 2003 through August 2004, the number of abuse cases per month remained relatively close to the average rate of nine per month, with the fewest number of reported abuses in March 2003 (one), July 2004 (four), and September 2004 (one). The issuance of interrogation policy memoranda in September 2003, October 2003, and May 2004, and MG Miller's visit to assess detention operations during August to September 2003 (all of which are described in our section on Iraq) do not appear to be correlated to the rate of detainee abuse, whether interrogation-related or not.

(U) We did observe spikes in abuse allegations in June 2003 (15), November 2003 (15), and April 2004 (22). While not necessarily statistically significant, it is possible that the June 2003 and April 2004 increases are attributable to the following events:
(U) **June 2003.** Baghdad fell to Coalition Forces in May 2003. Almost immediately thereafter, Iraqis engaged in widespread looting and destruction. In this month, we observed a moderate increase in alleged detainee abuse cases; however, we found no evidence that this increase was interrogation-related or associated with U.S. policy changes. Rather, two-thirds of the abuse cases in June 2003 involved point of capture abuses: the aggressive efforts of U.S. forces to stop looting and secure the peace appear to be a likely explanation for the increased number of alleged abuse cases that month.

(U) **April 2004.** This month saw an increase in combat operations, particularly in response to recent kidnappings, roadside bombings, and other attacks by insurgents against coalition forces. The number of U.S. service members killed in April 2004 increased to more than 150, almost a three-fold increase from only one month earlier in March 2004. During April 2004, alleged detainee abuse cases rose from five (all non-interrogation related) in March 2004 to 23 in April 2004 (with 8 of those cases being interrogation-related). It is possible, therefore, that increased combat operating tempo and efforts to stem the tide of the insurgency led to increases in abuses.

**Detainee Abuse: Summary (U)**

(U) In sum, we found no evidence that detainee abuse was related to any interrogation policies. This explanation is supported by the more detailed descriptions of interrogation-related abuse cases that appear in the following sections on GTMO, Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, although interrogation policy has not been a causal factor in detainee abuse, we found several factors that may have contributed to the abuse. For example, much of it occurred at the point of capture in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in many instances our service members clearly lacked the discipline necessary at the point of capture to ensure that detainees were treated appropriately. Another factor may be the nature of the insurgency that we have encountered - one in which our enemy's disregard for the law of war may have at times led to an erosion of our own standards of conduct. Finally, a breakdown in good order and discipline, which may be attributable to the absence of strong leadership or oversight, may have contributed to setting the conditions for abuse.
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (U)

(U) This section examines the interrogation techniques approved and those actually employed at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), and the relationship between those techniques and any detainee abuse. The section begins with a brief, background discussion below.

Background (U)

(U) GTMO and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

(U) The first planeload of twenty detainees from Afghanistan arrived at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on January 11, 2002. They had been captured by U.S. forces on the battlefield during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, which followed closely on the heels of 9/11 and was designed to flush out members of al Qaeda and their Taliban protectors from the hills and caves of Afghanistan. As suspected terrorists, these first detainees were transferred to the base for interrogation. By the summer of 2002, the detainee population at GTMO had quickly grown to nearly 600, a number that has remained fairly steady up until the present.

(U) GTMO was a logical place for the interrogation of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. It had existing holding facilities at Camp X-Ray, which had originally been built to house Cuban and Haitian refugees who attempted illegally to enter the United States by sea in the mid 1990s. It was close to the United States and under United States control, pursuant to a lease agreement with Cuba dating to 1903. Yet GTMO was in a remote and secure location, far from the battlefields of Afghanistan. And perhaps most importantly, GTMO was considered a place where these benefits could be realized without the detainees having the opportunity to contest their detention in the U.S. courts. This final consideration was negated, however, by the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rasul v. Bush, ___ S.Ct. ___ (2004), which held that the U.S. courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the detention of foreign nationals held at GTMO. At the same time, the Supreme Court held in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, ___ S.Ct. ___ (2004), that any U.S. citizens held in the U.S. as enemy combatants have a due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to contest their detention before a neutral decisionmaker.

(U) The combatants captured in Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM did not wear military uniforms or fall into any traditional military hierarchy. This presented the challenge, therefore, of determining which of them possessed (or were likely to possess) the most intelligence or law enforcement value and thus merited transfer to GTMO. Upon capture, a detainee was initially questioned on the battlefield to ascertain his level of participation in the conflict and to determine if he might possess valuable intelligence or be a continuing security threat to U.S. forces. The detainee was then sent from the front.
lines to a central holding facility, where he would undergo further screening and interrogation. If this screening indicated that the detainee might meet Secretary of Defense criteria for transfer to GTMO, a screening team of U.S. government officials - consisting of military lawyers, intelligence officers, and federal law enforcement officials - would review the detainee's relevant information, including the facts surrounding capture and detention, the threat posed by the individual, and the intelligence and law enforcement value of the detainee. The screening team, after reviewing all available information, then made a recommendation to retain the captured fighter in-country or transfer him to GTMO. Next, a general officer designated by the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), reviewed the screening team's recommendation and made a final recommendation to Department of Defense officials in Washington, D.C.

(U) A Department of Defense review panel, including legal advisors and representatives from the Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, assessed this final recommendation and, if necessary, made additional inquiries regarding the detainee. Upon the review panel's recommendation and final authorization by the Secretary of Defense, the individual either remained detained in Afghanistan or was airlifted to GTMO. Since the beginning of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM to the present, more than 10,000 suspected members of al Qaeda or the Taliban have been captured and processed through this screening process. Less than eight percent of these detainees (a total of 782 as of October 29, 2004) were ultimately transferred to GTMO. The most recent transfers occurred in September 2004, as DoD announced on September 22, 2004 that it had transferred 10 detainees from Afghanistan to GTMO. These were the first transfers since November 2003.

(GAN) As of October 2004, there were 550 detainees at GTMO. Of the detainees sent to GTMO during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 202 have departed the base: 146 of these were transferred to other countries for release, and 56 were transferred to the control of other governments (seven to Russia, five to Morocco, five to Great Britain, four to France, four to Saudi Arabia, one to Spain, 29 to Pakistan and one to Sweden). In response to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rasul, the Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Gordon England, is currently supervising Combatant Status Review Tribunals and Administrative Review Boards. Each detainee at GTMO will have the opportunity, with the help of a military representative, to contest the enemy combatant designation before a tribunal of three military officers. The detainees at GTMO will also have the opportunity to present information to an Administrative Review Board concerning why the detainee no longer poses a threat to the U.S. or its
Allies and should be released or transferred.

(U) It is U.S. policy not to release any detainees that still pose a threat to our country, but recent events have demonstrated the difficulty of making that assessment, and the difficulty now facing the Administrative Review Boards. On September 28, 2004, Afghan officials announced that Abdul Ghaffar, a senior Taliban commander who had been released from GTMO over one year ago, was killed on September 25th while apparently leading an ambush on U.S. forces, in which three American soldiers were wounded, one critically. According to Afghan officials, after his release Ghaffar had carried out several attacks on American Special Forces soldiers, as well as an attack on a district chief in Helmand, Afghanistan in which three Afghan soldiers were killed.

(U) Another former Taliban fighter who was held at GTMO for approximately two years and then released in March 2004, Abdullah Mehsud, has reportedly forged ties with al Qaeda and is leading a militant band that is opposing Pakistani forces hunting al Qaeda fighters along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In early October 2004, Mehsud's men kidnapped two Chinese engineers who were helping Pakistan to construct a dam near the border. The kidnappers, who were surrounded by Pakistani security forces, strapped explosives to the hostages and threatened to kill them if they were not allowed safe passage to where Mehsud was hiding in the nearby mountains. The crisis ended on October 14th when Pakistani forces moved in and killed five of the kidnappers, but one of the hostages also died, and Mehsud is still at large. Moreover, since his release, Mehsud has bragged to reporters that he tricked his interrogators into believing that he was someone else, and has stated that he will fight America "until the very end."

(U) In addition to Ghaffar and Mehsud, Afghan officials have stated that at least five other Afghan detainees released from GTMO have returned to Afghanistan and again become Taliban commanders or fighters. The number may be higher, as there are uncorroborated reports that an additional seven have participated in attacks or provided support to anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan.

(U) Detention and Interrogation Facilities

(U) The first detainees to arrive at GTMO were held at Camp X-Ray, which had the advantage of being an existing facility. Camp X-Ray, however, had a limited capacity (it could hold only approximately 300 detainees after rapidly expanding from its initial capacity of 40), and also was somewhat primitive. Upon their arrival, the detainees were housed in temporary, eight by eight foot units with a concrete slab floor, a combination wood and metal roof, and open air sides composed of chain link fencing. The detainees slept on the floor, with mats and blankets.
The interrogation facilities at Camp X-Ray were also spartan. The interrogation rooms were simple, plywood structures, but they did have air conditioning. These rooms were approximately fifteen by fifteen feet, and commonly referred to as "boxes." The rooms were equipped for audio monitoring only.

Due to Camp X-Ray's limited capacity and primitive conditions, plans were put into motion almost immediately after the arrival of the first detainees in GTMO to build a new detention facility, which became known as Camp Delta. This new facility had an initial capacity of 612 detention units, with room to expand as needed. In late April 2002, the detainee population, numbering just over 300 individuals, moved from Camp X-Ray to Camp Delta, whereupon Camp X-Ray was closed. Camp Delta has since expanded to 816 detention units, 84 of which are maximum security.

Also within Camp Delta is the detainee hospital, which is dedicated to providing...
medical care to the detainees and has a twenty bed capacity. Additionally, in April 2004 a maximum-security facility, designated as Camp 5, was opened approximately one-half mile from Camp Delta. Camp 5 holds the most uncooperative individuals. The detainees at Camp 5 are housed in a modern, two-story, multi-winged complex that has the capacity to hold approximately 100 detainees. The aerial photograph below shows the relative locations of Camp Delta (which contains Camps 1-4 and the detainee hospital), Camp 5 and Camp X-Ray.

Camp Iguala is a lower-security detention facility that at one point held three juvenile combatants, aged 13 to 15 years, who had been captured in Afghanistan. These juveniles were repatriated to their home countries in early 2004.

(U) Evolution of the Command Organization

(U) The command organization at GTMO has evolved significantly over time. Simply stated, the most significant aspect of the current organization is that it places both intelligence and detention operations under the command of a single entity, designated Joint Task Force GTMO (JTF-GTMO), whereas the original organization had separate chains of command for intelligence and detention operations. This new structure has permitted greater cooperation among the military intelligence (MI) units that are responsible for interrogation and the military police (MP) units.
that are responsible for detention. In essence, this organization recognizes the primacy of the human intelligence collection mission at GTMO in support of the Global War on Terror, by ensuring a unity of effort between MI and MP units. This unity of effort between MI and MP units has been the subject of recent controversy in light of MP participation in many of the abuses perpetrated at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The details of the respective MI and MP roles (as well as a discussion of what those roles should be) are addressed elsewhere in the report; the purpose of the discussion here is merely to trace the evolution of the command organization at GTMO.

(U) Just prior to the arrival of the first detainees on January 11, 2002, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) established Joint Task Force 160 (JTF-160) to be responsible for the security and detention of the detainees arriving at GTMO. This joint task force was essentially an MP organization. BG Michael Lehner, USMC, originally commanded this task force, but was quickly succeeded by BG Rick Baccus, who took command on March 28, 2002.

(U) The existence of two, separate joint task forces created a bifurcated chain of command that impeded cooperation between the MI units in JTF-170 and the MP units in JTF-160 and did not establish priorities for their competing interrogation and detention missions. Two external reviews of intelligence operations at GTMO, the Harrington GTMO Report in March 2002 and the Clouter Report in September 2002, were critical of this command structure. COL Herrington’s Report, which was provided to MG Dunlavy as well as the Acting Commander of SOUTHCOM, MG Gary Speer, USA, was particularly pointed in its remarks. For example, the report called it a “basic principle of human intelligence exploitation” that the intelligence function must be supported by the security function, and observed that in GTMO, “the security mission is sometimes the tail wagging the intelligence dog.”

(U) In an effort to address this situation and improve the intelligence collection effort at GTMO, the SOUTHCOM Commander, General James T. Hill, USA, placed MG Dunlavy in charge of both JTF-170 and JTF-160 in October 2002. Shortly thereafter, on November 4, 2002, the two joint task
forces were combined and renamed Joint Task Force GTMO. MG Geoffrey Miller, USA was appointed to lead this new joint task force. MG Miller was succeeded by BG Jay Hood on March 24, 2004, when MG Miller was transferred to Iraq to be Deputy Commander for Detainee Operations, Multinational Force-Iraq. The structure of JTF-GTMO and its current leadership is depicted in the figure above.

(U) As illustrated above, both the Joint Interrogation Group (JIG), which is responsible for intelligence collection, and the Joint Detention Operations Group (JDOG), which is responsible for detainee security and handling, report to the JTF-GTMO Commander, who in turn reports to SOUTHCOM. The JDOG is composed of six MP companies. The centerpiece of the JIG is the Interrogation Control Element (ICE), which coordinates and supervises the efforts of MI interrogators, analysts and linguists (as well as civilian contract personnel who augment the military interrogation effort), in support of human intelligence exploitation. From the initiation of interrogation and detention
operations at GTMO to the present, MPs have outnumbered the detainees by a relatively constant ratio of approximately 1.5 to 1. MI and contract interrogators, on the other hand, have been in more limited supply, with each interrogator assigned to approximately 20 to 25 detainees at any one time.

GTMO Counter-Resistance Policy Development (U)

- 7 Feb 02: Presidential guidance on dealing with detainees humanely
- 16 Feb 02: JTF-170 begins interrogations
- 2 Dec 02: SECDEF memo approving Tier II, III
- 16 Jan 03: SECDEF memo
- 17 Jan 03: Working group convenes per SECDEF direction
- 17 Jan 03: USAF GC lead
- 25 Oct 02: SOUTHCOM requests approval to use Tier I, II, and III techniques
- 18 Mar 03: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM begins
- 21 Apr-2 Sep 03: MG Miller visit to Iraq

UNCLASSIFIED
Evolution of Approved Interrogation Techniques at GTMO (U)

(U) The interrogation techniques approved for use at GTMO have evolved significantly over time, and been the subject of much study and debate within the senior echelons of both the uniformed military and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The highlights of this evolution are depicted in the figure on the previous page, and described briefly below. This is followed by a detailed, chronological examination of the major events and points of debate that have shaped the development of approved interrogation techniques at GTMO.

(U) When JTF-170 was established at GTMO on February 16, 2002, the military interrogators assigned to the task force relied upon existing interrogation doctrine, found in Army Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, when questioning detainees. Over the next several months, however, it became clear that many of the detainees were familiar with these techniques and had been trained to resist them. This eventually led SOUTHCOM on October 22, 2002, to seek Secretary of Defense approval to use additional techniques beyond those specifically listed in FM 34-52, or what we will call "counter resistance" techniques.

(U) On December 2, 2002, the Secretary of Defense approved a limited number of the counter resistance techniques that SOUTHCOM had requested, but rescinded his approval on January 15, 2003. The Secretary then directed the DoD General Counsel to form a working group. The DoD General Counsel requested that the General Council of the Department of the Air Force, Mary Walker, chair the group, to assess the legal, policy and operational issues relating to interrogation of detainees in the Global War on Terror and to make recommendations on the use of specific interrogation techniques.

(U) This working group issued its final report on April 4, 2003, and recommended 35 interrogation techniques to be used against "unlawful combatants outside the United States" subject to limitations described later in this section. In an April 16, 2003 memorandum, however, the Secretary of Defense accepted for use in GTMO only 24 of the proposed techniques,
which included the 17 techniques already found in FM 34-52. This memorandum has remained in effect to the present.

(U) The Initial Development of “Counter Resistance” Techniques

(U) Within the first few months of interrogation operations at GTMO, it became apparent that many of the detainees were skilled at resisting the 17 interrogation techniques enumerated in FM 34-52, and likely had been trained on U.S. interrogation methods. COL John Custer, USA, who led a Joint Staff team from August 14 to September 10, 2002 in reviewing intelligence collection operations at GTMO, reflected this concern in his final report, which observed that “JTF-170 has experienced limited success in extracting information from many of the detainees at GTMO,” because “traditional [interrogation] techniques have proven themselves to be ineffective in many cases.” The report noted that “[m]any of the detainees have undoubtedly received vigorous resistance to interrogation training,” and that the detainees appeared to understand the Geneva Convention rules, as well as the traditional “US rules of engagement (limitations) regarding interrogations.”

(U) Members of al Qaeda, in particular, were likely to be schooled in resistance to interrogation. British forces, for example, had recovered an al Qaeda training manual from the apartment of an al Qaeda operative in Manchester, England on May 10, 2000. Now commonly referred to as the Manchester Document, this manual contained detailed information on interrogation resistance, including instructions that an al Qaeda “brother” must:

- (U) “plan for his interrogation by discussing it with his commander”
- (U) maintain his cover story by “saying only the things that you agreed upon with your commander,” and “executing the security plan that was agreed upon prior to execution of the operation and not deviating from it”
- (U) “pretend that the pain is severe by bending over and crying loudly” in the event that an interrogator applies physical coercion
- (U) “disobey the interrogator’s orders as much as he can by raising his voice [and] cursing the interrogator back”
- (U) “disobey the interrogator’s orders and take his time in executing them”
- (U) “proudly take a firm and opposing position against the enemy and not obey the orders”
- (U) “refuse to supply any information and deny his knowledge of the subject in question”
- (U) “not disclose any information, no matter how insignificant he might think it is, in order not to open a door that cannot be closed until he incriminates himself or exposes his Organization”
(U) "Remember the basic rule: even a little disclosure of information would increase your amount of torture and result in additional information for the questioning apparatus," and

(U) remain "patient, steadfast, and silent about any information whatsoever."

(U) Another difficulty that hampered interrogations at Gitmo was that interrogators did not have a clear understanding of the legal limits under which they were operating. While they did have FM 34-52 as a guide, this field manual was intended to guide interrogations of POWs and, therefore arguably was designed for a more restrictive environment than the one at Gitmo. The danger, then, was twofold. On the one hand, interrogators might believe that their hands were essentially tied by FM 34-52, and adopt an overly conservative approach that would fail to extract intelligence from resistant detainees. On the other hand, interrogators who believed that they were unconstrained by the dictates of FM 34-52 might adopt overly aggressive strategies that could lead to detainee abuse. Again, the Custer Report acknowledged this problem by observing that interrogators did not "have a clear, delineated understanding of all the tools that are at their disposal when interrogating detainees." COL Custer recommended that SOUTHCOM "produce a White Paper on 'Metrics for Interrogators' delineating what tools and measures are available and permissi-
The October 11, 2002 memorandum was declassified and released to the public on June 22, 2004. In the memorandum, MG Dunlavey noted that although the techniques then employed by interrogators in the Global War on Terror had “resulted in significant actionable intelligence, the same methods had become less effective over time.”

(U) MG Dunlavey's request divided these additional, counter resistance interrogation techniques into three categories, based upon the perceived severity of the techniques. Category I techniques could be employed by an interrogator as part of a normal interrogation plan, vetted by the interrogator's immediate supervisors. Each use of Category II techniques would require the approval of the Interrogation Section Officer in Charge (OIC). Category III techniques, the most aggressive, could only be used after obtaining approval from the JTF-170 Commander. Each use of Category III techniques would also require a legal review by the Command Judge Advocate and notification to the SOUTHCOM Commander. All of these techniques are listed in the figure on the following page.
JTF-170 Proposed Counter Resistance Techniques - October 11, 2002 (U)

(U) Category I techniques
- (U) Yelling at the detainee, but expressly excluding yelling that would cause pain or damage the detainee's hearing
- (U) The use of multiple interrogators
- (U) Deceiving the detainee by having the interrogator present a false identity. The assumption of a false identity would be intended to paint the interrogator as either a citizen of a foreign nation, or as an interrogator from a country with a reputation for harsh treatment of detainees

(U) Category II techniques
- (U) The use of stress positions (like standing), for a maximum of four hours
- (U) The use of falsified documents or reports
- (U) The use of an isolation facility for up to 30 days, with any extensions beyond the 30 days requiring approval from the JTF-170 Commander
- (U) Interrogation of the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation booth
- (U) Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli
- (U) The use of a hood placed over the detainee's head during transportation and questioning (the hood should not restrict breathing in any way and the detainee should be under direct observation when hooded)
- (U) The use of 20-hour interrogations
- (U) The removal of all comfort items (including religious items)
- (U) Switching the detainee's diet from hot meals to Meals, Ready-to-Eat (American military field ration)
- (U) Removal of clothing
- (U) Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc.)
- (U) The use of a detainee's individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress

(U) Category III techniques
- (U) The use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family
- (U) Exposure to cold weather or water (with appropriate medical monitoring)
- (U) The use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation
- (U) The use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing
MG Dunlavey indicated that the Category III techniques were "required for a very small percentage of the most uncooperative detainees," which he estimated to be "less than three percent" of those held at GTMO. Under the proposed policy, any of the most aggressive techniques that would "require more than light grabbing, poking or pushing" were to "be administered only by individuals specifically trained in their safe application."

The JTF-170 Staff Judge Advocate, wrote an extensive legal review of the interrogation and counter resistance policy proposed by MG Dunlavey. This legal review was declassified and released to the public by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on June 22, 2004. As a result of her legal review, which examined the proposed policy in light of domestic criminal law, the Uniform Codes of Military Justice, treaties, customary international law, and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, recommended that Category I techniques be approved for general use. She recommended that whenever "interrogations involving Category II and III methods" were planned, however, that the interrogations "undergo a legal review prior to their commencement."

The SOUTHCOM Commander, GEN Hill, forwarded JTF-170's request for approval of counter resistance techniques to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 25, 2002. GEN Hill noted that JTF-170 had "yielded critical intelligence support for forces... prosecuting the War on Terrorism," but that "despite our best efforts, some detainees have tenaciously resisted our current interrogation methods." He stated that he believed "the first two categories of techniques are legal and humane," but was uncertain whether all the techniques in the third category were "legal under U.S. law, given the absence of judicial interpretation of the U.S. torture statute." GEN Hill was particularly troubled by the use of implied or expressed threats of death against the detainees or his family. He requested, therefore, that the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice review the third category of techniques. Finally, GEN Hill urged quick action on JTF-170's request for counter resistance techniques in view of the pressing need for actionable intelligence.

On October 23, 2002, the Director of the Joint Staff, then-Lieutenant General John P. Abizaid, instructed the J-5 section of the Joint Staff, the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, to "take the lead in pulling this together quickly." On October 30, the J-5 section circulated MG Dunlavey's proposed techniques to the Joint Staff Office of Legal Counsel, J-2, J-3 and the service planners for comment, establishing a deadline of
November 7.

(U) The Debate Surrounding the Request for Counter Resistance Techniques
had revolted against the four hijackers before they could maneuver the plane into either the White House or the U.S. Capitol. In August 2001, Kahtani had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport, where the 9/11 lead hijacker, Mohamed Atta, was waiting for him. Thus, Kahtani is commonly referred to as the "20th hijacker." (We note for clarification that some news reports have also referred to Zacarias Moussaoui, who was arrested in connection with the 9/11 attacks, as the "20th hijacker"; however, it is more accurate to use this description with Kahtani.)

(U) The Interrogation Plan for Mohamed al Kahtani

(U) As discussion of JTF-170's request progressed, intelligence gathered from a variety of sources indicated that an al Qaeda operation against targets in the United States was likely or even imminent. Intelligence also indicated that Mohamed al Kahtani, a Saudi citizen and al Qaeda operative held at GTMO, possessed information that could facilitate United States action against that threat. As the 9/11 Commission Report observed, Kahtani was the operative who likely would have rounded out the team that hijacked United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed into an empty field in Shanksville, PA after the passengers
In an action memorandum dated November 27, 2002, Mr. Haynes recommended to the Secretary of Defense that he approve for use all of the Category I and II techniques, but only the last of the Category III techniques, authorizing mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with a finger, and light pushing. This recommendation therefore excluded the most aggressive Category III techniques - use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family, exposure to cold weather or water, and the use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation - that had particularly concerned both GEN Hill and representatives on the Joint Staff. Mr. Haynes noted in his forwarding memorandum that "[w]hile all Category III techniques may be legally available, we believe that, as a matter of policy, a blanket approval of Category III techniques is not warranted at this time." This reflected Mr. Haynes' view that "[o]ur Armed Forces are trained to a standard of interrogation that reflects a tradition of restraint."

(U) The Secretary of Defense accepted this recommendation on December 2, 2002 by noting his approval on Mr. Haynes' November 27, 2002 memorandum. Below his signature, the Secretary questioned why standing (which was listed as an
example under Category II stress positions) would be limited to 4 hours when he "stand[s] for 8-10 hours a day." This memorandum, with the Secretary's approval, was declassified and released to the public on June 22, 2004. For ease of reference, the counter resistance techniques approved by the Secretary on December 2, 2002 are listed in the figure below.

December 2, 2002 Approved Counter Resistance Interrogation Techniques (U)

(U) Category I:
1. (U) Yelling
2. (U) Use of multiple interrogators
3. (U) Deceiving the detainee by having the interrogator present a false identity

(U) Category II:
4. (U) Stress positions (like standing), for a maximum of four hours
5. (U) The use of falsified documents or reports
6. (U) Isolation for up to 30 days, with any extensions beyond the 30 days requiring approval from the JTF-GTMO Commander
7. (U) Interrogation of the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation booth
8. (U) Deprivation of light and auditory stimulus
9. (U) The use of a hood placed over the detainee's head during transportation and questioning
10. (U) The use of 20-hour interrogations
11. (U) The removal of all comfort items (including religious items)
12. (U) Switching the detainee's diet from hot meals to Meals, Ready-to-Eat (American military field rations)
13. (U) Removal of clothing
14. (U) Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc.)
15. (U) The use of a detainee's individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress

(U) Category III:
16. (U) The use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing

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