Humanitarian Law Project, et al. v. U.S. Department of Treasury

Synopsis

Humanitarian Law Project, et al. v. U.S. Department of Treasury is a case challenging President Bush’s Executive Order 13224 issued under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). This is a companion case to Humanitarian Law Project, et al. v. Reno and Humanitarian Law Project, et al. v. Ashcroft.

Status

Both CCR and the government recently filed appeals from a November 21, 2006 district court ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Description

Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Department of Treasury is a case filed on behalf of the same plaintiffs as in the previous HLP cases with the exception of the Northern California Tamil Association. It challenges President Bush’s Executive Order 13224 under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The plaintiffs are seeking additional injunctive and declaratory relief, enjoining defendants from enforcing against them the executive order prohibiting contributions of "services" to two organizations designated as “terrorist” groups: the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an advocate for self-determination of the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in Los Angeles seeking an injunction so that they may: aid the PKK and LTTE in training and advocacy as well as to provide legal services in aid of setting up institutions for providing humanitarian aid and in negotiating a peace agreement; to provide humanitarian aid directly to the PKK and LTTE; to provide engineering services and technological support to help rebuild the infrastructure in tsunami-afflicted areas; and to provide psychiatric counseling for survivors of the tsunami.

The 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) allows the President to declare a national emergency “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat.” The act also allows the President to designate groups and individuals and freeze their assets.

Just as with the challenge to the "material support" statute, this case challenges the IEEPA ban on three sets of legal grounds: the ban on services is unconstitutionally vague, because it encompasses many areas of activity protected by the first amendment; the scheme imposes criminal liability and civil penalties without proof of specific intent to further the banned group's illegal activities; and the scheme creates a wholly unfettered licensing authority, imposing no statutory limitations on the Executive's discretion to designate groups as subject to the prohibitions, or on the granting of licenses to provide otherwise prohibited support to such groups once they are proscribed.

Pursuant to IEEPA, President Bush declared a national emergency in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. He issued Executive Order (EO) 13224 prohibiting any contributions of services to hundreds of "Specially Designated Global Terrorists," including the PKK and LTTE. Regulations implementing this order (the "Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations") were created by the Treasury Department in 2003. Willful violations of Presidential orders or regulations validly issued pursuant to IEEPA are criminal offenses. All other violations are subject to substantial civil penalties

 

Timeline

This suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in Los Angeles.

On November 21, 2006, Judge Collins issued her decision on the IEEPA claims and found that the contested prohibition was not unconstitutionally vague. She found partially in favor of the plaintiffs, agreeing with CCR that it would be unconstitutional to allow the President to designate our plaintiff groups as terrorist organizations simply because they were "otherwise associated with" a previously designated group (such as the LTTE or PKK). The court found that the Executive Order gave the President "unfettered discretion" to brand organizations as 'terrorist', and also cited the absence of "definable criteria for designating individuals and groups as [terrorist organizations]" as well as the "penalties for mere association" threatened by this designation power as her bases for finding it unconstitutional.

However, Judge Collins held that the criminal prohibition on providing "services" to designated organizations was not unconstitutionally vague – in contrast to her previous finding that the material support statute's ban on "services" was void for vagueness – and rejected plaintiffs' licensing claims.

Both CCR and the government filed appeals to Judge Collins’ decision recently in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.