

6951CENC Oral Argument

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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2
3 CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
3 RIGHTS, et al.,

4
4 Plaintiffs,

5 v. 06-CV-00313 (GEL)

6
6 GEORGE W. BUSH, et al.,
7
7 Defendants.

8
8 -----x
9 New York, N.Y.
9 September 5, 2006
10 2:00 p.m.

11 Before:

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12 HON. GERARD E. LYNCH,
12
13 District Judge

14 APPEARANCES

15 CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
15 For Plaintiffs
16 SHAYANA KADIDAL

16
17 NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD
17 For Plaintiffs
18 MICHAEL AVERY, Professor of Law

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19 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
19 For Defendants
20 ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO, Special Litigation Counsel

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 (Case called)

2 THE CLERK: Counsel, please state your names for the
3 record.

4 THE COURT: Everyone be can be seated, please.
5 Counsel?

6 MR. KADIDAL: Good afternoon, your Honor. My name is
7 Shayana Kadidal for the plaintiffs, and I'm with the Center for
8 Constitutional Rights.

9 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Kadidal.

10 MR. AVERY: Your Honor, my name is Michael Avery. I'm
11 with the National Lawyers Guild representing the Center for
12 Constitutional Rights.

13 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Avery.

14 William Goodman on behalf of the plaintiffs, your
15 Honor.

16 THE COURT: And Mr. Goodman. And for the government?

17 MR. COPPOLINO: Good afternoon, your Honor. Anthony
18 Coppolino from the Department of Justice Civil Division for the
19 government.

20 THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Coppolino.

21 MR. NICHOLS: Your Honor, Carl Nichols also with the
22 government.

23 MR. HUNT: Your Honor, Joseph Hunt, also with the
24 government.

25 MR. TANNENBAUM: Good afternoon, your Honor. Andrew
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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 Tannenbaum, also with the government.

2 THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon, gentlemen.

3 Before hearing from the parties, I want to say a few
4 words about what we're doing here and what I expect to happen
5 today. First, I feel that I owe the parties some explanation
6 as to the timing of this proceeding. The case has been pending
7 for quite some time, no doubt to the plaintiffs' dismay. This
8 case raises difficult and important issues, and it seemed
9 important to me not to rush to deal with issues that might be
10 resolved or altered in some way politically by a change in the
11 law.

12 The plaintiffs argue here that the President of the
13 United States is violating a law passed by Congress and signed
14 into law by the then president. The president argues in
15 response that his actions are both lawful and important to the
16 national security.

17 When the case was first filed, it seemed very possible
18 that Congress would respond to the national security interests
19 at stake by passing legislation that would make the law
20 clearer, at least on its prospective basis, one way or the
21 other, and I felt it would be imprudent for a judge to rush to
22 resolve difficult statutory and constitutional issues that
23 might be mooted or radically transformed by Congressional
24 action. That has not happened. I certainly mean no criticism
25 of Congress, which is perfectly entitled to leave the law as it

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 is if that's what Congress wants to do. But at any rate, it
2 became reasonably clear as the summer began that there was no
3 immediate prospect that the courts would not have to resolve
4 the issues as posed.

5 Then, at the government's request, I waited for the
6 Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to decide if all the
7 cases around the country raising these issues should go to a
8 single court. As I perhaps should have foreseen, the panel's
9 action in this regard was not conclusive and it seems that
10 further proceedings before that panel are anticipated to decide
11 whether this case will be transferred along with cases brought
12 against private third parties. Again, I have no complaint with
13 that decision or criticism of that, and maybe it's something I
14 should have foreseen from the posture of the case, but it seems
15 that it will not be until, at the earliest, sometime in mid to
16 late October before that matter is resolved. And it seems to
17 me that I've done what I responsibly could to avoid
18 precipitative action. There's only so long that a court can
19 justify deferring action on a matter within its jurisdiction.
20 The courts have an obligation to proceed to decide the cases
21 before them.

22 Plaintiffs say their rights have been violated by
23 unlawful action. Both sides have filed various motions asking
24 the Court to do various things or not do various things, and it
25 seems to me that it's time to proceed with those motions.

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 Second, I want to say a word about what I've done and
2 not done in preparation for these proceedings so that the
3 parties have some understanding of what I know and don't know.
4 I have read all of the parties' extensive public briefing and I
5 have at least surveyed most of the numerous amicus briefs and
6 read many of them in detail. I've reviewed the supporting
7 materials submitted by the parties in the public record and a
8 great deal of the relevant case law.

9 What I have not yet done is to read the government's
10 classified submissions. It's not at all, I hasten to add, that
11 I refuse to read them or anything like that. I believe the
12 submissions are perfectly proper and appropriate and I will
13 most assuredly read them before taking any action on any of
14 these motions. But this is a public argument and I did not
15 want to risk either inadvertent disclosure of classified
16 material or even the appearance of such disclosure. In an oral
17 exchange, unlike in a written opinion, the parties or the Court
18 could -- the Court is what I'm really worried about at this
19 moment -- could inadvertently let something slip out without
20 the opportunity to think about it and check it and make sure
21 that that's not something that was classified. Moreover, in
22 this kind of argument, either the parties or the Court might
23 raise certain hypotheticals or assume certain facts or suggest
24 certain possibilities. As the government argues and as I know
25 from previous experience with highly classified materials,

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 sometimes information is classified to protect sources or
2 intelligence methods or because actions that are commonly
3 assumed to have taken place or are guessed at ought not be
4 officially acknowledged. I don't want there to be any
5 ambiguity or any inference that if I ask a question during this
6 proceeding, what if the president does this or that for
7 such-and-such reason or suppose that the classified program at
8 issue really looks like this or really looks like that, if I
9 ask such questions, I don't want it to be assumed that this
10 represents any kind of signal that that concern was raised by
11 my reading of classified information. So I want to emphasize
12 that I am so far as ignorant as the plaintiffs or the public of
13 what is in the government's classified submissions. I know
14 nothing more at this point than is in the public record.

15 Finally, as to our procedure here today, this is not a
16 public debate about the wisdom or the appropriateness or the
17 desirability of certain forms of electronic surveillance. In
18 fact, I don't anticipate this afternoon that we're even going
19 to have a full airing of the legal arguments that are relevant
20 to this case. The parties have submitted hundreds of pages of
21 briefing on the legal issues in the case. I have read them.
22 And so I believe I understand the basic positions of each side
23 and there's not much need for me to hear the parties repeat in
24 a condensed form what they've already put in detail in writing.
25 I expect to spend most of our time this afternoon asking

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 specific questions that I had after reading those papers. This
2 may be frustrating to spectators because it will not
3 necessarily allow for a clear flow of debate nor for a full
4 presentation of issues by either side or of the positions of
5 either side, but the purpose here is to help me to decide the
6 issues presented by the case by getting answers or
7 clarifications of particular points of concern to me.

8 Finally, for the parties, I do not expect that we will
9 address all the issues in this case this afternoon, certainly
10 not in any detail. I intend to focus mostly on what may be
11 called the threshold questions raised by the government's
12 motion to dismiss and on the substantive questions of statutory
13 interpretation and of presidential power that are raised by the
14 motions. I expect to devote little time to the Fourth and
15 First Amendment issues raised by the plaintiffs' position.

16 There are a lot of legal issues in the case. They're
17 interrelated in complicated ways. There are a variety of ways
18 that the matter before me might be resolved without reaching
19 all of the issues in the case. So I want to take them up in
20 the order the parties have raised them and in the order that I
21 think is logically and analytically appropriate and see what
22 progress we can make. It's entirely possible that I might
23 later order additional arguments on matters that we don't get
24 to today.

25 So I want to start with the government's motion to

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 dismiss, which asks me to dismiss the case without reaching the
2 merits on the ground that the case necessarily turns on facts
3 that may not be disclosed because of the state secret
4 privilege.

5 I want to quote a sentence from the government's reply
6 brief at page 2 and see whether this represents common ground
7 or is contested. The government says this: Whether this case
8 may proceed turns on whether the evidence necessary to decide
9 the claims implicates facts that must remain secret in the
10 interests of national security. And I think from the
11 briefing -- and I want to confirm this with the parties, that
12 I'm correct to assume that this is common ground as a statement
13 of law. And it's not a trick question.

14 I put it to the government first. Mr. Coppolino, I
15 take it that that means that the government is not contending
16 that this is a case like *Totten v. United States*, where there's
17 a categorical bar to deciding the case; it's just that in the
18 government's view, the merits of the various arguments turn on
19 particular information as to which the privilege would properly
20 be asserted or is being asserted.

21 MR. COPPOLINO: Your Honor, it's not a case like
22 *Totten* in the sense that the categorical bar in *Totten* applied
23 to a specific type of relationship between the government and
24 an entity, an espionage relationship, and certainly that is not
25 at issue in this case.

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 However, I would hasten to add that Totten has been
2 cited in other state secrets cases for the proposition that,
3 where the very subject matter of the lawsuit implicates state
4 secrets from the beginning, it cannot proceed. There are three
5 grounds for dismissal based on state secrets.

6 THE COURT: Well, wait, wait, wait. I mean, I hear
7 that and I understand that you've quoted it to that effect, but
8 going back to what I just read, the grounds that you are
9 actually raising here have to do with the plaintiffs can't
10 establish standing without state secrets; the evidence
11 necessary for them to establish their position on the merits
12 requires state secrets; what you would need to do to respond to
13 the summary judgment motion requires state secrets. These are
14 the three things you were going to say, right?

15 MR. COPPOLINO: That's correct, your Honor, but I'd
16 like to just add this conclusion: As a result of those three
17 things, we also believe the case falls into the category of
18 whether the very subject matter implicates the state secret
19 because --

20 THE COURT: Well, but, I mean, in order to decide
21 whether this rhetorical thing about it's in the category works
22 or not, I have to answer those three specific questions --

23 MR. COPPOLINO: Yes.

24 THE COURT: -- about what is necessary to decide
25 particular issues that might come up in the case.

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 MR. COPPOLINO: Yes.

2 THE COURT: Okay. And in order to do that, I realize
3 you've raised this at the very beginning of the case,
4 although -- and the plaintiffs devote a lot of rhetoric to the
5 idea that you're trying to cut this off at the beginning and so
6 on. But in a certain sense it isn't the beginning of the case
7 because they're asking for summary judgment. They think it's
8 the end of the case. And you're raising it in response to
9 their particular arguments, right?

10 MR. COPPOLINO: We would have filed our motion to
11 dismiss precisely the same even if they hadn't moved for
12 summary judgment. Our motion to dismiss is responsive to their
13 motion for summary judgment in the sense that, having set forth
14 their particular claims and arguments in favor of them, we have
15 gone through each of those and identified for you why we think
16 facts are -- state secrets are necessary to resolve that.

17 I would hasten to add as a procedural matter, your
18 Honor, we think that our motion is the threshold motion to be
19 decided, not only because it addresses the issue of standing
20 but in particular because where privilege is asserted and the
21 issue is the availability of evidence, it seems to us that that
22 has to be decided before you can reach the merits.

23 THE COURT: Well, let me talk about the standing issue
24 first and maybe that will make my question a little clearer.
25 As I understand the plaintiffs' position, the plaintiffs are

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 not arguing that they have standing because they've been
2 overheard, they are not alleging that they've been overheard,
3 they're not even alleging on information and belief that
4 they've been overheard. Rather, what they're saying is that
5 they have standing because of a particular theory that they
6 have and particular allegations that they make. I guess I
7 should check out, Mr. Kadidal, I'm right about that, am I not?

8 MR. KADIDAL: Well, actually, I believe at paragraphs
9 5 and 43 of the complaint, we do indicate that, you know, on
10 information and belief that we would have been -- that we are
11 likely to be targets of this program and therefore that we
12 believe that we were targets of the program.

13 THE COURT: Well, you say --

14 MR. KADIDAL: But it's not essential to our standing.

15 THE COURT: You say you're likely to be, but are you
16 alleging that you've actually been overheard?

17 MR. KADIDAL: I believe we do allege that that is
18 something that, you know, on information and belief, we
19 probably could prove if --

20 THE COURT: Well, do you contest that it would be
21 proper for the government to assert the state secrets privilege
22 with respect to confirming or denying who exactly has or has
23 not been overheard under this program?

24 MR. KADIDAL: Well, we don't think it's necessary to
25 establish our standing.

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 THE COURT: I didn't ask you that. I asked you, are
2 you contesting that that would be a proper assertion of the
3 state secrets privilege?

4 MR. KADIDAL: I think we are.

5 THE COURT: All right. So that's an issue that maybe
6 I have to address.

7 But Mr. Coppolino, to get back to where I was, I
8 understand that you argue that the plaintiffs' theory of
9 standing is inadequate and, based on their theory, the case
10 should be dismissed; if that's the only ground for standing,
11 they're out of court, right?

12 MR. COPPOLINO: Whatever their grounding for standing
13 is, our argument --

14 THE COURT: No, no, please, answer the question that I
15 asked.

16 MR. COPPOLINO: Yes.

17 THE COURT: I'm asking, if the plaintiffs' theory as
18 to why they have standing is incorrect and they don't have
19 standing, then the case needs to be dismissed without reaching
20 state secrets issues.

21 MR. COPPOLINO: That's correct. It could be dismissed
22 on the allegations in the pleading as insufficient to establish
23 standing. Under --

24 THE COURT: And if I disagree with you and find that
25 those allegations are sufficient to establish standing, then

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 the case can go forward at least that far before reaching any
2 state secret issue; in other words, the standing argument
3 stands alone.

4 MR. COPPOLINO: I disagree in this respect: The
5 standing issue then becomes a fact issue and we'd move for
6 summary judgment as well on the state secrets grounds, and as
7 in Halkin in the DC Circuit, the fact issue then becomes
8 whether state secrets are necessary to adjudicate the issue of
9 standing as a factual matter.

10 THE COURT: Well, which factual matters that they
11 allege, that they allege, not what you think is necessary for
12 them to establish as standing, but what they allege, how does
13 state secrets bear on that?

14 MR. COPPOLINO: In two ways, your Honor. They do
15 allege that they've actually been intercepted on information
16 and belief. That's, as Mr. Kadidal pointed out, paragraph 43
17 of the complaint. With respect to that allegation of injury,
18 the primary defense is that state secrets are not available to
19 confirm or deny whether they've actually been subject to
20 surveillance.

21 THE COURT: Let's suppose I'm with you on that. Let's
22 suppose for the moment that I would sustain that allegation or
23 that assertion of privilege and that that allegation falls by
24 the wayside. After all, the plaintiffs say that's not
25 necessary to their standing case. So on their theory, where do

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 state secrets become relevant to decide the factual issues
2 which -- and I'm going to try and characterize their argument
3 and I'll have to have them do that again later, because maybe I
4 have it wrong, but as I understand it, the argument is that the
5 very existence of this program puts them in a position where
6 they can't do certain things vis-à-vis their clients or their
7 clients won't do certain things vis-à-vis them and that is an
8 injury.

9 MR. COPPOLINO: If you were to conclude that the
10 allegation is sufficient that -- which we would contest, and
11 have contested --

12 THE COURT: I understand that.

13 MR. COPPOLINO: -- then the state secrets issue there
14 goes to the scope and operation of the program. Because
15 they're contesting that the scope of the program covers them.
16 That is inherently a factual issue. It is not enough to say
17 that the scope on the public record includes the surveillance
18 of Al Qaeda. Rather, it is necessary, it would be something
19 that we would demonstrate as a factual matter, if we could, how
20 the program works, what is its scope, does it target people in
21 the manner in which they have alleged, for example, attorneys
22 representing former Guantanamo detainees or other types of
23 detainees. Does it target family members, witnesses, expert
24 witnesses, counsel, does it work in the way they've alleged,
25 and if we can show you as a factual matter that the scope and

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 operation of the program was much narrower, if we could show
2 you that the way NSA goes about picking targets, how they
3 choose those targets and how they proceed to surveil those
4 targets would demonstrate to you that their allegations are
5 unfounded, that they're built on speculation; that if we could
6 show you that to defend that involves state secrets, as we're
7 convinced it does, then that second allegation of injury, that
8 they're threatened by the existence of the program, also fails
9 on state secrets grounds.

10 In fact, I would say, your Honor, that while I think
11 we have a very substantial defense that that allegation of
12 injury by the existence of the program is foreclosed by Laird
13 on the face of the complaint, nonetheless, even that allegation
14 runs into factual issues because it inherently puts the scope
15 and nature and operation of the program at issue. And just one
16 quick example --

17 THE COURT: Excuse me. Is there anything in the
18 classified submissions that describes any of that for my
19 purposes?

20 MR. COPPOLINO: Well, the classified submission I can
21 just say generally describes --

22 THE COURT: Well, I want to be very careful, and I
23 appreciate that you need to be very careful. I'm trying not to
24 ask anything about the substance of what's in there. I guess
25 what I'm trying to get at in a very general way, not just about

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 this question, it has not been my impression from the public
2 filings that any classified submission by the government in
3 this case sets forth -- how to put it -- what you would have in
4 your summary judgment papers in full if there were no
5 classification or state secret issues. Do you understand what
6 I'm asking?

7 MR. COPPOLINO: I do understand what you're asking,
8 your Honor, and while I would not describe our submissions as a
9 full summary judgment presentation, I would say to you, though,
10 that we have submitted a classified version of our brief which
11 attempts to plug in the facts at the particular point where we
12 say facts are necessary both as to standing and on the merits.

13 And in addition, to go back to your original question,
14 the declarations we've submitted describe the nature,
15 operation, scope of the program in detail. And this is the
16 very evidence that we believe would be necessary --

17 THE COURT: Okay. That's the answer to my question.
18 I appreciate it.

19 All right. Let me turn to Mr. Kadidal for a moment
20 with respect to some both factual and legal questions about
21 your position on standing. First of all, is it stated in the
22 record that you have actual clients that you have to
23 communicate with who you allege are either members or
24 associates of Al Qaeda or who have been accused by the
25 government of being members or associates of Al Qaeda?

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 MR. KADIDAL: Right. We certainly don't allege that
2 they're members of Al Qaeda, but the government does. And our
3 contention, obviously, and here in the lawsuits in which we
4 work on behalf of those clients is that in fact the government,
5 you know, hasn't produced any evidence they are member of Al
6 Qaeda, and insists it doesn't have to. But just to give you
7 some examples, Maher Arar is probably the most prominent --

8 THE COURT: Mr. Arar is the one I focused on most in
9 your papers. On page 10 of your summary judgment brief, you
10 say the government asserts that Mr. Arar is associated with Al
11 Qaeda, but at least at that point there's not a citation to the
12 record or to some other place that says, here's where they did
13 that. Is that something that is in the record, or can you tell
14 me where and when the government has said that about Mr. Arar?

15 MR. KADIDAL: Sure. I can tell you that in open court
16 in the proceedings in Mr. Arar's civil suit against the
17 government, the government's attorneys stood up and announced
18 that he was a member of Al Qaeda, and I believe they've done
19 that repeatedly in their papers in that case.

20 THE COURT: That's somewhere in the record or if it's
21 not, you can support it?

22 MR. KADIDAL: Right. I think it's in the public
23 record at some point.

24 THE COURT: Are there other people in that category,
25 again, people that the government has publicly indicated are

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 associates of Al Qaeda?

2 MR. KADIDAL: Sure. Well, the government and the
3 media has indicated that Mohammad al-Qahtani, a Guantanamo
4 detainee, a relatively prominent Guantanamo detainee, whose
5 interrogation logs are published in Time magazine, that he is a
6 member of Al Qaeda. I don't believe they've said that directly
7 in any court filings. However, the government has indicated
8 that basically all Guantanamo detainees are either considered
9 to be associated with the Taliban or with Al Qaeda and that the
10 Taliban is an organization that's considered to be associated
11 with Al Qaeda. And therefore, in Alberto Gonzales' public
12 description of the scope of the program, he said, you know, the
13 surveillance is directed against persons when the executive has
14 a reasonable basis to conclude that one party of the
15 communication is a member of Al Qaeda, affiliated with Al Qaeda
16 or a member of an organization affiliated with Al Qaeda or in
17 support of Al Qaeda. And that's a relatively narrow
18 characterization of the target class for this surveillance.
19 There are broader ones we cite in our summary judgment brief.

20 But I think it's important to point out to the Court
21 that the action that causes injury to us is the public
22 announcement of the threat here. Essentially, it's no
23 different than if the president, you know, published something
24 in the Federal Register saying what Alberto Gonzales said in
25 that press conference, that we are intending to surveil anybody

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 who's, you know, a member of Al Qaeda or an affiliated
2 organization or anyone associated with any of those
3 organizations.

4 THE COURT: So you're saying you're injured regardless
5 of whether there even is such a program. Your injury stems
6 from the announcement of the program.

7 MR. KADIDAL: That's right. If the government came
8 out tomorrow and said, look, we were only kidding about this
9 whole thing, I think that we still are looking at, you know,
10 the injury from the countermeasures that we as attorneys have a
11 professional responsibility to take. To then --

12 THE COURT: Right. The only thing that's illegal,
13 according to you, I take it, is if they're actually doing it.
14 FISA doesn't say, the government shan't ever pretend that it's
15 engaged in surveillance of XYZ without getting a warrant first;
16 it says they can't do it.

17 MR. KADIDAL: Right. We're still -- obviously, we
18 still have an injury that comes from a government action that I
19 believe would probably still be actionable under --

20 THE COURT: But it may be actionable, but there has to
21 be a connection for you to have standing between the injury and
22 the illegality that's asserted, right?

23 MR. KADIDAL: Right. Well, first of all, I think
24 still our First Amendment claims would be there as to that sort
25 of action. But --

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 THE COURT: I mean, suppose the program turns out to
2 be something of a paper tiger. Suppose it turns out that yes,
3 the president has created this program in the belief that
4 certain surveillance may need to be done that's otherwise
5 prohibited by FISA and that the way that it has been described
6 in public by him and by the attorney general and others sets
7 forth the justification in political and/or legal terms for
8 doing it, that it's got to do with Al Qaeda members and so on.
9 But the actual program, let us hypothesize, only targets
10 certain particular core Al Qaeda members who the government has
11 reason to believe have contact with certain people in the
12 United States and it's not at all that once somebody is
13 identified as Al Qaeda, they're on any phone that that person
14 might ever hit in the United States. It's just, they think
15 they know who Osama bin Laden in person is talking to in the
16 United States and that's what they're on about. If that were
17 so and that were publicly announced and that were not any kind
18 of secret, you wouldn't have much injury, right?

19 MR. KADIDAL: If the really sort of qualified version
20 that you're describing was publicly announced?

21 THE COURT: Yes.

22 MR. KADIDAL: Well, you know, I think some of our
23 clients do fall into that sort of core, you know, category, at
24 least as far as the government believes. Certainly someone,
25 you know, like al-Qahtani who they have, you know, alleged in

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 the media is a 20th hijacker candidate and certainly the
2 associates of his or family members or whoever we might need to
3 interview in the course of, you know, sort of carrying out his
4 litigation, his habeas petition, those individuals that we need
5 to communicate with, those communications might still fall into
6 that very, very narrow category.

7 But be that as it may, it's not the case we're faced
8 with here. We're faced with a relatively broad program as it's
9 been announced by the attorney general, by General Hayden and
10 so forth. And I think it's really no different than the
11 president, you know, sort of publishing that as a surveillance
12 program that the government is about to undertake or is
13 undertaking in the Federal Register.

14 THE COURT: And if the government did announce this
15 program in the Federal Register, as you say, in the terms in
16 which it's been stated by the attorney general, your position
17 is, number one, that violates FISA, and number two, the
18 creation of that program is what creates the inhibitions on
19 communication and so forth that constitute your injury.

20 MR. KADIDAL: Absolutely. I mean, it's the threat
21 that creates the injury, in the same way that the Ninth Circuit
22 in the Presbyterian Church case said that the threat of future
23 surveillance that was implicit in the fact that the church had
24 been subject to infiltration is what drove away other
25 parishioners, that is what caused the clergy members to have to

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 spend time dealing with the fears of surveillance among
2 parishioners.

3 THE COURT: One of the things that the government
4 argues in its papers is that you can't really be serious that
5 before -- I'm characterizing their argument -- that before this
6 program was announced, you didn't have to take basically
7 similar measures in protecting attorney/client confidentiality.
8 Are you taking the position that before the announcement of
9 this program, it was consistent with your professional
10 obligations to talk to any of these people that we've been
11 talking about so far or any of the witnesses in their cases
12 without any concern that you were being intercepted pursuant to
13 FISA or Title III or by foreign intelligence services that
14 might cooperate with the United States? This was just not --
15 did this at least, whether it was a concern or a possibility,
16 this was not something that an attorney needs to take
17 countermeasures against before having a confidential
18 communication with a client.

19 MR. KADIDAL: Right. Well, you know, obviously that's
20 not the case for all communications prior to the announcement
21 of this program and, you know, we're not here to get into
22 details about what we did or didn't do prior to the program.
23 But I think that argument from the government fails for a
24 number of reasons, some of which we've laid out in our briefs.

25 First of all, probably most importantly, the measures

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 that our government could take to carry out lawful surveillance
2 under FISA or Title III all include statutory minimization
3 requirements that are specifically there to protect the
4 confidentiality of privileged communications. And those are
5 specifically judicially overseen minimization requirements,
6 right, so when we talk in our brief about how judges ask for
7 returns on these warrants, they supervise how the minimization
8 procedures are being implemented. There's a little bit of a
9 back-and-forth process that's contemplated. Obviously it's a
10 little ambiguous how these things are implemented in practice,
11 but that's the general sort of --

12 THE COURT: But your answer is privileged
13 conversations are -- attorney/client privileged conversations
14 are off limits under FISA and Title III.

15 MR. KADIDAL: Right. That's basically it. And --

16 THE COURT: And are they not off limits under this
17 program?

18 MR. KADIDAL: Well, the one thing we know about this
19 program is that, you know, while there have been claims made
20 that there are, you know, minimization aspects to it, they're
21 not judicially supervised minimization procedures. By
22 definition --

23 THE COURT: But we don't know whether this program
24 would categorically exclude attorney/client communications
25 based on anything in the public record, granting that there's

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 no judicial supervision over how that minimization would be
2 done, assuming it is done, do we? We don't know that, do we?

3 MR. KADIDAL: It's funny that you use the word
4 categorically exclude because in a series of answers which we
5 cite I believe in our opposition brief -- these were answers
6 that the justice department submitted in response to questions
7 from minority members of the House, I believe, and they said
8 that in fact, attorney/client communications and also
9 doctor/patient communications were not going to be
10 categorically excluded from the scope of the program, or were
11 not categorically excluded from the scope of the program. So
12 there is something in the public record that speaks to that
13 directly.

14 THE COURT: Okay. And so your position on that point,
15 at any rate, is that at least as regards what the United States
16 government does, the Terrorist Surveillance Program permits, as
17 has been stated in public record, the capture of at least some
18 attorney/client communications, while FISA and Title III do
19 not.

20 MR. KADIDAL: Right. I wouldn't say that
21 categorically about FISA and Title III. I mean, obviously if
22 there was implication --

23 THE COURT: There are circumstances under which such
24 communications might be overheard and might even be legally
25 overheard and legally usable, but basically the minimization

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 provisions make strenuous efforts to exclude that, whereas
2 under this program, the public record suggests that that is not
3 done.

4 MR. KADIDAL: That's right. And, you know, obviously
5 I think the most important point is that the fact that whatever
6 minimization is taking place behind the scenes with the NSA
7 program is not judicially supervised.

8 THE COURT: Okay. All right. The other thing I
9 wanted to ask you is, can you, just as succinctly as possible,
10 in simple words that I can really grasp in a practical manner,
11 how is this different from Laird? That's the heart of the
12 government's case, it seems to me, is Laird v. Tatum says, as
13 they read it, you just can't get standing by saying the
14 government has announced some kind of program and we're worried
15 and our people are worried that we're in it and that chills us
16 in various ways. That's how they read Laird. And there's a
17 lot of language in Laird, at least if you take out the cryptic
18 "without more," that sounds like that's what it's saying. So
19 what's different about this case? Forget the specific language
20 of Laird for a moment. How do you distinguish the facts of
21 Laird from the facts of this case in such a way that there was
22 no injury granting standing in Laird and there is injury
23 granting standing here?

24 MR. KADIDAL: Right. Well, I mean, I think the most
25 important aspect here is that, you know, Frank Askin, bless his

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 soul, stood up in front of the Supreme Court and said, these
2 are people who are not cowed by this surveillance, they are
3 here to speak on behalf of others who are chilled by the
4 existence of this sort of Army surveillance, Army intelligence
5 program.

6 If you look at Laird, I mean, the government tries to
7 characterize Laird basically as, you know, setting forward this
8 rule that any governmental exercise of power has to be either
9 regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory in order to create harm
10 that could underlie standing, that in a word could allow you to
11 maintain standing, and that's absolutely not the case for the
12 reasons we lay out in our reply brief. We cited a number of
13 cases, Ninth and Tenth Circuit cases in particular, where they
14 say, in fact --

15 THE COURT: You've got your Presbyterians from the
16 Ninth Circuit, he's got his Presbyterians from DC.

17 MR. KADIDAL: Actually, the Presbyterians in DC were
18 our Presbyterians, as it works out, although, again, I don't
19 think that their allegations there were particularly strong in
20 the DC United Presbyterian Church case. Their allegations of
21 harm were actually relatively weak. But if you look up and
22 down the Laird opinion, that can't be the holding because if it
23 were, the Court would have announced it in a very succinct
24 fashion. But instead, they look at the sort of allegations of
25 harm in a kind of more holistic manner and I think that's

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 consistent with what the Supreme Court does in all cases,
2 including the --

3 THE COURT: I'm with you on that. That is, I don't
4 think that this case can be governed or any case can be
5 governed by taking some phrase, whichever side it favors, out
6 of Laird and saying, there's the rule, now we plug in three
7 facts and we get an answer. But what I'm really trying to get
8 at is, what was the problem in Laird? Why was Laird so much
9 worse a case for the plaintiffs than yours? Is it just that
10 they conceded that they were not chilled? In which case it
11 also would have been a very easy case to decide, I suppose, and
12 it wasn't decided, as far as I can see, on that ground. They
13 admit they are not chilled, end of story, they're not injured,
14 everybody goes home. It was decided on a different holistic
15 view. So what fell short in Laird that they didn't have that
16 you've got?

17 MR. KADIDAL: Right. Let me say something general
18 about this and then move to what I think was specifically
19 absent in Laird, or a series of things that were specifically
20 absent. The Supreme Court said, or Chief Justice Burger said,
21 allegations of a subjective chill are not an adequate
22 substitute for a claim of specific present subjective harm or
23 threat of specific future harm. And this notion of
24 subjectivity runs throughout Laird.

25 I think Laird and the subsequent cases show a concern

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 about the objectivity of two elements in the analysis here.
2 First is that the fear causing plaintiffs to be deterred from
3 acting should be objectively reasonable; and second, that the
4 harm asserted should be something tangible, objective in that
5 sense, you know, not necessarily sort of vague psychological
6 injury or something of that like but instead have the what the
7 courts refers to, the Supreme Court refers to in subsequent
8 cases as concrete harm.

9 So you've got the objectivity of the fear, and you've
10 got the objectivity of the resultant harm, right? So, and I
11 think that theme runs throughout the cases from the, you know,
12 the environmental cases to all the other standing cases that
13 the Supreme Court has decided over the years since Laird.

14 So if you look at the facts in Laird and tie it back
15 to this, you've got, first of all, the fact that there wasn't
16 an actual chill there and, you know, we cite not only places
17 that the Supreme Court describes that in somewhat ambiguous
18 terms but maybe the slightly stronger version that the DC
19 Circuit, slightly stronger description of the fact that they
20 basically weren't chilled that the DC Circuit puts forward. We
21 cite those in our briefs. And then there are factors that the
22 Supreme Court found would make it not objectively reasonable
23 for the plaintiffs to have any fear, and, given the
24 circumstances that they were facing, whatever the actual fear
25 that they had in their hearts was.

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 So, you know, Chief Justice Burger says that the
2 program was of known scope and that scope was not a vast one,
3 that there are only about 60 agents, as you can do the math
4 from his description, who were working on this nationwide.

5 And then the surveillance was lawful, which is a
6 really very essential factor there. He said basically that
7 it's simply what any good journalist could have gathered, that
8 there are obviously good reasons why unlawful surveillance is
9 held by subsequent cases to be, you know, sort of a pretty good
10 foundational place for standing to be based on.

11 So you've got cases like Riggs and Jabara,
12 Philadelphia Society of Friends --

13 THE COURT: Let me try and jump ahead then. In Laird
14 the allegation or the chill was, the allegation was the chill
15 is caused by what the government might someday do with the
16 information that it gathered legally, right? Which sounds
17 awfully hypothetical, I must admit.

18 MR. KADIDAL: Yeah. It's basically a speculative
19 chain of causality leading to any sort of objective harm in the
20 future. So that's the last element I think that's missing.

21 THE COURT: Whereas here you're saying the harm that
22 you're experiencing is caused by the government's announcement
23 that it's doing something that is, on your theory, illegal.

24 MR. KADIDAL: Right. Right. And by the things that
25 we are obligated by our professional responsibilities to do in

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 response to that.

2 THE COURT: And you referred to the fact that, cited
3 by Chief Justice Burger, that the program in Laird was of known
4 scope. I don't know who's got more catch-22s in this argument,
5 but you're suggesting that -- are you suggesting that the very
6 fact that this program is of unknown scope because of the
7 assertions of privilege and so on intensifies the harm or
8 distinguishes Laird in some way?

9 MR. KADIDAL: Well, you know, your Honor, you're a
10 lawyer. I mean, you can imagine, how do you go about figuring
11 out what you're supposed to do in response to an open-ended
12 threat like this? We've got our -- we've submitted the
13 affirmation of Stephen Gillers, who's probably the leading
14 expert on this sort of thing in the United States, who says,
15 look, you're obligated to take these measures given what we
16 know that's out there factually. And I think that's basically
17 the long and short of it. You know, they can say all they want
18 about what they could conceivably produce in terms of limiting
19 the facts about this program, but we're obligated to respond to
20 what they have done, which is announce a threat that isn't
21 limited in some way.

22 You know, the Army intelligence program was narrow,
23 and again, I don't think that's one of the most major factors
24 in the decision of the court in Laird. But I think, you know,
25 obviously the fact that the harm wasn't objective and was

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 highly speculative and hadn't happened yet, all those things
2 that make it not a concrete harm, to use the Supreme Court's
3 sort of later terminology, I think those are the most important
4 things, along with the fact that there wasn't a chill. But
5 this is a cumulative factor in terms of, you know, the scope in
6 Laird was one of the factors that sort of was additive in terms
7 of leading the court to conclude that it wouldn't be
8 objectively reasonable for plaintiffs to be scared of this sort
9 of program.

10 THE COURT: I think the last question that I have for
11 you on the standing set of issues is, the DC Circuit's
12 decisions in Halkin -- and maybe we can throw in the DC version
13 of the Presbyterians, who's on which side -- are those the
14 cases that you believe are also fairly distinguishable from
15 this one or are you just telling me, well, that's the DC
16 Circuit and I don't have to follow them and they're wrong for
17 some reason, or both, probably?

18 MR. KADIDAL: Of course I would say the latter, but,
19 you know, in terms of the -- to tie it back to the factual
20 analysis that I was just kind of proposing in terms of Laird,
21 this notion that you have to have objectively reasonable harm,
22 or, sorry, objectively reasonable fear and then that the harm
23 has to be somewhat concrete, that it has to be an objective
24 harm, I think those are both elements that are missing from
25 those cases.

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 I'd like to start with the United Presbyterian Church.
2 You know, with all due respect to the people who brought that
3 case, including the president of our organization, I think both
4 of those elements are missing there. And we didn't address it
5 in our brief so I'd like to kind of run through the facts, if
6 you'll humor me. In that case there was an executive order
7 issued by President Reagan in 1981 that basically set forward
8 procedures for the division of labor between the FBI and other
9 foreign intelligence agencies in carrying out surveillance, and
10 that executive order is reproduced at the end of Justice
11 Scalia's opinion for the DC Circuit. Now the EO makes no
12 mention of the authority for that surveillance, but it seems on
13 its face that most of the EO is basically addressing
14 operational procedures for obtaining FISA warrants, you know,
15 FISA having been passed a couple years before this EO issued.
16 And nowhere in the executive order does it talk about
17 warrantless wiretapping procedures. In fact, the order was
18 issued in order to remedy some of the abuses that the church
19 committee had uncovered a few years earlier. And again, Scalia
20 addresses that as well in his third footnote in that opinion.

21 So if you look at what the plaintiffs alleged in that
22 case, they claimed, one, that they stopped engaging in
23 international travel because they thought it might make them
24 targets under this executive order, as agents of foreign
25 powers. Really, that's a complaint about FISA, but there's no

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 allegation directed at FISA in the complaint there, as far as
2 you can tell from the opinions. I haven't managed to pull the
3 stuff from the archives yet, although we're trying.

4 And second, the plaintiffs there said, well, they
5 might be targets now based on their past travel on the same
6 grounds. But they made no substantive claims that any future
7 government action was going to be illegal under this executive
8 order. So I think that's deeply problematic for the reasons
9 that I expressed when we were talking about Laird. And the
10 district court opinion in the case actually makes it much
11 clearer that the only real allegations of illegality that those
12 plaintiffs were making were directed at actions that had taken
13 place before this executive order that's at the center of all
14 their claims, or all their specific causes of action actually
15 took place.

16 So if I can read a little bit from it. I'll just cite
17 it for the record. It's 557 F.Supp. 61. And this description
18 of what the plaintiffs were charging comes at page 63. The
19 judge says, Plaintiffs in this case have failed to allege any
20 such redressable concrete injury attributable to the executive
21 order. They allege fear and concern that they may be targeted
22 for future -- sorry -- for intelligence-gathering activities
23 but introduce no evidence to support their claim beyond
24 allegations that some of the plaintiffs had been subject to
25 possibly illegal surveillance for past activities in the past

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 before the order was promulgated, nor do they make any
2 allegations to support the assumption that any
3 intelligence-gathering activities that may take place pursuant
4 to the order in the future will be illegal.

5 THE COURT: Try and go slower --

6 MR. KADIDAL: I'm sorry.

7 THE COURT: -- because the court reporter's got to get
8 all this and she's been working very hard here.

9 MR. KADIDAL: Okay. And then finally it ends,
10 Plaintiff has conceded in oral argument that much of the
11 activity authorized by the order is well within the strictures
12 of the Constitution and the laws of the United States.

13 Now I think if you take a close look at the actual
14 allegations in that case, you'll realize that Judge Scalia,
15 when he writes his DC Circuit opinion, is basically way too
16 generous in implying that there's any sort of colorably
17 unlawful activity that's permitted by that order. In fact, he
18 even says --

19 THE COURT: Judge Scalia was being very generous to
20 these left wing plaintiffs.

21 MR. KADIDAL: That's right. He's a sympathizer.

22 But be that as it may, in fact he even says that the
23 few allegations of illegal current surveillance are basically
24 too generalized to support a complaint. So when you look at
25 the examples he cites, it's things like, we sent letters and

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 they never got there to people overseas or we suspect that our
2 organization is subject to infiltration and disruption, without
3 citing anything specific that leads them to attribute that to
4 the government.

5 So that all touches on the notion that they didn't
6 really allege very much in terms of illegality. Beyond that
7 they also didn't allege that they were particularly vulnerable
8 to warrantless surveillance either. These were basically
9 political, religious, journalistic, academic groups. It
10 doesn't mention lawyers; it doesn't talk about that. And, you
11 know, the notion that we as lawyer plaintiffs, and particularly
12 lawyer plaintiffs who do the kind of work that we do,
13 basically, you know, suing the federal government in, you know,
14 post-9/11 cases where there's, you know, some implication of
15 links to terrorism and particularly where our clients seem to
16 be detained specifically for the purpose of interrogation,
17 there's obviously this fear that our communications with, and
18 given that this program exists, are going to be essentially an
19 extension of that interrogation process if they're listening.
20 But --

21 THE COURT: So let me be as -- I realize I'm
22 oversimplifying all that you've just said, but what I'm getting
23 out of what you said is, to some extent, look, these were
24 people who alleged we're generally the centers or people that
25 we might grandiosely think are of great interest to the

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 government, but who knows, really. Whereas in your case,
2 you're saying that not necessarily you but your clients are
3 people who have been directly alleged to be exactly the people
4 that this program is designed to get at, and that's the heart
5 of this distinction. Is that at the heart of the distinction?

6 MR. KADIDAL: The distinction of this particular case?

7 THE COURT: Yes.

8 MR. KADIDAL: Well, I think, first of all, the fact
9 that we're making much more colorable allegations of
10 illegality, right, that's one aspect.

11 THE COURT: That too, although I'll have to think
12 about this because I've been accustomed to thinking about
13 standing as being separate from some question of the merits,
14 and I would have thought that anybody who's asserting standing
15 and trying to get some relief is saying that there's some
16 illegality on the other side --

17 MR. KADIDAL: Right. But then you have cases --

18 THE COURT: -- and were harmed by that, but maybe some
19 of these cases are not quite that.

20 MR. KADIDAL: In Meese v. Keene, there's no underlying
21 illegality, right, but there was harm. And that's the real
22 inquiry.

23 And the vulnerability point is the other thing that
24 really sharply distinguishes us from the plaintiffs in United
25 Presbyterian Church in the DC Circuit cases.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 THE COURT: Briefly, Halkin, is there --

2 MR. KADIDAL: Sure. Well, I mean, I think basically,
3 you know, the story with Halkin is, by the time you get to
4 Halkin II, which is the case that the government really is
5 citing as one of its more important precedents to defeat our
6 standing, you've essentially got no claim of illegality there
7 either. You've got a situation where the only thing that is
8 remaining in the case after the state secrets assertions is
9 this notion that plaintiffs might be injured because their
10 names might be put on watch lists and passed to NSA in the
11 future. And the Court essentially says, look, there's no legal
12 violation, you know, implicit in that. That's the short
13 version.

14 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Coppolino, I'm
15 going to give you the open-ended chance in a minute to respond
16 to the things that Mr. Kadidal said in response to my
17 questions. But I want to ask just a couple of more specific
18 things first. The plaintiffs here are not, would you agree,
19 just people off the street in the sense that we often think on
20 the standing cases, that they're just citizens who read about
21 this and they don't like it and they want to present an
22 abstract argument to the Court? They're closer to this than
23 that, aren't they?

24 MR. COPPOLINO: No. I'm not sure what you mean by
25 citizens off the street, your Honor, but I would say --

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 THE COURT: Well, to me the classic notion of somebody
2 who doesn't have standing is, you know, John Q. Public reads in
3 the newspaper that the government is doing XYZ and says, by
4 god, I don't like that and I went to law school and I think
5 it's illegal, so I'm going to sue. And that person has no
6 standing. You have to allege that you're somehow affected by
7 this before you can get the courts to address your concern. In
8 that sense, I mean, these people are not way out there when
9 they make this argument, are they?

10 MR. COPPOLINO: Perhaps, but I'm not willing to
11 concede that that addresses their standing adequately, your
12 Honor, because the --

13 THE COURT: Fair enough.

14 MR. COPPOLINO: -- the ultimate issue is not whether
15 they are more likely than another party to be subject to
16 surveillance but whether in fact they can demonstrate factually
17 or whether they have alleged sufficiently that there are
18 reasonable grounds to believe they are subject to it and that a
19 threat of harm is imminent. Those are the essential elements
20 of standing. And so in our view it is not sufficient for CCR
21 to say, we represent people who had been determined to have
22 some association with Al Qaeda; therefore, we necessarily fall
23 within this program such that we should feel fear and such that
24 as a result of our fear, we take some conduct, we make changes
25 in our conduct, which we think causes us injury.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 THE COURT: Well, why shouldn't they feel fear based
2 on what's in the public record?

3 MR. COPPOLINO: Because, your Honor, I think this is a
4 fundamental difference I think we have with them. I do think
5 that Laird and subsequent standing decisions look to the
6 existence of some proscriptive requirement by the government.
7 That is, you have standing if the government actually does
8 something to you like surveils you or if there is a requirement
9 in place which is, A, applicable to you, and, B, you can show
10 as a factual matter that your chill is justified by an imminent
11 threat of harm.

12 THE COURT: Well, let me put a hypothetical. Suppose
13 the police commissioner here in New York says, you know, due to
14 increasing violence at sporting events or maybe even due to
15 terrorist threats, we're going to at random strip search people
16 who come to ball games. And we're not going to say how we're
17 going to target the people other than it's random. There won't
18 be any profiling, there won't be any reasonable suspicion,
19 we're just going to pick people at random. And we think that
20 will discourage people from bringing beer bottles and guns and
21 god knows what into the arenas. Now are you saying that a
22 plaintiff -- well, let me start with a plaintiff who actually
23 goes to Yankee Stadium and they say, excuse me, ma'am, we'd
24 like to strip search you, and she says, no, thank you, I'm
25 going to leave, and they let her leave. Standing? On the

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 ground that I had a ticket, I made the choice not to go into
2 the game rather than be strip searched, but she was never
3 searched by anybody. Standing to raise whatever Fourth
4 Amendment claim might be raised against such a program?

5 MR. COPPOLINO: I would say yes, because the policy
6 that was announced was specifically applied to her as she went
7 to the ball game. We have a requirement, here it is, we're
8 going to strip search Yankee fans as they go to the game, it
9 was applied to her, she had an adverse injury because they
10 said, you can't go to the game.

11 THE COURT: Okay.

12 MR. COPPOLINO: Let's assume that's an injury, which I
13 don't know if it is.

14 THE COURT: What if the plaintiff says, I had a
15 ticket, in fact, I have season tickets, I go to every game, and
16 I think, whatever they're doing, the odds are they're going to
17 get to me sooner or later. I'm turning in my season tickets.
18 I'm not going to the games because of this. No standing?

19 MR. COPPOLINO: I don't know. But let me tell you
20 what I think about that. Let me tell you what I think about
21 that.

22 THE COURT: Fair enough. That's not your case. It's
23 fair for you to not answer directly. But why, what would be
24 the argument that she doesn't have standing?

25 MR. COPPOLINO: I think the difference is, from your

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 hypothetical, I would discern that the New York Police or
2 whoever has presented this policy has announced a requirement:
3 This is one of the things we're going to do. It's not that
4 different from the McWade case that was just decided where they
5 had a requirement of random backpack searches on the subway.

6 THE COURT: Excuse me. But when you say requirement,
7 I think what I -- what I think is true of the subway case and
8 what I'm trying to suggest in the hypothetical, it's not that
9 we search everybody who comes in, it's that there is a random
10 search process that people might get subject to this and then
11 some people make a decision, I don't want to be in the lottery,
12 I'm going to take unilateral action to absent myself from that
13 lottery. And is there standing there?

14 MR. COPPOLINO: I understand that. I just don't think
15 that the policy in place, that imposes a proscription, that the
16 fact that it doesn't necessarily apply to every single fan
17 doesn't make it less proscriptive. It is an enforcement matter
18 as to whether it is applied to every fan. But my point to you
19 is that it is materially different from surveillance.
20 Surveillance, foreign intelligence surveillance is something
21 the government might do, it may not necessarily do. It is done
22 in part to find out where the threat is. And what they're
23 saying is that the existence of a surveillance program with
24 respect to Al Qaeda imposes such an obligation on us or a
25 burden on us that we have to react to it. I think that puts

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 them into the category of people speculating that they're
2 likely subject to the program.

3 Now in the case of the strip search policy, they are
4 subject to the program. The target of the program is known.
5 People going to Yankee Stadium, you are a potential target. In
6 the case of surveillance, who is and is not a target, beyond
7 this level of generality that we're seeking to surveil or what
8 Al Qaeda is up to, is not as clear --

9 THE COURT: No, no, no. I mean, I realize that one of
10 the things that makes this case difficult -- and I'm sure this
11 is at the heart of your point in a lot of ways -- is that we
12 don't know exactly what the program is. What the plaintiff is
13 alleging, though, based on, as I understand it, what they're
14 alleging, based on public statements, is that the government is
15 authorized to seize the conversations of people believed to be
16 associates of Al Qaeda with people in the United States.
17 Right? And so we're not just -- when we say surveillance, we
18 are talking about a Fourth Amendment event of some sort, right,
19 as the seizure of a conversation, correct?

20 MR. COPPOLINO: I understand the point, your Honor,
21 but I happen to think that the reasoning of Judge Scalia in
22 United Presbyterian and also in Halkin in the DC Circuit
23 distinguishes this case from your hypothetical and from their
24 claims of injury and that is, if you think you have a greater
25 likelihood of being subject to surveillance because for some

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 reason you think you might fall within the scope of the
2 program, as Mr. Kadidal pointed out it could be because you
3 traveled a lot, it could be because you're a political
4 activist, those may be less specific reasons than they have
5 advanced here, but nonetheless, they're reasons which the
6 plaintiff have said we're more likely to be subject to
7 surveillance. I think the Court correctly concluded that that
8 is not sufficient to demonstrate an actual imminent harm
9 because whether you are in fact going to be subject to
10 surveillance is a matter of conjecture, unlike your
11 hypothetical, where, if you happen to get picked, you are going
12 to be subject to the strip search. And so -- and I think being
13 at greater risk in general, as the court in United Presbyterian
14 pointed out, falls too far short of the genuine threat of
15 imminent harm that would support Article III standing, which
16 is, admittedly, I think, a reasonably tough standard to meet,
17 because there has to be an actual case or controversy.

18 And so I think what they're actually arguing is very
19 much akin to what the plaintiff said in Laird, because they're
20 saying, we feel we are more likely to be subject to this
21 program, we're not sure if we are, we might be, as Mr. Kadidal
22 said a moment ago, we might be subject to it but we're not
23 sure. And my point to you in response is that, unlike the
24 situation in cases that involve policy, such as statutory
25 requirements, banning leafletting on the sidewalk and things of

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 that nature, which are generally applicable to the
2 communitywide, and I would put the hypothetical you just gave
3 in there, a surveillance program doesn't necessarily apply to
4 anyone in particular, and an allegation that it might apply to
5 you because you're more likely to fall into it is too
6 speculative, too conjectural, to establish standing.

7 THE COURT: And can you respond to this argument that
8 the announcement of this program, particularly coupled with
9 the, I'll stipulate certainly for purposes of this question,
10 legitimate refusal to further detail what the program is puts
11 them in a position where they necessarily must assume that
12 they're subject to it for purpose of taking professional
13 actions that are costly and that impose burdens on them? Is
14 that -- I think I understood Mr. Kadidal to be making that as
15 an argument that creates a harm that isn't present just with
16 some generalized, you know, we know, as in Laird, what the
17 government says it's doing, we even know how many agents
18 they've got doing it and we can make some estimates of what's
19 really likely and what's not really likely. Here, and again,
20 I'm prepared to stipulate, legitimately, the government says,
21 we won't tell you any more about this. Don't they then have to
22 act as if they're subject to the program?

23 MR. COPPOLINO: No, I don't agree that they have to as
24 a matter of law, in other words, as a matter of responding as
25 if this were an actual requirement that is imposed on them.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 Their reaction is akin to the reaction of the plaintiffs in
2 Laird, which said, we have a present inhibiting effect by the
3 existence of the intelligence surveillance program. This
4 program may be more specific in its contours because it says it
5 is focused on the Al Qaeda threat. But nonetheless, I would
6 submit that their reaction to it is a self-imposed inhibiting
7 effect that is based on speculation as to what the program
8 actually does.

9 I would add, to go back to your original question,
10 though, that to the extent this implicates factual questions as
11 to how the program actually operates, then the standing problem
12 becomes a factual problem, not a problem of allegation, and
13 that is why we have quickly gone from one to the other. I
14 think there's a serious Laird problem. On the other hand, if
15 there is not, I think there is a fact problem precisely
16 because, if we could demonstrate to you that in fact these
17 concerns are not well founded, conversely, your Honor, if we
18 could demonstrate to you that they were well founded because
19 this is how in fact we do this program, either would run into
20 state secrets.

21 THE COURT: All right. I guess that just leaves me
22 with one question, and maybe the answer is that's just how it
23 is and the law works out that way sometimes. But this does
24 create a situation, does it not, where, by definition, the only
25 people who could ever have standing to contest this program or

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 to raise the legal issues that these plaintiffs want to raise
2 by definition can't ever know that they have such standing?

3 MR. COPPOLINO: Can't ever know? It's certainly
4 intended that the people that we surveil do not know that
5 they're being surveilled.

6 THE COURT: I should hope so.

7 MR. COPPOLINO: However, it's not to say that there
8 may not be an instance where, if it ultimately comes to light,
9 as an official acknowledgment in a criminal case, for example,
10 where someone was subject to the Terrorist Surveillance
11 Program, there could be an opportunity to contest that program,
12 but I can see --

13 THE COURT: By way of suppression motion, in effect?

14 MR. COPPOLINO: Yes. But I can see there would have
15 to be an acknowledgment of the program. The opposite, though,
16 concern, if that is of concern to you, that only someone as to
17 whom the program has acknowledged can raise standing, the
18 opposite concern I think is equally true, that if we have
19 someone as to whom we cannot confirm or deny surveillance, and
20 that, by the way, is valid evidence to go to whether or not
21 their fears are well founded, if we cannot then demonstrate to
22 the Court how the program operates in order to demonstrate that
23 their fears are not well founded, then the issue of standing
24 can't be adjudicated.

25 And furthermore, if you were to just say, as a matter

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 of allegation, well, we don't know if we've been surveilled, in
2 fact, the government can't actually tell us and we accept that,
3 we're going to have to -- but, however, we're concerned about
4 this program, we think we might be subject to it and now we
5 want to contest this lawfulness as a part of, in an article --
6 in a federal court, where we need a clear case in controversy
7 requirement, I would submit that isn't enough, that you have to
8 be able to allege some sort of concrete imminent threat of
9 actual injury beyond the mere existence of the program, your
10 fear of it and the subsequent inhibiting steps that you take as
11 a result of that.

12 THE COURT: Okay.

13 MR. COPPOLINO: By the way, your Honor, they cited a
14 raft of cases in their brief which they think meaningfully
15 distinguish Laird. But if you look through each of those
16 cases -- and we've discussed this in our brief so I won't
17 repeat them, as you admonished. But Meese v. Keene and
18 numerous others are cases that have two essential fact
19 patterns: Either, one, there was some direct action taken
20 against the plaintiff; they were actually surveilled. The
21 California Presbyterians, they were actually surveilled. The
22 FBI or whoever it was went to their church, and that was known,
23 the surveillance was confirmed, and as a result, the Court
24 said, their claim of injury, a decrease in attendance of church
25 and so on is well founded.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 Mr. -- in the Meese v. Keene, this was an individual
2 who was subjected to an actual regulatory requirement that if
3 he showed certain films from Canada, he was going to be labeled
4 as showing something that's political propaganda, he had to
5 file a registration statement with the federal government
6 indicating that he was lobbying on behalf of a foreign
7 government, he had to give a copy of the film to the attorney
8 general, and he had to tell people he showed it to that the
9 government says it's political propaganda. Actual proscriptive
10 regulatory requirements imposed on him, far different from what
11 we have in this case.

12 Mr. Jabara, the case in Detroit that he mentioned, he
13 was surveilled for eight years and it was acknowledged. There
14 was no unconfirmed surveillance there. He had standing. He
15 had direct standing.

16 And I could go through the list of these, but you get
17 my point.

18 THE COURT: You're saying that applies across the
19 board to the cases they rely on, essentially.

20 MR. COPPOLINO: Yes, it does.

21 THE COURT: One final thing about what the facts
22 either are or aren't. I take it I can assume for purposes of
23 this litigation and these motions that everything that the
24 president and the attorney general have said, and I'll add
25 General Hayden to that as well, are true, the things they've

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 said in the public record? That is, there may be more details
2 or a lot of things that have not been addressed by those
3 statements, but there is no contention here that the government
4 is precluded by a state secret privilege from presenting
5 evidence that would show me that actually these things aren't
6 the way they've been represented?

7 MR. COPPOLINO: No, I think you can assume everything
8 that the government has said in the public record, the
9 president, General Hayden, the attorney general, is true.

10 THE COURT: Is true?

11 MR. COPPOLINO: It just may not be fully complete, as
12 they have all indicated.

13 THE COURT: Right. Because there are all sorts of
14 operational details which you argue are relevant and they argue
15 aren't, whatever, ranging from very detailed matters to fairly
16 significant generalities that are not in the public record.

17 MR. COPPOLINO: Right. And as long as we're clear
18 that I'm agreeing that what they said is true, not some
19 interpretation of what they said is true.

20 THE COURT: Of course. The only alleged admissions
21 here are the things that have been said, not what the press or
22 somebody else attempts to make of them.

23 Okay. Is there anything else that you wanted to raise
24 in direct response? Because I think it's only fair. I had
25 spent a lot of time with Mr. Kadidal and he said a lot of

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 things. If there's anything that you think is critical to be
2 responded to, I'm happy to hear it, even if it's not a direct
3 response to anything I asked you.

4 MR. COPPOLINO: Nothing, your Honor. The only other
5 point I would make about this, whether they're more chilled
6 under the TSP than under other programs, because we lose sight
7 of the fact -- basically, they think the universe of other
8 programs is just FISA and Title III in the United States and in
9 fact, under EO 12333, that surveillance could occur overseas.
10 And so, you know, it is not our central standing point by any
11 means. But the notion that the Terrorist Surveillance Program
12 creates a greater inhibition on them where, in representing
13 their clients who reside overseas, who may be Al Qaeda
14 suspects, they could be surveilled by the United States
15 overseas. And so we think that their allegation of an
16 additional chill under the TSP is not well founded.

17 THE COURT: Well, let me just try and nail down the
18 factual/legal issue there. If somebody, Mr. Arar, makes a
19 telephone call from Canada to Mr. Kadidal's office in
20 New York -- New York is where your offices are? All right. He
21 makes that telephone call. Would I be mistaken in any way in
22 assuming that by statute, by, you know, putting aside your
23 claims of inherent power or whatever, but could that be
24 intercepted legally, under FISA, under Title III? Under FISA
25 it could be if it met the standards and there was a warrant or

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 it was in the window before the warrant or whatever. But the
2 fact that Mr. Arar is abroad doesn't change the fact that that
3 interception of that phone call to New York, so far as FISA is
4 concerned, has to be intercepted only under FISA. Am I wrong
5 about that?

6 MR. COPPOLINO: Your Honor, I think it depends on the
7 method of surveillance and the authority under which it's
8 undertaken, and I'm not prepared to say that it would have to
9 be -- if it's intercepted overseas, that it would have to
10 necessarily be under FISA or Title III, and it does go to a
11 particular source and method that was utilized.

12 THE COURT: And again, I'm not going to ask you about
13 what is possible or isn't possible. But assuming something
14 very simple, I guess, I mean, something actually, I'm sure,
15 would be highly classified. If any of this were ever done, it
16 would be a very simple technology. Somebody goes to Canada and
17 puts a device on the guy's telephone in Canada. If the call is
18 to the United States but the interception somehow takes place
19 outside the United States, by whatever science fiction or other
20 means we want to imagine it takes place, the fact that the call
21 is coming to the United States is not what puts it under FISA,
22 in your view, it has to be --

23 MR. COPPOLINO: I believe that's correct, under the
24 definition of what is subject to the FISA, your Honor, but I
25 would guess -- or I'd prefer to review that further to be

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 absolutely certain, but my understanding is the methods that
2 could be utilized to surveil overseas would not necessarily be
3 subject to FISA.

4 THE COURT: So it's not just a function of where the
5 call is coming to, it's also a function of how the interception
6 is made.

7 MR. COPPOLINO: That's correct.

8 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Kadidal, is that your area or
9 is that Mr. Avery's?

10 MR. KADIDAL: It's probably my area. I mean, our
11 response to all of these are essentially causation arguments.

12 THE COURT: I understand that. But I'm just trying to
13 get -- I want to know where I stand. In terms of FISA
14 coverage, is it your understanding or is this something I can
15 find out more about, or find out more about it, that if the
16 interception takes place by some technology that is not
17 operating on United States soil that FISA would not apply, that
18 FISA is a function not only of who's a party to the call but
19 also where the interception takes place or how the interception
20 takes place?

21 MR. KADIDAL: Right. This is all in FISA 1801(f),
22 essentially the definition of electronic surveillance, so it
23 also implicates --

24 THE COURT: So I can go and read it and figure it out
25 and everybody here is flying a little higher on such details.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 MR. KADIDAL: It also indicates who the targeted party
2 is. You know --

3 THE COURT: That's what my understanding is, but I may
4 be wrong. I think both parties, in fairness, have briefed a
5 lot of this on the assumption that whatever it is, it violates
6 FISA, because more or less that's what's been said. But I
7 don't know if that's actually right.

8 MR. KADIDAL: Well, I believe we cite to statements
9 that essentially the program is something that -- Hayden and
10 Gonzales talk about this notion of parallel authorities, that
11 the surveillance that we're doing under the program is
12 surveillance we could do under FISA.

13 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me turn next to the
14 merits of the statutory/Article II issue here.

15 Mr. Coppolino, is it common ground -- I understand
16 what you just said about the executive order and some other
17 possible possibilities for interception that maybe are things
18 that the plaintiffs should have been concerned about even
19 before the TSP, but is it not common ground in this case that
20 whatever the government is doing under the TSP program is in
21 fact expressly prohibited by FISA?

22 MR. COPPOLINO: It actually is not, your Honor. The
23 government's position in describing how the TSP works has made
24 an assumption for public debate that the methods used under the
25 TSP are akin to the methods that are used under the FISA. But

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 that in itself is a classified fact as to how the methods of
2 the TSP are carried out and whether in fact they meet the
3 definition of electronic surveillance under the FISA. We don't
4 agree that the government has specifically conceded that point
5 because it would concede particularly sources and methods. But
6 the assumption is, for purposes of this case, that FISA may
7 cover these types of communications or at least some of them,
8 and therefore, we defend the lawfulness on that assumption.

9 THE COURT: Okay. I think I hear this but let me try
10 and restate it to make sure. You're saying I should assume for
11 purposes of this case that whatever it is that the government
12 is doing would violate FISA, even though you can't confirm or
13 deny that that is in fact so?

14 MR. COPPOLINO: No. I'm saying, precisely because I
15 can't confirm or deny the specific methods utilized under the
16 TSP, you shouldn't make any assumptions about that. And that's
17 one of the difficulties adjudicating the merits of this
18 lawsuit. Because the very fact of how these intercepts work
19 and whether or not, as a factual matter, they are consistent
20 with the intercepts under FISA is something that we couldn't
21 acknowledge, and that's the difficulty in litigating a lawsuit
22 like this because the assumption throughout is, this is all
23 subject to FISA. And there has been certainly a lot of public
24 discussion and debate as if that were so. But we've not
25 confirmed the specific means by which we have intercepted

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 conversations under the Terrorist Surveillance Program.

2 THE COURT: I understand that. Is that a position
3 that's different from what was said in your brief? Because I
4 think this is the first time that I have understood that the
5 government is taking the position that it is a contested issue
6 whether this surveillance violates FISA, a contested issue
7 which you then say we can't adjudicate because of the state
8 secrets privilege. But that was not one of the issues that I
9 thought was contested.

10 MR. COPPOLINO: I think there is the distinction. The
11 president has indicated and we have I think indicated on the
12 public record that this program does not proceed under the
13 FISA. That is to say that the Terrorist Surveillance Program's
14 intercepts are not ones which we go and obtain an order from
15 the FISA court in order to carry out. And we have defended the
16 program as that that would not be consistent. That would
17 indeed impede the president's Article II authority to protect
18 the nation from attack if we had to do that.

19 But the question you originally raised is a narrower
20 and specific question, as a matter of a specific source and
21 method, is it precisely the source and method that is covered
22 by FISA. And the answer is, that has not been a matter that
23 the government has actually confirmed.

24 THE COURT: So you're telling me that everything the
25 people have been saying in public, which wouldn't surprise me,

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 actually, that everything the people have been saying in
2 public, in the press and whatever, the entire premise of this
3 debate could be completely off the point because there might be
4 no violation of FISA here whatsoever and the government does
5 not concede for purposes of this litigation and has never said
6 on the public record that it is conducting any surveillance
7 whatsoever that would be prohibited by FISA?

8 MR. COPPOLINO: The public debate has made assumptions
9 and that's how it has proceeded. And all I can do further,
10 your Honor, is refer you to our classified submissions to
11 understand precisely the sources and methods that are at issue.

12 THE COURT: I'm happy to do that and to hear that. I
13 just want to make sure I understand what is in the public
14 submissions because -- once again, is there anything you can
15 point me to in the briefing that has said this? Because I
16 missed it. I came in here and maybe -- you know, this happens.
17 You read stuff in the newspapers and no matter how much you try
18 not to be influenced by it, you may make certain assumptions.
19 I was operating under the assumption that there was not a
20 contest as to whether the very meaning and purpose of this
21 program was that the government felt it necessary, the
22 president felt it necessary, to engage in certain things that
23 would otherwise be prohibited by FISA. And I don't remember
24 anything in the briefing. You would think that would be like
25 point 1 of what the plaintiffs need to prove that is a state

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 secret is they start by saying this program violates FISA and
2 nobody's ever said that and we've never confirmed that and it's
3 top secret exactly how we're doing it, and exactly how we're
4 doing it is critical to whether it violates FISA, therefore,
5 state secrets, therefore, end of story. And I don't remember
6 you saying that.

7 MR. COPPOLINO: Understand, your Honor, that our
8 motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is built on the fact
9 that there are state secrets that we cannot confirm that run
10 the range, whenever there's been surveillance necessary to
11 decide these claims, and that has been built on -- in response
12 to this lawsuit, we have come here and said, look, if you want
13 to actually try to litigate these claims, here are the kinds of
14 state secrets you would need to get into, and we haven't
15 described them publicly, we've described them in camera, and
16 this is among them.

17 THE COURT: But again, Mr. Coppolino, I would separate
18 the state secret issue in general into two different things.
19 One, I have to decide, what are the legal issues, and it's only
20 once the legal framework is kind of understood that we then
21 reach the question of, well, what facts do we need under that
22 framework and are they secret. And one thing that I had not
23 assumed, frankly, was in contest was the allegation that
24 whatever the source of legal authority for doing this that the
25 government asserted, it was not contested that this whatever it

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 is violates FISA and that the government's position on the
2 merits is that FISA is pro tanto repealed by the authorizations
3 for force resolution or FISA is pro tanto unconstitutional
4 because of the president's inherent power to do certain things
5 to protect the country. And as to each of those propositions,
6 I understand the government has certain arguments that fact X,
7 Y or Z about the program is highly relevant to answering those
8 questions and is a secret. But I had not understood it to be
9 the case, and I'm asking you if there's any place in the
10 briefing where it said, that the government actually contests
11 the plaintiffs' allegation that whatever it's doing under TSP
12 violates FISA, assuming that FISA is not repealed and assuming
13 that FISA is constitutional.

14 MR. COPPOLINO: I'd have to search my brief and find
15 the page. And it's also possible it's in the other brief.

16 THE COURT: Okay.

17 MR. COPPOLINO: I know we made the point. I don't
18 have a memory right now whether it's in this public brief or
19 the other.

20 THE COURT: Okay. I'll look for it. And I don't know
21 whether it's any question of waiver or anything else anyway,
22 but I'm just curious because it's not something I picked up,
23 and I'm usually pretty good at picking up what's in the briefs.

24 MR. COPPOLINO: Just a point of what type of method it
25 is, not to confirm that there is a particular method.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 THE COURT: Understood. And I'll state it again, and
2 this isn't going to keep anybody who's listening from getting
3 it wrong, but I understand, I understand perfectly well that
4 you are not saying here that it is a fact that what we do does
5 not violate FISA any more than you are saying it is a fact that
6 what we do does violate FISA. You are saying we can't confirm
7 or deny that because it's a secret that would reveal
8 intelligence methods. The issue that I'm asking is just, it is
9 a live issue in the case because the government, according to
10 you, has never conceded in public that what it is doing would
11 violate FISA and therefore that's an open issue?

12 MR. COPPOLINO: That's correct.

13 THE COURT: Okay. I've got it right, as far as --

14 MR. COPPOLINO: Yes.

15 THE COURT: Okay. Good. All right. That certainly
16 renders a lot of what I thought were the issues in the case
17 perhaps more moot. But let me go through some of them anyway.

18 If we were to assume that whatever the government is
19 doing does violate the terms of FISA, there's an amicus brief
20 from the Washington Legal Foundation that says
21 straightforwardly then, FISA is flat out unconstitutional to
22 the extent that it limits the president's authority to engage
23 in surveillance that the president believes is necessary to
24 ward off threats of military force against the United States,
25 essentially.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 I'm not asking if you agree with everything they say
2 in the brief. Obviously you have your own brief. But that is
3 the position that the government takes here, is it not?

4 MR. COPPOLINO: Correct. We've made very clear that
5 to the extent FISA is construed as applying to and therefore
6 barring the Terrorist Surveillance Program, that we do think
7 that raises an extremely serious constitutional question
8 because the president, in our judgment, has retained inherent
9 authority under Article II of the Constitution to undertake
10 foreign intelligence surveillance. We're not making this
11 argument with respect to all foreign intelligence surveillance
12 of any kind but specifically with respect to the TSP in this
13 case, because that's what's at issue in this case, that if you
14 apply FISA, to bar the TSP, you are intruding on the
15 president's Article II powers that he has to undertake foreign
16 intelligence surveillance.

17 THE COURT: Well, let me push you on this because it's
18 a little hard for me to sort out what is fact-specific and what
19 is not. Without characterizing the TSP in any way, is there
20 any way that you can narrow the claim of what is it that the
21 president inherently can do without saying it's any foreign
22 intelligence surveillance that the president feels like doing?
23 In other words, I don't think that it requires you to disclose
24 anything about this program to be more specific about what the
25 legal standard is that you're proposing, all right?

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 MR. COPPOLINO: Right. But I am not attempting to
2 draw the line as to what the president can and cannot do. What
3 I am saying is that he has authority. The specific application
4 of that authority is going to depend on the facts and
5 circumstances of the particular case, at the very least. It
6 may well be that the Court may find -- the courts may find, as
7 they did preFISA, that the president has very broad authority
8 to authorize foreign intelligence surveillance, so long as it
9 is directed at the agents of a foreign power. That's really
10 the key standard. Foreign intelligence purpose, directed at an
11 agent of a foreign power. And beyond that, whether it crosses
12 a particular constitutional line as between president's
13 authority and Congress' authority to regulate foreign
14 intelligence is going to depend on the particular case. If we
15 saw in, for example --

16 THE COURT: Yes, it depends on the particular case,
17 but Youngstown Steel or at least the Jackson opinion, to which
18 we all genuflect in Youngstown Steel, says, I think -- maybe
19 you can correct me about this if I'm wrong -- says that it's
20 not as simple as the president either has or doesn't have
21 inherent authority. Where Congress has some regulatory say in
22 the matter, if Congress hasn't gotten into the business, then
23 the president may have quite a lot of authority to do various
24 things. But once Congress does exercise its responsibility in
25 the matter, exercises its power, then that changes the deal.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 So here's what I take the plaintiffs' position to be
2 in this case: I take the plaintiffs to be saying that if FISA
3 flatly prohibits the president from doing whatever it is he's
4 doing, then there is no inherent authority, period, anymore.
5 Maybe there was before FISA because somebody's got to deal with
6 this issue and the president has a general power in foreign
7 relations and the president does what the president thinks
8 best. But once Congress comes into play, assuming that
9 Congress has a heading of power here to deal with it and
10 Congress exercises that power, then the president's residual
11 power more or less disappears, at least if Congress has totally
12 occupied the area, which they're saying it has and which it
13 certainly looks like when you read FISA. That they're saying,
14 these things shall not be done except under these terms.

15 Now if they were right about that, and I understand
16 you say they're not, then the only national security, the only
17 fact that needs to be decided, which I didn't realize was
18 contested, is, does this program violate FISA, right, because
19 if it does, the game's over, on that legal theory.

20 MR. COPPOLINO: But your Honor, what box you fall into
21 under Justice Jackson's opinion I don't think can be so easily
22 determined. I mean, you can obviously determine if Congress
23 hasn't acted, something, if Congress has acted in the field,
24 then the toss-up is, is it box 2 or box 3, shared power or
25 where the president's acting alone. And you have to look at in

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 particular whether Congress itself has legislated, as you just
2 pointed out, within the limits of its power and whether it has
3 impermissibly intruded on the president's Article II powers.
4 Could well be that in fact the president had the Article II
5 power to do all foreign intelligence surveillance. We're not
6 taking that on in this case because we don't quite need to. We
7 need to just demonstrate that the Terrorist Surveillance
8 Program falls within the president's Article II power, as we
9 are confident that it does. But --

10 THE COURT: But which you can't explain because we
11 can't know what that is.

12 MR. COPPOLINO: Well, yes. I mean, that is the
13 dilemma of the case. Because if you accept the notion that
14 there is a line between what Congress can do under FISA and
15 what the president can do and that actually might not in fact
16 be the case, it might be all the president's authority, as we
17 think a fine argument can be made, as all of the courts that
18 looked at this had concluded --

19 THE COURT: No, no, no, they did not. They're doing
20 something very different, it seems to me. Forgive me for
21 interrupting, but it does seem to me that all the courts that
22 have addressed this in the past, except for In Re Sealed Case,
23 which back-in-the-hands it, were addressing a situation where
24 Congress had not acted, and that's a very different --

25 MR. COPPOLINO: I didn't finish. I was about to say

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 that the president had some inherent authority to do what was
2 at issue in that case. Now comes FISA and FISA's enacted by
3 Congress. Our view is that FISA doesn't magically eliminate
4 whatever inherent authority the president had because that
5 authority derives from the Constitution itself, from his
6 Article II powers as commander in chief and as head of state as
7 involved in the -- as our leader in foreign relations.

8 Now if that proposition of law is true, and we're
9 quite confident that it is, then you have a collision between
10 Congress attempting to take the field and the president saying,
11 wait, I have powers here that you purported to try to take away
12 from me under the FISA which I don't think you can do, at least
13 in this particular application, and we'll worry about other
14 applications later because certainly there are -- the executive
15 branch works cooperatively with the FISA court and therefore
16 with the instrument Congress has passed in numerous instances.

17 And so in that respect there has been an accommodation
18 where possible. This was an instance where the president felt
19 that to follow the prescriptions of FISA would impede his
20 ability to protect the nation from attack.

21 Now therefore, that does raise a serious
22 constitutional question. By the way, the AUMF argument which
23 we advanced, which we're quite confident of, nevertheless is an
24 attempt to avoid this constitutional issue, as the Court is
25 advised to do.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 THE COURT: Well, I think I'll just in summary say I'm
2 not that impressed by that one. Let's talk about the
3 constitutional one because I think it is a very serious issue.

4 MR. COPPOLINO: Sure.

5 THE COURT: Is there any case that you're aware of
6 where the Supreme Court or any court has held that an act of
7 Congress that purports to regulate some foreign affairs matter
8 is unconstitutional because it infringes the inherent war
9 powers or commander in chief powers of the president?

10 MR. COPPOLINO: It's not jumping to mind, your Honor.
11 I don't want to say there's one that isn't out there.

12 THE COURT: You haven't cited me one that I know of?

13 MR. COPPOLINO: I don't believe we have.

14 THE COURT: There are cases, of course, like the
15 appointments powers cases where acts of Congress have been
16 found unconstitutional for infringing on presidential power.
17 But there aren't many, are there? I mean, this is a pretty
18 uncharted ground that you're asking me to get on, or you're
19 asking me to stay off it. But basically, in saying that FISA
20 can be unconstitutional for this reason, if we got to the
21 merits of this, you would be asking this Court and ultimately
22 more authoritative courts than this one to rule that on the
23 basis of implicit understandings, conundrums and emanations and
24 unspecific things in the Constitution, that an act of Congress
25 signed by the President of the United States into law enacted

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 after full debate by the political branches of the government
2 is nevertheless unconstitutional.

3 MR. COPPOLINO: Your Honor, I think you have to
4 concede that if there were any area where that would be so, it
5 would be an area which has purported to take away from the
6 president the power to detect the activities and locations of
7 an enemy attempting to attack the United States. Because in
8 this context, unlike any other case that has involved a
9 potential showdown between the Congress' powers and the
10 president's powers, you have clear Article II power to protect
11 the nation from attack. That's been recognized by the Supreme
12 Court.

13 THE COURT: And where is that --

14 MR. COPPOLINO: It was in the case of --

15 THE COURT: No, where is it textually in the
16 Constitution?

17 MR. COPPOLINO: Well, the president's Article II
18 powers as the commander in chief of the United States, we
19 submit, includes inherently the power to surveil the enemy to
20 know when it is coming. It's his most basic duty to protect
21 the nation from attack. I don't think that's really a disputed
22 proposition.

23 THE COURT: I guess what worries me about that, you
24 know, it may be terribly unwise for Congress to inhibit the
25 president's freedom of action in military matters, but after

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 all, what we are talking about here is domestic activity. We
2 are talking about, that is, Congress' power to regulate, for
3 want of a better word, the civil liberties and rights of
4 Americans on American soil. We're talking about a textual
5 Congressional power to regulate the government and conduct of
6 the military forces that are subject to the president, and we
7 are operating in a constitutional order in which, generally
8 speaking, Congress, or at least two thirds of it, usually gets
9 to override the president or, in which, when the president
10 signs something into law, it becomes law, and courts do not
11 lightly strike them down. I understand the plaintiffs want me
12 to strike down. Everybody's got their judicial activism that
13 they want me to do here. But this is serious stuff that you're
14 suggesting when you say that because the president is the
15 commander in chief and because he has an obligation to operate
16 as such in a way that will protect the United States, that that
17 gives him the power to override what Congress says can be done
18 on American soil to Americans. Even Julius Caesar didn't get
19 to bring his Armies back into Rome, right? He did. But that
20 was the boundary line between what gets done in this country
21 and what gets done abroad.

22 MR. COPPOLINO: Your Honor, your statement is making
23 some assumptions as to fact and law. First is the assumption
24 that even under box 3 in Youngstown, I think it was clear that
25 the Congress could indeed infringe on a constitutional power of

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 the president.

2 THE COURT: Sure.

3 MR. COPPOLINO: And that is not -- even if it's
4 perceived to be at the low ebb, that is not a proposition that
5 is really in dispute. Congress can intrude on president's
6 Article II powers.

7 Secondly, while I agree that in some respects Congress
8 has some authority in the area of national security and foreign
9 affairs, it is primarily in the power of declaring war and in
10 supporting our armed forces. The president's power is much
11 broader in that area, as courts have consistently recognized,
12 and in particular courts have recognized that the president not
13 only has, as his most basic duty, to be the person on the line
14 in our government protecting the nation from foreign attack as
15 the commander in chief, but that he also in that capacity has
16 the authority to utilize intelligence services and has
17 traditionally utilized intelligence services throughout the
18 course of our history.

19 Now we could elaborate on the latter point at much
20 greater length if at this stage we had been briefing the
21 merits. But the proposition I don't think is really seriously
22 in dispute that the president's Article II powers as commander
23 in chief necessarily include and indeed must include the power
24 to detect where that enemy is coming from. That's his duty.
25 His duty is to protect the nation from attack. And if he

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 doesn't have the tools available to do that or if he believes
2 that a Congressional enactment has impeded his ability to do
3 that as swiftly as possible, then he is himself not living up
4 to his constitutional --

5 THE COURT: Doesn't Congress always have the power to
6 give the president tools or not give the president tools that
7 he can raise armies or not? They can provide for the funding
8 of any of these high-tech or low-tech surveillance activities
9 or not. They can provide tools or withhold tools. And it may
10 be terrible for them to withhold tools in a particular
11 situation; it may be awful political judgment in a particular
12 case. But when you say the president must have the tools,
13 doesn't that prove too much?

14 MR. COPPOLINO: I think not, your Honor, because if
15 you take as a proposition that the authority granted to the
16 president under the Constitution is his authority to exercise,
17 then if Congress seeks to take away a tool that the president
18 needs to carry out his constitutional duties, it would be an
19 impermissible encroachment on the president's powers.

20 THE COURT: So he can build a B-1 bomber if he wants
21 to, whether Congress pays for it or not, if he thinks it's
22 necessary to have it in order to fight a particular war?

23 MR. COPPOLINO: Your Honor, I'm not going to concede
24 the hypothetical because you're talking about something that
25 falls squarely within the power to raise the armies and to

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 provide their implements. We're talking about, that also
2 implicates Congressional appropriations authority as well. But
3 here, there is no Congressional authority, express
4 Congressional authority beyond the authority to declare war and
5 raise and support armies to carry out foreign intelligence
6 surveillance of the enemy. I'm not saying they may not have
7 any authority in this area, but it's really a question that has
8 never been resolved.

9 You mentioned, is there a court case. The Keith case
10 specifically reserved the question. Obviously the Supreme
11 Court in Keith was troubled by the notion that the law
12 necessarily took away from the president the power to engage in
13 foreign intelligence surveillance.

14 The Zweibon case, which is a DC Circuit case, in a lot
15 of that analysis suggested that, well, maybe the president
16 didn't perhaps have full plenary authority with respect to
17 foreign intelligence but it limited its holding in that case
18 because the particular organization was a domestic
19 organization.

20 And I think the reason for this caution by the Supreme
21 Court in Keith and the DC circuit in Zweibon is that this is an
22 area that is so much inherently close to the actual day-to-day
23 duties of the commander in chief, the armed forces and the
24 intelligence services that support them to detect where that
25 enemy is coming from. It is as close to the modern-day

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 battlefield as you can get. Where is Al Qaeda today, what are
2 they planning to do, where are they planning to hit us? And
3 the proposition the plaintiffs advance is that for the
4 president to do all that he feels necessary and appropriate to
5 find that out, he has to stop and follow a Congressional
6 prescription and go to a Court and say, may I please go find
7 out what Al Qaeda is doing today? We think that raises a
8 serious constitutional problem.

9 THE COURT: But the argument that you're making
10 essentially would apply to any provision of the penal code,
11 that if the president feels it's necessary to break into a
12 psychiatrist's office to find out what Al Qaeda is up to, he
13 can do that. If an American citizen is to be kidnapped or
14 physically assaulted in order to get information, he can do
15 that by the same argument, can he not?

16 MR. COPPOLINO: I disagree, your Honor, that it
17 necessarily applies there, because whenever you get into
18 another area, and this is -- they cite Hamdan, and they cite
19 some other cases. You have to analyze, first of all, does
20 Congress play a role in establishing a particular regulation
21 that is at issue.

22 And so the implications of our argument is not that
23 the president can do whatever he wants in every circumstance,
24 and nor have we argued that. We didn't, for example, argue in
25 Hamdan that the president had inherent constitutional authority

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 to establish the terms of the military commissions in that
2 case. It was a straight-up question of whether the executive's
3 actions were consistent with statutory authority, and the
4 Supreme Court decided the matter.

5 So I don't concede that the implications of our
6 argument is that in any other conceivable area where national
7 security imperative applies, the president can act. It is
8 contextual. And that I think is --

9 THE COURT: What is the special context of electronic
10 surveillance that's different from human intelligence that
11 could be obtained by interrogation? Why is that somehow within
12 the president's special zone while the other might be something
13 that Congress has greater authority to regulate?

14 MR. COPPOLINO: Well, I didn't understand your
15 question to draw a distinction between the signals intelligence
16 and humans intelligence.

17 THE COURT: Well, I was thinking about, if somebody in
18 Mr. Kadidal's office had spoken to somebody from Al Qaeda and
19 was thus believed to be in possession of information that would
20 be useful in warding off an attack, isn't it an intelligence
21 function of the sort that you're describing --

22 MR. COPPOLINO: I see. I understand.

23 THE COURT: -- to get that person and pull them off
24 the streets and put them somewhere where they're compelled to
25 talk about it?

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 MR. COPPOLINO: I understand. Yes, I would say it is
2 possible, depending on the scenario that's at stake. Suppose,
3 for example, the president obtained intelligence that a nuclear
4 bomb was planted in Georgetown, you know, right there in
5 Washington, and the only way he was going to find out whether
6 that was going to happen would be to go grab the person and
7 interrogate him. Would that be within his constitutional
8 authority? I would say it would. Now --

9 THE COURT: Well, let me push that, because I
10 understand that there's a whole different argument that
11 philosophers and lawyers have had about the human rights
12 implications of that. But what I guess I'm asking is, isn't
13 this a different question than the question of -- suppose we
14 have that human rights argument, not here in this courtroom,
15 not asking some judge to say it's unconstitutional for the
16 government to do that ever, even in those extreme
17 circumstances, but we have that debate as a political matter in
18 the United States of America, we ask that question of the
19 voters and their representatives, do we agree with the sort of
20 Dershowitz position about torture or the Jeremy Waldron or
21 somebody else's position about torture and we have the debate
22 and Congress decides either by a two thirds majority or by
23 simple majority that is then concurred in by the president of
24 the United States at that time that no, we do not allow that
25 kind of thing in the United States, you're saying not only that

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 this individual has no human right to trump the government,
2 you're saying that the president has the inherent authority to
3 override that decision by the political branches of the
4 government.

5 MR. COPPOLINO: But, your Honor, I am not saying that
6 that is a process that is not to be respected and that does not
7 in the main establish where the lines are drawn. It is
8 conceivable, it is certainly possible, and we think this is one
9 instance where the specific line is drawn; nonetheless, in a
10 particular application, will encroach on the president's
11 inherent residual authority.

12 THE COURT: But the problem is, there's then this
13 catch-22 that comes into play which is that, as a practical
14 matter, the state secrets privilege, at least as you would
15 apply it here, means that de facto, however the president
16 decides to exercise that authority, since it will, of course, I
17 have to assume, only be done in cases that are believed by the
18 president to be of critical importance and highly confidential,
19 the president de facto will always have the power to do it
20 because there's nobody who can even question it in a courtroom.

21 MR. COPPOLINO: I think that overstates the case a
22 little, but let me tell you why.

23 THE COURT: Sure.

24 MR. COPPOLINO: First of all, to go back to your prior
25 point, we constantly have disputes in our government between

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(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 our political branches as to who has what power and where the
2 line is drawn. But if you take the proposition you advanced
3 that any time Congress enacts legislation that that simply is
4 the end, then there would never be the possibility that
5 Congress has sought to intrude on the president's powers. We
6 know that that is certainly possible and the question is going
7 to be, when. And indeed, when Congress enacted FISA --

8 THE COURT: Well, but I would submit that maybe the
9 answer is when the constitutional text gives the president a
10 very clear-cut power. There have been such instances, of
11 course, when the president has an appointments power. I take
12 it that, and plaintiffs concede, if Congress passed a law that
13 said from now on, General X is in charge of the Army and he can
14 do whatever he wants in pursuing, if he follows the words of
15 the president, that would violate a specific commander in chief
16 power. But it's a little harder for me to think that these
17 things come out of some generalized sense that, well, national
18 intelligence is something that's the president's --

19 MR. COPPOLINO: Well, I just think that's a little --
20 you're characterizing our argument a little bit broadly, your
21 Honor, that -- that's some of the security and there's some
22 generalized sense that the president has to act. This is an
23 action that we believe, and I think the historical record would
24 demonstrate, is closely tied to the president's Article II
25 powers as commander in chief.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 Throughout history -- and I'm sure I don't need to
2 educate you on this. Throughout history, the role of
3 surveillance, of intelligence gathering is absolutely vital in
4 a wartime effort and it has been utilized by every president
5 through his intelligence officers in every conflict, back to
6 the Revolutionary War and certainly into modern times in World
7 War One and World War Two. Intelligence gathering is
8 absolutely crucial to carry out an armed conflict, which is
9 what we are in. And Congress itself has recognized that in
10 authorizing the president to take all measures necessary and
11 appropriate to detect and prevent terrorist attacks
12 specifically by Al Qaeda.

13 If you're the president, you say, well, how do I do
14 this? One way is to send the Army to Afghanistan and rout the
15 Taliban. Another is, I have to know if Al Qaeda is going to
16 come again and kill thousands of people on US soil. That's
17 central to my authority and to my responsibility as the
18 commander in chief.

19 So I don't agree that it is some kind of a generalized
20 unrelated national security matter.

21 You asked about the state secrets privilege, though.
22 If that is so, is the state secrets privilege necessarily tied
23 to everything that the president's doing. I don't agree that
24 that's also the case. This is a lawsuit where they have
25 challenged a foreign intelligence surveillance activity. We've

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 seen in the last three or four years several other challenges
2 to actions that the president and the administration have taken
3 in the war on terrorism that have been subject to judicial
4 review, mostly involving the detention of --

5 THE COURT: Usually over the government's objection.

6 MR. COPPOLINO: Right. But the point is, we didn't
7 assert the state secrets privilege in any of those cases. They
8 cite a number of cases that have been adjudicated involving the
9 foreign powers of the president in the executive branch, none
10 of which involve the state secrets privilege. It is a rare
11 thing that we have to do, but we have to do it where
12 intelligence sources and methods and activities are inherently
13 at issue, such as, when you ask whether a program that is
14 intended to detect Al Qaeda is lawful, you need to know how
15 that program works, how we utilize it.

16 You made an assumption in your comments earlier that
17 it is a domestic activity. That's a fact issue, your Honor,
18 and I would suggest to you that you cannot just draw a broad
19 conclusion that it is a domestic activity involving US persons
20 until you understand the facts of the program, and all you --

21 THE COURT: Well, excuse me. Here's where I'm puzzled
22 again. And do help me. I understand that it is peculiar,
23 perhaps, to define some of what is at issue here as domestic
24 because by definition, we're talking about communications that
25 have one end abroad.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 MR. COPPOLINO: Right.

2 THE COURT: But I have taken it, I think accurately,
3 that for purposes of FISA, this is domestic because the other
4 end of the communication takes place in the United States, and
5 however unwise it may be to proclaim that everyone in the
6 United States is not subject to such interception, I guess what
7 I have assumed -- and again, this is not about how the
8 interception is done but -- that Congress is legislating about
9 protecting the communications of United States persons in the
10 United States and not only about where the communication takes
11 place and in that sense it's -- or where the interception takes
12 place and in that sense it's domestic.

13 MR. COPPOLINO: In that narrow sense, yes, it may well
14 be, but that doesn't render the activity a domestic activity
15 subject to the regulation of Congress. If in fact the target
16 of the surveillance is an agent of a foreign power, which is
17 one of the distinctions the court made, the Keith court made in
18 that case, which said if you have an agent of a foreign power
19 being surveilled, that's the determinative factor that could
20 put this over into the president's side of the authority.

21 And so I just quibble with the characterization that
22 it is necessarily a domestic matter within the inherent
23 authority of Congress to regulate when in fact, that one end
24 call coming to -- or from the United States, nonetheless may be
25 a matter that involves intelligence information which shows

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 that an agent of a foreign power is planning to attack the
2 United States. And I would suggest that that remains within
3 the president's authority to find out and do something about
4 and consistent with his constitutional duties.

5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. Let me ask
6 some corresponding questions of Mr. Avery, and then I think I
7 will have accomplished at least what I've wanted to today.

8 Mr. Avery, have I stated your position correctly that
9 the plaintiffs believe that the president has no inherent power
10 to engage in electronic surveillance prohibited by FISA,
11 period, end of story?

12 MR. AVERY: Yes.

13 THE COURT: And does that position have to be right
14 for you to win this case without additional details of the
15 program?

16 MR. AVERY: No.

17 THE COURT: Why not?

18 MR. AVERY: Because we have a Fourth Amendment
19 argument that is as powerful, in our view, as the statutory
20 argument.

21 THE COURT: Oh, yes, but the Fourth Amendment says
22 that the government may not engage in unreasonable searches and
23 seizures. And how on earth am I to decide whether this is
24 reasonable or unreasonable without knowing what it is, without
25 knowing exactly what they're doing?

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 MR. AVERY: In Keith, the government argued this
2 notion that the Fourth Amendment simply subjects government
3 searches to a general reasonableness test. And the Supreme
4 Court rejected it and said, although that's been argued, we've
5 rejected that.

6 And the warrant requirement is more than just
7 something that gets thrown in the balance to a general weighing
8 of reasonableness. The warrant requirement is something that
9 you have to meet unless you fall within one of the carefully
10 delineated exceptions.

11 THE COURT: Yes. But of course, that was then, this
12 is now, and one doesn't have to subscribe to some generalized
13 notion that the world is completely different or we face a
14 threat that is unprecedented and all of that rhetoric to
15 suggest that this is a particular program justified, if at all,
16 by particular circumstances that the court in Keith did not
17 have before it and, necessarily, if that issue were to be
18 revisited today, the court would have to assess, is this a
19 violation of the Fourth Amendment, given whatever it is that
20 the president is doing.

21 MR. AVERY: Actually, your Honor --

22 THE COURT: I think it would be very difficult to get
23 at that without some details of the program.

24 MR. AVERY: Actually, in Keith, the government argued
25 that there had been over 1600 bombings between January 1st of

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 1971 and July 1st of 1971 and that we were in the midst of an
2 unprecedented wave of domestic terror, to which the president
3 was responding. This argument that our time is the worst time
4 is something that the government has made, you know, from the
5 Alien and Sedition Acts up till the present.

6 THE COURT: There have been times to try the souls of
7 men before this one. I appreciate that. But nevertheless, I
8 don't know that the broad dictum from prior cases necessarily
9 covers all new situations. But that's not -- I think I've
10 gotten distracted in a sense. I perhaps asked the question
11 imprecisely. I did not mean in asking you does the no inherent
12 power position have to be right for you to win. I wasn't
13 taking into account the separate constitutional argument that
14 you've got.

15 MR. AVERY: Right.

16 THE COURT: I mean, with respect to the FISA plus or
17 minus Article II issue.

18 MR. AVERY: Correct.

19 THE COURT: Mr. Coppelino is suggesting that if there
20 remains any residual power in the president to conduct
21 electronic surveillance without Congressional approval or, in
22 the face of Congressional disapproval, that then the state
23 secrets privilege clicks in because then we'd have to assess
24 exactly what is he doing at this point and how far does that go
25 or not go, and what I was asking is, in order to avoid the

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 state secrets issue, anyway, don't you have to be right that
2 FISA, A, prohibits whatever it is they're doing and, B,
3 exclusively occupies the field such that the president has no
4 remaining power?

5 MR. AVERY: I don't think so, your Honor, and I'd like
6 to say why. First, with regard to whether FISA does occupy the
7 field, we think Hamdan is a pretty complete answer to that
8 question, that if Congress had completely occupied the field
9 with regard to establishing the universal code of military
10 justice, such that the president could not set up these
11 tribunals with rules different than the code of military
12 justice supplied, the Supreme Court said in footnote 23 in
13 Hamdan, well, then, the president has no power to do that. And
14 we think this is, by analogy, the same situation.

15 I actually thought when you asked Mr. Coppolino about
16 oral interrogation that you were referring to the interrogation
17 at Guantanamo, not something that someone might overhear
18 Mr. Kadidal talking about with one of his clients, because I
19 thought that was a very apt analogy. But even if that's not
20 correct, even if the result of this case isn't completely
21 controlled by Hamdan, which is our initial position, then, it
22 seems to me, we still can answer the question based on first
23 principles without getting into the question of what exactly is
24 the president doing in this particular case. Mr. Coppolino,
25 for example, in his argument, seemed to suggest that in

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 enacting FISA, Congress was acting in an area where its
2 constitutional power was uncertain or not clearly established.

3 THE COURT: I don't know if he said that here today
4 exactly, but he did say it in the brief.

5 MR. AVERY: And I thought it was implied in what he
6 was arguing here. We think Congress's power in this area is
7 very clear. First, as a regulation of the regulations of the
8 land and sea forces -- by the way, it was a Congressional
9 enactment that established the National Security Agency.
10 National Security Agency is a creature of a Congressional
11 statute. So for Congress to make, pass laws regarding what the
12 National Security Agency can do is not a constitutional
13 stretch.

14 Secondly, the commerce power and the ability to
15 regulate foreign commerce, which was, after all, what Congress
16 was relying on in *Little v. Barreme*, when it told the
17 president -- I thought when you were questioning Mr. Coppelino,
18 I can't remember now whether it was what you said or what he
19 said, but as a description of what Congress can do, it was to
20 guard it. I mean, in *Little v. Barreme*, the Supreme Court
21 sustained a statute in which Congress told the president, you
22 can seize ships coming from France, but -- no, going to France
23 but not coming from France, which is a pretty intrusive
24 regulation of what the president's doing with regard to foreign
25 affairs and military policy, and that was sustained by the

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 Supreme Court.

2 So I think that Congressional bona fides in this area
3 with regard to FISA are very well established and indeed the
4 Supreme Court assumed as much in Keith when it said Congress
5 can pass statutes regulating, you know, the interception of
6 domestic --

7 THE COURT: Once again, I'm not sure that's exactly
8 what I was asking. I think you're answering the question does
9 Congress have the power to enact FISA, and if it does, is that
10 supreme over whatever the president is doing. I guess what I
11 was trying to get at is, I take it that if you are right, that
12 the president has no residuum of power to engage in electronic
13 surveillance that would violate FISA that it requires no
14 further facts about the program other than a concession by the
15 government, that this violates FISA, which apparently the
16 government is now saying it has not made it.

17 MR. AVERY: Although we say it did make it, at least
18 if Mr. Coppelino's statement that the government officials were
19 telling the truth --

20 THE COURT: Okay. Can you tell me where, if at all,
21 the government has conceded that whatever it's up to is in
22 violation of FISA.

23 MR. AVERY: Yes. In the briefing that the Attorney
24 General Alberto Gonzales and General Hayden gave the press, the
25 attorney general stated as follows: "Now in terms of legal

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 authority --" and this is, by the way, at page 9 of our initial
2 brief. This is the attorney general. "Now in terms of legal
3 authorities, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides
4 requires a court order before engaging in this kind of
5 surveillance that I've just discussed and the president
6 announced on Saturday. Unless there is somehow -- there is
7 unless otherwise authorized by statute or Congress, that's what
8 the law requires." So we take that as a statement by the
9 attorney general that at this press briefing, where they were
10 discussing the TSP, that he acknowledged that this is the kind
11 of surveillance that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
12 provides requires a warrant.

13 There are also statements there from General Hayden
14 that are corroborative of that, which are also in our brief.

15 THE COURT: Okay. So if we were to take that as a
16 concession that this program violates FISA --

17 MR. AVERY: Yes.

18 THE COURT: -- then your primary position is that
19 there is no remaining constitutional authority to the president
20 that would under any circumstances authorize the president to
21 ignore FISA as a matter of any kind of Article II inherent
22 power whatsoever.

23 MR. AVERY: Yes. And the reason I was talking about
24 Little v. Barreme and so on is because I wanted to say that is
25 a question which has to be answered by resort to first

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 principles, not by examining the particulars of what the
2 president is doing in this case. In other words --

3 THE COURT: Well, I think it's analytically necessary
4 that that proposition you have to be right about, that
5 answering the question does the president have flatly no power
6 or not is not something that requires knowing exactly what it
7 is he might be up to. He either has some power or he has no
8 power. And that I think is a matter of law, a matter of
9 constitutional principle. But if there is any power left, then
10 we get into some dicey issues about what that power might
11 encompass and whether some particular, for the sake of the
12 argument, extremely narrow program, whether that might come
13 within that power.

14 MR. AVERY: One might make an argument, for example,
15 the ticking bomb hypothetical, much favored by the government
16 in these discussions. The ticking bomb hypothetical that the
17 president has some power in the face of an imminent attack to
18 conduct some surveillance that's necessary, even some
19 interrogation that's necessary in order to forestall that
20 imminent attack, but that's far short of saying that the
21 president has the power to create a program that lasts for five
22 years, that is as broad as the one they've described. Now
23 whereas the --

24 THE COURT: It's a rhetorical leap, in other words,
25 from the ticking bomb to the proposition that whatever is

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 necessary to ward off any attack, however distant, however
2 hypothetical, whatever the circumstances might be.

3 MR. AVERY: Yes, yes. And what we're really talking
4 about here is a program that's been going on for five years,
5 during which time the executive has not gone back to Congress
6 and asked them to amend FISA, to provide whatever tools they
7 say they need. Whatever they say the secret papers, documents
8 they need, they have not gone to Congress for five years to ask
9 for that. And I'd like --

10 THE COURT: They say they don't need to. I mean,
11 look, if we're having some political debate here --

12 MR. AVERY: No.

13 THE COURT: I understand the proposition, and I think
14 all participants do and should. I think the government
15 understands that in this court of law we're not debating
16 whether it's wise for the president to have this power or
17 unwise or whether Congress could have done something or whether
18 Congress should have done something or whether, if the
19 president had asked for this power, Congress could have given
20 it to him and should have given it to him. We're debating a
21 rather abstract but rather vital issue, which is, does the
22 president have the power to do something, notwithstanding that,
23 at least for the purpose of this hypothetical, Congress has
24 said, thou shalt not have this power?

25 MR. AVERY: Yes.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 THE COURT: That's what we're talking about.

2 MR. AVERY: Yes. And I wanted to make not a political
3 argument but a constitutional argument about why the president
4 has to go back to Congress. And it has to do with the -- as
5 Justice O'Connor said in Hamdan, it has to do with the fact
6 that when we're talking about civil liberties and when we're
7 talking about individual rights, all three branches have to be
8 involved in making these kinds of decisions. If the president
9 is forced to go back to the Congress to amend FISA, then
10 there's going to be some vetting of the president's arguments
11 in Congress.

12 The president -- I have no idea, of course, what's in
13 the secret papers that they've filed with you, whether it's
14 technology or whether it's data about Al Qaeda. I have no idea
15 what it is. But I do know this: And that is that in our
16 constitutional system there's something wrong with saying, we
17 have to take the president's word for the fact that that
18 requires him to go around FISA. If instead the courts say to
19 the president, you must go to Congress to get FISA amended,
20 then there's going to be a hearing, there's going to be an
21 opportunity for contrary evidence to be presented, there's
22 going to be expert testimony, civil liberties advocates will be
23 heard, as well as people charged with protecting the national
24 security, the credibility of the president's claims can be
25 heard, in Congress, or, if you will, they could be heard at the

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 FCC. If the government decided to do this by amending CALEA
2 instead of amending FISA, by requiring telecommunications
3 companies to change their technology so that they can do
4 whatever they want to do through CALEA, then there would be
5 hearings in front of the FCC and maybe ultimately in front of
6 Congress. But in one way or another, there would be something
7 other than the unilateral, unfettered, unexamined decision of
8 the executive to expand the scope of these intrusions into
9 private conversations. And that I think is a fundamental
10 element of our constitutional system.

11 THE COURT: Isn't that a much stronger argument than
12 the Fourth Amendment argument, at least in terms of the
13 structure of government? Because in the Fourth Amendment
14 argument, what you're essentially saying is that the courts
15 should rule as a matter of constitutional law that even if
16 Congress -- we went through that process that you've just
17 described and Congress formally approved this program and the
18 elected representatives of the people, with the concurrence of
19 the president, authorized this behavior, then you'd be asking
20 the courts to rule as a matter of the majestic generalities of
21 the Bill of Rights that nevertheless, this can never be done,
22 and notwithstanding whatever the consequences to the national
23 security might be, whereas this other argument is one that
24 says, it's really on them at this point to be asking the Court
25 to somehow strike down the product of the political process and

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 to say, on the basis of the sort of majestic generalities of
2 Article II, that FISA is somehow unconstitutional if it
3 purports to occupy this field?

4 MR. AVERY: Your Honor, Mr. Coppolino has his brief
5 and I have mine. I'm not going to waive the Fourth Amendment.

6 THE COURT: Of course you're not.

7 MR. AVERY: But I'll agree with you that today I like
8 the separation of powers argument better, absolutely.

9 THE COURT: At least if I do, you do.

10 MR. AVERY: No. I do anyway. But I might be back
11 here in ten years arguing the Fourth Amendment argument, and
12 I'm not waiving that. And I'm also, you know, passionate about
13 it.

14 But I like the separation of powers argument. I like
15 the separation of powers argument better. And I think that --

16 THE COURT: Okay. But there's really nothing -- and
17 it's hard for me to even come up with hypotheticals that aren't
18 somehow absurd. But you've got a Taliban commander in
19 Afghanistan who's on the battlefield and for whatever reason
20 consults somebody in the United States about what tactics he
21 should follow. Congress can say, you can't listen in to that
22 conversation and the president has no inherent power to say, I
23 want my spy technology to pick that up and relay to the
24 American commander on the field, here's what the other guy's
25 about to do. That there's just nothing, there's no example

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 that you can think of, if this program is so narrow that it's
2 focused only on Osama bin Laden and one other guy and the
3 president has authorized the NSA that whenever you hear Osama
4 bin Laden on the telephone, and we're hypothesizing that
5 there's some technology which will enable them to do it, if
6 he's calling -- we don't care if he's calling the United States
7 or who he's calling or what he's doing, you get on that call.
8 If that violates FISA, the president has no authority to tell
9 his spy satellites to do that, or whatever he's got.

10 MR. AVERY: I think I've acknowledged that in the case
11 of an imminent attack that the president may have some power
12 because of exigent circumstances, and one reason I'm prepared
13 to acknowledge that is because I think it fits comfortably
14 within Fourth Amendment doctrine. Not to go back there, but it
15 fits comfortably within Fourth Amendment doctrine. Other than
16 that, no, I don't acknowledge any other hypotheticals.

17 THE COURT: And how do we know that this program is
18 not limited to imminent attack situations? Is there something
19 in the public record that has said that?

20 MR. AVERY: Well, General Hayden has taken it well
21 beyond that in terms of what he's described. And we have
22 several quotations in our brief from him to that regard. They
23 have said that they want to -- let's see. Actually, this was
24 Alberto Gonzales. Whenever they have a reasonable basis to
25 conclude that one party to the communication is a member of Al

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 Qaeda, affiliated with Al Qaeda or a member of an organization
2 affiliated with Al Qaeda or working in support of Al Qaeda,
3 that they will listen.

4 THE COURT: That they will or that they are, the
5 president is authorizing, and is that an important distinction
6 made?

7 MR. AVERY: I don't have the whole quotation, I'd have
8 to go back and look, but Hayden said the trigger is quicker and
9 a bit softer than it is for a FISA warrant. So, you know, I --

10 THE COURT: I take it -- I mean, I don't know, maybe
11 you don't want to concede this, I don't know, but if there was
12 a conversation such as I just described where Osama bin Laden
13 in person is calling someone in the United States, I take it
14 the trigger for a FISA warrant would be easily satisfied.

15 MR. AVERY: Sure it would.

16 THE COURT: And what you're saying is that by
17 definition, it has been conceded that the trigger is somewhat
18 softer than that.

19 MR. AVERY: Yes.

20 THE COURT: So my hypothetical, at least that version
21 of my hypothetical, is one that doesn't require this program.

22 MR. AVERY: That's right. But the reason -- but I'm
23 not eager to get into that debate because then Mr. Coppelino
24 will say, now Mr. Avery has in effect conceded that the facts
25 matter.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 THE COURT: Exactly.

2 MR. AVERY: And I'm not conceding that. What I'm
3 saying is that FISA provides a very flexible program between
4 the 15 days once a war's broken out and the 72 hours. As a
5 matter of fact, the government didn't think 72 hours was --
6 didn't think 24 hours was long enough, it went back and got 72
7 hours as an amendment to FISA. It could go back again.

8 My point is, to the extent that facts matter, they
9 should tell Congress about it. And they should get an
10 amendment to the statute if Congress agrees. And if Congress
11 doesn't agree, maybe what they're asking for is wrong.

12 THE COURT: Well, again, that may or may not be right,
13 as a matter of prudence or constitutional government. But when
14 I'm talking about the facts, I'm talking about in this
15 litigation, the assertions of privilege that are being made,
16 and we can't, I think, sort of prejudge it must be illegal and
17 therefore they should go back to Congress and therefore they
18 shouldn't have a privilege to cover this. At least the
19 government's position is, in order to decide if it's legal, we
20 have to know more about exactly what they're doing than has
21 been disclosed so far and we are asserting the privilege.

22 And this gets sort of back to something I asked
23 Mr. Kadidal about earlier, which is, without suggesting you
24 conceded anything, I've read the briefing that the plaintiffs
25 have submitted as trying pretty hard to avoid coming head on at

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 the assertion of privilege and arguing, we can win this case
2 even if they're entitled to assert privilege about essentially
3 anything they want to assert the privilege about because we win
4 the case based on what's here. And I've been trying very hard
5 to test that proposition by putting these issues about, you
6 know, what is it that you have to be asserting for that to be
7 the case. Now I guess I'd like to at least --

8 MR. AVERY: I'm asking myself how I'm doing on the
9 test so far.

10 THE COURT: I'd like to at least give you the
11 opportunity to present an argument, if there is one, as to why
12 the assertion of the privilege should somehow not be respected,
13 because almost everything that we've discussed here so far
14 today has been on the assumption, on my part, for purposes of
15 this argument, that the assertion of privilege is valid.

16 Now is there any contest about that, point 1, and
17 point 2, do we need to reach that issue at all in order to
18 authoritatively resolve all the motions -- in your view, in
19 order to authoritatively resolve all the motions that are
20 before me?

21 MR. AVERY: I think what I'm about to say is
22 responsive to what you're asking, and if it's not, I believe
23 you'll interrupt me and redirect me, but --

24 THE COURT: I think it's a complicated question, and
25 it's fair to answer it however you want to answer it.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 MR. AVERY: This is the first time that the government
2 has asserted the state secrets privilege in connection with the
3 argument that Congressional regulation of the president's
4 otherwise whatever-might-exist power to engage in this kind of
5 warrantless electronic surveillance -- whether or not that
6 exists. In fact, it didn't even assert the state secrets
7 privilege in any of the cases that predated FISA, including the
8 Tran case, which was a case that sort of straddled the
9 enactment of FISA. All those cases were decided by going back
10 and reading the Federalist Papers and, you know, those two
11 cases that they -- their name slips my mind for the moment but
12 the cases about the president's -- Curtiss-Wright and the
13 airlines case, and all these other cases about general
14 principles. And in Tran, not only that, but in Tran, the
15 government came to the court -- it's very interesting to read
16 the government's brief in Tran. We cited it in our memorandum
17 but we didn't quote from it. They embrace FISA. They embrace
18 the process by which FISA is enacted. They say that they've
19 been working with Congress to develop this system. And they
20 conclude that the bill provides a workable procedure for
21 judicial review and possible rejection of executive branch
22 certifications for surveillances of US persons. They make the
23 same distinction in their Tran brief. The government in the
24 Tran brief makes the same distinction we're making here between
25 the preFISA regime and the postFISA regime. They say --

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 THE COURT: That was a different government. I mean,
2 I don't mean to be facetious.

3 MR. AVERY: Sure, it was Jimmy Carter, and now we have
4 George W. Bush. But --

5 THE COURT: Yes, but you see, I mean, it's a serious
6 point. The government, the United States, the president, as an
7 institution, I take it is not bound by concessions that, as
8 matters of law, that the government or the president, at a
9 different time, embodied in different people, have asserted in
10 court, right?

11 MR. AVERY: Correct. I'm not arguing they're bound.
12 I'm arguing that what the government said, what the executive
13 department said in Tran had incredible persuasive force.
14 That's what I'm arguing. And --

15 THE COURT: Look, it's fair enough for you to argue --
16 I'll make it for you. I think it's a perfectly reasonable
17 argument that for all these years the government has gotten
18 along without doing certain things, as far as we know, without
19 asserting certain privileges and so on. And that's a kind of
20 historical argument akin to the argument that Mr. Coppolino is
21 making about here's what presidents have done over time. It
22 gives some institutional texture to --

23 MR. AVERY: Marshall made this argument repeatedly in
24 his early decisions about the history that leads up to
25 something.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 THE COURT: And it's relevant.

2 But I guess I do want to bring you back to this
3 question. Are you saying that there is -- as to the sort of
4 stuff that's on page something or other of the government's
5 papers, I think page 15, they list, here's the kind of thing
6 that we're asserting privilege about and Mr. Coppolino has
7 reasserted it today. The actual mechanisms of what they're
8 doing, who's being listened to and who isn't being listened to,
9 all those details, are you saying that's not something that
10 they can assert privilege about under Reynolds?

11 MR. AVERY: I'm saying they can assert the privilege.
12 I don't think that the Court needs to look at those privileged
13 documents to decide this case. I think they can assert the
14 privilege. I think it's the use of the argument that you have
15 to see those privileged documents to decide this case that's
16 opportunistic and it's that opportunism that I was trying to
17 call attention to by going back and saying, at a time when
18 their own actions weren't being questioned, at a time when the
19 executive department's actions about this weren't being
20 questioned -- they were being questioned about something else
21 in Tran but not about this -- they didn't make that argument.
22 And the presidents and the attorneys general from then until
23 now have not made the argument. The argument's being made now
24 because it's a way of escaping what I think is inevitable,
25 which is, if you look at the merits, they don't have this power

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 in the face of FISA.

2 THE COURT: Well, okay. And I hear the argument. But
3 the point really is not about their motivations, the point
4 really is, can this case be decided without reference to those
5 details. And I think what I'm hearing is, your answer is yes,
6 and your answer is yes because your legal position is that FISA
7 occupies the field, that the president has no remaining power
8 in the face of FISA except for certain exigent circumstances
9 that are so narrowly drawn and unique that under no
10 circumstances can what the president and General Hayden and
11 Attorney General Gonzales said in characterizing this program,
12 under no circumstances could be that; that's your position.

13 MR. AVERY: And there's another reason why my answer
14 is yes, which is that if we look at the other cases where this
15 kind of issue has been drawn, it's been resolved without
16 looking at that level of detail. The steel seizure case, for
17 example. The steel seizure case was resolved without asking,
18 how many bullets do we have left, how many more people will be
19 killed if there's a strike, how long will the steel mills be
20 shut down, I mean, how long does it take to get them going
21 again once they're shut down. None of those questions were
22 addressed. And the answers wouldn't have been trivial. We
23 lost 35,000 people in Korea. The total casualties were almost
24 a million. So it wasn't that it didn't matter. It's that the
25 court said, we're going to answer this on the basis of first

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 principles, not on the basis of how it's going to work out in
2 this particular case. Same thing in Keith.

3 THE COURT: Because you're saying, as you said -- I
4 guess we're getting to the point of repetition. That's the
5 case they should make to Congress then. If President Truman
6 had wanted to go back to Congress and say, give me the power
7 because I'll have a confidential briefing with the intelligence
8 committee and tell them that we're running out of bullets and
9 we're losing this many men and so on and so forth, and then
10 Congress could authorize it if they agree.

11 MR. AVERY: And that's precisely what Justice Burger
12 and the other justices said he should have done and that's what
13 we're saying he should do here.

14 THE COURT: All right. I think I understand the
15 parties' positions. If anybody has two minutes that they think
16 I need to hear, I'm prepared to hear either side.

17 Mr. Coppolino, is there anything else that needs to be
18 said?

19 MR. COPPOLINO: I just wanted to close with a
20 procedural point, your Honor, perhaps less dramatically than I
21 would otherwise, and that is that --

22 THE COURT: Well, I hope you've learned I'm not
23 interested in the drama.

24 MR. COPPOLINO: That's why I'm not doing it.

25 THE COURT: Fair enough.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 MR. COPPOLINO: I think, you know, you raised a lot of
2 very interesting questions today, and we tried to answer them
3 as best we can. We think our motion to dismiss is well founded
4 and it should be granted, quite obviously. If you're not sure
5 about that or if you indeed disagree with that, and while
6 upholding the claim of privilege don't necessarily think the
7 case needs to be dismissed, I'd ask that you'd at least stop
8 there before turning to an actual adjudication of the merits on
9 plaintiffs' summary judgment motion because we would like an
10 opportunity to at least react to your reasoning, see if there
11 is some way to proceed and, if not, what other options might be
12 available to us. So rather than replicate the situation which
13 happened in Detroit where the court just rushed to judgment
14 without actually telling us why she was doing it in the face
15 of -- even though she upheld our state secrets claim, proceeded
16 immediately to the merits, we think that was not appropriate
17 and we'd just ask you if you would give us that opportunity
18 after you've ruled to assess the matter further.

19 THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand what you're
20 asking. The way I've been formulating the questions to
21 people -- and I certainly can't say I've thought any of this
22 through to resolution and I will do so and then you'll get it
23 in the written form that people usually get things from judges.
24 But the way I've been formulating the questions I think has
25 signaled a belief that the merits and the state secrets issue

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 are somewhat intertwined in the sense that, depending on what
2 the legal principles are, the state secrets privilege has
3 greater or lesser bite. If, for example, the conclusion -- I'm
4 just hypothesizing a few things. If the conclusion were the
5 authorization for use of force resolution repeals FISA and
6 authorizes the president to do this and we then have to reach a
7 Fourth Amendment issue, it seems to me that the state secrets
8 issue has a lot more clout as addressed to the question of what
9 would I have to do to decide whether it's reasonable as a
10 Fourth Amendment matter for this to happen.

11 With respect to the standing issue, it may be that the
12 issue of the plaintiffs' standing could be resolved in a way
13 favorable to the government, for example, without addressing
14 any state secrets issue and maybe, although I think there have
15 been a number of interesting questions raised about that, maybe
16 it could be resolved on certain theories, if I accepted them,
17 favorable to the plaintiff without there being so much bite to
18 the state secret issue.

19 So when you say addressing the merits, I think what
20 you're asking is, whatever legal framework I might think is
21 appropriate to the case, if I think the case does not need to
22 be dismissed, you are asking for an opportunity on behalf of
23 the government to make a potentially -- if you decided it was
24 wise, a second summary judgment submission that might address
25 more facts if it seemed appropriate, or something like that,

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

6951CENC

Oral Argument

1 that I haven't got yet?

2 MR. COPPOLINO: Correct. I'm asking that you not
3 decide their summary judgment motion on the merits and that you
4 allow the government to react to whatever you do decide. As
5 you say, it may be dismissal, but if it's not dismissal, that
6 we then have the opportunity to respond further before we go to
7 judgment. And I'll --

8 THE COURT: Or -- and I think I understand exactly
9 what you're saying and it's just a matter of quibbling. I just
10 want to make sure I understand it. That before entering some
11 final judgment, because I have no idea at this point how I'm
12 going to come out on this, and I'm not going to make a
13 precommitment that it might not be to conclude as a matter of
14 law that on the papers before me the plaintiffs seemed to be
15 correct on everything. Suppose I found that, that you're
16 asking, even under those circumstances, that I not enter a
17 judgment or an injunction or anything dramatic until you've had
18 a chance to react to that. And if I point to anything less
19 than that they're right on everything else, that it might well
20 be that it necessitates, as a matter of my analysis, that you
21 have such an opportunity. But I think that's what I'm hearing
22 you saying.

23 MR. COPPOLINO: That is what I'm saying. And just so
24 it's clear, at this stage of the proceedings and where the
25 different motions line up, we just thought it was untenable to

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1 expect us to both assert privilege and to respond to summary
2 judgment where the issue of what evidence is and is not at play
3 isn't resolved, that we would either have to defend the merits
4 without facts that we think are classified or declassified
5 facts, which we wouldn't do. That's why the summary judgment
6 at this posture we thought was simply not appropriate or the
7 logical way to proceed.

8 So all I'm asking is, as you have outlined that you
9 may agree with us and dismiss the case or do something along
10 that continuum, but certainly, if there's going -- let us react
11 to what you do before we proceed to a merits adjudication.
12 That's all.

13 THE COURT: Okay. And again, depending on what you
14 mean by merits adjudication, I think we're in agreement or at
15 least I'm in agreement that there are many circumstances, maybe
16 all, in which it would be appropriate to give the government an
17 opportunity to respond, including, but not exclusively, by
18 declassifying certain information that might be necessary to
19 respond. But I'm not bargaining about this. You'll decide
20 what you have to do --

21 MR. AVERY: Yes.

22 THE COURT: -- in response to whatever the Court's
23 ruling is. And I take it that other than the general sense of
24 urgency, the plaintiffs don't really have an objection to that,
25 at least if Mr. Coppolino's request is interpreted to encompass

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Oral Argument

1 the possibility that I say, gee, you guys seem to be right
2 about everything but I'll give them one last shot to tell us
3 what's really going on here if they choose to.

4 MR. AVERY: Well, their motion for a stay of our
5 summary judgment motion was denied.

6 THE COURT: Denied, I know, and they passed on the
7 opportunity to provide, even ex parte, even on a classified
8 basis, a further summary judgment request. But --

9 MR. AVERY: And we are talking about, you know, the
10 important rights of our clients. So I'm not --

11 THE COURT: You're not waiving anything, okay. But
12 I'm telling you --

13 MR. AVERY: I can read the handwriting on the wall.

14 THE COURT: Yes. You know, these are matters of great
15 importance.

16 MR. AVERY: Of course.

17 THE COURT: And I don't think they should be decided
18 on the strength of some notion of favor or some notion that the
19 time for the government to do this was last week. If,
20 hypothetically, they were to come in and say, see, here's what
21 the program really is and you have nothing to fear and you were
22 to hypothetically look at it and say, yeah, you're right, we
23 have nothing to fear but fear itself and we're all on board at
24 that point and the case goes away, that might have terrible
25 consequences because they are now disclosing something or

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Oral Argument

1 whatever, but, you know, certainly I shouldn't be enjoining the
2 president of the United States from doing something if, under
3 some hypothetical set of circumstances, they can come forward
4 and make another presentation.

5 MR. AVERY: I'm not pressing some absurd procedural
6 position.

7 THE COURT: Okay. Then I think I understand what
8 Mr. Coppolino is requesting and I think at this point I can
9 take all of these motions under advisement. And thank you all
10 very much.

11 MR. AVERY: You were going to give --

12 THE COURT: That's right. You didn't get your chance
13 to make your either dramatic or undramatic request.

14 MR. AVERY: Well, I know you don't like drama so I'll
15 just say this, which is that I think our position can be summed
16 up very simply, both with regard to the state secrets argument
17 and with regard to the merits of the case, and that's the
18 position that balancing the need for security against the
19 protection of civil liberties is not something that our
20 constitutional system entrusts to unilateral decision-making by
21 the executive, or, as Justice Powell put it in Keith, the
22 Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of
23 the government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. And
24 that's what I think the core of this case is.

25 Not just to make a rhetorical point but, I mean, if

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Oral Argument

1 Alexander Hamilton were alive, he'd be here listening to this
2 argument. This is the central issue of American government.
3 And that's our point of view on that.

4 THE COURT: Okay. Point taken. Again, I thank
5 everyone. I think it has been a very informative and wonderful
6 argument, really, conducted at a very high level of intellect
7 and also at a level of dispassion that I think reflects
8 wonderfully on the bar and on all the lawyers who have
9 participated because these are intensely emotional issues,
10 they're very important issues, they're issues that have what I
11 call an ideological underlay that goes back to the founding of
12 the republic and different attitudes about our Constitution
13 that have existed throughout that period. And anyone would be
14 blind not to recognize that there are significant political
15 overtones to any decision the Court makes in the sense of how
16 the public may react to those decisions, but I think that the
17 way the parties have conducted themselves this afternoon
18 demonstrates that the law can get past that political set of
19 overtones, that there may be no getting past the sort of poor
20 decisions about how our institutions of government work, and
21 there are different philosophies about that that surely infuse
22 every position of everybody in this matter. But certainly this
23 argument has demonstrated that we can conduct that discussion
24 in a way that is independent of the partisan politics of the
25 moment, and I very much thank counsel for that way of

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1 proceeding.

2 Decision will be reserved. And thank you very much.

3 MR. AVERY: Thank you, your Honor.

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